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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



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<-f:f(/o^j^..\^.:. fUen. 



A SYSTEM 



INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



BY EEV. ASA MAHAN, 

FIEBT FBESIQEMT OF CLEVELAND TINITXESITT 



"How charming is divine Philosophy 1 
Not harsh, and crabhed, as dull fools suppose^ 
But musical as is Apollo's lute. 
And a perpetual feast of nectared sweets^ 
"Where no rude surfeit reigns." 



EETISED AHD ENLAEGED FEOM THE SEOOND EDITION, 



NEW YORK: 
A. S. BARNES & CO., 51 JOHN-STREET! 

CINCINNATI:— H.W. DERBY. 

1857. 






1-^716 



Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1854, by 

ASA MAHAN, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, for 

the Southern District of the State of New York. 




WILLIAM H. 8HAIN & CO., 
eTEB£OITP£BS, HUDSON, OHIO. 



DEDICATORY PREFACE 
TO THE FIRST EDITION. 



The following Treatise presents the sum of a course of 
Lectures, which, for six or eight years past, I have been in 
the habit of delivering to successive classes, on the subject of 
Intellectual Philosophy. One thing I may say in relation to 
this subject, without boasting. No class have yet passed 
through this course, without becoming deeply interested in the 
science of Mental Philosophy; and, in their judgment, re- 
ceiving great benefit from the truths developed, as well as from 
the method of development which was adopted. Hence the 
desire has been very generally expressed by those who have 
attended the course of instruction, as well as by others who 
have become acquainted with the general features of the sys- 
tem taught, to have it presented to the public in a foi-m 
adapted to popular reading. In conformity to such sugges- 
tions, as well as the permanent convictions of my own mind, 
the following Treatise has been prepared. In preparing it, it 
has been my aim to reject light from no source whatever from 
which it could be obtained, and at the same time to maintain 
the real prerogative of manly independence of thojight. The 
individuals to whom I feel most indebted as a philosopher, are 
Coleridge, Cousin, and Kant — three luminaries of the first 
order in the sphere of philosophy. How far proper discrimi- 
1 



VI DEDICATORY PKEFAOE. 

nations have been made in the study of their -works, the reader 
will be able to judge. With these remarks, I would simply 
add, that 

To THE BELOVED AND HONORED PUPILS, WHO HAVE 
HITHERTO PASSED FROM UNDER MY INSTRUCTION AS A 
TEACHER OF MeNTAL SCIENCE, THE FOLLOWING TREATISE 
IS NOW AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED, WITH THE EXPRES- 
SION OF THE FOND HOPE, THAT IN ALL FUTURE CLASSES, 
WHICH IT MAY BE MY PRIVILEGE TO INSTRUCT, I MAY, IN 
THE LANGUAGE OP ANOTHER, " FIND THE SAME LOVE OF 
PHILOSOPHY, AND THE SAME INDULGENCE TO THE PRO- 
FESSOR." 



PREFATORY NOTE 

TO THE REVISED EDITION. 



Since the publication of the first edition of this work, the 
author has had the benefit resulting from successive years in 
teaching the same, and of a careful reading of other -works 
upon the same subject. In this manner, he has been enabled 
to perceive defects that needed correction in the work, as first 
presented. The work is now given to the public, as the result 
of his mature reflections upon this fundamental science. Some 
of the most important chapters have been so entirely rewritten 
and remodeled, as to render the present, in some important 
respects, a new work on Intellectual philosophy. I may no- 
tice, among others, the chapter on Sense, the examination of 
the true as distinguished from false systems of Philosophy, in 
the chapter on Miscellaneous Topics, and the development of 
the evidence of the being and perfections of Grod, in the last 
chapter. The author has always been fully persuaded of the 
correctness of his views in respect to external perception, but 
has felt a growing dissatisfaction with his manner of presenting 
the subject, in the chapter referred t©. In the present edition, 
this subject, so fundamental to a right system of mental sci- 
ence, is so presented as to meet his ideas in most, if not all 
respects. One of the great wants of the age is a fundamental 
examination of false systems of Philosophy, as developed in 



Vm PREFATORY NOTE. 

Materialism, and in the various forms of Idealism, as distin- 
guished from the true system. This he has attempted, and, as 
it appears to him, accomplished, in the chapter on Miscellane- 
ous Topics. The improvements made, in presenting the topic 
last named, will be appreciated, we think, by all who carefully 
read the chapter in which they appear. It has been the aim 
of the author to give to the public a work, on this great sci- 
ence, which should meet the fundamental philosophic wants of 
the age. As such an attempt, he commends his production to 
the careful study of all who would understand this science. 

I close with a suggestion to teachers who may introduce 
this work to their pupils as a text-book. No system of ques- 
tions is here proposed. Each topic has a heading, however, 
which gives the subject-matter therein developed. My own 
method of teaching has always been, to read to the class this 
heading, and then require the student to state, in his own 
words, the subject-matter contained in the topic referred to. 
Two benefits result to the pupil by this mode of teaching : 
1. He is made to understand the subject much better than he 
can by any system of questions. 2. He acquires the import- 
ant habit of first forming distinct conceptions of a subject be- 
fore speaking, and then of clothing his thoughts in appropriate 
language. Much higher and more perfect forms of mental 
discipline are acquired by this mode of teaching, than by any 
other which we have ever tried. 

Cleveland, Ohio, August 1854. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. , PAGE 

INTRODUCTION. 

Classification of the Sciences — Object of Mental Philosophy — 
What is to be expected from such Investigations — Mental Phi- 
losophy, as a Science, possible — The Method in conformity to 
■which Psychological Reseai'ches should be conducted — The 
above the only Psychological Method — Utility of this Science 
— State of Mind requisite to a successful prosecution of this 
Science 1-12 

CHAPTER II. 
CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND POWERS. 

Mental Faculties indicated by the phenomena above classified — 
Object of Mental Philosophy — Meaning of the words Mental 
Faculties 13-16 



CHAPTER III. 



PHENOMENA OF THE INTELLIGENCE. 

Principle of Classification — Contingent and n£cessary Phenom- 
ena of Thought defined. 



CONTENTS. 



IDEAS OF BODY AND SPACE, 
Idea of Body contingent — Idea of Space necessary — Other 
characteristics of these two Ideas — Idea of Body relative — 
Idea of Space absolute — Idea of Body implies that of Limit- 
ation — Idea of Space implies the absence of Limitation — Idea 
of Body, a sensible representation — Idea of Space a pure ra- 
tional conception. 

IDEAS OF SUCCESSION, AND TIME, OR DURATION. 
Idea of Succession contingent — The Idea of Time necessary — 
Other characteristics of these Ideas. 

IDEAS OF THE FINITE AND OF THE INFINITE. 
Remarks of Locke — Characteristics of these Ideas — Idea of 
Finite contingent and relative ; that of the Infinite necessary 
and absolute. 

IDEAS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND PERSONAL IDENTITY 
Idea of Mental Phenomena contingent and relative — Idea of 
Personal Identity necessary — Necessary ideas distinguished 
as conditional and unconditional. 

IDE.^S OF PHENOMENA AND SUBSTANCE. 
Idea of substance explained — Idea of Phenomena contingent 
and relative — that of Subs^tance necessary — Our ideas of 
Substance not obscure, but clear and distinct. 

IDEAS OF EVENTS AND CAUSE. 
The idea of events contingent ajid relative ; that of Cause nec- 
essary — Theory of Dr. Brown and others — Observations on 
Mr. I)ugald Stewart. 

IDEA OF POWER. 
Conclusion of the present Analysis '... 17-37 



CHAPTER IV. 
APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS. 

LOGICAL AND CHRONOLOGIC.'IL ORDER OF IDEAS. 

Logical order — Chronological order. 

PRIMARY INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES PRE-SUPPOSED BY THE 

PRECEDING ANALYSIS. 
These Faculties why called Primary — Also called Intuitive Fac- 
ulties — Relation of Primitive Intuitive Faculties to each. 



other — Importance of the Truths ahove elucidated — Classi- 
fication of Intellectual Phenomena given by Kant 38-46 



CHAPTER V. 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Consciousness Defined — Self-Consciousness conditioned on Rea- 
son, but not a function of Pieason — Natural, or spontaneous, 
and Philosophical, or reflective Consciousness — Process of 
classification and Generalization in Reflection, illustrated — 
Functions of Consciousness — Necessity of relying implicitly 
upon the testimony of Consciousness — Consciousness, a dis- 
tinct function or faculty of the Intellect — Theory of Dr. 
Brown — Meaning of the term Consciousness as employed by 
Sir William Hamilton 47-59 



CHAPTER VI. 



SENSE. 

To be distinguished from Sensation — Spontaneous and volun- 
tary determination of Sense — Mental process in Perception 
— Objects of Perception — Common and Philosophic doubts 
in respect to the comparative validity of the afiirmations of 
Sense and Consciousness — The province of Philosophy — 
Comparative validity of the afiirmations of Sense and Con- 
sciousness — True theory of external Perception — Theory 
verified — The above Theory verified as a truth of Science — 
Qualities of Matter: Primary qualities, Secundo-primary 
qualities, and Secondary qualities — What these qualities are 
in general — Representative and Presentative Knovyledge — 
True theory of Perception stated and verified — False theo- 
ries of external perception : The Scholastic Theory ; The 
Cosmothetic Theory, and the Idealistic Theories — Reasons 
for the Idealistic Theories — Objections to these Theories — 
Hypothesis, that all our knowledge of Matter is derived 
through Sensation exclusively, the main source of error in 
Philosophy — Explanation given by Kant and the Transcend- 
ental School generally of the fact of Sense-perception — 
Is color a primary or secondary quality of Matter? — Valid- 
ity of our knowledge of the Non-Ego or Matter — Conclu- 
sion of the present Exposition 60-107 



CHAPTER VII. 



SECONDARY FACULTIES. 

rNDEnSTANDINQ. 

Notions Particular and General. 

ELEMENTS OF WHICH NOTIONS ARE CONSTITUTED. 
Contingent Elements — Necessary Elements : Substance and 
Cause the fundamental elements of all Notions — Evolution 
of these Laws not Arbitrary — I. Time and Space — Errors 
of Kant: 1. In respect to the relation of Phenomena and 
Noumena to Time and Space — 2. Relation of the ideas of 
Time and Space to Phenomena — II. Identity ^and Diversity, 
Resemblance and DiflFerence — III. The idea of a Whole, as 
including its parts, or Parts, in reference to the Whole — 
Kant's Antinomy of Pure Reason — IV. The Category of 
Quantity — The Category of Quantity distinct from that pre- 
viously considered — V. Of Quality — VI. Of Relation — 
VII. Of Modality — VIII. The Idea of Law — Conceptions 
as distinguished from Notions — A Fact often attending Per- 
ception — Mistake of Mr. Stewart — Notions and Concep- 
tions charaterized as complete or incomplete, true or false — 
Mistake of Coleridge in respect to the Understanding 10&-125 

CHAPTER VIII. 

FACULTY OP JUDGMENT. 

Abstraction — Abstract Notions, what, and how formed? — 
General Notions, how formed. 

CLASSIFICATION. 
Forms of Classification — Classification, in what sense arbi- 
trary — Genera and Species. 

GENERALIZATION. 
Rules in respect to Generalization — The term General some- 
times used in a limited sense. 

GENERAL TERMS. 
Theory of the Realists — Theory of the Nominalists — The- 
ory of the Conceptualists. 

UNDERSTANDING AND JUDGMENT DISTINGUISHED. 
Distinction between the Understanding and Judgment veri- 
fied — Observations of Kant — Pielations of the Under- 
etanding and Judgment 126-138 



CONTENTS. Xm 

CHAPTER IX. 

ASSOCIATION. 

Term defined — Term Association, why preferred — The Asso- 
ciating Principle not without law — Law of Association sta- 
ted and defined — The present Hypothesis, when established 
as the Law of Association — A priori Argument — All the 
Phenomena referred to the commonly received Laws, can be 
explained on this Hypothesis — Phenomena exist which can 
be accounted for on this, and on no other Hypothesis — 
Those falling under the relation of Analogy — Phenome- 
na of Dreaming — Phenomena of Somnambulism — Facts 
connected with particular Diseases — This Hypothesis es- 
tablished and illustrated, by reflecting upon the facts of As- 
sociation — Argument summarily stated — Explanatory Re- 
marks — Reasons why different objects excite similar 
feelings in our Jlinds — Application of the Principles above 
illustrated — Ground of the Mistake of Philosophers in re- 
spect to the Laws of Association — Action of the Associa- 
ting Principle in different Individuals — Influence of Habit 

— Standards of Taste and Fashion — Vicissitudes in re- 
spect to such Standards — Peculiarities of Genius associa- 
ted with .Judgment, or correct Taste — Influence of Wri- 
ters and Speakers of splendid Genius, but incorrect Taste 

— Danger of Vicious Associations — Unrighteous Prejudi- 
ces, how justified — Giving Individuals a bad Name, spread- 
ing false Reports, &c. — Influence of the Associating Prin- 
ciple in perpetuating existing mental Characteristics 139-161 



CHAPTER X. 
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. 

Terms defined — States of Mind entering into and connected 
with these Processes — The above statement verified — Prin- 
ciple on which Objects are remembered with Ease and Dis- 
tinctness — Deep and distinct Impressions, on what condi- 
tioned — Diversity of Powers of Memory, as developed in 
different Individuals — Philosophic Memory — Local Mem- 
ory — Artificial Memory. 

MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 
A ready and retentive Memory — The vast and diverse 
Power of Memory possessed by different Individuals — Im- 
provement of Memory — Memory of the Aged — Duration 

of Memory 161-172 

2 



X17 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XI. 

IMAGINATION. 

Definitions of distinguished Philosophers — Objections to the 
above Definitions — Another definition proposed — Imagi- 
nation and Fancy distingiiished — Another Definition of the 
term Fancy. 

IMAGINATION AND FANCY ELUCIDATED. 
Preliminary Remarks — Elucidation. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CREATIONS OF THE IMAGINATION. 

1. Elements of Diverse Scenes blended into one Whole — 

2. Blending the Diverse — 3. Blending Opposites — 4. 
Blending things in their Nature alike — 5. Combining Num- 
bers into Unity, and dissolving and separating Unity into 
Number — G. Adding to, or abstracting some Quality from, 
an object — 7. Blending with external objects the Feelings 
which they excite in us — 8. Abstracting certain Charac- 
teristics of Objects, and blending them into Harmony with 
some leading Idea — 9. Throwing the fleeting Thoughts, 
Sentiments, and Feelings, of our past Existence, into one 
beautiful Conception. 

REMARKS ON THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS. 
Remark of Coleridge. 

CREATIONS OF THE IMAGINATION, WHY NOT ALWAYS FICTIONS. 
Sphere of the Imagination not confined to Poetry — Law of 
Taste relative to the Action of the Imagination. 

IMAGINATION THE ORGAN OP IDEALS. 

Idea defined — Ideal defined — Ideals, Particular and Gen- 
eral — Ideals not confined to Ideas of the Beautiful, the 
Grand, and the Sublime — Ideals not fixed and changeless, 
like Ideas — Ideals the Foundation of Mental Progress — 
Ideals in the Divine and Human Intelligence. 

ACTION OF THE JUDGMENT RELATIVE TO THAT OF THE 
IMAGINATION. 

Taste defined — Productions of the Imagination when not 
regulated by correct Judgment or good Taste. 



PRODUCTIONS IN WHICH THE ACTION OF THE PANCY OR IMAG- 
INATION IS MOST CONSPICUOUS. 

COMBINATIONS OF THOUGHT DENOMINATED WIT, AS DISTIN- 
GUISHED FROM THOSE RESULTING FROM THE PROPER AC- 
TION OF THE IMAGINATION OR FANCY. 
Bombast — Burlesque — Sarcasm. 

PROPRIETY OF USING THE IMAGINATION AND FANCY IN WORKS 
OF FICTION. 

False idea in respect to the Influence of Familiarity Tvitli the 
popular Fictitious Y/ritings of the Day — Imagination and 
Fancy — How improved 173-213 



CHAPTER Xn. 
REASON. 

Reason defined — Coleridge's Characteristics of Reason as dis- 
tinguished from the Understanding. 

Secondary Ideas of Reason — Idea of Eight and Wrong. 

This Idea exists in all Minds in which Reason is developed — 
Idea of Right and Wrong necessary — Ideas dependent on 
that of Plight and Wrong, &c. — Chronological Antecedent 
to the Idea of Right and Wrong, &c. 

Idea of Fitness. 
This Idea synonymous with Right and Wrong, &c. 

Idea of the Useful, or the Good. 
The Summum Bonum. 

Relations of the Ideas of Right and Wrong, and of the Useful, to 
each other. 
This purely a Psychological Question — Nature of Virtue — 
Happiness a Phenomenon of the Sensibility — Relation of 
Willing to Happiness — Conclusion necessarily resulting 
From the Facts above stated — Argument Expanded — Ad- 
ditional Considerations — Argument stated in view of an- 
other Example — Result of the Discussion thus far — Other 
important Considerations — The above Argument of Uni- 
versal Application — Obligation not affirmed in view of the 
subjective Tendencies of Right or Wrong Willing — Another 
General Consideration — Mutable Actions. 



XVI CONTENTS. 

Ideas of Liberty and Necessity. 
Ideas defined — These Ideas Universal and Necessary — 
Idea of Liberty realized only in the action of the Will — 
Chronological Antecedents of these Ideas. 

Idea of the Beautiful and Sublime. 
Opinions of Philosophers — Considerations indicating the 
existence in the Mind of Ideas of Reason, designated by the 
terms Beautiful and Sublime — Objection to the Universal- 
ity of these Ideas — Chronological Antecedent of these 
Ideas — Illustration from Cousin — Explanatory Remarks. 

Idea of Harmony — Reflections. 
Mind constituted according to fundamental Ideas — Poetry 
defined. 

Idea of Truth. 
Idea defined — Chronological Antecedent of this Idea. 

Idea of Law. 
Coleridge's Definition of Law — Law, Subjective and Object- 
ive — Conclusion from the above — Chronological Antece- 
dent to this Idea — Apparent Mistake in respect to Law — 
Theory and Law distinguished — Natui-e of Proof — Funda- 
mental and superficial Thinkers. 

The Fhilosophic Idea. 
Chronological Antecedent of this Idea. 

First Truths, or Necessary Principles of Reason, as distinguished from 

Contingent Principles. . 

Contingent and Necessary Principles defined and distin- "* 

guished — First Truths defined — Kind of Proof of which i 

Necessary Ideas or Principles admit — Statement illustrated 1 

by a Reference to the Idea of God — Idea and Principle of '. 

Reason distinguished — Axioms, Postulates, and Definitions. i 

Idea of Science, Pure and Mixed. j 

Idea of Science defined — Pure Sciences — Mixed Sciences. 

Function of Reason denominated Conscience. < 

Conscience defined — General Remarks — Objection — Term j 

Conscience as used in the Scriptures. 

General Remarks pertaining to Reason. 
Relation of Reason to other Intellectual Faculties — Through 
Reason Man is a Religious Being — Reason common to all 
Men — Error of Coleridge — Paralogism of Cousin — Trans- 
cendentalism — Reason, in what sense Impersonal — Rea- 
8on, in what sense identical in all Men 214-269 



CUiNTKxNTS. XVU 

CHAPTER XIII. 
RECAPITULATION, AVITH ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS. 

Intellectual Faculties enumerated — Influence of the above 
Distinctions — Errors of Kant — Classification of the Pri- 
mary Mental Faculties. 

Remarks upon the Relations of Intuitions to one another. 
Intuitions cannot be opposed to each other — Different Intu- 
ition Faculties cannot contradict each other — The logical 
Consequents of no one Intuition can be in opposition to any 
primary Intuition, nor to the logical Consequents of the 
same — Error of Kant and Coleridge. 

Secondary Faculties. 
Understanding — The Judgment — The Associating Princi- 
ple — Imagination 270-282 

CHAPTER XIV. 

SPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS OP THE 
INTELLIGENCE. 

General characteristics of all Objects of Knowledge, and of 
our Knowledge of the same — Distinct Apprehension condi- 
tioned on Attention — Spontaneous Development of the In- 
telligence — Characteristics of this Spontaneity — Charac- 
teristics Illustrated. 

Additional Remarks and Illustrations. 
Categories of Spontaneous and ReflectiTC Reason — Rela- 
tion of Observation and Reflection to this original Spontane- 
ity — Confidence reposed in the first Truths of Reason, how 
weakened — Use of the Common Demonstrations of the 
Divine Existence — Conclusions arrived at by a process of 
Reasoning, when false — Reasons of the Diversity and Dif- 
ference of the opinions of Men — Sources of Error 283—292 



CHAPTER XV. 



ORIGIN OP IDEAS. 

The two Schools in Philosophy — Principles of Locke — The- 
ory of Kant — Principles of Locke tested with reference to 
Necessary Ideas — Principles of Locke fail in respect to 
2* 



XVm CONTENTS. 

Understanding-conceptions — Error of Kant — Position of 
Kant ti'ue in respect to Understanding-conceptions and Af- 
firmations of the Judgment. 

True Explanation. 
Intuitions — Notions — The Judgment — Associating Prin- 
ciple and the Imagination — Scientific Movement. 

Manner in which the General, Abstract, and Universal, are eliminated 

from the Concrete and Particular. 
General Notions — Abstract Notions — Universal and Neces- 
sary Ideas — Error of Cousin 29S-304 

CHAPTER XVI. 

LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 

Investigation and Reasoning distinguished — Substances, how 
known — Induction of Phenomena, for what purposes made 
— Induction pertaining to particular Substances — Induc- 
tion for purposes of Classification into Genera and Species — 
Finding a General Fact, or Order of Sequence — The prob- 
able and Improbable — Order of Sequence — The Discovery 
of Universal Law. 

TesHmonr/. 
Characteristics of the Statements made by a Witness — Cir- 
cumstances which go to establish the Credibility of a Wit- 
ness — Corroborating Circumstances aside from the Charac- 
ter of the witness — Concurrent Testimony 305-815 

CHAPTER XVII. 

REASONING. 

The Syllogism the universal Form of Reasoning — The above 
Principle verified — Forms in which the Major Premise ap- 
pears — Principles which lie at the Basis of all Conclusions 
from a Process of Reasoning — Remarks upon these Princi- 
ples — Remarks on Aristotle's Dictum. 

Different kinds of Reasoning. 
Distinctions elucidated — Distinction between Demonstra- 
tive and Probable Reasoning — Common Impression in re- 
spect to the extent of Demonstrative Reasoning — Method 
of Proof — Real Proof found in jao other Method — Sources 
of Fallacies in Reasoning, 



I 



CONJ?ENTS. 



Conception of Logic. 
All Things occm* according to Rules — Logic defined — Re- 
lations of Logic to other Sciences 316-330 



CHAPTER XVIII. 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 



The bearing of the Philosophy of Locke upon Science, prop- 
erly so called. 

Kant's distinction between Analytical and Synthetical 
Judgments — Analytical and SyntheticalJudgments defined 
and distinguished — Consequences which Kant deduced 
from the Judgments as defined by himself — Error of Kant 
in defining and applying these Distinctions. 

True and False Systems of Philosophy. 
Criterion or Tests by which we can distinguish the True 
from all False Systems — Theory of Realism : This Theory 
verified — Materialism: Conditions on which the Material 
Hypothesis ciin be sustained : Objections to Materialism — 
Systems of Idealism — Ideal Dualism : What are Realities 
according to this System — Remarks on tliis System — Sub- 
jective Idealism: System stated: Remarks upon this Sys- 
tem — Pantheism or the System of Absolute Identity: El- 
ements and characteristics of the system : Remarks upon 
this System — Pure Idealism : System stated: General Re- 
marks upon the Systems — General Remarks upon Idealism. 

Modern Transcendentalism. 
Eclecticism of Cousin : System stated : Remarks upon this 
system — Common Sense Defined — Common Sense a stand- 
ard of Truth — Philosophic Principles, why rejected by the 
mass of Mankind — Dictates of Common Sense, how known 
and distinguished — Characteristics of Men distinguished 
for Common Sense SBl-dOi 

CHAPTER XIX. 

THE INTELLIGENCE OP MAN AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT 
OF THE BRUTE. 

Brute Instincts classified — Manifestations of Instinctive In- 
telligence — Principle on which the Argument is based — 
Points of Resemblance between the Man and the Brute — 
Hypotheses on which these common Pacts may be Explain- 



ed — Points of Dissimilarity between Man and the Brute — 

Facts applied — General Remarks 405-422 

CHAPTER XX. 

MATTER AND SPIRIT. 

Principles on -which the Argument is based — Principles ap- 
plied — Common Objections 423-426 

CHAPTER XXI. 

IMMORTALITY OP THE SOUL. 

Preliminary Considerations — Principles on ■which the Argu- 
ment is based — Direct Argument — Future Retiibutions... 427-436 

CHAPTER XXII. 

THE IDEA or GOD. 

Preliminary Considerations — God the Unconditioned Cause of 
all that exists Conditionally — Possible Hypothesis on this 
subject — None but the Theistic Hypothesis can be true — 
The Theistic Hypothesis established as a truth of Science 
— Attributes necessarily implied in the idea of the Uncon- 
ditioned — Atti'ibutes of the Unconditioned necessarily sup- 
posed in the facts of the Universe — Facts of Creation bearing 
upon our present inquiries — The Theistic Hypothesis intu- 
itively certain from these Facts — Truth of this Hypothesis 
more particularly developed — Does Creation indicate the 
character of God as Infinite and Perfect — God, the Infinite 
and Perfect — This a first Truth of Reason — Reason -why 
these elements have not yet been designated — Foundation 
of the conviction that God is both Infinite and Perfect — 
Relation of the idea of God, above elucidated, to all other 
ideas of Him — The idea of a system of Theology — Postu- 
late, Axioms, &c., in Theology — Kind of Proof pertaining 
to each j^articular Attribute — This Science to be evolved in 
the light of the Works of God, Material and Mental, and of 
the teachings of Inspiration — Theology, Natural and Re- 
vealed — DiflFerence between a Mystery and Absurdity in 
Theology — Absurdity defined — Mystery defined — Myste- 
ry and Absurdity defined in another form — Fundamental 
characteristics of a real Revelation from God — Revealed 
Theology defined — Defects of Method in the common sys- 
tems of Theology — Use of the common Treatises on Natu- 
ral Theology — Conclusion 437-476 



INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



CHAPTER I. 

INTRODUCTION. 
CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 

All substances may be classified under two general divi- 
sions, Matter and Mind. This arrangement presents a twofold 
division of the sciences, to wit, Material, and Mental. 

OBJECT OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Mental Philosophy is the science of Mind, and of the 
human Mind in particular. Its object is a correct classification 
of the phenomena, for the purpose of a full and distinct de- 
velopment of the Powers, Susceptibilities, and Laws of the 
human Mind. This department of inquiry being completed, 
Mental Philosophy, as a science, then ascends to an investiga- 
tion of the wide field of Moral Obligation, for the purpose of 
developing the extent, limits, and grounds of human respon- 
sibility. 

WHAT IS TO BE EXPECTED FROM SUCH INVESTIGATIONS. 

The field before us is of almost boundless extent. We ai-e 
not, therefore, to expect, that any one treatise will present all 



2 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

that may be known of the human ]Mind. All that I hope to 
accomplish, is to introduce the inquire!" to the science, and 
give to his inquiines, in respect to it, a right direction. His 
own investigations will then lead him to exhaustless treasures 
of wisdom and knowledge. 

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, AS A SCIENCE, POSSIBLE. 

Every substance in existence is known, and can be known 
by us, through and only through its respective phenomena. 
This, with us, is the changeless condition of knowledge, in 
respect to all realities which lie around us iu the universe. 
Every power or substance in existence is knowable to us, so 
far only as we can know its phenomena. The question, then, 
whether Mental Philosophy is possible to us, depends wholly 
upon this, whether the Mind, in the action of its varied powers 
and susceptibilities, is so revealed to itself, that it can know 
its own operations or phenomena ? ' To this question, but one 
answer can be given. "VVe are so constituted, that we have a 
knowledge of whatever passes in the interior of our minds. 
This power, or law of our Mental Faculties, explain the fact in 
whatever manner we please, is denominated Consciousness, 
which is a faithful witness of whatever passes within us. On 
the authority of Consciousness, all men do and must rely. 
Here Skepticism it.self assumes the garb of positive fliith : for 
in the language of Descartes, "let a man doubt everything 
else, he cannot doubt that he doubts; " and "he cannot doubt 
that he doubts " for this reason, that he cannot but rely, in 
some form or other, upon the testimony 'of his own Con- 
ciousness. 

Not only are all things which pass within us given as phe- 
nomena of Consciousness, but we have also the power of re- 
taining these phenomena under the eye of the mind, until we 
have fully resolved them into their original elements, and 



INTRODUCTION. 3 

marked their ctaracteristics. This power or exercise of the 
mind is denominated reflection, and is conditioned on the Will. 
Mental Philosophy then becomes possible for the same 
reasons, and on the same conditions, that physical science, or 
Natural Philosophy is possible. Facts equally undeniable, 
and equally distinct and palpable, are given as the foundation 
of both sciences. All that is required in either instance, is, 
that our researches be conducted upon right principles — that 
we introduce into our investigations nothing but actual facts, 
— that these facts be correctly arranged and classified, — and 
that none but legitimate conclusions be drawn from them. 

THE METHOD IN CONFORMITY TO "WHICH PSYCHOLOGICAL 
RESEARCHES SHOULD BE CONDUCTED. 

Having shown that Mental Philosophy, as a science, 13 
possible, we will now contemplate the question in respect to 
the Method which should be adoJDted in conducting our inves- 
tigations. Every philosopher commences his inquiries in con- 
formity to a certain ideal of which he has conceived, and 
which he has assumed, as involving the most perfect method in 
conformity to which such investigations can be conducted. A 
remark of Cousin on this point demands special attention. 
" As is the method of a philosopher, so will be his system ; 
and the adoption of a method, decides the destiny of a philos- 
ophy." It becomes us, therefore, at the threshold of our 
inquiries, to stop, and with great care, determine the Method 
in conformity to which we are to investigate the powers, sus- 
ceptibilities, and laws of the mysterious substance before us. 
The following Principles I would propose as involving and 
announcing the true Method to be adopted : 

1. We should present to our own minds, with great dis- 
tinctness, the question, what are the facts which lie at the 
basis of all our conclusions in respect to this science; facta 



4 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

upon wliicli all legitimate conclusions do and must rest ? They 
are, as all must admit, the facts which lie under the eye of 
Consciousness. But what are these facts ? In other words, 
what are the sole and exclusive objects of Consciousness? 
Not, surely, as Cousin observes, the " external world, or its 
Creator — not the substance, nature, essence, or Faculties of 
the soul itself." They are the soul in its manifestations — in 
the exercise of its various Faculties. Upon these all our con- 
clusions in regard to the nature of these Faculties, as well as 
upon the nature of the soul itself, and of all other objects are 
based. As the sole basis of physical science, we have the 
phenomena of perception. As the basis of Psychology, we 
have the phenomena of Consciousness, and these only. As 
we know the mind only through its phenomena, or manifes- 
tations, so all legitimate conclusions in respect to it must 
be revealed and affirmed by these manifestations. Hence I 
remark, 

2. That in pursuing our investigations according to the 
true Psychological Method, we shall commence with no ques- 
tions in respect to the nature or essence of mind, whether it is 
material or immaterial, or in respect to its various powers, or 
functions, nor in respect to the origin of mental phenomena. 
All such questions are to be adjourned, until we have observed, 
characterized, and classified the phenomena, or operations, 
which now, in our present state of mental development, lie 
under the eye of Consciousness. The question, in regard to 
the origin of mental phenomena, involves, as its foundation 
and starting point, a knowledge of such phenomena as they 
now exist. Otherwise we are inquiring after the origin of 
that of the nature of which we are profoundly ignorant. So 
also, if, before we have attained this knowledge, we study and 
attempt the resolution of questions pertaining to the nature or 
essence of the mind, or in respect to its Faculties, we violate 



INTRODUCTION. 

the fundamental law of all correct philosopLizing, to wit : that 
substances are known and are to be studied only through 
their phenomena. The true Psychological Method does not 
neglect any legitimate questions in respect to ontology, or 
the origin of mental phenomena. It simply adjourns these, 
till another preliminary department of inquiry has been com- 
pleted. 

In pursuing our inquiries in respect to mental phenomena, 
and in respect to the characteristics of particular phenomena, 
two rules of fundamental importance present themselves, — • 
to wit : Suppose or assume, as real, nothing which does not 
exist — and omit, or disregard, nothing which does exist. 

3. The phenomena which lie under the eye of Conscious- 
ness clearly indicate a diversity of mental powers, or func- 
tions. In conformity to the true Psychological Method, a 
fundamental aim of the Mental Philosopher will be, to adopt 
those principles of classification by which these different powers 
or functions shall be distinctly revealed to the Mind. Two 
self-evident principles will guide him in determining the differ- 
ent powers or functions of the Mind. 1. Phenomena, in their 
fundamental characteristics alike, are to be attributed to one 
and the same Faculty. 2. Phenomena, in their fundamental 
characteristics unlike, suppose a diversity of powers or func- 
tions. Hence the vast importance of classification with exclu- 
sive reference to fundamental characteristics. 

4. Amid the endlessly diversified phenomena of Con- 
sciousness, there are, in the depths of the Mind, particular 
phenomena, which reveal the Laws which govern the action 
of the difterent mental powers. One of the principal aims 
of the Mental Philosopher, in conformity to a correct Psy- 
chological Method, will be, to fix upon, and develope those 
facts, or phenomena, by which the Laics of thought, feeling, 
and action, are revealed. No department of inquiry in the 

1* 



6 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

■wide field of Mental Science is of greater importance than 
this. 

5. Having, by careful reflection, and in conformity to cor- 
rect principles, ascertained, classified, and arranged the phe- 
nomena of the Mind, as they now lie under the eye of 
Consciousness, a correct Psychological Method would then lead 
us to move the important questions pertaining to the origin 
of these phenomena, to Ontology, and to the nature, extent, 
limits, and grounds of Moral Obligation. This completes the 
circle of investigations in the wide domain of Mental Science. 
Much will be done for Philosophy, if this circle is completed 
according to the method above developed. 

The above the onlj correct Psi/chohgical Method. 

A moment's reflection will convince us, that this is the 
philosojyhical, and I may add, the only philosophical Method. 
The powers of nature, external and internal, are known to 
us only in their manifestations, or through their respective 
phenomena. These manifestations must, of course, be known, 
or we must remain in total ignorance of the powers them- 
selves. 

This is the universal Method, the Method which lies at the 
basis of all real science pertaining to Matter or Mind. In 
pursuing our investigations in strict conformity to the princi- 
ples of this 3Iethod, we shall be conducted to no conjectural 
conclusions, but to certain knowledge; provided we have 
marked with correctness existing phenomena, and have pro- 
ceeded logically from the facts thus given, to our conclusions. 
It puts us, to say tbe least, upon the right road to knowledge. 
If we ''fall out by the way," the fault will be our own, and 
not that of the Method adopted. 

If we arrive at correct conclusions, we shall, also, in the 
light of the Method pursued, understand and be able to assign 



INTRODUCTION. 7 

the reasons for those conclusions, a most important attainment 
in the progress of mental development. If, on the other hand, 
we adopt any false conclusions, our Method itself presents the 
best means for their correction. No individual will long re- 
main in the embrace of any important error, who has adopted 
a correct method of investigation, and who rigidly adheres to 
the principles of that method. 

Utility of this Science. 

But little need be said to impress the inquirer with a con- 
viction of the importance of our present investigations. 

Mental Philosophy is the science of self-reflection. It 
teaches us to know ourselves, in our relations to God, and to 
the universe around us. 

The importance of this science may likewise be seen in 
the light of its relations to all other departments of human 
investigation. ''Whatever be the object of inquiry," says 
Cousin, " God or the world, beings the most near or remote, 
you neither know nor can know them, but upon one condition, 
namely, that you have the faculty of knowledge in general; 
and you neither possess nor can attain a knowledge of them 
except in proportion to your general faculty of knowledge. 
Whatever you attain a knowledge of, the highest or the lowest 
thing, your knowledge in the last result rests, both in respect 
to its extent and its legitimacy, upon the reach and validity 
of that faculty, by whatever name you call it, Spirit, Keason, 
Mind, Intelligence, Understandici^ * One of the first ast" 
great inquiries of man, then, is the nature, extent and limits 
of this faculty. This is Intellectual Philosophy. This is 
Psychology, a science, which indeed is not the whole of Phi- 
losophy, but " must be allowed to be its foundation and start- 
ing point." 

By developing the laws of human belief, and by habituating 



8 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the mind to contemplate and investigate causes through their 
respective phenomena, this science also furnishes a light, to 
guide our investigations in every other 'science, and presents 
the strongest possible motives to lead us onward. 

Nor is its connection with morality and religion less im- 
portant and influential. Indeed, here lies its chief importance. 
The development of the laws of evidence, will place in a clear 
light, the ground of our assent to the Divine authority of 
Christianity, so far as externa] evidence is concerned. A de- 
velopment of the powers and susceptibilities of the mind itself, 
will lead us to a correct understanding of the bearing of the 
internal evidence of Christianity. A development of the 
grounds of moral obligation will lead us to perceive distinctly, 
and to feel deeply, our obligation to obey the moral precepts 
of Christianity. Every truth, every principle and precept of 
Christianity, supposes some one or more faculties or suscepti- 
bilities of the mind, to which they are addressed. A distinct 
knowledge of these faculties and susceptibilities, places those 
truths and principles in the clearest possible light before the 
mind. 

One other consideration will show clearly the important 
bearing which our present inquiries have upon religion. The 
study of Mind, according to the Method above announced, 
implies, as its foundation and starting point, a careful investi- 
gation of mental phenomena. Among these phenomena, ideas 
occupy a very important place, and among the most funda- 
mental and important of all our ideas, are the conceptions of 
the infinite and perfect, that is, of God, of eternity, of immor- 
tality, of moral obligation, and of retribution. In developing 
the characteristics, origin and grounds of these ideas, we are 
determining our convictions in regard to many of the most 
important and fundamental truths of religion. We are mould- 
ing and forming convictions which will, and must determine 



INTRODUCTION. 9 

the meaning, wliicli we shall attach to the most important por- 
tions of the Sacred Volume itself. 

If we should appeal to facts, we should find the fullest 
verification of all that is said above. All the forms of corrupt 
Christianity which have appeared for the last eighteen centu- 
ries, all the false religions which have ever cursed the earth, all 
the forms of infidelity and skepticism, which the seathings of 
human depravity have, in any age, thrown upon the surface of 
society, have had their foundation in systems of false Philoso- 
phy. No maxim is more fully verified, by universal observa- 
tion than this : as is a man's Philosophy, so is his Theology. 
The changeless laws of our being renders us, in all departments 
of research and action, philosophic beings. In religion, we 
can no more be exempt from the influence of Philosophy, than 
in all other departments of investigation. Suppose we pro- 
fessedly, as some have done, repudiate all Philosophy, and 
approach the Sacred Volume, to be taught of God, irrespective 
of any philosophic speculations. What is this but the enun- 
ciation of a peculiar system of Philosophy — a system which, 
after all, will determine, in many essential respects, the meaning 
which we shall attach to the most important responses of the 
Sacred Oracles ? God hath joined Philosophy and Religion 
together. We do violence to the nature which he has given 
us, when we attempt to put them asunder. False Philosophy 
is the mother of false religions. A correct Philosophy is the 
handmaid of true Religion. 

In short, in every condition and relation of life, next to 
the wisdom, which, by direct inspiration, " cometh from above," 
is a correct and comprehensive knowledge of Mental Philoso- 
phy, important to man. To the citizen, this science is useful 
by giving him the reasons of the duties devolved upon him in 
all the relations of life. To the theologian, it will be of great 
use, by enabling hini not only to understand correctly the truths 



10 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and principles of Christianity, but also to present them in such 
a manner that he will " commend himself to every man's con- 
science in the sight of God." How true also is the sentiment 
advanced by the great philosopher of England, to wit, that no 
man is qualified to fill the sphere of an enlightened statesman, 
who has not thought much and profoundly upon the infinite, 
the just, the right, the true, and the good. 

State of 3Iind requisite to a successful prosecution of this 
Science. 

It remains to speak upon one topic more, the spirit requi- 
site to a successful prosecution of this science. 

The first requisite that I mention is this, a deep conviction 
of the imjwrtance of the science. We pursue nothing with 
energy which, to our minds, does not possess an importance de- 
manding the exertion of our entire powers. If I could impress 
the inquirer with a due conviction of the importance of our 
present investigations, and could excite in hira a purpose of 
corresponding inflexibility to master the science, I should not 
have any unpleasant apprehensions in respect to the result. 

I mention, in connection with the above, another requisite, 
to wit, a love of the science for its own sake ; that is, for what 
presents itself to the mind, as intrinsic in the science itself, as 
well as an account of its relative value. That which strongly 
appeals, not only to our convictions of what is valuable, but to 
the sensibilities of our nature, we readily pursue with the most 
untiring energy and perseverance. But two things are requi- 
site to excite in any mind this love for the science under con- 
sideration — a proper conviction of the importance of the 
science, and familiarity with its great truths and principles. 
We are naturally such philosophic beings, that almost nothing 
else delights us so much as philosophic truths and principles, 
when we once become acquainted with them. 



INTRODUCTION. 11 

Anotber essential requisite is the habit or spirit of zelf- 
reflection. All legitimate conclusioDS pertainiDg to this science 
rest upon the facts which lie under the eye of Consciousness. 
To know these facts, that eye must be fixed with long and in- 
tense gaze upon them, till their fundamental characteristics are 
distinctly revealed. Without the spirit of self-reflection the 
inquirer will make but poor progress in Mental Philosophy. 
With it, he will "go from strength to strength." 

The inquirer who would make progress in this science, 
must also be deeply imbued with a teachable spirit. This is 
the true and only true philosophic spirit. Under its influ- 
ence the mind " cries after knowledge, and lifts up its voice 
for understanding." " It seeks for her as silver, and searches 
for her as for hid treasures." " Wisdom enters into the 
heart, and knowledge is pleasant to the soul." The love 
of truth, for her own sake, takes full possession of the mind. 
To " sit under her banners," and " dwell in the light of her 
countenance," all opinions, all systems and prepossessions, con- 
trary to her teachings, are readily sacrificed. Facts are weighed 
with the utmost care for the exclusive pm'pose of knowing 
their characteristics ; and all conclusions, however contrary to 
all performed theories, are readily admitted, which sustains to 
such facts the relation of logical antecedents or consequents. 
In this state of mind, the student will not fail to " understand 
rigbteousness, and judgment, and equity; yea, and every good 
path." 

I mention as another indispensable requisite, untiring indus- 
try aiid jjerseverance. " There is no royal road to knowledge" 
qf any kind ; much less to a knowledge of ourselves. Before 
we attain that high eminence from which the goodly moun- 
'ains, waving forests, verdant hills, luxuriant valleys, and ma- 
jestic rivers of this " land of promise," this " land flowing 
with milk and honiy," shall lie out with distinctness beneath 



12 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the enraptured vision j we shall find many a tiresome wilder- 
ness to pass, many a rugged steep to climb, and sometimes, 
perhaps, almost *' through the palpable obscure," will we be 
compelled to " find out our uncouth way." But when that 
eminence has been attained, no one feels that he has " labored 
in vain, and spent his strength for nought." Every individual, 
who is not fully prepared for the toil of hard and tireless 
tJiinMng, had better abandon this study before he commences 
it. Otherwise, in addition to all the wretchedness of ignor- 
ance, he will be subject to the more depressing influence of 
conscious unworthiness of the possession of this treasure of 
knowledge. 

I will allude to but one requisite more — a deeply serious 
state of mind. In no other state are we prepared for deep 
comnuxnion with the mysteries, and for profound contempla- 
tions of the sublime and majestic creations of truth. To walk 
among her " cloud-capped towers, gorgeous palaces and solemn 
temples," and to worship at her shrine, here is no place for 
triflers here. A trifler neither knows himself nor respects 
himself. lie is, therefore, wholly unprepared to inquire for, 
or appreciate when found, the most momentous of all the rev- 
elations of truth, those respecting the nature, character and 
relations of himself. 

The individual who commences, and continues to prose- 
cute, his inquiries pertaining to this science, in the spirit above 
described, will find in the end a full reward of his labors. The 
object of the author is not to think for the inquirer, but to 
enable him to think for himself. 



CHAPTER II. 

CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND POWERS. 

" All the facts," says Cousin, " -wbicli fall undex' the Con- 
sciousness of man, and consequently under the reflection of 
the philosopher, resolve themselves into three fundamental 
facts, which contain all others. These facts which, beyond 
doubt, are never in i eality, solitary, and separate from each 
other, but which are essentially not the less distinct, and which 
a careful analysis ought to distinguish without dividing, in the 
comples phenomena of intellectual life; these three facts are 
expressed in the words TO FEEL, TO THINK, TO ACT." 
Is this a full and correct classification of the phenomena of the 
human mind ? Are these distinctions real ? Are all mental 
phenomena included in these fundamental facts ? These ques- 
tions I answer in the affirmative, for the following reasons : 

1. No mental phenomena can be conceived of, which do 
not fall under one or the other of these facts. What mental 
operation can we conceive of, which is not a thought, feeling, 
or choice, purpose, or determination ? 

2. These classes of phenomena differ from one another, 
not in degree but in Icind. How entirely distinct, for example, 
is thought, in every degree and modification, from feeling, on 
the one hand, and mental determination, on the other. Feel- 
ings, also, of every kind and modification, stand at an equal 
remove from thoughts and mental acts or determinations. So 
of the class last mentioned. Choice in every degree or form 

2 



14 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

makes, in its fundamental characteristics, no approach what- 
ever to thoughts or feelings. 

3. All men recognize the states of mind designated by the 
above expressions, as actually existing in human Conscious- 
ness, and as clearly distinguishable from each other. When 
I affirm to the peasant, or to the philosopher, at one time, that 
I think so and so ; at another that I have particular feelings ; 
and at another still, that I have resolved, or determined upon 
a particular course of conduct; both alike readily apprehend 
my meaning, and understand me as referring to states of mind 
perfectly distinct. 

4. In all known languages there are terms employed to 
designate these three classes of phenomena; terms, each of 
which is applied to one class exclusively, and never to either 
of the others. Thus, the term thought is never applied to any 
mental phenomena but those designated by the words to think. 
We never use it to designate feelings, or mental determinations 
of any kind. The terms sensation or emotion are never ap- 
plied to any but the phenomena o^ feeling. In a similar man- 
ner, we never apply the terms purpose, willing, determining, 
&c., to the phenomena of thought or feeling, but exclusively 
to those designated by the words to act. The existence of 
such terms undeniably evince, that the different classes of 
phenomena, under consideration, are recognized by universal 
Consciousness, not only as existing, but as entirely distinct 
from one another. 

5. As a final reason I would adduce an argument presented 
in the work, recently published, on the Will. " The clearness 
and particularity with which the universal Intelligence has 
marked the distinction under consideration, is strikingly indi- 
cated by the fact, that there are qualifijing terms in common 
use, which are applied to each of these classes of phenomena, 
and never to either of the others. It is true that there are 



I 



MENTAL PHENOMENA AND POWERS. 15 

such terms which are promiscuously applied to all classes of 
phenomena. There are terms, however, which are never ap- 
plied but to one class. Thus we speak of clear tJiouc/hts, but 
never of clear feelings or determinations. We speak of ir7-e- 
pressible feelings and desires, but never of irrepressible 
thoughts or resolutions. We also speak of injiexihle determi- 
nations, but never of inflexible feelings or conceptions. With 
what perfect distinctness, then, must the universal Conscious- 
ness have marked thoughts, feelings, and determinations, as 
phenomena entirely distinct from one another — phenomena 
differing not in degree, but in Mud." 

Mental Faculties indicated hy the 'phenomena above classified. 

The threefold classification of mental phenomena, above 
established and elucidated, clearly indicate a tri-unity of men- 
tal faculties and susceptibilities equally distinct from one an- 
other. These faculties and susceptibilities we designate by the 
terms Intellect or Intelligence, Sensibility or Sensitivity, and 
Will. To the Intellect we refer all the phenomena of thought, 
of every kind, degree, and modification. To the Sensibility 
we refer all feelings, such as sensations, emotions, desires, and 
affections. To the Will we refer ail mental determinations^ 
such as volitions, choices, purposes, &c. 

OBJECT OP MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The object of Mental Philosophy is a full development of 
the phenomena, characteristics, laws, and mutual relationships 
and dependencies of these different faculties. 

MEANING OF THE WORDS MENTAL FACULTIES 

When I speak of a diversity of Mental Faculties, I would 
by no means be understood as teaching the strange dogma, 
that the mind is made up of parts which may be separated 



16 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

from one another. Mind is not composed of a diversity of 
substances. It is one substance, incapable of division. Yet 
this simple substance, remaining, as it does, always one and 
identical, is capable of a diversity of functions, or oi)erationa, 
entirely distinct from one another. This diversity of capa- 
bilities of this one substance, we designate by the words 
Mental Faculties. As the functions of thought, feeling, and 
willing, are entirely distinct from each other, so we speak of 
the powers of thought, feeling, and willing, to wit, the Intelli- 
gence, Sensibility, and Will, as distinct faculties of the Mind. 
The remarks made above respecting the Mind itself will, 
at once, appear equally applicable to each of the Mental Fac- 
ulties which have been enumerated. As we speak of the In- 
telligence, for example, as a Faculty of the Mind entirely dis- 
tinct from those of the Sensibility and Will, without supposing 
that the Mind is not strictly one substance, so we may speak 
of the diiferent Powers, or Faculties of the Intelligence itself, 
without implying that that Faculty is composed of a diversity 
of parts. The term Faculty, whether applied to the whole 
Mind, or to any of the departments of the Mind, implies a 
diversity of functions of the same power, or substance, and 
not a diversity of substances, or parts. 



CHAPTER III. 

PHENOMENA OF THE INTELLIGENCE. 

We are now prepared to enter directly upon the great in- 
quiry to be pursued in this Treatise, — the Phenomena, Fac- 
ulties, and Laivs of the human Intelligence. As all that we 
know, or can know, of this, as well as of every other depart- 
ment of the Mind, is revealed to us through the phenomena 
which lie under the eye of Consciousness, the first inquiries 
which now present themselves are, What are the phenomena 
of thought thus revealed ? What are their fundamental cha- 
racteristics ? In conformity to what principles shall they be 
classified and arranged ? 

PRINCIPLE OP CLASSIFICATION. 

There is one principle, in conformity to which all intel- 
lectual phenomena may be properly classified, and in the light 
of which, the fundamental characteristics of such phenomena 
may be very distinctly presented. I refer to the modes in 
which all objects of thought are conceived of by the Intelli- 
gence. Of these modes, there are two entirely distinct and 
separate, the one from the other. Every object of thought is 
conceived of as existing either contingently or oi necessity, that 
is, that object is conceived of as existing, with the possibility 
of conceiving of its non-existence, or it is conceived of as ex- 
isting, with the impossibility of conceiving of its non-exist- 
ence. If we have any conceptions of an object at all, we 
2* 



18 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

must conceive of it as falling under one or the other of these 
relations. The principle of classification, therefore, is funda- 
mental, and of universal application. 

CONTINGENT AND NECESSARY PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT 
DEFINED. 

Every thought, conception, cognition, or idea, then, by 
whatever term we may choose to designate it, all the phe- 
nomena of the Intelligence, may be classed, as contingent, or 
necesxary. A conception is contingent, when its object may he 
conceived of as existing with the possibility of conceiving of its 
non-existence. 

An idea is necessary when its object is conceived of as ex- 
isting with the impossibility of conceiving of its non-existence. 

All the phenomena of the Intelligence must, as shown 
above, fall under one or the other of these relations. It re- 
mains now, to illustrate the principle of classification here 
adopted, by a reference to an adequate number of particular 
phenomena, as the basis of important distinctions pertaining 
to the different functions or powers of the Intelligence. la 
the notice which we shall take of particular phenomena, other 
important characteristics, aside from those under consideration, 
will be developed, while these will be kept prominently in 
mind, as the grounds of classification. 

IDEAS OF BODY AND SPACE. 

Two prominent ideas, those of body and sjmce, will first 
claim our attention. They are to be analyzed as they now lie 
in the Intelligence, in its present state of development. That 
these ideas exist in all minds, which have attained to any con- 
siderable degree of development, none can doubt, and none 
will deny. The question to be resolved is, what are their fun- 
damental characteristics ? 



IDEAS OP BODY AND SPACE. 19 

Idea of hocli/ contingent. That of Sjjace necessary/. 

We will begin with the idea of body. A careful analysis 
of this idea will undeniably evince the fact, that it has the 
characteristic of contingenci/ ; in other words, that its olject 
may always be conceived of, as existing, with the possibility 
of conceiving of its non-existence. Take any body we please, 
the book, for example, that lies before us, our own physical 
organization, the habitation in which we dwell, the earth itselfj 
or the entire physical universe together, and we shall find, on 
careful reflection^ that we may conceive of them as existing, or 
as not existing. We believe, that things equal to the same 
things are equal to one another, because we cannot even con- 
ceive the opposite to be true. We believe, on the other hand, 
that body exists, not because we cannot conceive that it does 
not exist, but on the testimony of our senses. We believe, 
on such testimony, in the reality of body, as a fact, the noa- 
reality of which is conceivable. We believe in the above 
axiom, on principle, as a truth, the opposite of which is incon- 
ceivable. Many have, as a matter of fact, denied the reality 
of an external, material universe; but none ever denied the 
truth of the above principle, and others of a kindred character. 
The reason is obvious. The idea of body is contingent, the 
conception of the existence or non-existence of the object of 
that idea being equally possible to the mind. The axiom or 
principle under consideration, on the other hand, is a neces- 
sary truth, its non-truth being in itself inconceivable, and nat- 
urally impossible. 

We now turn to a consideration of the idea of space. We 
can, as shown above, readily conceive of the non-existence of 
all bodies, of the external material universe itself. When we 
have done this, however, can we even conceive of the non- 
reaJ ly of space, in which the universe does or may exist ? We 



^P INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

cannot. We conceive of space as a reality. Can we conceive 
of it, as not being ? We cannot. No intelligent being can 
by any possibility form such a conception. Of this every one 
cannot, on reflection, but be distinctly and absolutely conscious. 
When we have conceived of the non-existence of any one par- 
ticular body, or of all others, even of the universe itself, let us 
attempt to conceive of the non-reality of space, in which we 
necessarily conceive of these objects as existing, and we shall 
find the formation of such a conception, an absolute impossi- 
bility. The idea of space, then, is necessary. We conceive 
of the ohjcct of that idea, as existing, with the impossibility of 
conceiving of its non-existence. 

OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OP THESE TWO IDEAS. 

It now remains to mark other characteristics of these im- 
portant ideas. The following may be presented, as the most 
fundamental : 

The idea of body is conditioned and relative. That of space 
is unconditioned and absolute. 

An idea is conditioned and relative, when its object can be 
conceived of, as existing, but upon the condition of conceiving 
of the reality of the object of some other idea, the reality of 
the latter object, being necessarily supposed, as the condition 
of that of the formei'. An idea is unconditioned and absolute, 
when- the reality of its object does not, of necessity, suppose 
that of the object of any other idea, and when the Intelligence 
cannot but conceive, that the former object must exist, whether 
any other object does, or does not exist. 

Now when we conceive of body, as existing, we necessarily, 
as the condition of its existence, suppose the reality of another 
object, to wit, space in which body does, and must exist, and 
without which the latter cannot exist. If body is, as the con- 



IDEAS OF BODY AND SPACE. 21 

dition of its existence, space must be. The principle, body- 
supposes space, is just as necessary as any other axiom, the 
principle above referred to, for example, that things equal te 
the same things are equal to one another. The idea of body, 
then, is conditioned and relative, the reality of the object. of 
that idea necessarily supposing, as the condition of its exist- 
ence, that of the object of some other idea, that of space. 

When, on the other hand, we conceive of space, we con- 
ceive, as the condition of its existence, of no other reality. 
Space must be, whether anything else exists or not. The idea 
of space, then, is unconditioned and absolute, the reality of its 
ohject supposing, as the condition of its existence, the reality 
of the object of no other idea. 

The idea of hody implies that of limitation. The idea of 
space implies that of the absence of all limitation. 

We always, and of necessity, conceive of body as limited. 
Under this condition we not only conceive of all particular 
bodies, but of the universe itself. The idea of body, then, 
implies that of limitation. In other words, body is finite. 

Space, on the other hand, we necessarily conceive of, as 
without limits. Its idea implies that of the absence of all 
limitation. In other words, space is infinite. 

The idea of hody, a sensible representation. That of space, 
a pure rational conception. 

When we form a conception of any particular body, we can 
readily conceive of something else with which the former may 
be compared, and by which it may be represented. The hu- 
man countenance, for example, can be represented upon can- 
vas. The idea of body, then, is a sensible representation. 

When, on the other hand, we have formed an idea of space, 
we find that we know, and can conceive, of no existence with 



22 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

which the former can be compared. It bears no resemblance 
whatever to any other object which we know, or of which we 
can form a conception. The idea itself is wholly unlike any 
other idea which exists, or ever has existed in the mind. The 
idea of space is a pure rational conception. 

The remark just made will be found, on reflection, to be 
applicable to each necessary idea existing in the Intelligence. 
Each one exists entirely alone, and in total separation from all 
others of every kind, as far as resemllance is concerned. The 
idea of time, for example, substance, cause, right and wrong, 
obligation, &c., each bears no resemblance to either of the others, 
or to any other actual or conceivable existing in the mind. 

The following then may be stated, as the most important 
characteristics of these two ideas : 

1. The idea of body is contingent. That of space is 
necessary. 

2. The idea of body is conditioned and relative. That of 
space is unconditioned and absolute. 

3. The idea of body implies that of limitation. Or, body 
is finite. The idea of space implies the absence of all limita- 
tion. In other words, space is infinite. 

4. The idea of body is a sensible representation. That of 
space is a pure rational conception. 



IDEAS OP SUCCESSION, AND TIME, OR DURATION. 

These ideas are in all intelligent minds. No individual, 
whose Intelligence has been developed at all, will fail to un- 
derstand you, when you speak of one event, as having hap- 
pened ; of another, as having succeeded it, and of the fact 
that that succession took place in some definite period of time. 
We will now mark the characteristic of these ideas. 



IDEAS OP SUCCESSION AND DURATION. 23 

Idea of Succession contingent. That of Time necessary. 

You can conceive of some one event as having happened, 
and of another as having succeeded it. In other words, you 
have the idea of succession. Can you not conceive, that nei- 
ther of these events occurred ? Every individual can readily 
form such a conception. The same holds true of all events, 
of all succession of every kind, and in all time. The idea 
of succession, like that of body, is contingent. 

But when we have conceived of the total cessation of suc- 
cession, we find it absolutely impossible to conceive that there 
is no time, or duration, in which succession may take place. 
We can no more conceive of the non-existence of time, than 
we can of that of space. The idea of time, then, like that of 
space, is necessary. 

Other Characteristics of these Ideas. 

When we conceive of succession, we necessarily affirm, as 
the condition of its existence, the reality of something else, 
that is, of time, in which succession takes place. The idea 
of succession, like that of body, is conditioned and relative. 

On the other hand, when we affirm the reality of time, we 
suppose, as the condition of its existence, the existence of noth- 
ing else. Time is, and must be, whether anything else exists 
or not. The idea of time, then, is unconditioned and absolute. 

Once more ; whenever we can conceive of succession, we 
necessarily conceive of time before, and after it. The idea of 
succession, therefore, implies that of limitation, or succession 
is limited, finite. 

The idea of time, however, implies the absence of all limi 
tation. Duration never began; nor will it ever cease to be. 
In other words, time is infinite. The following are the most 
important and fundamental characteristics of these two ideas : 



24 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

1. The idea of succession is contingent. That of time is 
necessary. 

2. The idea of succession is conditioned, and relative. That 
of time is unconditioned and absolute. 

3. The idea of succession always implies that of limitation. 
Or succession is finite. The idea of time, on the other hand, 
implies that of the absence of all limitation. In other words, 
duration is infinite. 

IDEAS or THE FINITE AND OP THE INFINITE. 

Body and space, succession and duration, are given to us, 
as we have seen, with the following characteristics : Body and 
succession are limitable; time and space are illimitable. In 
other words, the former are finite, the latter infinite. " Now 
the ideas of the finite and the infinite," as remarked by Cousin, 
" may be detached from the ideas of body and succession, time 
and space, provided we keep in mind the subjects from which 
they are abstracted." 

These ideas then are in the mind. They are also distinct, 
the one from the other. Consequently the one cannot be de- 
rived from the other. The multiplication of the finite cannot 
give the infinite. Nor by dividing the infinite do we find the 
finite. Being correlative ideas, the one necessarily supposes 
and suggests the other. The one cannot possibly exist in the 
mind without the other. Yet, as above remarked, the one is 
perfectly distinct from the other. 

Nor is one of these ideas less distinct than the other. 
When I speak of the infinite, every one as readily and dis- 
tinctly apprehends my meaning, as when I speak of the finite. 
The following propositions, for example — body is limitable ; 
space is illimitable — are equally intelligible to all minds, the 
one as the other. 

There are other forms in which these ideas appear in the 



IDEAS or THE FINITE AND INFINITE. 25 

Mind, in all of which they sustain, to each other, the same re- 
lations, and possess the same characteristics. When the Mind 
conceives of power, wisdom or goodness, as imperfect, or limit- 
able, or finite, it necessarily conceives of similar attributes 
which are perfect, illimitable, and infinite. "When it conceives 
of anything which is and began to be, it, of necessity, con- 
ceives of something else, which not only is, but always has 
been. 

If any individual still afiirms that he has, in reality, no 
idea of the infinite, we have only to ask him, whether he un- 
derstands the import of the words he employs, when he makes 
such an affirmation ? whether he is not conscious of speaking 
of something, which, in thought, he himself clearly distin- 
guishes from all that is limitable, or limited ? These ques- 
tions he will readily answer in the affirmative. In this answer 
he clearly contradicts the affirmation under consideration. 
For, if he really, as he affirms, has no idea of the infinite, he 
would not know the meaning of the terms he uses, nor could 
he, in thought, clearly distinguish the infinite from all that is 
limitable, or finite. 

If also we have no real or positive idea of the infinite, we 
can have none of time and space, for they are positive ideas, 
and their objects are given in the Intelligence, as positively or 
absolutely infinite. 

REMAKKS OF LOCKE. 

Four remarks of Locke, pertaining to the idea of the Infi- 
nite, demand a passing notice. 

His first remark is, that it is an " endlessly growing idea." 
On the other hand, the idea of the Infinite is always fixed. 
Being a simple idea, it must, when once generated in the mind, 
remain there, at all times, one and identical. It may become 
more and more vivid. In the respect under consideration, 
3 



26 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

however, this idea undergoes no modification whatever. Who 
has ever found, since the ideas of infinite space and duration 
were developed in his Mind, that these have undergone the 
least modification, as far as growth is concerned ? 

Again : Locke maintains that the idea of the Infinite is 
obscure. Still it exists, and as a phenomenon of Conscious- 
ness, falls, most legitimately, under the cognizance of the 
philosopher. But in what sense is this idea obscure ? To 
those faculties of the Intelligence which pertain to the finite, 
it must for ever remain obscure. To that faculty, however, 
•which apprehends truths necessary and absolute, it is as plain 
as any other idea whatever. 

According to Locke, also, the idea of the infinite is merely 
a negative idea. " We have," he says, " no positive idea of 
Infinity." This is directly contradicted by the testimony of 
universal Consciousness. Who is not conscious that his ideas 
of God, of space, and time, all of which are given in the In- 
telligence as infinite, are just as positive as any of our concep- 
tions whatever? We might also, with the same propriety, 
maintain that our conceptions of the finite are negative, as 
that our ideas of the infinite are. Being correlative ideas, if 
one is assumed as positive, the other will be relatively negative 
of course. In themselves, however, both are alike positive 
and equally so. 

Once more : " Number," says Locke, " afi'ords the clearest 
idea of the infinite." This is to reduce the infinite to the 
finite; for number, however large, is always limited — that is, 
finite. The multiplication of the finite may call into exercise 
the faculty which apprehends the infinite, and thus render our 
idea of the latter more distinct and vivid (as all acts of atten- 
tion do) than it otherwise would be. In no other sense, how- 
ever, can such repetitions give us the Infinite. 



PHENOMENA AND PERSONAL IDENTITY. 27 



CHARACTERISTICS OF THESE IDEAS. 

Having established the fact, that the idea of the infinite, 
as well as that of the finite, is in the mind, it now remains to 
mark their respective characteristics. 

Idea of the Finite contingent and relative; that of the Infi- 
nite necessary and absolute. 

Whatever substance we conceive of as finite, we cannot but 
regard as existing contingently. We cannot regard it, as in 
its own nature, a necessary existence. Hence, for all that we 
conceive of as finite, we naturally and necessarily inquire after 
a cause. We do not ask the question, had it a cause ? but 
what caused it ? The idea of the finite, therefore, is contin- 
gent, and consequently relative. 

On the other hand, whatever we regard as infinite, we ne- 
cessarily apprehend as uncaused — that is, as existing by ne- 
cessity. When we trace back any chain of causes and effects, 
for the purpose of finding a first cause, at each successive link 
we always inquire for its antecedent, till we arrive at the Infi- 
nite. Here we pause ; here our inquiries cease ; here we re- 
cognize ourselves at once, as in the presence of an existence 
which is not contingent, but necessary and absolute. The idea 
of the Infinite, therefore, is necessary and absolute. 

IDEAS OP MENTAL PHENOMENA, AND OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 

Every individual believes, that he is now the same being 
that he was yesterday, and will be to-morrow. Numberless 
and ever-varying phenomena are constantly passing under the 
eye of Consciousness. Many are recalled of which we were 
formerly conscious ; yet they are all referred to the same indi- 
vidual subject. Every phenomenon of thought, feeling, and 
willing, of which we are now conscious, which we recall as 



28 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

having, in some former period, been conscious of, or which we 
expect to put forth in some future time, is given in the Intel- 
ligence in this exclusive form — I think, I feel, I will ; I did 
think, I did feel, I did will, so and so. The same holds 
equally true of all similar phenomena which we contemplate, 
as about to occur in future time. Whatever the phenomena 
may be, the same identical I is given as its subject. This is 
what is meant by personal identity. It is the unity of our 
being, of the I, or self, as opposed to the plurality and ever- 
changing phenomena of Consciousness. Having shown that 
the idea of mental phenomena and of personal identity are in 
the Mind, we will consider their characteristics. 

Idea of Mental Phenomena contingent and relative. 

You have a Consciousness of some thought, feeling, or act 
of Will. You remember similar phenomena of which you 
were formerly conscious. You conceive of them as now being, 
or as having been actual realities. Can you not conceive of 
them as not being, or as never having taken place ? You can. 
Can you conceive of such phenomena as existing or having 
existed, without referring them to some subject? In other 
words, can you conceive of some thought, feeling, or volition 
as now existing, or as having existed, in former times, without 
referring it to some subject, some being which thinks, feels, or 
wills? You cannot. All the phenomena of Consciousness 
are contingent and relative. 

Idea of Personal Identity necessary. 

How is it with the idea of personal identity ? You are 
now conscious of some thought, or feeling, or act of Will. 
You recall others, of a similar nature, of which you have been 
formerly conscious. This you refer to one and the same sub- 
ject, the I of Consciousness, as it is sometimes called. This 



1 



PHENOMENA AND PERSONAL IDENTITY. 29 

reference you and all mankind alike must make. This refer- 
ence mankind universally make in all the transactions of life. 
Under its influence we hold ourselves and others bound to ful- 
fill contracts made years ago. Under its influence, the virtuous 
are commended and rewarded, and the vicious blamed and 
punished for actions long since performed. Under its influ- 
ence we anticipate the retributions of eternal justice, in a fu- 
ture state, for the deeds done in the body. Is it possible to 
avoid making this reference ? It is not. You cannot possibly 
conceive of a thought, for example, without referring it to 
some subject which thinks. You cannot be conscious of any 
mental phenomenon, or recall any others of which you were 
formerly conscious, without referring them to one and the 
same subject, yourself The idea of personal identity, then, 
is necessary. 

NECESSARY IDEAS DISTINGUISHED AS CONDITIONAL AND 
UNCONDITIONAL. 

Here an important distinction between necessary ideas de- 
mands special attention. When we contemplate the ideas of 
space and duration, for example, we find that the objects of 
these ideas must exist,- whether anything else exists or not. 
Those ideas, therefore, are not only necessary, but uncondi- 
tioned and absolute. On the other hand, the ideas of personal 
identity, and of substance and cause, which we shall hereafter 
consider, are not, in this sense, necessary. They are only coii- 
ditionally necessai-y. Phenomena being given, substance must 
be. An event being given, the supposition of a cause is neces- 
sary. Phenomena and events not being given, we do not 
affirm the existence of substances or causes. The phenomena 
of Consciousness not being given, we do not afiirm the reality 
or identity of the self, the subject of these phenomena. Such 
ideas are conditionally necessary, and not like those of space 
3* 



30 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and time, not only necessary, but unconditioned and ab- 
solute. 

IDEAS OP PHENOMENA AND SUBSTANCE. 
Lha of substance explained. 

If tbe observations whicb bave been made upon tbe idea 
of personal identity, bave been distinctly understood, tbe cbar- 
acteristics of tbe idea of substance will be readily apprehended. 
All tbe phenomena of Consciousness and Memory are, as we 
bave seen, by a necessary law of our being, referred to one 
and tbe same subject. The phenomena are accidents, perpetu- 
ally changing. The subject, however, remains the same. Now, 
in the language of Cousin, " Being, one and identical, opposed 
to variable accidents, to transitory phenomena, is substance." 
But thus far we have only personal substance. The same 
principle, however, applies equally to all external substances. 
Through the medium of our senses, such objects are given to 
us as being possessed of a great variety of qualities, and as 
existing in a great variety of states. Tbe qualities and states, 
which are perpetually varying, we necessarily refer to one and 
the same subject, a subject whicb remains one and identical, 
amid the endlessly diversified phenomena which it exhibits. 
This is substance. 

Idea of Phenomena contingent and relative — tJiat of Sich- 
stance necessary. 

Now as it is with our ideas of the phenomena of Conscious- 
ness and personal identity, so it is with our ideas of external 
phenomena and external substance. The former is contingent 
and relative; the latter is necessary. When any phenomenon 
appears, we can readily conceive that it had not appeared. Its 
appearance also we can admit, only on the supposition of some- 



PHENOMENA AND SUBSTANCE. 31 

thing else, to wit, substance, to wbich this appearance is neces- 
sarily referred. Our ideas of phenomena, therefore, are con- 
tingent and relative. 

On the other hand, the idea of substance, relatively to 
phenomena, is necessary. Phenomena being given, substance 
must be. It is impossible for us to conceive of the former 
without the latter. 

Our ideas of Substance not obscure, but clear and distinct. 

According to Locke, " we have no clear idea of substance 
in general." This idea also, he represents, as " of little use 
in philosophy." In reply, it may be said, that our idea of 
substance is just as clear and important, as those of time, 
space, and personal identity. Of this every one is conscious. 
The same function of the Intelligence which apprehends one 
of these ideas, apprehends them all. Take away the power to 
apprehend one, and the power to apprehend every other of 
these ideas is annihilated. Philosophy itself also becomes an 
impossibility. How could we reason philosophically about 
ourselves, in the absence of the idea of personal identity ? 
Equally impossible would it be, to reason about objects external 
to us, in the absence of the idea of substance. This and kin- 
dred ideas, instead of being " of little use in philosophy," are, 
in reality, the foundation of all our explanations of phenom- 
ena, external and internal. 

We often hear individuals, in expatiating upon the great 
ignorance of man, affirming, that all we " know of realities 
within and around us, is their phenomena. Of the substances 
thetiiselves, we know nothing." In reply to such rhapsodies, 
it may be said, that our knowledge of every substance of every 
kind, is just as clear, distinct, and extensive, as our knowledge 
of its phenomena. In phenomena, substances stand revealed, 
the substance being as its phenomena. In the phenomena of 



32 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHl 

thought, for example, we know ourselves, as thinking beings 
or substances, our powers being as the thoughts which they 
generate. Our knowledge of the 2^oive7- of thought, is just as 
distinct as that of thought itself. The same holds true, in re- 
spect to all substances, material, and mental. 

IDEAS OF EVENTS AND CAUSE. 

The universe within and around us, presents the constant 
spectacle of endlessly diversified and ever-changing phenomena. 
Some of these are constantly conjoined, in the relation of " im- 
mediate and invariable antecedence and consequence " The 
connection between others is only occasional. In reference to 
events of the former class, the mind judges, that the relation 
between them is not only that of antecedence and consequence, 
but of cause and effect. In reference to every event, however, 
whether its antecedent is perceived or not, we judge that it 
had a cause. This judgment is universal, extending to all 
events, actual and conceivable. It is absolutely impossible 
for us to conceive of an event without a cause. Let any one 
make the effort to form such a conception, and he will find that 
he has attempted an impossibility. 

Here it should be noticed, that we do not affirm that every 
effect has a cause. That would be mere tautology. It would 
be equivalent to the affirmation, that whatever is produced by 
a cause, is produced by a cause. All this might be true, and 
the proposition, every event has a cause, be false, notwith- 
standing. 

2Vie idea of Events contingent and relative ; that of Cause 
necessary. 

The relation between the idea of an event, and that of a 
cause, may be readily pointed out. Whenever the mind wit- 
nesses, or is conscious of, the occurrence of an event, it appre- 



EVENTS AND CAUSE. 33 

bends that event as contingent and relative. It might or 
might not have happened. There is no impossibility in mak- 
ing these different suppositions. The occurrence of an event 
also necessarily supposes something else, to wit, a cause. On 
the other hand, no event uncaused can possibly be conceived 
to have taken place. The idea of an event, then, is contin- 
gent and relative. The idea of cause is necessary, condition- 
ally so, as shown above. 

THEORY OP DR. BROWN, AND OTHERS. 

The speculations of certain philosophers respecting the 
subject under consideration, here demand our attention. The 
relation of cause and effect, according to Dr. Brown and others, 
is nothing more than that of " immediate and invariable 
antecedence and consequence.-" " A cause," says Dr. B., 
"is nothing else than an immediate and invariable antece- 
dent." According to this philosopher, in no instance what- 
ever is there any reason, in the nature of any particular cause, 
why it should produce one event rather than another. Suc- 
cession, mere antecedence and consequence immediate and in- 
variable, without any reason in the nature of the antecedent 
and consequent why this order of succession should arise, 
rather than another, is all that exists in any instance. In re- 
gard to this theory, it is enough to say that no man does or 
can believe it. Let any man, for example, behold a piece of 
wood and a metallic substance put together into a heated fur- 
nace. The wood is immediately consumed, and the metal 
changed from a solid to a fluid state. Can he avoid the con- 
viction, that there is, in the nature of these two substances, a 
reason, why, that when acted upon by the same cause, one is 
consumed, and the other changed from a solid to a fluid st-;ite ? 
When the Almighty said, " Let there be light, and there was 
light," who dares believe that there was not, in the nature of 



84 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

that fiat, a reason, why, as its consequent, light, rather than 
any other substance, should appear? When two pounds 
weight are placed on one side of a balance, and five on the 
other, who does not believe, that aside from the particular se- 
quence which follows here, there is, in the circumstances sup- 
posed, a reason why one particular sequence should follow, 
rather than any other ? In the succession of day and night, 
also, we have an order of sequence immediate and invariable. 
Is this equivalent to the declaration, that day causes night, 
or night causes the day ? It would be so, if the theory un- 
der consideration was true. For all the conditions of that 
theory are here fulfilled. We have an order of sequence im- 
mediate and invariable. 

As a further illustration, let us, for a moment, consider the 
theory of "pre-established harmony" between the action of 
the Soul and Body, proclaimed by Leibnitz. According to 
this author. Matter and Mind do, and can exert no influence 
upon each other, whatever. I will, for example, a motion of 
my arm, or of any other part of the body, and the motion fol- 
lows. Still my volitions have no influence in causing or con- 
trolling that motion. So in all other instances. God, fore- 
seeing the states of our minds, has so constituted our bodies, 
that the action of the latter shall always be in perfect harmony 
with that of the former, though wholly uninfluenced by it. 
In this theory, the relation of cause and efiect, as announced 
by the theory of Dr. Brown, is perfectly fulfilled. Between 
the states of our minds, and the corresponding action of our 
bodies, we have an order of sequence immediate and invariable. 
But who does not regard the Liebnitzian theory as announcing 
a relation totally distinct and opposite to what is universally 
believed to exist between our minds and bodies ? When we 
say, that the motion of the body is in immediate and perfect 
harmony with that of the mind, we say one thing. When w© 



EVENTS AND CAUSE. 35 

say, that the action of the mind causes that of the body, we 
introduce, in the judgment of all men, an entirely different 
idea. Sequence immediate and invariable is all that we j)er- 
ceive to exist between any antecedent and consequent; but it 
is, by no means, all that we helieve^ yea hnow to exist. 

OBSERVATIONS OE MR. DUGALD STEWART. 

The following remarks of Mr. Stewart also demand a pass- 
ing observation : 

" It seems now to be pretty generally agreed among phi- 
losophers, that there is no instance in which we are able to 
perceive a necessary connection between two successive events, 
or to comprehend in what manner the one proceeds from the 
other, as its cause. From experience, indeed, we learn, that 
there are many events, which are constantly conjoined, so that 
the one invariably follows the other : but it is possible, for 
anythiug we know to the contrary, that this connection, though 
a constant one, as far as our observation has reached, may not 
be a necessary connection ; nay, it is possible, that there may 
be no necessary connections among any of the phenomena we 
see ; and if there are any such connections existing, we may 
rest assured that we shall never be able to discover them." 

Again : 

" When it is said, that every change in nature indicates 
the operation of a cause, the word cause expresses something 
which is supposed to be necessarily connected with the change, 
and without which it could not have happened. This may be 
called the metaphysical meaning of the word ; and such causes 
may be called 'metaphysical or efficient causes. In natural 
philosophy, however, when we speak of one thing being the 
cause of another, all that we mean is, that the two are con- 
stantly conjoined, so that when we see the one, we may expect 
the other. These conjunctions we learn from experience alone ; 



36 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and, without an acquaintance with them, we could not accom- 
modate our conduct to the established course of nature." 

These remarks certainly cannot hold in regard to the pri- 
mary qualities of matter, as, for example, solidity considered 
as the antecedent, and resistance as the consequent. Is it pos- 
sible to conceive of the existence of an object which is ex- 
tended and solid, which is at the same time destitute of the 
power of resistance ? 

Here I would drop the suggestion, whether it is possible to 
conceive of any substance as existing, which is destitute of 
power ; and whether our ideas of substance and of power are 
not, in fact, identical ? For my own part, I find it impossible 
to conceive of substances which are not real powers. 

IDEA OF POWER. 

The idea of Power, is that of causation in its quiescent 
state, or as the permanent attribute of a subject irrespective 
of its action, at any particular moment. When particular 
effects are attributed to particular causes, while the nature of 
the substances containing such causes remains unchanged, the 
mind considers the power to repeat such effects under the same 
circumstances, as the permanent attributes of those substances. 
This is the idea of power, as it exists in all minds. All sub- 
stances, in their active state, are Causes — in their quiescent 
state, are Powers. Powers are of two kinds, active and pas- 
sive. The latter are commonly called susceptibilities. As the 
existence of powers and causes is indicated by their respective 
phenomena, so the nature of such powers and causes is indi- 
cated by the characteristics of their respective phenomena. 

The idea of Power, sustaining, as it does, the same relation 
to phenomena, that that of cause and substance do, is, of 
course, like those ideas, universal and necessary. 



IDT^A OF POWER. 37 



CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENT ANALYSIS. 

Here our analysis of intellectual phenomena will close, for 
the present. It might have been extended to almost any 
length. Enough has been said, however, to indicate the prin- 
ciple of classification adopted, and to show its universal appli- 
cability, as well as to lay the foundation for the important dis- 
tinctions, &c., in respect to the intellectual powers, an elucida- 
tion of which will be commenced in the next Chapter. 



CHAPTER IV. 

>^PPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS. 
LOGICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF IDEAS. 

Tn applying the results of the preceding analysis, one of 
the first questions which arises, respects the relations of intel- 
lectual phenomena, contingent and necessary to each other. 
With regard to this question, I would remark, that there are 
two, and only two important relations which such phenomena 
sustain to each other — the relation of logical and chronologi- 
cal antecedence and consequence. The latter relates to the 
order of acquisition, or to the question, Which, in the order 
of time, is first developed, in the Intelligence. The former 
relates to their order in a logical point of view, that is, to the 
question, Which sustains to the other, in the process of ratio- 
cination, the relation of logical antecedent. 

Logical order. 

In regard to the order last mentioned, I would remark, 
that one idea is the logical antecedent of another, when the 
latter necessarily supposes the former, that is, when the reality 
of the object of the latter can be admitted, only on the admis- 
sion of that of the object of the former. The ideas of events 
and cause being given in the Intelligence, for example, we 
find that we can admit the reality of an event on one supposi- 
tion only, to wit, that of a cause which produced the event. 
We say, therefore, that the idea of cause is the logical antece- 
dent of that of events. 



APPLICATION OF THE ANALYSIS. 39 

Now, if we contemplate ideas in this view, it will be per- 
ceived at once, that necessary ideas are, in all instances, the 
logical antecedents of contingent ones. What was shown 
above to be true of the ideas of event and cause, is self-evi- 
dently true of the ideas of body and space, succession and 
time, the finite and the infinite, and phenomena external and 
internal, and substance and personal identity. Every contin- 
gent idea is relative, necessarily supposing, as its logical ante- 
cedent, some necessary idea. 

Chronological order. 

Contingent ideas, on the other hand, are the chronological 
antecedents of necessary ideas, that is, in the order of actual 
development in the Intelligence, the former precedes the latter. 
Two considerations will render this proposition demonstrably 
evident. 

1. Necessary ideas are given in the Intelligence, only as 
the logical antecedents of contingent ones. Space, for exam- 
ple, is known to us, only as that in which bodies or substances 
exist. In no other light can we possibly know or conceive of 
it. Now that which is and can be known to us, only as the 
place of some other thing, cannot have been known to us 
prior to that thing ; otherwise, the former might be known and 
conceived of, irrespective of the latter. The sarb§ holds true 
of the ideas of succession and time, phenomena and substance, 
events and causes. The latter class of ideas can be conceived 
of, only as the logical antecedents of the former. The former 
therefore must have been originated in the Intelligence, prior 
to the lattei-. 

2. While necessary ideas can be defined, only as the logi- 
cal antecedents of contingent ones, the latter can be defined 
without any reference to the former — a fact which could not 
be true, if the latter were not the chronological antecedents 



40 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of the former. Cause, for example, can be defined, only as 
that which produces events. An event, as any one can per- 
ceive, by consulting his dictionary, can be, and is defined, 
without any reference to the idea of cause. Contingent ideas 
therefore are the chronological antecedents of necessary ones. 

PRIMARY INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES PRE-SUPPOSED BY THE 
PRECEDING ANALYSIS. 

The preceding analysis has fully prepared us to proceed 
legitimately and safely to another very important inquiry — 
the Primary Intellectual Faculties pre-supposed by that analy- 
sis. As stated in the Introduction, the being and character- 
istics of every power or substance in existence, are indicated 
to us by its respective phenomena. The perception of such 
phenomena, being itself a phenomenon of the mind which 
perceives, supposes, in the mind, corresponding powers of per- 
ception. When the Intelligence apprehends a fact, or truth 
of any kind, such act implies, in the Intelligence, correspond- 
ing powers of apprehension. Now truths, perceived by the 
Intelligence are, as we have seen, of two kinds, contingent 
and necessary. The perception of such truths indicates a cor- 
responding distinction of intellectual functions, or powers. 
The faculty or faculties which perceive, and affirm the reality 
of contingent phenomena, are clearly distinguishable from that 
which affirms the reality of truths necessary and universal. 

But contingent phenomena perceived by the Intelligence, 
are distinguishable, with equal clearness, as objective and sub- 
jective, that is, part pertain to the Mind itself, and part to ex- 
ternal material substances. These facts most obviously de- 
mand a twofold division of the Intellectual faculties which 
pertain to contingent phenomena, as objective and subjective. 
The analysis completed in the last Chapter, presents to our 
contemplation three distinct faculties of the Intelligence : 



APPLICATION OF THE ANALYSIS. 41 

1. That which perceives the phenomena of the mind itself, 
the faculty which gives us subjective phenomena. This func 
tion of the Intelligence is denominated Consciousness. 

2. The faculty which perceives the phenomena of external 
material substances, or which gives us objective phenomena. 
This function of the Intelligence is denominated Sense.* 

3. The faculty which apprehends truths necessary and uni- 
versal. This intellectual function, or faculty, is denominated 
Eeason. 

These Functions why called Primary. 

Consciousness, Sense, and Reason, are called the primary 
faculties of the Intelligence, for two considerations : 

1. Because, that with them, all our knowledge com- 
mences. 

2. All our complex cognitions are composed of elements 
given by these faculties. All the phenomena of the intelli- 
gence are either simple or complex. All simple ideas are 
found to be the direct intuitions of one or of the other of 
these faculties. All complex ideas are found, on a careful 
analysis, to be composed of elements previously given by these 
faculties. The truth of this last remark will be fully confirmed 
in the progress of our subsequent investigations. 

Also called Intuitive Faculties. 

The faculties above named are also sometimes denominated 
Intuitive Faculties. The reason is, that each alike, pertains 
to its objects, by direct intuition. Consciousness, for example, 

* The term Sense will be used throughout this treatise, in strict 
accordance with this definition. This is the first meaning assigned to 
it by Webster, and is the meaning generally attached to it when em- 
ployed, as it is in this treatise, to designate a special function of the 
Intelligence. A great diversity of meanings attach to it when em- 
ployed for other pui-poses. 



42 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

by direct intuition, and not thi-ough any medium, apj^reliends 
the phenomena of the mind. The same is true of the faculty 
of Sense in respjct to the phenomena of external material 
substances. The action of Reason is conditioned on the prior 
action of Sense and Consciousness. It is not through any 
medium, but by direct intuition, however, that Reason affirms 
truths universal, necessary, and absolute. Like the former, 
therefore, it may, with equal propriety, be denominated a fac- 
ulty of intuition. These faculties, as we shall see hereafter, 
give us the elements of all our knowledge. 

RELATION OF PRIxMITIVE INTUITIVE FACULTIES TO EACH 
OTHER. 

We are now prepared also for another very important in- 
quiry — the ajyprojyriate sj^hcres of the primary faculties rela- 
tively to each other. This inquiry can now be met in very 
few words. Sense, and Consciousness, give us phenomena 
external and internal. Reason gives us the logical antecedents 
of phenomena thus perceived and affirmed. This is its appro- 
priate and exclusive sphere relatively to the other faculties. 
It cannot enter the domain of either Sense or Consciousness, 
and judge of the validity of its affirmations. The same holds 
true of each of these last-mentioned faculties, relatively to the 
domain of the other, and that of Reason too. Each faculty 
has its own exclusive sphere- in which it is wholly independent 
of either or both of the others, and independent in this sen.se, 
that the validity of its affirmations cannot be tested at the bar 
of either of the others. Its response, when questioned, in 
respect to what it has affirmed is, " What I have written, I have 
written." When Sense, for example, has made an affirmation 
pertaining to the phenomena of an external material substance, 
all that Consciousness can do, pertaining to the subject, is, to 
give that affirmation as it is, together with its characteristics. 



APPLICATION OF THE ANALYSIS. 43 

Of the validity of the affirmation, it can say nothing. Reason 
can give the logical antecedent of that affirmation, and that is 
all. With its validity it has no more to do, than Conscious- 
ness has. The same will hereafter be shown to be true of 
Beason, in respect to every other function of the Intelligence. 

IMPORTANCE OP THE TRUTHS ABOVE ELUCIDATED. 

If the truth of the conclusions above stated be admitted, 
they will be found to be of fundamental importance in philos- 
ophy. They will put an end at once to the wild speculations 
of many philosophers of the Super-sensual school, both in this 
country and in Europe. Here lies, for example, the great 
error of Kant, the father of modern Transcendentalism. He 
first gives us a most profound, and correct analysis of intellect- 
ual phenomena, together with a statement equally correct, 
of the faculties pre-supposed by those phenomena. He then 
arraigns all the other faculties at the bar of Reason, there to 
test the validity of their affirmations. It is no matter of sur- 
prise at all, that the result of the trial should be thus an- 
nounced by the philosopher himself who instituted it, a trial, 
the entire results of which, as we shall hereafter see, and a 
moment's reflection must convince us, must and can rest upon 
nothing else than groundless assumptions, and not at all upon 
the real affirmations of the Intelligence. " We have therefore 
intended to say," says Kant, in giving the results of his phi- 
losophy, " that all our intuition is nothing but the representa- 
tion of phenomenon — that the things which we invisage [form 
conceptions and judgments of] are not that in themselves for 
which we take them ; neither are their relationships in them- 
selves so constituted as they appear to us ; and that if we do 
away with our subject, or even only the subjective quality of 
the senses in general, every quality, all relationships of objects 
in space and time, nay, even space and time themselves would 



44 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

disappear, and cannot exist as plienomeiia in themselves, but 
only in us. It remains utterly unknown to us what may be 
the nature of the objects in themselves, separate from all the 
receptivity of our sensibility. We know nothing but our 
manner of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us and which 
need not belong to every being, although to every man. 
With this we have only to do." The above extract contains 
the following strange paralogisms, contradictions and absurd- 
ities : 

1. That our Intelligence takes, that is, affirms things not 
to be, what the same Intelligence takes, that is, affirms them 
to be. Kant first employs the Intelligence to find out what 
things are. He then employs the same Intelligence to de- 
monstrate, that these very things are not what the Intelli- 
gence had previously affirmed them to be. As if a merchant 
should profess, that by his yard-stick, he had demonstrated, 
that he had a thousand yards of cloth, and then, that, by the 
same yard-stick, he had as fully demonstrated the fact, that 
he had no real cloth at all, and that neither the yard-stick nor 
the cloth were, in themselves, what the yard-stick had shown 
them to be. 

2. That, while our Intelligence represents nothing what- 
ever as it is in itself, this same Intelligence does correctly rep- 
resent "our manner of perceiving objects" — a most palpable 
contradiction, surely. For if our Intelligence does not repre- 
sent things as they are, it surely will not represent our " man- 
ner of perceiving " as it is. 

3. Kant affirms, that all that we have to do with objects, 
is " according to our manner of perceiving them," that is, as 
they are given, in our Intelligence. He then teaches us, that 
these objects are not as our Intelligence affirms them to be. 
This, certainly, is doing with objects far otherwise than "ac- 
cording to our manner of perceiving them." 



APPLICATION OF THE ANALYSIS. 45 

Now all these absurdities and contradictions wliich Kant 
gives as the results of his philosophy, and which constitute its 
distinguishing peculiarities, would have been prevented, to- 
gether with the tide of skepticism, which, through that philos- 
ophy, has desolated so large a portion of Europe, had that 
great philosopher, after demonstrating the reality of Reason, 
as a faculty of the Intelligence, raised, and correctly answered, 
the inquiry pertaining to the true sphere of that faculty rela- 
tively to other functions of the Intelligence. Philosophers of 
the Super-sensual school have run wild with Reason^ just as 
those of the Sensual school did with Sensation and Reflection. 

The possession of Reason is the great distinguishing char- 
acteristic of humanity, that characteristic which separates man 
at an infinite remove from the lower orders of creation around 
him, and places him among the great Intelligences of the 
universe. The full demonstration of Reason, as a function of 
the Intelligence, has placed the philosopher whom Coleridge 
not unappropriately denominates the " venerable sage of Kon- 
ingsburg," among the brightest intellectual luminaries of earth. 
When the appropriate sphere of this divine faculty in man, 
relatively to the action of the other functions of the Intelli- 
gence shall be fully settled, then philosophy, instead of being 
the sport of wild and blind assumptions, will stand unmoved 
upon the rock of eternal truth. This subject will be resumed 
again in a subsequent part of our investigations. 

CLASSIFICATION OF INTELLECTUAL PHENOMENA GIVEN BY 

KANT. 

It was stated above, that Kant has given a most profound 
and correct analysis of intellectual phenomena, together with a 
development equally correct of the intellectual faculties pre- 
supposed by those phenomena. I will close this chapter by 
giving a concise statement of the results of his analysis. 



46 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPnT. 

Intellectual phenomena, according to this philosopher, are 
divided into two classes — those derived from experience j and 
those not derived from experience — the empirical and rational. 

The operations of our own minds, for example, together 
with the qualities of external material substances, are given 
us by the direct intuitions of Sense and Consciousness. Such 
intuitions, therefore, are exclusively empirical, being derived 
solely from experience. 

On the other hand, space is an object neither of Sense nor 
Consciousness. Its reality we know, and know absolutely ; but 
not as an object of experience. The same is true of the ideas 
of Time, the luhnite, Substance, Cause and Effect, &c. 

Rational intuitions are by Kant denominated " intuitions 
di priori." Events, for example, are objects of experience; 
as such we know them. But the proposition, every event has 
a cause, we know d priori, and not by experience. 

Intuitions d priori, have these characteristics, and by these 
they are distinguished from empirical intuitions, viz. : imiver- 
saliti/ and necessity. Though we might know by experience, 
that such and such events have a particular cause, we cannot 
know from experience, that every event has a cause; much 
less, that every event must have a cause. Experience, if it 
could give us what is, could not give us the fact that what is, 
must be. 

The above classification, it will readily be perceived, is, in 
reality, identical with that elucidated in the preceding Chap- 
ter, and leads to precisely the same division of the Intellec- 
tual faculties, a division which Kant, in fact, presents, as the 
result of his investigations. The " h priori" phenomena of 
Kant are those there given as necessary, while his empirical 
intuitions are the contingent phenomena of Sense and Con- 
Bciousness, 



CHAPTER V. 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 
CONSCIOUSNESS DEFINED. 

Of this function of the Intelligence various definitions have 
been given by diflferent philosophers. The following is the 
definition given by Dr. Webster. " The knowledge of sen- 
sations and mental operations, or of what passes in our own 
mind ; the act of the mind which makes known an internal 
object." Cousin represents it as that function of the Intel- 
ligence which " gives us information of everything which 
takes place in the interior of our minds." " Perhaps the 
most correct description of the mind m Consciousness, ^. e., 
of the conscious states of the mind/' says the translator of 
Cousin's Psychology, " is the being aware of the phenomena 
of the mind — of that which is present to the mind; and if 
self-consciousness be distinguished, not ni genera, but as a 
special determination of Consciousness, it is the being aware 
of ourselves, as of the me, in opposition to the not me, or as 
the permanent suhject, distinct from the phenomena of the 
mind, and from all outward causes of them." In simple Con- 
sciousness, accoi-ding to this author, we have a knowledge, in 
conformity to the statement of Cousin, of whatever passes in 
the interior of our own minds, that is, of all our mental exer- 
cises. In self- Consciousness, which is only a special form or 
determination of the former, we know ourselves in those phe- 
nomena, and thus distinguish ourselves from all external 
causes of them. This, certainly, is a very distinct and correct 
exposition of the subject. 



48 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The definition of Professor Tappan, given in his work on 
the Will, though somewhat lengthy, demands special atten- 
tion, on account of the distinctness and correctness with which 
the subject is there presented. 

" Consciousness," he says, '' is the necessary knowledge 
which the mind has of its own operations. In knowing, it 
knows that it knows. In experiencing emotions and passions, 
it knows it experiences them. In willing, or exercising acts 
of causality, it knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This 
is common, universal, and spontaneous Consciousness. 

" This definition may appear to some an identical proposi- 
tion — the mind knows its knowledges, the mind knows its emo- 
tions, the mind knows its acts of causality, may seem to be 
implied, if not affirmed, when we say, the mind knows, feels, 
and wills. Therefore, we would say further : 

*' By Consciousness more nicely and accurately defined, we 
mean the power and act of self-recognition : not, if you please, 
the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and volitions; but 
the mind knowing itself in these." 

In the above definitions the subject is presented with such 
distinctness, and correctness, that I shall attempt no particular 
definition of my own. In the exercise of Consciousness, we 
are not only aware of some mental state, or exercise, but we 
know ourselves, in that state, as the subjects of it. In every 
exercise of thought, feeling, and willing, we not only know 
what these states are, but know ourselves in them, as exercis- 
ing them, and as the subjects of them. Hence all mental 
phenomena, as given in Consciousness, are expressed in pro- 
positions like the following: — I think, I feel, I will; — the 
mental phenomena being given, together with the self, the I, 
as the subject of them. 

A remark, which I deem of special importance to make 
here, is this : In Consciousness, we not only know mental 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 49 

phenomena as they are, but what is in reality implied in such 
knowledge ; we know also the fundamental and distinguishing 
characteristics of such phenomena. If we could merely know, 
by Consciousness, mental-phenomena, and not also their dis- 
tinguishing characteristics, we could never classify and arrange 
such phenomena as the basis of important conclusions in the 
science of Mind. Whatever intelligent affirmations we can 
make respecting ourselves, as beings capable of thinking, feel- 
ing, and willing, we must affirm, on the exclusive authority 
of the characteristics of such phenomena, characteristics per- 
ceived and affirmed by Consciousness. 

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS CONDITIONED ON REASON, BUT NOT A 
FUNCTION OF REASON. 

The exercise of Self- Consciousness, contemplated as a par- 
ticular form or determination of Simple Consciousness, is 
conditioned on the prior exercise of the Reason. It is by 
Reason, as we have already seen, that we know that phenom- 
enon supposes substance, or a subject, and that each particular 
phenomenon supposes a particular subject. But for Reason, 
therefore, whatever mental phenomena might be given in Con- 
sciousness, we could not know, that, for such phenomena, any 
subject whatever is supposed. Simple Consciousness gives us 
mental phenomena. Self-Consciousness, a particular form, or 
determination of the former, connects such phenomena with 
the subject, the reality of which Reason has affirmed, and con- 
nects them in the propositions, I think, I feel, I will, &c. 
While, therefore, Self-Consciousness is conditioned on the Rea- 
son, the former, as a function of the Intelligence, is clearly 
distinguishable from the latter. This is further evident from 
a single consideration. Reason is the organ of a priori, that 
is, universal and necessary truths. This is its exclusive sphere. 
All the affirmations of Consciousness, even in the form called 
5 



50 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Self-Consciousness, bear the characteristic of contingency. A 
sound philosophy, therefore, will not fail, as philosophers some- 
times have done, to distinguish these different functions of the 
Intelligence from each other. 

NATURAL, OR SPONTANEOUS, AND PHILOSOPHICAL, OR RE- 
FLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Consciousness, in its simple spontaneous form, is common 
to all mankind, in the natural development of their Intelli- 
gence. In the language of Cousin, it is, " in all men a natu- 
ral process." Every individual is accustomed to use the pro- 
positions, I think, I feel, I will, &c. All persons are accus- 
tomed, also, to speak of themselves, as conscious of particular 
states, or exercises of mind. This shows, that they not only 
are conscious of their mental exercises, but also are aware of 
the function of the Intelligence exercised under such circum- 
stances. All men, also, in the spontaneous developments of 
Consciousness, clearly distinguish themselves as subjects of 
mental phenomena, from all external causes, or objects of the 
same. They may not be able technically to express this dis- 
tinction with the clearness and definiteness that a philosopher 
would. They may not be able to understand at first, the mean- 
ing of the terms he would employ to express that distinction. 
Still it is, to them, a no less palpable reality, than to him. 

Now Consciousness, which is thus seen to be, " in all men, 
a natural process, some," in the language of the philosopher 
above named, '' elevate this natural process to the degree of an 
art, a method, by reflection, which is a sort of second Con- 
Bciousness — a free re-production of the first ; and as Consci- 
ousness gives all men an idea of what is passing in them, so 
reflection gives the philosopher a certain knowledge of every- 
thing which falls under the eye of Consciousness." Reflection, 
or philosophic Consciousness, is simple or natural Conscious- 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 51 

ness directed by the Will, in tlie act of careful attention to the 
phenomena of our own minds. As natural Consciousness is 
one of the characteristics which distinguishes man from the 
brute, so philosophic Consciousness is the characteristic which 
distinguishes the mental philosopher from the rest of mankind. 
The above remarks may be illustrated by a reference to 
two common forms of observation in respect to external ma- 
terial substances. The phenomena of such substances all 
mankind alike notice, and to some degree reason about. It 
is the natural philosopher, however, who attentively observes 
these phenomena, for the purpose of marking their fundamen- 
tal characteristics, as the basis of philosophic classification, 
generalization, &c. The same holds true in respect to the two 
forms of Consciousness under consideration. Mental phe- 
nomena all men are conscious of, and all men, to a greater or 
less degree, are accustomed to reason about. The philosopher, 
however, by laborious eflForts of self reflection, most critically 
attends to these phenomena, for the purpose of marking their 
characteristics, classifying and arranging them according to 
philosophic principles, and thus determining the powers and 
laws of mental operations. In simple Consciousness, we have 
a knowledge of whatever passes in our minds. In reflection, 
we have the same phenomena classified and generalized, ac- 
cording to fundamental characteristics thus perceived and 
affirmed. 

PROCESS OF CLASSIFICATION AND GENERALIZATION IN RE- 
ELECTION, ILLUSTRATED. 

I will now present a short illustration of this process, for 
the purpose of elucidating the proper method of questioning 
Consciousness, although in so doing I shall allude to a mental 
process of a secondary character, hereafter to be explained. 
The mind perceives, we will suppose, some object, an external 



52 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

material substance, denominated body. With this perception 
there arises the conception of the object as existing somewhere, 
— in space. The proposition, this body exists somewhere, 
or in space, falls under the eye of Consciousness. It is taken 
up by reflection, and by the process of abstraction, hereafter 
to be described, the two elements constituting the proposition 
are separated from each other. Thus the mind obtains two 
distinct ideas, that of body and space. These two ideas are 
now separately considered and marked with their respective 
characteristics of contingency and necessity. Again, some 
event is perceived. With this perception arises the conviction 
that it had a cause. The proposition, this event had a cause, 
falls under the eye of Consciousness. It also is taken up by 
reflection, and by the process above described, two new ideas, 
that of event and causation, marked by their respective char- 
acteristics of contingency and necessity, are obtained. These 
two ideas now being in the mind, by the laws of association, 
the other two, above referred to, are suggested and ranged with 
them in two distinct classes, as contingent and necessary ideas. 
Here we have the process of classification. Now on a further 
examination of the particular ideas comprehended under either 
of the above classes, some new characteristic common to them 
all, may be discovered; as, for example, all contingent ideas 
may be found also to have the characteristic of relative. This be- 
comes a general fact, and we have it in the process of generali- 
zation. The Intelligence now takes up these phemomena, origi- 
nally given by Consciousness, and then analyzed, arranged, and 
generalized by reflection, and gives us the powers and suscepti- 
bilities of the Mind, as indicated by these phenomena, &c. 

FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Such are the nature and functions of Consciousness, to- 
gether with the knowledge derived through it. 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 53 

1. In its original spontaneity, it gives us all the phenomena 
of the mind. 

2. In connection with the Reason, it gives us ourselves as 
the subjects of these phenomena, and as distinguished from 
all existences around us, perceived or apprehended. 

3. In reflection it gives the same phenomena, analyzed, 
arranged, and generalized. 

4. From these data, the Intelligence gives us the nature, 
faculties, susceptibilities, and laws of mental operation, indi- 
cated by these phenomena. 

NECESSITY OF RELYING IMPLICITLY UPON THE TESTIMONY OF 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

In the Introduction, a proof of the possibility of mental 
philosophy, as a science, was attempted. On this point I 
shall add nothing more here. I will make a few remarks upon 
the necessity of relying with implicit confidence upon the 
testimony of Consciousness, as the basis of all conclusions 
pertaining to the science of Mind. The great reason, as I 
suppose, why many individuals are prejudiced against mental 
philosophy, as a peculiarly difficult, obscure, and uncertain 
science, is a secret distrust of the validity of the facts which 
lie at the basis of the science ; in other words, in the credi- 
bility of the witness through whom the facts are obtained. 
In respect to physical science, no such distrust is felt. Man- 
kind generally rest with implicit confidence in the validity of 
Sense, with regard to external, material substances. With 
equal assurance do they, consequently, rest on any conclusions 
legitimately drawn from such phenomena respecting the nature 
and laws of the substances revealed in those phenomena. 
Now, why should we not repose the same faith in the validity 
of the testimony of Consciousness, in respect to those phe- 
nomena which constitute the basis of an infinitely more im- 
5* 



54 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

portant science, the knowledge of Mind, than we do in our 
senses in respect to external, material phenomena ? Of these 
two sciences, that which is by far of the highest concern- 
ment to us, we should not suppose would rest upon the most 
uncertain basis. If we look also at the real facts of the case, 
can any one tell us, or even conceive of the reason why we 
should rest with less assurance in the truth of that of which 
we are conscious, than in that which is perceived and afl&rmed 
by the external senses ? 

The visionary speculations, and dreamy theories of many 
of the most distinguished mental philosophers of ancient and 
modern times, has no doubt contributed (and rightly, too, if 
mad speculations are the legitimate results of the principles 
of the science), to the impression on the minds of many, that 
the Scotchman's definition of Metaphysics must be the true 
one, to wit : *' Metaphysics is, when he that is listening dinna 
ken what he that is speaking means, and he that is speaking 
dinna ken what he means himself." It should be borne in 
mind, however, that up to the time of Bacon, a remark precisely 
similar would have been equally applicable to the speculations 
of natural philosophers ; and that while the principles of phys- 
ical science have, since that period, been settled upon the right 
foundation, the true tnethod in mental science is of compara- 
tively recent development. I will here drop the suggestion, 
whether posterity will not regard itself as almost as much in- 
debted to Victor Cousin for the annunciation of the true 
method in mental Science, as to Bacon for announcing the 
same in respect to physical ? Mental philosophy, just emerg- 
ing from the darkness of ages, seems now to have gained the 
high road to truth, with its laws of investigation correctly set- 
tled. If we would make sure and rapid progress, two things 
are indispensable — that we enter upon our investigations with 
implicit confidence in the validity of the facts of Conscious- 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 55 

ness, as the basis of the science of mind — and that we adhere 
with equally assured confidence to all conclusions to which 
those facts legitimately conduct us. 

CONSCIOUSNESS, A DISTINCT FUNCTION OR FACULTY OF THE 
INTELLECT. 

We are now prepared to answer the question, whether 
Consciousness is a distinct function, or faculty of the Intelli- 
gence ? All philosophers, when speaking of it without refer- 
ence to any pre-formed theory, agree in speaking of it as a 
function as distinct and real as any other. Sense and Reason, 
for example. Yet, by some, the fact that it is such a faculty 
has been denied. Consciousness, says the translator of Cousin's 
Psychology, " is not to be confounded either with the Sensibility 
(external nor internal) nor with the Understanding, nor with 
the Will; neither is it a distinct and special faculty of the 
Mind; nor is it the principle of any of the faculties; nor 
is it, on the other hand, the product of them." It would be 
somewhat difficult, after so many negations, to put anything 
very positive into a definition of the subject. Yet the learned 
author has himself given to \his something a " local habitation 
and a name." " Consciousness," he says, 'Ms a loitness of our 
thoughts and volitions." Now as this witness has a special 
function distinct from every other function of the Intelligence, 
ought we not to conclude that it is a special function of that 
Intelligence ? 

The act of knowing also implies the power of knowledge. 
A knowledge unlike all other knowledges, implies a special 
function of knowledge, a function distinct from every other. 
Is not the knowledge obtained by Consciousness, thus distinct 
from all other knowledges ? Does it not, therefore, imply a 
special function distinct from every other function of the In- 
telligence ? 



66 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Consciousness also, must be a special function, or it must 
be a peculiar function of some other faculty, or of the whole 
together. From Sense and Reason, it is as clearly distinguish- 
able, as either of those is from the other. No one will pre- 
tend, that it is a special function of any of the secondary 
faculties hereafter to be named, nor of all the Intellectual fac- 
ulties together. What shall we regard it then but a special 
function of the Intelligence? 

One other consideration which I present, is, as it appears 
to me, quite decisive of the question under consideration. The 
exerci.se of Consciousness is dependent on the Will, in the 
same sense, that that of the other special functions of the 
Intelligence is. When, for example, an external object makes 
an impression upon one or more of the organs of Sense 
through this function, there is an instant and spontaneous ap- 
prehension of the cause of that impression. Before that 
cause is distinctly perceived, however, the perceptive faculty 
must, by a voluntary act of attention, be directed particularly 
to the object. The specific control which the Will thus exer- 
cises over this faculty, clearly indicates it, as a special function 
of the Intelligence. Now a relation precisely similar, as shown 
above, in respect to its spontaneous, and reflective determina- 
tions, does the Will exercise over Consciousness. We have 
the same evidence that it is a special function of the Intelli- 
gence, that we have that Sense is. 

THEORY OF DR. BROWN. 

I will close my remarks upon the subject of Consciousness, 
by a reference to the theory of Dr. Brown in respect to it. 
Consciousness, according to this philosopher, is simply a gen- 
eral term expressive of all the phenomena or states of the 
mind. " Sensation," he says, for example, " is not an object 
of Consciousness differing from itself, but a particular sensation 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 57 

is the consciousness of the moment, as a particular hope, or 
fear, or grief, or resentment, or simple remembrance, may be 
the actual consciousness of the next moment." 

A single example will fully demonstrate the incorrectness 
of this theory. I affirm (what is actually true), to myself, or 
some other individual, that I am in pain. This affirmation 
imphes three things — the existence of the feeling as a state 
of the Sensibility — an apprehension of pain in general, to- 
gether with that of the particular feeling referred to — and a 
reference of that feeling to myself as the subject, this appre- 
hension and reference being exclusively states of the Intelli- 
gence. Now this knowledge of the feeling under considera- 
tion, with its reference to myself as the subject, is an act of 
Consciousness ; an exercise of the Intelligence which accompa- 
nies all mental states, and which differs as much from sensation, 
or any other state of the Sensibility, as thought differs from such 
states. Sensation then is an object of Consciousness differing 
from itself. The same holds true in respect to all mental ex- 
ercises. /The state itself is one thing. The knowledge of that 
state, ■' ■. reference of it to ourselves is quite another. This 
last e,. ' -ise of the Intelligence is Consciousness, an exercise 
as disimct from the state of which it takes cognizance, as that 
state is from the object which causes it, 

MEANING OF THE TERM CONSCIOUSNESS, AS EMPLOYED BY 
SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON. 

There is an apparent, though not real, discrepancy, if not 
contradiction, in the analysis of the Intellectual faculties, as 
given by Sir William Hamilton, and that developed in this 
Treatise, as far as the function of Consciousness is concerned. 
This discrepancy, on careful examination, however, will be 
found to consist, not in the analysis itself, but simply and ex- 
clusively in the use of terms, which each philosopher is per- 



58 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

mitted to employ according to his own definition. For the 
term Consciousness, as defined and employed in this Treatise, 
he substitutes that of Self-Consciousness, which, as the follow- 
ing paragraph will show, he uses in strict conformity to the 
definition above referred to. In tbe same paragraph also, he 
defines " External Perception or Perception simply," in perfect 
accordance with that given of the term Sense, as employed in 
this Treatise. 

" External Perception or Perception simply, is the faculty 
presevtative or intuitive of the Non-Ego or Matter, if there be 
any intuitive apprehension allowed of the Non-Ego at all. In- 
ternal Percejjtion, as Self-Consciousness, is the faculty presen- 
tative or intuitive of the phenomena of the Ego or mind." 

In a subsequent paragraph, he defines Consciousness itself, 
as the general faculty of Intuition, As thus defined, it would 
include Sense, Consciousness, and Reason, as these terms are 
defined and employed in this Treatise, and would difi"er from 
each of these functions of the Intelligence, only as the whole 
differs from each of its parts. " Consciousness," he says, " is 
a knowledge soleli/ of tchat is now here present to the mind. 
It is therefore only intuitive, and its objects exclusively pre- 
sentative. Again, Consciousness is a knowledge of all that is 
noio here jyrcsent to the mind : every immediate object of cog- 
nition is thus an object of Consciousness, and every intuitive 
cognition itself, simply a special form of Consciousness." 

When, therefore, our author affirms that we are immedi- 
ately conscious of the existence of the " Non-Ego or Matter," 
that is, of its primary qualities, he means, not that such quali- 
ties are the immediate objects of Self-Consciousness, as he has 
defined the term, that is, of Consciousness as defined in this 
Treatise, but that they are the immediate, that is, the " pre- 
sentative or intuitive" objects of the faculty of "External 
Perception, or Perception simply," that is, of Sense, as this 



EVENTS AND CAUSE. 59 

function of the Intelligence is defined in this Treatise. No 
difference of opinion obtains, therefore, between us and our 
author, so far as the analysis of the primary faculties them- 
selves of the Intelligence is concerned. The only difference, 
■which does obtain, is in the use of terms, in respect to which 
even, we would not willingly depart from such authority as 
Sir William Hamilton, but for the fact, that a single term is 
needed in a Treatise like this, to express each special function 
of the Intelligence, that the nomenclature which we have 
adopted has this special advantage over that adopted by our 
author, and that, with all, it is equally definite, and is now 
very generally obtaining in mental philosophy. 



CHAPTEE VI 



Sense has already been defined, as that Faculty or Func- 
tion of the Intelligence, by which we apprehend the phenomena, 
or qualities [primary qualities, as we shall hereafter see] of 
external material substances. 

As thus defined, the exercise of this faculty should be care- 
fully distinguished from those states of the Sensibility denom- 
inated sensations, states which always accompany external per- 
ception, but which are, notwithstanding, none the less, for that 
reason, distinct from it. Sensation is (hat state of the Sensi- 
hility which immediately succeeds any impression made hy 
any cause iipon the physical organization. Sensation is ex- 
clusively a state of the Sensibility. Sense is no less exclu- 
sively a function of the Intelligence. Of these distinctions 
we should never lose sight, when reasoning upon this depart- 
ment of mental science. 

SPONTANEOUS AND VOLUNTARY DETERMINATION OF SENSE. 

Sense, like Consciousness, is, in its primitive developments, 
a simple spontaniety of the Intelligence. Its action, in this 
state, is, in no degree, conditioned on that of the Will. Per- 
ception, in its distinct form, is conditioned on attention, which 
is nothing but the perceptive faculty directed by the Will, and 
hence, for the want of a better term, or phrase, called the 



SENSE. 61 

voluntary determination of the faculty. Attention in the 
direction of Consciousness, that is, when directed to mental 
phenomena — is called reflection. When in the direction of 
the faculty of external perception — that is, towards the phe- 
nomena of material substances — it is called observation. 

The necessity of observation, that is, of attention, in the 
voluntary direction of the perceptive faculty towards phenom- 
ena obscurely given in the spontaneous developments of that 
faculty, may be readily illustrated. A portion of a congrega- 
tion, for example, who have been listening to a certain speaker, 
have fallen into a state of slumber. The speaker suddenly 
stops, and immediately are all aroused. Now, if the audience 
had not, in some form, heard the voice which broke upon their 
ears, why were they roused ? Yet, if inquired of, in respect 
to what had been spoken to them, they would, for the obvious 
and exclusive reason, that they had not attended to it, be 
wholly unable to answer. How often do we hear the remark, 
I gained no distinct conception of that part of a discourse. 
My attention happened, at the time, to be directed to some- 
thing else. 

The attention may, in some instances, be so fixed upon 
some object in one direction, that the Sensibility and Intelli- 
gence both may be almost, if not quite, totally isolated from 
what would otherwise deeply affect us in another direction. 
A gentleman, for example, who was employed about the ma- 
chinery in a factory, had one of his fingers entirely cut off, by 
the sudden and unexpected starting of a portion of that ma- 
chinery which carried, with great velocity, a circular saw. So 
intensely did his attention instantly become occupied with the 
prevention of the destruction of the whole machinery, that he 
was not aware of the injury done to his own person, nor was 
he sensible of the least pain from it, till the accident was 
pointed out to him by another who stood by. As soon, how- 
6 



62 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ever, as the injury was discovered, the pain from it became 
intense. 

The basis of attention is the spontaneous action of the 
Sensibility and Intelligence — action which always occurs, 
when the proper conditions are fulfilled, and when the mind is 
not isolated from objects in other directions, by its intense 
action upon some object (as in the case above cited), in some 
specific direction. 

MENTAL PROCESS IN PERCEPTION. 

The process of the mind, in the perception of external 
objects, is doubtless originally something like this : An im- 
pression is made upon the Sensibility, or a sensation is pro- 
duced, by the action of some external material object upon the 
physical organization. In connection with the sensation, there 
is a direct and immediate spontaneous apprehension (percep- 
tion), of the presence and quality (primary quality, as we 
shall hereafter see), of the object which caused the sensation. 
To this quality the attention, by an act of volition, is then 
directed. Thus the apprehension or perception becomes clear 
and distinct. Sensation always, as a matter of fact, accom- 
panies Sense-perception. Sensation, also, is the occasion of the 
perception, but not its cause, that cause being always found 
in the correlation between the nature of the Intelligence, as a 
faculty^ and that of the Non-Ego or Matter, as an object 
Qii knowledge.* 

* The distinction between a condition, and a cause of a given event 
is obvious, and may be readily elucidated. The removal of an obstruc- 
tion may be the occasion of the descent of a heavy body towards the 
earth; but it is, in no proper sense, the cause of such an occurrence, 
the principle of attraction being itself the real cause. So, in the 
language of Sir William Hamilton, "Sensation proper la the condition 



SENSE. 63 

OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION. 

The objects of Sense-perceptions, which, as we shall here- 
after show, always pertain directly and immediately to said 
objects, are the qualities (primary or secundo-primary quali- 
ties, terms hereafter to be defined) of external material sub- 
stances, qualities, such, for example, as extension, form, so- 
lidity, &c. The secondary qualities, such as those of taste, 
smell, sound, &c., are apprehended indirectly and mediately, 
through, and in the consciousness of sensations. Such quali- 
ties are to us the index, and the only index we have, of the 
nature of their respective subjects. In the consciousness of 
thought, feeling, and acts of will, we know ourselves, as think- 
ing, feeling, and acting beings. So in the consciousness of Sense- 
perceptions, and sensations, produced in us by external mate- 
rial substances, we know such substances as the subjects of the 
qualities thus perceived and apprehended. 

COMMON AND PHILOSOPHIC DOUBTS IN RESPECT TO THE 
COMPARATIVE VALIDITY OF THE AFFIRMATIONS OF SENSE 
AND CONSCIOUSNESS. 

While the mass of mankind appear to exercise more con- 
fidence, theoretically, in the testimony of Sense than in that 
of Consciousness, the case seems, in many instances, to be 
reversed in respect to philosophers. The testimony of Con- 
sciousness the latter appear to regard as valid in respect to 
subjective, while that of Sense is not, in their estimation, 
equally so in respect to objective phenomena. Now the reason 
of the presence of these philosophic doubts, as Colei'idge would 
call them, in the latter instance, and of their absence in the 

sine qua non of a perception proper of the primary qualities." The 
cause proper of the perception, on the other hand, is found, as said 
above, in the correlation between the nature of the Intelligence, as a 
faculty and of the Non-Ego or Matter as an object of perception. 



64 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

former, arises, as I suppose, from the fact that philosophers 
have attempted to explain the quo modo of external percep- 
tion, and not that of internal. This is the very reason for the 
doubts under consideration, assigned by Coleridge himself. 
''As this," he says [to wit, the belief that there exist things 
without us], " on the one hand, originates neither in grounds 
nor arguments, and yet, on the other hand, remains proof 
against all attempts to move it by grounds or arguments 
(jiatura furca exjjellas tamen usque redehit^) on the one 
hand, lays claim to immediate certainty as a position at 
once indemonstrable and irresistible; and yet, on the other 
hand, inasmuch as it refers to something essentially differ- 
ent from ourselves, nay, even in opposition to ourselves, 
leaves it inconceivable how it could possibly become a part of 
our immediate Consciousness (in other words, how that which 
is ex hj/pothesi continues intrinsic and alien to our being) ; the 
philosopher, therefore, compels himself to treat this faith as 
nothing more than a prejudice, innate indeed and connatural, 
but still a prejudice." Now why does this philosopher compel 
himself to treat as a groundless prejudice and an untruth that 
which himself acknowledges to be an innate, connatural belief, 
an irresistible affirmation of his own and of the universal In- 
telligence ? Simply because he cannot explain the q%io modo 
of external perception — cannot see how an object not our- 
selves, and wholly unlike ourselves, as matter is universally 
conceived to be, should be to us an object of knowledge. If 
that is a reason why we should compel ourselves to treat as 
false what we know to be true, it should certainly induce us to 
treat his theory as equally false. For how can we explain the 
manner in which that which is intrinsic and a part of our- 
selves, should be presented to us, by our Intelligence, as wholly 
extrinsic and foreign, and even opposed to ourselves — how if 
can present that which is exclusively sidijective, as wholly oh 



SENSE. 65 

jective — that which is purely spiritual, as wholly material — 
that, in short, which is " without form and void," as possessed 
of a definite form ? The quo modo of knowledge, according 
to this last theory, would be found quite as difficult of expla- 
nation as in conformity to any other whatever. 

Let us now suppose that philosophers should undertake to 
explain the quo modo of knowledge by Consciousness. How, 
for example, can I perceive and attend to an object external to 
m^'self, and yet have, at the same time, a consciousness equally 
distinct of the act of perception itself? Suppose they should 
attempt to explain such mysterious acts of the Intelligence as 
these, and at the same time compel themselves to treat as a 
prejudice all mental affirmations, the mode of origination of 
which they cannot explain. Would not their philosophic doubts 
be quite as strong in respect to the validity of Consciousness, as 
with regard to that of any other function of the Intelligence ? 

THE PROVINCE OP PHILOSOPHY. 

Philosophy, it should be borne in mind, has to do with 
facts as they are, with the nature of the powers revealed in 
those facts, and with the laws in conformity to which those 
powers act. With the mode of their action, further than this, 
it has nothing to do. In the fall of heavy bodies to the earth, 
for example, we learn that attraction is a property of all ma- 
terial substances. We then set ourselves to determine the law 
which controls the action of this property. Here we are within 
the legitimate domain of philosophy. But suppose we attempt 
to explain the mode in which the attractive power acts. " Such 
knowledge is too wonderful for us. It is high, we cannot at- 
tain unto it." Philosophy, well satisfied with her own legiti- 
mate and wide domain, resigns such things to the Eternal One, 
who created all the powers of the universe, and consequently 
understands the mode of their action. All that philosophy 
6* 



66 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

can say in regard to the mode of action of any power is, that 
such is its nature. 

COMPARATIVE VALIDITY OP THE AFFIRMATIONS OP SENSE 
AND CONSCIOUSNESS. 

We are now prepared to contemplate the comparative va- 
lidity of the affirmations of these two functions of the Intel- 
ligence, Sense and Consciousness. I will suppose that I have 
a perception of some external object, as possessed of the qual- 
ities of extension, form, and color. In Consciousness I recog- 
nize the existence of this perception as a phenomenon of my 
own mind. Which of these affirmations are, in reality, the 
most valid, and which would a wise and sound philosophy im- 
pel me to esteem and treat as such — the affirmation of Sense, 
in respect to the qualities of the external object, or of Con- 
sciousness, in regard to the existence and character of the 
affirmation of the former faculty, as a phenomenon of the 
Mind itself? Neither, surely. Each faculty pertains alike to 
its object, by direct and immediate intuition. The affirmation 
of each is alike positive and absolute in re.><pect to its object. 
The action of one is, in realit}^ no more a mystery than that 
of the other. The quo modo of the action of each is alike 
inexplicable, and no more inexplicable than the mode of action 
of every other power in existence. It is a sage remark of Dr. 
Brown, when speaking of the mode in which causes produce 
their re^pective effects, that *' cverijthing is mysterious, or 
nothing is." When philosophy leails us to doubt the real 
affirmations of any faculty of the Intelligence, then philosophy 
it.«elf becomes irapos.-ible, and the attempt to realize it, the 
perfection of absurdity. 

TRUE THEORY OP EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. 

The way is now prepared for an enunciation of the theory 



SENSE. 67 

of external perception, taught in this Treatise. Knowledge 
implies two things, an object to be known, and a subject capa- 
ble of knowing. Between the nature of the subject and ob- 
ject there must be such a mutual correlation, that, when cer- 
tain conditions are fulfilled, knowledge arises, as a necessary 
result of this correlation. Between matter and mind this cor- 
relation exists. The latter knows the former, because the one 
is B, faculty, and the other an object of knowledge. Mind per- 
ceives the qualities of matter, because the former has the 
ipoioer of perception, and the latter is an object of perception. 

Mind also exists in a tri-unity, consisting, as we have seen, 
of the Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will. To each of these 
departments of our nature, the external world is correlated. 
Certain conditions being fulfilled, particular qualities of ma- 
terial substances become to the Intelligence, direct objects of 
knowledge. Other conditions being fulfilled, they affect our 
Sensibility, producing in us certain sensations, either pleasur- 
able, painful, or indifferent. Our Will then acts upon these 
substances, controlling their movements, and modifying their 
states, while they, in turn, react upon the Will, modifying 
and limiting its control. In the first instance, knowledge is 
direct and immediate. In the second, through a consciousness 
of sensations, we learn the correlation between those objects 
and our sensibility. In the last, through a consciousness of 
the nisuses of our W^ill, and an experience of their results, 
we learn the correlation between these substances and our vol- 
untary powers. In respect to the manner in which, when 
certain conditions are fulfilled, we know these objects, the only 
answer that philosophy gives or demands, is this : Such is the 
correlation between the nature of the knowing faculty and 
that of the objects of knowledge. 



bo INTELLECTU^VL PHILOSOPHY. 

Theory Verified. 

It is a sufficient verification of the theory above announced, 
that it is a statement of the case, as it presents itself to the 
universal Intelligence — that it is encumbered with no difficul- 
ties which are not involved in every theory of a different kind 
which has hitherto been presented, and is entirely free from 
those difficulties which are perfectly fatal to those theories. 
Every individual believes, that he knows the external world 
as correlated to the threefold departments of our nature under 
consideration, and in accordance with the principles above 
stated. Every theory also must rest, in the last analysis, in 
respect to the mode of knowledge, upon this one principle, 
The mind knoics, because if, is a faculty of knowledge. The 
difficulties which all theories, contradictory to that above an- 
nounced, involve, are these : either they do not present the 
facts or conditions of knowledge, or the manner of knowing, 
as they are given in the universal Intelligence. 

THE ABOVE THEORY VERIFIED AS A TRUTH OF SCIENCE. 

As this Theory, however, is regarded, by the author of this 
Treatise, not only as true, but also as of fundamental import- 
ance in philosophy, a more extended and logical verification 
of it is deemed requisite, than that above given. 

QUALITIES OF MATTER. 

In accomplishing the object which I have in view, I would, 
in the first place, direct special attention to a consideration of 
the qualities of matter, as given in the universal Intelligence. 
According to Sir William Hamilton, such qualities may, and 
according to a strictly scientific arrangement, should be classed 
as, Primary-proper, Secundo-primary, and Secondary. 



Primary qualities. 

The first class, Primary-proper, include all those properties 
■which belong to Matter, as such, and which cannot, in thought 
even, be separated from it as Matter. The necessary constit- 
uents of our idea of Matter, as such, are two, that it occupies 
space, and is contained in space. Hence, in the language of 
the author referred to, " we have thus eight proximate attri- 
butes : 1. Extension; 2. Divisibility; 3. Size; 4. Density or 
Rarity; 5. Figure; 6. Incompressibility absolute; 7. Mo- 
bility; 8. Situation." That which occupies space, and is con- 
tained in it, must have extension ; else it would fulfill neither 
of these conditions. An extended substance occupying space 
and, at the same time, contained it, must also, be divisible, on 
the one hand, and possess size, on the other, Size which refers 
to the quantity of space which the substance occupies. When, 
on the other hand, we refer to the quantity of matter occupy- 
ing space, we attain to the conception of the quality of Density 
or Rarity. That also which has Extension and Size must have 
Form or Figure. That too which occupies space, and is con- 
tained in it, must be susceptible of motion from one point of 
space to another, and must, at each successive moment, have a 
given situation in space. Hence we have the idea of the qual- 
ities of Mobility and Situation. These then must be reckoned 
as the qualities Primary-proper of Matter. They distinguish 
no one kind of material substance from another, but Matter 
itself from every other substance, and cannot; even in thought, 
be separated from it, as Matter. 

Secundo-primary qualities. 

The Secundo-primary qualities are those which pertain, not 
to Matter, as such, but which distinguish different classes of 
material substances from one another, and which pertain, aa 



70 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

essential qualities, to such classes. Thus bodies are classed, 
in reference to their Gravity and Cohesion, also as Heavy and 
Light, as Hard and Soft, Solid and Fluid, Viscid and Friable, 
Tough and Brittle, Rigid and Flexible, Fissile and Infissile, 
Ductile and Inductile, Elastic and Inelastic, Rough and 
Smooth, Slippery and Tenacious, Compressible and Incompres- 
sible, Resilient and Irresilient, Movable and Immovable. I 
name the qualities, as given by the author above referred to. 
The classification is undeniably correct, and complete. 

Secondary qualities. 

The Secondary qualities are, properly speaking, subjective 
affections in ourselves, and not properties of Matter at all. 
Tlicy pertain to Matter, only as the causes, unperceived in 
themselves, of these affections or sensations. Such, for ex- 
uniplo, are the qualities represented by the terms Sound, Fla- 
vor, Savor, Tactual sensation, &c. 

Whatever may be thought of the propriety of the phrase- 
ology adopted, no one can doubt the reality of the distinctions 
above made, or the consequent propriety of the corresponding 
classification of the qualities of Matter. My own opinion is, that 
it would be as well to retain, for the sake of convenience, the 
old classification of Primary and Secondary, making a subdi- 
vision of the first class, as Primary -proper and Secundo-primary. 

What these qualities are in general. 

As no form of statement can excel that given by our 
author of the general characteristics of these three classes of 
qualities, I will venture to take from his writings the following 
extract, in which we have a specific statement of such charac- 
teristics : 

" 1. The primary are less properly denominated Qualities 
(Suchnesses), and deserve the name only as we conceive them 



SENSE. 71 

to distinguish body from not body — corporeal from incoporeal 
substance. They are thus merely the attributes of hody as 
hody — corporis ut corpus. 

" The Secundo-primary and Secondary, on the contrary, are 
in strict propriety denominated Qualities, for they discriminate 
body from body. They are the attributes of body, as this or 
that kind of body — corporis ut tale corpus. 

" 2. The Primary rise from the universal relations of body 
to itself; the Secundo-primary from the general relations of 
this body to that; the Secondary from the special relations 
of this kind of body to this kind of animated or sentient 
organism. 

''3. The Primary determine the possibility of matter ab- 
solutely; the Secundo-primary the possibility of the material 
universe as actually constituted ; the Secondary the possibility 
of our relations as sentient existences to that universe. 

"4. Under the Primary we apprehend modes of the iVbn- 
ego ; under the Secundo-primary we apprehend modes both of 
the Ego and of the Non-Ego; under the Secondary we appre- 
hend modes of the Ego, and infer modes of the Non-Ego. 

" 5. The Primary are apprehended as they are in bodies; 
the Secondary as they are in us ; the Secundo-primary as they 
are in bodies, and as they are in us. 

" 6. The term quality in general, and the names of the 
qualities in particular, are — in the case of the Primary, unuiv- 
ocal, one designation unambiguously marking out one quality 
— in the case of the Secundo-primary and Secondary equivocal, 
a single term being ambiguously applied to denote two quali- 
ties, distinct though correlative — that, to wit, which is the 
mode of existence in bodies, and which is a mode of affection 
in one organism. 

" 7. The Primary and also the Secundo-primary qualities 
are definite in number and exhaustive, for all conceivable re- 



72 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

lations of body to itself, or of body to body merely, are few, 
and all these found actually existent. The Secondary, on the 
contrary, are in number indefinite ; and they actually hold no 
proportion to the possible. For we can suppose in animal or- 
ganism, any number of unknown capacities of being variously 
affected, and, in matter, any number of unknown powers of 
thus affecting it, and this though we are unable to imagine to 
ourselves what these actually may be." 

As our author subsequently shows, the '' Primary are con- 
ceived as necessary and perceived as actual; the Secundo- 
primary are perceived and conceived as actual ; the Secondary 
are inferred and conceived as possible." " The Primary are 
perceived as conceived. The Secundo-primary are conceived 
as perceived. The Secondary are neither perceived as con- 
ceived, nor conceived as perceived ; for to perception they are 
occult, and are conceived only as latent cau.ses to account for 
manifest effects." The Primary are given in Consciousness, 
as " modes of a not-self; " the Secondary as " modes of self; " 
and the Secundo-primary as '' modes of self and of a not-self 
at once." — " In the apppehension of the Primary qualities 
the mind is primarily and principally active; it feels only as 
it knows. In that of the Secondary, the mind is primarily 
and principally pa.ssive; it knows only as it feels. In the 
Secundo-primary the mind is equally and at once active and 
passive ; in one respect it feels as it knows, in another, it knows 
as it feels." Hence, as our author might have shown, our 
knowledge of the Primary qualities is given in our minds, as 
valid for all Intelligents. Our knowledge of the Secundo- 
primary is given, as, in one form, valid for all Intelligents, and 
in another, as valid only for ourselves in the present consiitution 
of our sensitive nature. Our knowledge of the Secondary 
qualities is given, as valid for ourselves exclusively, and that in 
the sense last named. 



SENSE. 73 

REPRESENTATIVE AND PRESENTATIVE KNOWLEDGE. 

Every one is accustomed to distinguish between that kind 
of knowledge which is direct and immediate, and that which 
is obtained, mediately, that is, through something diflering 
numerically from the object of knowledge. The former kind 
of knowledge, Sir William Hamilton denominates Presentative, 
and the latter, Representative knowledge. " An immediate 
cognition," he says, '■'■ inasmuch as the thing known is it&elf 
presented to observation, may be called presentative, and inas- 
much as the thing presented is, as it were, vieived hy the mind 
face to face, may be called intuitive. A mediate cognition, 
inasmuch as the thing known is held up or mirrored to the 
mind in a vicarious representation, may be call-ed a representa- 
tive cognition." No remarks are necessary to show the reality 
of the above distinction, or the propriety of the phraseology 
employed to represent it. 

TRUE THEORY OF PERCEPTION STATED AND VERIFIED. 

I now lay down the following propositions pertaining to our 
knowledge of the qualities of matter, propositions which I will 
then proceed to verify : 1. Our knowledge of qualities Prim- 
ary-proper of matter is exclusively Presentative, that is, is not 
mediate, but direct and immediate or intuitive. 2. Our 
knowledge of the Secundo-primary qualities is partly Pre- 
sentative, and partly Representative. 3. Our knowledge of 
the Secondary qualities, is wholly and exclusively Representa- 
tive, such qualities being revealed to us, only as the unknown 
causes of known sensations, and revealed also, as exclusively 
through such sensations. 

That our knowledge of the Secondary qualities is wholly, 
and of the Secundo-primary, partly, to say the least, Repre- 
sentative, no one will deny. The only question that can arise, 
7 



74 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

pertains to the matter of fact, whcthei* our knowledge of the 
Primary qualities, and of the Secundo-primary is, in any form, 
Presentative, and not like that of the Secondary, wholly and 
exclusively Representative. That we have a direct and im- 
mediate, that is, Presentative knowledge of the two classes of 
qualities first named, to wit, the Primary, and Secundo-prim- 
ary, I argue from the following considerations : 

1. The fact of such knowledge cannot be shown, d priori, 
to be, in itself, impossible. If an individual should affirm, 
that things equal to the same things are not equal to one an- 
other, we should have no occasion to appeal to experience to 
determine the question, whether such a proposition is, or is 
not, true. Prior to such an appeal, or a priori, we know ab- 
solutely, from the nature of the case, that such a proposition 
is not, and cannot be true. Can we thus know, that a pre- 
sentative knowledge of the qualities referred to, is in itself, an 
impossibility ? Certainly not, and who will affirm the truth 
of the contrary proposition ? Neither the existence, nor the 
extent or limits, of the Faculty of Knowledge, can be known, 
cL priori. The existence of i\\Q poicer of knowledge is revealed 
wholly and exclusively, through the fart of knowledge. The 
extent and limits of the possible reach that power, can be de- 
termined, as exclusively, only by what the mind actually does 
know, and by what is logically implied in such knowledge. 
We can know, aprioi'i, that knowledge cannot extend beyond 
the compass of realities. But how fir such realities are, to 
the intelligence, real or possible, objects of knowledge, or what 
realities do, in fact exist as objects of knowledge, cannot be 
known at all, d priori, but, as said above, wholly and exclu- 
sively, by a reference to what the mind does, in fact, know, 
and to what is necessarily iuiplied in such knowledge. Sup- 
pose, that extended substances actually occupy space, and exist 



SENSE. 75 

in it, and tlie Intelligence cannot affirm the reality of such 
existences, to be a natural impossibility, who Avill pretend to 
say, that a faculty of knowledge may not be given, to which 
the essential qualities of such substances, as Matter, and as 
particular classes of Matter, shall be objects of direct, and 
immediate or Presentative knowledge ? Who will pretend, 
then, to know, a priori, that the human Intelligence, in the 
very condition of its present existence, is not, in fact, just such 
a faculty ; that such qualities do not, in fact, exist, sustaining 
to it the relation of ohjects, while it sustains to them the rela- 
tion of a poicer of real Presentative knowledge ? The reality 
of such qualities as objects, and of the Intelligence, as a power 
of such knowledge, cannot be intelligently affirmed to be, in 
itself, impossible. ' Hence, no evidence does, or can exist, d 
priori, against the truth of the propositions under consider- 
ation. 

2. It cannot be shown, a posteriori, that is, by an appeal 
to facts, that such knowledge does not, in fact, exist in the 
human Intelligence. "We are absolutely conscious, that our 
knowledge of the Secondary qualities of Matter is not Presen- 
tative, but wholly and exclusively Eepresentative. Have we, 
in fact, a similar consciousness, in reference to our knowledge 
of the Primary and Secundo-primary qualities of the same 
substance ? The Secondary qualities are consciously given, in 
the Intelligence, wholly inferrentially as the unknown causes 
of known sensations. Is the quality of extension, in Matter, 
for example, given in the same Intelligence, consciously in the 
same manner, and as a precisely similar cause of a similar 
feeling ? On the other hand, while the Secondary quality is 
given, in Consciousness, as the unknoivn cause of a hnoicn 
state of the Sensihility ; is not the primary quality given, as 
a known ohject of a known state of the Intelligence? We are 



76 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

conscious, that a state of the Sensibility lies between the In- 
telligence, and the unknown cause of that state, the Secondary 
quality, and that the reality of that cause is not directly per- 
ceived, but inferred. Are we also conscious, that a known 
sensation, or state of the Sensibility, lies between the known 
act of the Intelligence above referred to, and its known object, 
the Primary quality, that the sensation is, and the quality is 
not, the immediate object of perception, and that, consequent- 
ly, the quality is consciously not perceived, but its reality, vie- 
diateli/ inferred ? If our knowledge of the Primary qualities 
of matter is not Presentative, but wholly and exclusively Rep- 
resentative, no one will pretend that we have a consciousness 
of the fact; nor will any one attempt to prove the fact, a pos- 
teriori, by an appeal to the facts of Consciousness. 

Nor can the same fact be established by an appeal to any 
known facts connected with the condition of the mind, as con- 
nected with its pTir/sical organization. What shall be the ex- 
tent, limits, or modes of its knowledges, in connection with 
such an organization, or whether it knows all or any of the 
facts referred to mediately or immediately, cannot be deter- 
mined, a priori. All such questions can be intelligently an- 
swered, but by an appeal to Consciousness. Now we are not 
conscious, at all, that all our knowledge of the facts referred to, 
the Primary qualities of our own physical organism, for ex- 
ample, is, in no form, Presentative, but wholly and exclusively 
Representative. 

Nor do any other known facts anywhere exist, in the uni- 
verse of Matter or Mind, from which we can draw the infer- 
ence that our knowledge of these qualities is not Presentative. 
The proposition that this knowledge is Representative, then, 
is neither a necessary intuitive truth, nor is it capable of being 
established, a posteriori, that is, by an appeal to fticts. 



SENSE. 77 

3. Hence, I remark, in the next place, that the theory, 
that all our knowledge of Matter, is exclusively Eepresentative, 
that is, through the consciousness of Sensations, rests upon 
absolutely nothing but a baseless assumption, an assumption 
wholly unsustained by any form or degree of evidence, d 
priori, or a posteriori, that is, an assumption neither self- 
evidently true, nor sustained by any known facts of Matter or 
of Mind. The only merit that can be claimed for it is, that 
like all false theories in mental science, it rests upon a partial 
induction of the facts of Consciousness. That all our know- 
ledge of the Secondary qualities of Matter is exclusively Rep- 
resentative, and derived wholly through a known medium, 
Sensation, is an absolute fact of Consciousness. Upon this 
simple fact, the assumption, on which Philosophy, in all ages, 
has run off the track of truth, has been based, to wit, that all 
our knowledge of all the qualities of the same substance, is, 
and must be, of the same character, and derived exclusively 
through the same medium. No assumption conceivable is, or 
can be, more unreasonable in itself, or more unphilosophically 
induced. How unreasonable the assumption, that because 
qualities of a given character, and universally recognized as 
not fundamental, are known in a given manner, that therefore 
qualities of a totally different and opposite character, and uni- 
versally recognized as fundamental, must be known in the 
same manner, and through the same uncertain medium. 

4. The origin of this assumption should not be overlooked, 
in this connection, as having a not unimportant bearing upon 
our present inquiries. This assumption had its origin in an 
attempt to determine, d priori, the nature, extent, limits and 
mode of human knowledge, facts none of which can, by any 
possibility, be determined only d p>osteriori, or by an appeal to 
Consciousness. These are all, it should be borne in mind, as 

7* 



78 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

facts, contingent and not necessary truths. They cannot, 
therefore, be determined, a priori, but must be resolved wholly 
d 2^osteriori. This assumption, therefore, is the exclusive re- 
sult of a most unscientific procedure in philosophy, a procedure 
in which mere guessing has ever been substituted for certain 
knowledge, when the latter was in the immediate presence of 
the philosopher, and when no higher merit was attained, than 
very poor guessing at that. 

5. I now adduce, in favor of the truth of the three proposi- 
tions under consideration, to wit, that our knowledge of the 
Primary qualities of Matter is wholly Presentative, that that 
of the Secundary-primary is partly Presentative and partly 
Representative, and finally, that that of the Secondary is 
wholly Pi.eprcsentative, the direct, immediate, and absolute 
testimony of universal Consciousness. No one will deny, that 
in the universal Consciousness, the Primary quality is recog- 
nized as the known oLJect of a known act of the Intelligence 
(Sense-perception), and that the Secondary quality is also 
recognized as the unknown cause of a known state of the Sen- 
sibility (Sensation). Nor does any one doubt that our know- 
ledge of the Sensation itself is Presentative, wholly so. Now, 
in all proper Sense-perceptions, we have, undeniably, just as 
distinct and absolute a consciousness of a direct and immedi- 
ate or Presentative aspect or knowledge of the Primary qualitj', 
extension for example, as we have of the Sensation itself, when 
produced by the unknown cause referred to, the Secondary 
quality. It would be a denial of the facts of Consciousness 
no more palpable, to af&rm, that our knowledge of Sensation 
itself is wholly Representative, than it would be, to affii*m, that 
our knowledge of the Primary qualities is not Presentative. 
No honest interpreter of the facts of Consciousness will deny 
the truth of these statements. The truth of the propositions 
under consideration can be denied, but upon one assumption, 



SENSE. 79 

that tte same faculty affirms, witli the same absoluteness, what 
is true in regard to Sensation, and what is not true in regard 
to Sense-perception. The true and only true interpretation of 
the facts of Consciousness, on the subject, is this : The Pri- 
mary qualities are given in Consciousness, exclusively as the 
known presentative objects of known acts of the Intelligence, 
Sense-perceptions. The same holds true of the Seeundo-pri- 
mary, so far as they are given as qualities of Matter. So far 
forth as they are given as causes of Sensations, they are given 
as the otherwise unknown causes of known states of the Sen- 
sibility. The Secondary, on the other hand, ai-e given exclu- 
sively as such causes of such states, and in no other form as 
objects of knowledge. In reference to the Secondary quali- 
ties, and of the Secundo-primary, so far forth as they are given 
as causes of sensations, we are conscious of the presence of a 
medium between us and the object of knowledge, and that it 
is wholly through such medium that the object is known. In 
reference to the Primary qualities, and the Secundo-primary, 
so far as the latter are regarded as essential qualities of their 
respective subjects, we are conscious of no medium between us 
and the object of knowledge, and still less of the fact, that it 
is wholly through such medium that the object is known. We 
can therefore, by no possibility, have a consciousness, that any 
form of knowledge whatever is Presentative, if we have not 
that such is the character of our knowledge of the qualities 
last named. 

6. I remark, in the next place, that our knowledge of the 
Primary qualities has all the essential characteristics of Pre- 
sentative, and none of those of Representative knowledge; 
while thiit of the Secondary has all of the characteristics of 
Eepresentative, and none of those of Presentative knowledge. 
Our knowledge of the Secundo-primary, on the other hand, so 
far forth as they are given, as objects of Sense-perceptions, has 



80 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

all, and exclusively, the characteristics Presentative, and so far 
forth, as thej are given as causes of sensations, has all, and 
exclusively, the characteristics of Kepresentative knowledge. 
In Representative knowledge, the object is never given, asper- 
ceived, but its reality exclusively, as inferred; precisely the 
opposite obtains, in all respects, in Presentative knowledge. 
In this case, the object is given, as known in itself, that is, its 
reality is given, not as inferred, but as perceived. These are 
the fundamental distinctions between Presentative and Piepre- 
sentative knowledge. 

Now the Secondary qualities of matter are given, in our 
Intelligence, as not known in themselves. Their reality is 
given exclusively, as inferred, as known only relatively. The 
Primary qualities are given exclusively, as known in themselves, 
and their reality as perceived, and not as inferred. The Se- 
cundo-primary are given partly, as perceived, and partly, as 
inferred, and that just so flir forth as they rank with the Pri- 
mary, on the one hand, and with the Secondary, on the other. 
We experience a sensation pleasurable or painful. We afl&rm, 
that it had a cause, and that in the cause, there is a quality 
adapted to affect our Sensibility, in the manner referred to, 
while that Sensibility remains constituted as it now is. The 
reality of the cause and the quality is given, as not perceived, 
but inferred, and the nature of the quality, not as known as it 
is in itself, but only relatively to our Sensibility. The Primary 
quality, on the other hand, that of extension for example, is 
given as known in itself, and its reality is affirmed as perceived, 
and not as inferred as the unknown cause of a known sensa- 
tion, as is true of the Secondary qualities. The same holds true 
of all the Primary qualities, and of the Secundo-primary, so far 
as the latter take rank with the former. We can, by no pos- 
sibility, make a distinction between Presentative and Represen- 
tative knowledge, if we have not these two kinds of knowledge 



81 



before us, if our knowledge of the Primary qualities of Mat- 
ter is not exclusively of the former kind, and of the Secondary 
of the latter, and if that of the Secundo-primary does not, in 
the sense explained, partake partly of both. 

7. There are also undeniable facts of Consciousness which 
can be explained but upon the admission of the truth of the 
propositions which I am now endeavoring to establish. It will 
not be denied either, that our knowledge of the Primary, and, 
in the sense explained, of the Secundo-primary qualities of 
Matter, is Presentative, or that all our knowledge of Matter is 
equally and in the same sense Representative, and derived en- 
tirely through the same medium, Sensation. On the latter 
supposition, all qualities alike should be given, in precisely the 
same form, as exclusively the unknown causes of known sen- 
sations, and all alike given, not as known in themselves, but 
only relatively. Their reality also should be given, as not per- 
ceived, but inferred. Now how can one class of qualities, all 
of which are alike exclusively objects of Representative know- 
ledge, and known as exclusively through the same identical 
medium, be given in Consciousness, as the objects exclusively 
of Presentative and the other as exclusively of Representative 
knowledge; the one class as known in themselves, and the 
other as known only relatively ; the one class, as exclusively 
the known objects of known perceptions, and the other with 
equal exclusiveness, as the unknown causes of known sensa- 
tions; the one class as directly perceived, and the other as 
merely inferred qualities ? On this theory, the theater of Con- 
sciousness is one exclusive scene of palpable contradictions 
more irreconcilable than the discords of Chaos and Old Night. 
If, on the other hand, we suppose that our knowledge of the 
Primary qualities is really and truly Presentative, and that of 
the Secondary as really and truly Representative, and finnlly, 



82 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

that that of the Secundo-primary blends, in the sense ex- 
phiined, both forms of knowledge, then all the facts of Con- 
sciousness bearing upon the subject, are susceptible of a ready 
and perfectly consistent explanation, and they can be explained 
upon no other supposition. 

8. I remark, finally, that the existence of the conceptions 
of these qualities, just as they lie in the Consciousness, can, 
by no possibility, be accounted for, on the supposition, that all 
our knowledge of Matter is derived exclusively through Sen- 
sation, and can be accounted for but upon the assumption of 
the truth of the propositions which I am endeavoring to estab- 
lish. We will take, as an example, one quality, that of exten- 
sion. The conception of this quality must have had its origin 
primarily in the mind, in consequence of the quality itself 
having been originally the object of immediate perception, that 
is, of Presentative knowledge; or it must have been derived 
mediately, as the logical antecedent or consequent of sensation. 
The direct and immediate perception of the quality will account 
for the idea of said quality in the mind. Suppose we reject 
this supposition, and attempt to account for the existence of 
the idea mediately, as the logical antecedent or consequent of 
Sensation. If the idea be assumed as the logical antecedent 
of the consciousness of Sensation, then the reality of the 
quality must be supposed to account for the existence of the 
sensation itself If, on the other hand, the idea be assumed 
as the logical consequent of the consciousness of the Sensa- 
tion, then the quality must be held as an eflfect of the Sensa- 
tion, and Sensation as the cause of said quality. No one will 
take the latter position. Let us, for a few moments, look at 
the former. As the cause of the sensation, the quality would 
be known not as it is in itself, but only as the unknown cause 
af a known sensitive state. It would be the object, not of 



absolute but of relative knowledge. Further, nothicg is ne- 
cessarily supposed, in the cause, which is not as absolutely 
revealed in the effect. Now the sensation has, in itself, the 
phenomena, neither of length, breadth, nor thickness. How 
can the consciousness of such a phenomenon suggest even the 
idea of the quality of extension, as the cause of such a phe- 
nomenon ? Nothing conceivable can be more unphilosophical 
than tbe supposition of such an origination of this idea. Its 
existence in the Intelligence can be scientifically accounted for, 
but upon one supposition, that the quality of extension was 
itself originally given as the object of Presentative knowledge. 
So of all the other Primai-y qualities of Matter, and of the 
Secundo-primary, so far as they take rank with the Primary, 

The truth, then, of the propositions under consideration, 
may be assumed as a truth of science, and, as such, employed 
in the elucidation of the various functions of the Intelligence. 

FALSE THEOKIES OE EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. 

Theories of Sense-perception differing from that above elu- 
cidated, Theories formed by philosophers to explain the man- 
ner in which the mind perceives external material objects, di- 
vide themselves into two classes — those which affirm, that 
our knowledge of such objects is real — and those which affirm 
that it is not real, and that all that we can know of such ob- 
jects is our manner of conceiving of them. 

Of the former Theories, there are two subdivisions, both 
agreeing in this, that our knowledge of Matter is, in no form, 
Presentative. The first affirms, that we know external mate- 
rial objects through the medium of certain Images existing 
between such objects and the faculty of knowledge. The sec- 
ond affirms, that all our knowledge of such objects is esclu- 
eively representative, and derived wholly through the medium 



84 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY, 

of Sensation. The former I will venture to denominate the 
Scholastic Theory. The latter has, by Sir William Hamilton, 
been very properly denominated the Cosmothetic Theory 
The Theories which affirm that our knowledge of matter is, in 
no sense, real or valid for the reality or true character of its 
object, we will denominate the Idealistic Theories. As thus 
designated, we will notice them, in the order named above. 

THE SCHOLASTIC THEORY. 

To all of the forms in which this Theory has been devel- 
oped, says Mr. Dugal Stewart, " I apprehend the two following 
remarks will be found applicable : First, that in the formation 
of them, their authors have been influenced by some general 
maxims of philosophizing borrowed from physics; and, sec- 
ondly, that they have been influenced by an indistinct, but 
deep-rooted conviction of the immateriality of the soul ; which, 
although not precise enough to point out to them the absurdity 
of attempting to illustrate its operations by the analogy of 
matter, was yet sufficiently strong to induce them to keep 
the absurdity of their theories as far as possible out of view, 
by allusions to those physical facts, in which the distinctive 
properties are the least grossly and palpably exposed to our 
observation. To the former of these circumstances is to be 
ascribed the general principle upon which all the known 
theories of perception are produced, to the latter, the various 
metaphorical expressions of ideas, species, forms, shadows, 
phantasms, images; which, while they amused the fancy with 
some remote analogies to the object of our senses, did not di- 
rectly revolt our reason." Very little in addition to the obser- 
vations above cited, need be said upon these theories. They 
all agree in leaving totally unexplained the very difficulties 
which they profess to explain, to wit, How can the mind per- 
ceive an object out of itself, and at a distance from itself? 



SENSE. 85 

The image between the mind and the object, is as really dis- 
tinct from the mind, and as really removed from it, though at 
a less distance, as the object itself Perception of the inter- 
mediate image is just as difficult of explanation, and as truly 
needs another intermediate image, as perception of the object 

THE COSMOTHETICAL THEORY. 

According to the Cosmothetic Theory, we have no Pre- 
sentative knowledge whatever of the material universe. All 
such knowledge, on the other hand, is, as we have said above, 
altogether Representative, and derived exclusively, through 
the medium of Sensation. If the material universe had no 
existence, and we had the same sensations that we now have, 
sensations produced by any cause whatever, the immediate in- 
terposition of Deity, for example, we should have, from the 
laws of our Intelligence, precisely the same Sense-perceptions, 
apprehensions, and knowledge that we now have, and the ex- 
ternal universe would be just as real to us, as it now is, and 
in all resp-octs just what it is. Grod has so constituted our In- 
telligence, that, on occasion of these Sensations, our percep- 
tions, &c., became what they are. We are so constituted also, 
that we instinctively helieve the universe to be what we have 
conceived it, or rather perJiajJS imagined it, to be. In consti- 
tuting us with such an instinctive belief, the divine veracity 
stands pledged, that what we thus believe in must be real : for 
God would not constitute us thus to believe in what is unreal. 
Thus we are required to believe in an external material uni- 
verse, not because we have, in fact, in our experience, any 
actual knowledge or perception of its reality, any real evidence 
of the fact. Our belief, on the other hand, really rests upon 
such grounds as the following : 1. Such is the constitution 
of our intelligence, that on occasion of sensations induced in 
us, we conceive of an external material universe, as their 



86 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

cause. 2. From the laws of the same constitution also, we 
instinctively believe in the reality of that of which we have 
formed a conception. 3. In this constitution, we have a direct 
revelation from the author of nature, that what we thus ap- 
prehend and instinctively believe in as real, is real. 4. On the 
ground, therefore, not of our own perceptions and knowledges, 
but of the veracity of the author of nature, we believe in the 
reality of the material universe. This is tiie ground on which 
Christian Theists, holding the Sensational Theory, do, in ftict, 
believe in the reality of the material universe, and is the only 
ground on which they can, by any possibility, believe in it. 
On this Theory we need only make the following remarks : 

1. It has already been proved to be false. 

2. It is in itself, most palpably self-destructive, and self- 
contradictory. According to it, God has so constituted our 
Consciousness, that, in it, the material universe is given, as, in 
very fundamental respects, the object of real Presentative, 
while it is, in fact, the exclusive object of Representative 
knowledge, and also that certain qualities of Matter are given, 
as the known objects of known states of the Intelligence, while 
they are, in fact, nothing but the unknown causes of known 
states of the Sensibility. Now if the author of nature has de- 
ceived us in the constitution of our Consciousness, why should 
we suppose, that He has not done the same thing, in reference 
to our instinctive beliefs ? If the voice of the author of na- 
ture is to be heeded, in our Instinctive beliefs, why not, in the 
revelations of Consciousness? We should then be required 
to contradict this Theory, and hold, that certain qualities of 
matter are, in reality, what they are given, in our Conscious- 
ness, as being, to wit, the real objects of Presentative knowl- 
edge. 

3. This Theory also involves a most vicious reasoning in a 
circle. We first reason from this very universe to the reality 



SENSE. " 87 

of the Divine existence and attributes, and then backward from 
the reality of the Divine existence and attribues to that of the 
univorse from which we started. We must first know the 
universe, at least as real, before we can reason at all, legiti- 
mately, from it, to its author or any of his attributes. If the 
universe, as this Theory affirms, is in reality in itself unknown 
to us, we can only find, through it, an unknown Grod, a God, 
from whose attributes, we cannot legitimately reason to any- 
thing. .Nothing further need be added to prove that such a 
Theory cannot be true. 

THE IDEALISTIC THEORIES. 

Of the Theories which affirm, that our knowledge of the 
material universe is, in no sense real, some affirm, that there 
are no objects whatever external to the mind, that what we 
have postulated, as the qualities of objects external to us, are, 
in fact, nothing but our own mental states seen by the eye 
of Consciousness. This is the Theory of Coleridge, and of 
modern Transcendentalists generally. Others maintain the 
reality of something called mind, on the one hand, and of a 
something not mind, on the other. They deny, however, that 
the latter can be to the former, in any sense, an object of real 
knowledge, or that either is, in itself, what we take it to be. 
When this unknown something, having in itself neither ex- 
tension nor form, and existing nowhere and in no time (inas- 
much as neither time nor space are realities in themselves, but 
only modes in us of conceiving of things as external to us), 
when I say, this unknown and nameless something, in some 
unknown and nameless manner, affects the unknown something 
called mind — the latter, by virtue of laws innate in itself, 
postulates to itself its own sensations as the qualities of sub- 
stances distinct from itself. Thus the great universe, in which 
we contemplate ourselves as existing, together with time and 



88 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

space, in which wc contemplate ourselves and the universe aa 
having being, is nothing in itself but a fiction of our own In- 
telligence. This is the theory of Kant, stated without carica- 
ture. Both the kinds of theories under consideration agree 
in this, that what our Intelligence postulates as the qualities 
of external substances, are, in reality, nothing but mental 
states seen by the eye of Consciousness. External perception 
is nothing but the eye of Consciousness directed to an affection 
wholly subjective, which the Intelligence postulates as the 
quality of something objective and external to the mind. In 
Consciousness, mental affections of different kinds are given 
as subjective and objective : that is, some are given as phe- 
nomena of the mind itself, and others as those of objects ex- 
ternal to the mind. Hence, according to philosophers main- 
taining these theories. Consciousness has two distinct functions, 
the external and the internal. When taking cognizance of 
some affection which the Intelligence has postulated as a sub- 
jective phenomenon, this is Consciousness in the exercise of 
its interior function. When taking cognizance of some affec- 
tion which the Intelligence postulates as a phenomenon of an 
object external to the mind, this is Consciousness in the exer- 
cise of its exterior function. Sense, according to these theo- 
ries, is not a faculty of knowledge at all ; but only a receptivity 
of affections or impressions, postulated by the Intelligence as 
the qualities of objects external to the mind. Thus that 
which we have been accustomed to regard as a real world ex- 
ternal to the mind, and altogether unlike ourselves, has no 
existence out of ourselves. Neither the universe, nor its 
author have any existence in itself. They are mere ideals of 
our own creating ; ideals grand and perfect, and which we are 
therefore bound to regard and revere, not as realities in them- 
selves, but as grand conceptions — sublime creations of our 
own Intelligences, creations which are true, as Coleridge re- 



marks simply and exclusively, ''because we have conceived 
them.'^ 

Reasons for these Theories. 

Among the reasons given for these theories, the most im- 
portant, and all that I now need to notice, are the following : 

1. They explain the possibility of knowledge. Of all 
things real to us, as objects of knowledge, we have a direct 
and immediate Consciousness. All objects of knowledge, 
therefore, are brought within the sphere of direct mental vision. 
The possibility of perception is thus fully demonstrated. 

2. These theories render the reality and certainty of know- 
ledge self-evident. If nothing exists in the object, but what 
our Intelligence has put there, our knowledge of the object 
must be real, certain, and absolute. If, for example, nothing 
exists in a contribution box but what I have put there, and I 
know what I have put into it, then my knowledge of what the 
box contains is real and absolute. So when I contemplate an 
object which my Intelligence has postulated as external to 
myself, if that object is in reality nothing but a pure creation 
of my Intelligence, and contains nothing but what the same 
Intelligence has put into it, how demonstrably manifest it is, 
that my knowledge of the object is real and absolute. 

Objections to these Theories. 

But while these theories apparently, at first thought, com- 
mend themselves to our minds, as explaining things which 
would otherwise be wholly inexplicable to us, they are at 
once, in our Intelligence, met with difficulties perfectly insur- 
mountable. 

1. They leave totally unexplained the same mystery hanging 
over the subject which they profess to explain, that hung over 
it before, to wit, the possibility of knowledge. The distance 



90 INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHY. 

between the subject and object of knowledge is, to be sure, 
greatly abridged ; inasmuch as all things are brought under the 
immediate vision of Consciousness itself. A theory, however, 
which is valid as an explication of the jjossibil it >/ of knowledge, 
must explain the possibility, not of one, but of all kinds of 
knowledge. Now the theories under consideration, explain, in 
a certain form, the possibility of what is called external percep- 
tion. But they leave wholly unexplained the possibility of 
knowledge of another kind, the possibility of which needs to 
be explained, just as much as that of the former, to wit, the 
possibility of knowledge hy Consciousness. Suppose an expli- 
cation of the possibility of a knowledge of our own mental 
states be demanded, what answer can be given, but that which 
is rejected as valid, in regard to the possibility of external per- 
ception — to wit, that Consciousness, relatively to mental states, 
is H, faculty, and the states themselves are objects of perception, 
or knowledge. Now this explication, the only one possible, in 
the case under consideration, and indeed in any case whatever, 
is equally valid, as an explanation of the possibility of external 
perception. We have only to postulate the Intelligence as a 
faculty, and external substances as objects of perception, and 
the possibility of such knowledge is just as manifest as knowl- 
edge by Consciousness, or through any other function of the 
Intelligence. 

2. These theories leave another mystery, still more inexpli- 
cable, hanging over the question in respect to the possibility 
of knowledge, to wit, how can the Intelligence postulate a 
purely mental affection as exclusively the quality of an exter- 
nal object ? In other words, how can the Intelligence give a 
phenomenon as pertaining, an object wholly distinct from and 
independent of the precipient subject, which, after all, is noth- 
ing but a phenomenon of that subject? Above all, how can 
the Intelligence first give an affection purely subjective, as a 



SENSE. 91 

quality exclusively objective, and afterwards give the same 
quality as exclusively subjective, and that without the possibil- 
ity, as Coleridge acknowledges, of considering it, as anything 
but objective ? All these contradictions take place in the inte- 
rior of our intelligence, in respect to external perception, ac- 
cording to the theories under consideration — contradictions 
perfectly equivalent to the declaration, that the same thing, at 
the same time, is, and is not. Should it be said, that this pro- 
cess is possible to the Intelligence, because, that such is its na- 
ture, the same explanation renders equally explicable, the 
possibility of external perception as maintained in this Trea- 
tise, a fact denied exclusively on the ground of its inexplica- 
bility. 

3. The explication which these theories give of the fact of 
perception is, in reality, the destruction of the fact, and not its 
explication at all. In the Intelligence, there appears a percep- 
tion of an external object. Philosophy is called upon for an 
explanation of the fact. The fact to be explained is that of 
the perception of such objects. As such exclusively, it is to 
be explained, and not as something different from a real percep- 
tion of something external. This is what philosophy is bound 
to do, if she speaks at all. Now what is the explication given 
by the theories under consideration ? The perception of an ob- 
ject external to the mind, is explained by a profound demon- 
stration, that no such object, nor perception of such object, 
exists in the Intelligence, and that such perception is an inex- 
plicable impossibility. Now this is not the explanation of a 
fact, but its destruction, the most unphilosophical procedure — 
a procedure very much like the Frenchman's definition of the 
flea, to wit, an animal upon which, if you put your finger, he 
is not under it. 

4. These theories involve an explication equally sophistical 
and unphilosophical of the question, in respect to the certainty 



92 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and reality of knowledge. An apprehension of an object exists in 
the Intelligence. Philosophy is called upon to answer the ques- 
tion, whether this apprehension is valid, in respect to the ob- 
ject? If it is so, our knowledge is real, certain. What 
answer do these theories give to this question? This: Our 
knowledge is certain and absolute, for the obvious reason, that the 
object has no existence at all ; that the perception itself is the 
only thing real, and as it contains nothing but what the Intel- 
ligence has put into it, therefore our knowledge is real and ab- 
solute. What a strange answer this to the question, the only 
question submitted to philosophy, to wit, the validity of the 
perception relatively to its object. 

5. These theories annihilate wholly all distinctions between 
truth and error, all criteria of truth whatever. The reality, 
the certainty of knowledge, according to these theories, consists 
in this — that as our conceptions are the only realities existing, 
and as these contain nothing but what the Intelligence puts 
into them, therefore our knowledge is real, is absolute. Now, 
this condition of certainty holds, in respect to one conception, 
just as well as another; and if this is the condition of cer- 
tainty, the Avildest vagaries of the maniac are just as true as 
the sublimest demonstrations of Newton. 

6. Finally, all such theories give a totally false explication of 
the real procedure of the Intelligence in respect to knowledge 
of every kind. Let any one attempt to apply such theories, as 
elucidating the process of his own mind in its perceptions and 
knowledges, and the efFect cannot be better expressed, than in 
the following extract of a letter written to Coleridge by a 
friend, explaining to the philosopher the effect of a careful 
study of his theory of the Imagination : 

"As to myself, and stating, in the first place, the effect on 
my understanding, your oj^inions and method of argument 
were not only so new to me, but so directly the reverse of all I 



had ever been accustomed to consider as truth, that, even if I 
had comprehended your premises sufficiently to have admitted 
them, and had seen the necessity of your conclusions, I should 
still have been in that state of mind, which, in your note, p. 
251, you have so ingeniously evolved, as the antithesis to that 
in which a man is when he makes a hull. In your own words, 
I should have felt as if I had been standing on my head. 

" The effect on my feelings, on the other hand, I cannot 
better represent, than by supposing myself to have known only 
our light, airy, modern chapels of ease, and then, for the first 
time, to have been placed, and left alone, in one of our largest 
Gothic cathedrals, in a gusty moonlight night of autumn. ' Now 
in glimmer, now in gloom ; ' often in palpable darkness, not 
without a chilling sensation of terror; then suddenly emerging 
into broad, yet visionary light, with colored shadows of fantas- 
tic shapes, yet all decked with holy insignia and holy symbols ; 
and ever and anon, coming out full upon pictures, and stone- 
work images, and great men, with whose names I was familiar, 
but which looked upon me with countenances, and an expres- 
sion, the most dissimilar to all I had been in the habit of con- 
necting with those names. Those whom I had been taught to 
venerate as almost superhuman in magnitude of intellect, I 
found perched in little fret- work niches, as grotesque dwarfs; 
while the grotesques, in my hitherto belief, stood guarding the 
high altar with all the characters of apotheosis. In short, what 
I had supposed substances, were thinned away into shadows, 
while, everywhere, shadows were deepened into substances : 

* If substances may be call'd what shadows seem'd, 
For each seemed either ! ' " 

Now, a theory which gives such an explanation of the pro- 
cess of the human Intelligence as this, does not give a true ex- 



94 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

position of that process. There is surely no presumption in 
such an affirmation as this. 

In the remarks above made upon the theories under con- 
sideration, I have anticipated some things which properly be- 
long to a later department of mental science; no more, 
however, than was necessary to a distinct presentation of our 
present subject of investigation. 

The hypothesis that all our knowledge of Matter is 

DERIVED through SeNSATION EXCLUSIVELY, THE MAIN 
SOURCE OF ERROR, IN PHILOSOPHY. 

Before leaving this department of our inquiries, a few re- 
marks are deemed requisite upon the main source of error, in 
Philnsopliy. All systems of false Philosophy, almost without 
exception, have one common basis, and start from one common 
assumption, to wit, that all our knowledge of Matter is Repre- 
Beutative, and derived exclusively, through one medium, Sen- 
sation. If this hypothesis is true, as we have already seen, all 
our perceptions, apprehensions, and knowledge, pertaining to 
Matter, would be, in all respects, just what they are, provided 
we had all our present sensations, as they are, whatever may 
be the cause of such states, and whether any external material 
universe exists or not. As these causes also are, and must 
be, to us, according to this hypothesis, wholly unknown as 
they are in themselves, being given in the Intelligence exclu- 
sively, as the unknown causes of known states of the Sensibil- 
ity, we can, by no possibility, determine whether our present 
impressions, in respect to them, be true or false, whether they 
are, in reality, extended or unextended substances, whether 
they are material or immaterial, finite or infinite, and whether 
they are objective or subjective, whether they exist out of, and 
separate from, the mind, as real Non-Egoes, or whether they 
are inherent principles of our own nature. 



SENSE. 95 

We have, therefore, and cannot but have, according to this 
hypothesis, just as many theories of perception, and of nature 
too, as we have conceivaUe causes of our sensations. All these 
theories have perfectly equal claims, and each of them has ab- 
solutely no claims whatever to be regarded as true. If also, 
our knowledge of what is given in Consciousness, as the Kon- 
E<jo, or Matter, is thus uncertain, it must be equally so in re- 
spect to the Ego or Mind itself. The same Intelligence which 
has thus deceived us, in the one case, cannot but have done the 
same in the other. Of nature, subjective and objective, we can 
have no certain knowledge. If we attempt to pass " through 
nature up to nature's Grod," every step of our progress must 
be in absolute midnight. We are advancing through the abso 
lute unknown, to find the unknown. Grod, accordingly, can be 
nothing to us, but an unknown and unknowable something, sus- 
taining unknown and unknowable relations to an unknown and 
unknowable something called the Universe. The only proper 
altar of worship that can be raised to such a being, will have 
upon it the inscription, "To the Unknown God." Absolute 
skepticism, in regard to the possibility of all knowledge, objec- 
tive or subjective, and pertaining to the Finite or the Infinite, 
is the only true Philosophy. All systems of Realism resting 
as most of them do, upon the Sensational hypothesis, are mov- 
ing on the track of truth, only by a happy, but palpable viola- 
tion of their own foundation principle. David Hume was a 
universal skeptic, and the evangelical philosophers of his own 
age, who held with him this hypothesis, were believers in the 
truth, simply and exclusively because he reasoned logically, 
and they most illogicaly from the fundamental principle which 
they held in common. All the consequences above alluded to, 
arise from the hypothesis under consideration, and can, by no 
possibility, be separated from it. 

In regard to this hypothesis, I need only remark, in this 



96 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

connection, that we have already demonstrated, as we judge, 
the fact, that it cannot be true. In showing that our know- 
ledge of some of the qualities of matter is, in fact, Presenta- 
tive, we have shown that all our knowledge of Matter is not, 
and cannot be, what this hypothesis affirms it to be, exclusively 
Representative. In showing, as we have done, that some of 
these qualities are the known Presentative objects of known 
acts of the Intelligence, we have shown, that they are not, as 
they must be exclusively, according to this hypothesis, the un- 
known causes of known states of the Sensibility. Universal 
Consciousness is itself a lie, if this hypothesis is true. 

There is one fundamental fact alluded to above, but which 
was not brought to bear in the preceding argument, that I will 
adduce in this connection. Our knowledge of the Secondary 
qualities of Matter, and of the Secundo-primar}', so far as they 
take rank with the Secondary, is given in Consciousness, as 
valid, only to ourselves, and to ourselves only as our sensitive 
nature is now constituted. Our knowledge of the Primary 
qualities, and of the Secundo-primary, so far as they take rank 
with the former, is given in the same Consciousness, as valid 
for all Intelligeuts, whatever the constitution of their sensitive 
nature may be. Now, if all our knowledge of all the qualities 
of matter alike, was derived through Sensation, it would be 
given in its entireness in Consciousness, as only valid for our- 
selves, and for ourselves only in the present constitution of our 
sensitive nature. It is not thus given, and therefore the Sen- 
sational hypothesis is demonstrably false. 

I remark, also, that fundamental facts pertaining to Sense- 
perception, are totally inexplicable on the Sensational hypoth- 
esis. In such perceptions, the object, whatever it may be in 
itself, the object actually perceived by the mind is given in 
Consciousness ; 1st, as an object of direct and immediate per- 
ception; 2nd, as the known quality of a Non-Ego, or Matter; 



SENSE. 97 

3rd, as a Non-Egc. as possessed of definite estension and form. 
No one -will question the truth of any of these statements. 
Now, according to the Sensational hypothesis, the reality truly 
perceived is nothing but a Sensation, and consequently, in no 
sense, an object-object, but wholly and exclusively a subject- 
object, that is, the real object of perception is not, in fact, a 
quality of the Non-Ego or Matter at all, but exclusively a 
phenomenon of the Ego or Mind. That also which is given 
in Consciousness, as having actual extension and form, the 
sensation itself, the sole object perceived according to this hy- 
pothesis, has, in reality, neither of these characteristics, nor 
any others of a kindred nature. Now by what known, or in- 
telligently conceivable law of mind can that, which as an ob- 
ject of immediate perception, is given in Consciousness, as 
exclusively an object-object, be, in reality, nothing but a sub- 
ject-object; and that also which, in itself, has absolutely no 
extension or form, be given in the same Consciousness, as hav- 
ing bc.h these characteristics? The Sensational hypothesis is 
not an explanation of the facts of Consciousness pertaining to 
Sense-perception, but their total perversion, or destruction rather. 
I remark, finally, what has already been shown, that this 
hypothesis rests, like all other false hypotheses, on a partial 
induction of facts, and that, in the presence of other facts 
equally palpable, of a contradictory nature. That we have 
sensations, and through them a certain form of knowledge, 
knowledge mediate and relative, of Matter, we know absolutely. 
That we have Sense-perceptions, and through these, a Presen- 
tative knowledge of other and more fundamental qualities of 
the same substance, we know with the same absoluteness. We 
are as absolutely conscious of the existence of such percep- 
tions as we are of that of Sensations. It would be no more a 
denial of the palpable facts of Consciousness, to deny the 
reality of the one class of phenomena, than it would to deny 
9 



98 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

that of the other. It would therefore be no more a denial of 
the palpable facts of Consciousness to affirm, that all our 
knowledge of Matter is through Sense-perceptions exclusively, 
and therefore, as exclusively, Presentative, than it would to 
affirm, as this hypothesis does, that all knowledge of this sub- 
stance is through Sensation, and therefore exclusively Represen- 
tative. On such a partial, and therefore false induction of the 
real facts of Consciousness, does this hypothesis rest, an hy- 
pothesis more fruitful of frightful error than almost any other 
that was ever introduced into the domain of philosophy. I need 
not, however, any further repeat arguments by which the total 
groundlessness of this hypothesis has been already demon- 
strated. 

EXPLANATION GIVEN BY KANT AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL 
SCHOOL GENERALLY OF THE FACT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 

According to Kant, all Sense-perception is exclusively 
through Sensation. The object really perceived, in such per- 
ception, is nothing but the Sensation itself Yet this suhject- 
ohjcct having, in itself, neither extension nor form, is given, in 
Consciousness, as an ohject-ohjcct, having both extension and 
form. In this, all forms of the Transcendental School, from 
Kant, through Fichte, and Scheling to Hegel, perfectly agree. 
Now what is that which, according to these Schools in Philos- 
ophy, renders to Consciousness this purely subject-object, hav- 
ing, in itself, neither extension nor form, an exclusively object- 
object, possessed of both the forenamed qualities ? The Sen- 
sation itself, it is replied, gives the content of the perception, 
while the ideas of Time and Space existing, d priori, in the 
mind, gives it \is form, and makes it appear as an object-object. 
" Space and Time," says Kant, <' are the pure forms of them" 
[Sense-perceptions], '' Sensation in general the matter." The 
thing really perceived, in such perceptions, or the content of 



SENSE 99 

the perception, is the Sensation. That which makes this im- 
material, and consequently unextended and formless subject- 
object, appear wholly as a material object-object, having definite 
extension and form, is the ideas of Time and Space. I will 
venture the affirmation, that a greater absurdity never danced 
in the brain of Philosophy than that which is involved in this 
Transcendental exposition. Space and Time are given, in the 
Intelligence, as absolutely infinite quantities, the latter in two, 
and the former in all directions. Now how can ideas which 
pertain to their objects exclusively, as infinitely extended, 
make objects which really have no extension whatever appear 
as having this quality in a finite degree ? How can ideas 
which pertain to their objects as having no form whatever, im- 
part to that which is also itself without form, the appearance 
of having a definite form ? If these ideas should impart the 
appearance of extension at all, they must, it would seem, im- 
part to them that of infinite instead of finite extension. Fur- 
ther, if they should impart to sensations the appearance of 
extension at all, it would seem that they must impart to them 
all alike that of the same extension. So of form. How can 
ideas which pertain to their objects, as infinite, and conse- 
quently without form, impart to these difi'erent sensations, all 
of which are alike without extension or form, and in this respect, 
sustaining the same identical relations to precisely the same 
ideas, the appearance even of possessing difierent degrees of 
extension, and a diversity of forms? How can these ideas 
make sensations which are exclusively subjective phenomena 
appear whollo as qualities of objects exclusively external to the 
mind, having an existence out of, and independent of the mind ? 
How can these ideas impart to one class of sensations the ap- 
pearance of being wholly independent qualities of a Non-Ego 
or Matter, and to another, that of being as exclusively phe- 
nomena of the Ego or Mind itself, when all of them alike are 



100 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

exclusively phenomena of the Ego, and sustain precisely the 
same relations to the ideas themselves ? We may just as rea- 
sonably suppose, that pure Time and absolutely empty Space 
contain, in themselves, infinite Intelligence and Almighty crea- 
tive Power, as to suppose their ideas contain the qualities at- 
tributed to them in the Transcendental Schools of Philosophy. 
Besides, this exposition of Sense-perception is based wholly 
upon a very gross psychological error. In this exposition, the 
ideas of Time and Space are given as chronological antecedents 
and determining causes or principles of Sense-perception; 
whereas they are, in fact, chronological consequents of such 
perceptions. These ideas, as we have seen in a former chap- 
ter, are the logical antecedents of those of body and succession, 
while the latter ideas are the chronological antecedents of the 
former. We must first perceive succession and extension be- 
fore we can, in any degree, conceive of Time and Space, the 
former of which is given in the Intelligence, as the place of 
events, and the latter originally exclusively as that of extended 
substances. These ideas, then, instead of giving us the per- 
ception of extension and form, cannot exist, as ideas in the 
mind at all, that of Space especially, till after these qualities 
are actually perceived. The entire Transcendental exposition 
of Sense-perception is based wholly upon a singular reversal 
of the relations between an antecedent and its consequent; 
and with that exposition all the forms of this Philosophy must 
fall to the ground. Not one of these Theories can be true, if 
this exposition is false, as it has now, we think, been fully 
proved to be.* 

* In a siibseqvxent chapter it will be shown, that the ideas of Time 
and Space, instead of being laws of Sense-perception, as affirmed by 
Idealism, are in fact categories of understanding conceptions, that 
is, they are laws not of the Primary, as Kant affirms, but of the Sec- 
ondary faculties. 



101 



IS COLOR A PRIMARY OR A SECONDARY QUALITY OF MATTER ? 

In all schools of Philosophy with which I am acquainted, 
color is assumed as exclusively a Secondary quality of Matter. 
Into this error, Sir William Hamilton has fallen, although he 
has himself given, with absolute correctness, the distinguishing 
characteristic which separates the Primary from the Secondary 
quality, and then, in express words, and as correctly given this 
identical characteristic to this one quality. The primary qual- 
ity of matter, as he has defined it, is that quality which neces- 
sarily pertains to this one substance, as Matter, and which con- 
sequently cannot, in thought, be separated from it. Such 
qualities are Extension and Form, for example. We cannot 
even conceive of matter, as void of these qualities. They per- 
tain to it as Matter. In the presence of this definite and dis- 
tinguishing characteristic of the Primary quality, our author 
uses the following language, in a note under a paragraph in 
which he ranks color as a Secondary quality : " But as Aris- 
totle has observed, we cannot imagine body without all color, 
though we can imagine it without any one." The same pre- 
cisely be might have said of extension and form. We cannot 
imagine body without all extension and form, though we can 
imagine it without any one. That which cannot, even in 
thought, be separated from body, without annihilating it as 
body, must be ranked as a Primary quality of body, or it has 
no such qualities. Color, then, is such a quality of Matter, 
or by the showing of Aristotle and Sir William Hamilton both, 
it has no Primary qualities. Such also is this quality as given 
in the universal Intelligence. Such we cannot but regard it, 
even when attempting to demonstrate its rank among Secondary 
qualities, and when we suppose we have accomplished our ob- 
ject. "We know well," says Dr. Brown (a strange assertion, 
that we know well, what he goes on to show we cannot believe, 
9* 



102 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

even while attempting to prove it), " when we open our eyes, 
that whatever aifects our eyes is within the small compass of 
their orbit ; and yet we cannot look for a single moment, with- 
out spreading what we thus visually feel over whole miles of 
landscape. Still, I must repeat, not the slightest doubt is 
l^liilosopliicaVij entertained by those, who, when they open 
their eyes, yield like the vulgar to the temporary illusion — 
that the colors, thus supposed to be spread over the external 
objects, or rather the rays of light that come from them, are 
merely the unknown causes of certain sensations in ourselves. 
When questioned on the subject of vision, we state this opin- 
ion with confidence; and even with astonishment, that our 
opinion on the subject, in the present age of philosophy, should 
be doubted by him who has taken the superfluous trouble of 
putting such a question. At the very moment, probably, at 
which we give our answer, we have our eyes fised on him to 
whom we address it. His complexion, his dress, are regarded 
by us as external colors, and we are practically, at the very 
moment, therefore, belying the very opinion which we profess, 
and in speculation truly profess, to hold." 

For myself, my opinions must undergo an essential modi- 
fication before I shall hold a dogma philosophically, which I 
cannot intellectually but disbelieve, even in the act of attempt- 
ing to demonstrate its truth. 

There is a very singular mistake into which Sir William 
Hamilton appears to have fallen, in the subsequent part of 
the note above alluded to. " In like manner," he says, '' where 
the qualities are mutual contradictories, we cannot positively 
represent to ourselves an object without a determination by 
one or other of these opposites. Thus we cannot conceive a 
body which is not either vapid or tasteless, either sonorous or 
noiseless, and so forth. This observation applies likewise to 
the first class." The cases cited are, in no form, parallels. 



SENSE. 103 

The terms "vapid and tasteless/' "sonorous and noiseless/' 
are contradictories, while " any color " sustains to " all color/' 
the relation of a subaltern proposition merely. I can conceive 
of a body as vapid or tasteless, because we have here a second- 
ary quality, which body consequently may or may not possess. 
I cannot, on the other hand, conceive of body as possessed of 
color, or as void of all color, for the reason, that we have here 
a Primary quality which body, as an extended visible sub- 
stance, cannot but possess. 

Hence I do not agree, in the absolute truth of the state- 
ments of this author, that " the primary are perceived as in 
our organism," and that the " primary qualities of things ex- 
ternal to our organism we do not perceive, i. e., immediately 
know.'' On the other hand, I hold, that vision is direct and 
immediate, when the proper conditions are fulfilled, and that 
consequently color " is an object not of sensation proper, but 
of perception proper, in other words, we perceive color not as 
an affection of our minds, but as a quality of external things." 
I believe that color is given, in Consciousness, as a direct and 
immediate known object of a known state of the Intelligence, 
and consequently its knowledge is Presentative, just as much 
and for the same reasons, that extension is. Every charac- 
teristic which our author has given by which we can distin- 
guish Presentative from Representative knowledge, marks 
color as belonging to the former class It is not given, in Con- 
sciousness, as an unknown cause of a known sensation, but as 
a known object of a known Sense-perception. 

VALIDITY OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OP THE NON-EGO OR MATTER. 

If all our knowledge of Matter is through Sensation, then 
we can know it only in its relation to our Sensibility as now 
constituted, and consequently as an unkown and unknowable 
cause of such sensitive states. What this cause is, in itself, 



104 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

or whether it does or does not accord with our mediate appre- 
hensions in regard to it, we can have no certain knowledge 
whatever. We must regard ourselves as mere dreamers in- 
habiting a dream-land, and whether our sleeping or waking 
dreams best accord with the objects to which we refer them, or 
whether both are alike deceptive, we have no means of know- 
ing, both forms of perception and apprehension being alike 
and equally necessary results of the sensations produced in us 
at the time, and those sensations in neither instance proeeding 
from known or knowable causes. We must regard ourselves, 
not in the possession of real knowledge, but as the hopeless 
victims of baseless conjectures, conjectures the more torturing 
the more we philosophize upon them. 

If, on the other hand, we not only know realities around 
us, as causes of certain sensitive states, but in all their funda- 
mental qualities, as objects of immediate or Presentative 
knowledge, that is, as they are in themselves, then we are not 
inhabitants of a mere *' dream land," but of a universe of 
knowable and known realities. In speaking of these realities, 
" we speak that we do know, and testify to that which we have 
seen," and the time is not distant when even philosophy, so 
long bewildered by false hypotheses, will receive our testimony. 
Every theory of knowledge but that which postulates the In- 
telligence relatively to realities within and around it, as a 
power, and such realities relatively to it, as objects of real 
knowledge, and every theory of nature material and mental 
but that of absolute Realism, will not only be condemned, as 
contrary to the Common Sense of the race, but equally to all 
the teachings of sound and valid Philosophy. In regard to 
the question of reality of the material universe, and of the 
validity of our knowledge in regard to it, I need but allude, 
in this connection, to the following considerations bearing upon 
such questions : 



SENSE. 105 

1. Bj no possibility can the reality of the one, or the 
validity of the other be disproved, and the one must be held 
as real and the other as valid, till the opposite in both particu- 
lars, is proved. The burden of proof lies upon the skeptic ex- 
clusively. There are but two ways in which the skeptic can, 
by any possibility, accomplish his object — by showing that the 
conception of such a reality is self-contradictory, like the prop- 
osition, that it is possible, for the same thing, at the same time, 
to be and not to be — or that such conception is contrai-y to 
some known and absolute truth, or truths, or to some of their 
logical consequents. Now such an end never has been ac- 
complished in either of the forms named, and we may rest as- 
sured, that it never will nor can be. This we shall attempt 
specifically to show in a subsequent chapter. 

2. The reality of the material universe is an object of di- 
rect, immediate, and, therefore, of ahsohite knowledge. We 
have the same absolute perception of it, that we have of any 
of our own mental states. The latter is no more given in Con- 
sciousness, as the objects of direct Presentative knowledge, 
than the former. We have the same grounds to hold our 
knowledge as valid, in the one case, that we have in the other. 
The following remarks of Sir William Hamilton on this topic, 
are deemed worthy of very special attention in this connection : 

" In perception, Consciousness gives, as an ultimate fact, a be- 
lief of the knowledge of the existence of something different from 
self As ultimate, this belief cannot be reduced to a higher prin- 
ciple; neither can' it be truly analyzed into a double element. 
We only believe that this something exists, because we believe 
that we Jcnoio (are conscious of) this something as existing; 
the helief of the existence is necessarily involved in the helief 
of the hnowledge of the existence. Both are original, or nei- 
ther. Does Consciousness deceive us in the latter, it necessarily 
deludes us in the former ; and if the former, though a fact of 



106 INTELLECTUAL PHTLOSOPHT. 

Consciousness, be false; the latter, because a fact of Ccnscious- 
ness, is not true. The beliefs contained in the two propo- 
sitions : 

^' 1st. I believe tliat a material world exists; 

"2c?. I believe that I immediateli/ know a material world 
existing, (in other words), / believe that the external reality 
itself is the object of tohich I am conscious in perception') : 
though distinguished by philosophers, are thus virtually iden- 
tical." 

In another place, he adds, " In our perceptive Conscious- 
ness there is revealed as an ultimate fact, a self, and a not-self, 
each given as independent — each known only in antithesis to 
the other. No belief is more intuitive, universal, immediate, 
or irresistible, than that this antithesis is real and known to be 
real; no belief is therefore more true. If the antithesis be 
illusive, self and not-self, subject and object, I and Thou are 
distinctions without a difference; and Consciousness, so far 
from being ' the internal voice of our Creator ' is shown to be, 
like Satan, ' a liar from the beginning.' " 

8. Neither the reality of the material universe, nor the va- 
lidity of our knowledge in respect to it, can be denied, without, 
to be logically consistent, an universal impeachment of the In- 
telligence itself, as in respect to any subject external or in- 
ternal, a faculty of real knowledge. If Consciousness has de- 
ceived us, in regard to the character of our knowledge of the 
Non-Ego, it should not be held as worthy of confidence in re- 
gard to any other mental states. Sound Philosophy requires, 
that we hold the universe of Matter as real, or nothing as real, 
our knowledge, in respect to it as valid, or as valid in respect 
to no subject whatever. All forms of real Presentative knowl- 
edge must be held to be valid for the reality and character of 
their respective objects; or to be logically or philosophically 
consistent, no form whatever must be thus held. Each form 



SENSE. 107 

m^f^ h^* held d priori, as just as possible in itself as any other, 
an<l erich pertaius, with the same directness and absoluteness to 
its ?-espective objects. "We must deny the reality of all our 
own mental states, and the validity of our knowledge, in re- 
spect to them, or to be logically consistent, we must admit the 
reality of the external material universe, and the validity of 
our knowledge in respect to it. 

CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENT EXPOSITION. 

The conclusion to which we are conducted, as the result of 
our investigations in this chapter, is this : Sense, like Con- 
sciousness, and Reason, is a source of real, valid knowledge. 
The basis for the procedures of the Secondary Faculties which 
are next to claim our attention, is not shadows, but eternal 
rock, the rock of truth. Through a real and known universe, 
we are advancing towards a real, and not "unknown Grod." 



CHAPTER VII. 

SECONDARY FACULTIES. 
UNDERSTANDING. 

Through the faculty of Sense, and a consciousness of sen- 
sations, we have, as we have seen, intuitions of the qualities 
of external material substances; phenomena, such as are ex- 
pressed by the terms extension, form, resistance, color, taste, 
smell and sound. By Consciousness, we have similar intu- 
itions of the operations of our own minds, such as thinking, 
feeling, and willing. Through Reason, on condition of the 
perceptions of Sense and Consciousness, we have the intuitions 
of time, space, personal identity, substance, and cause. These 
intuitions being given, another and secondary intellectual 
process occurs, a process, in which these intuitions, necessary 
and contingent, are united into notions of particular things. 
Thus, our notion of body, for example, is complex, and when 
analyzed into its distinct elements, is found to be constituted 
exclusively of intuitions given by the faculties above referred 
to. We conceive of it as a substance, in which the qualities 
above named, inhere, a substance existing in time and space, 
and sustaining certain relations to other substances, of which 
we have notions similarly compounded. The same holds true 
of our notions of all substances whatever. They are all com- 
plex, and constituted exclusively of intuitions given by the 
primary faculties 



UNDERSTANDING. 109 

A notion, then, is a complex intellectual phenomenon, com- 
of intuitions. The faculties, or functions of the Intel- 
ligence, which give us the latter, we have already considered. 
What shall we call that which gives us the former ? In other 
words what shall we call the notion-forming power of the mind ? 
In conformity to a usage which has, since the time of Cole- 
ridge, extensively obtained, we denominate this faculty of the 
Intelligence, the Understanding. In strict conformity to this 
specific application, will the term Understanding, when special 
notice to the contrary is not given, be employed throughout 
this Treatise. It will be employed, not as Locke uses it, as 
designating the general intelligence, but to designate a special 
function of that Intelligence, a function in which intuitions 
contingent and necessary, given by the primary faculties, are 
combined into notions or conceptions of particular ohjects, or 
classes of objects. 

NOTIONS PARTICULAR AND GENERAL. 

Notions are of two kinds — particular and general. Partic- 
ular notions are such as we form of individuals, and designate 
by terms which are applicable to such individuals only — such 
as John, Samuel. General notions appertain to classes of in- 
dividuals, and are designated by terms of corresponding appli- 
cation, such as man, mountain. The formation of the notions 
last mentioned, will be considered in a subsequent chapter. 

ELEMENTS Or WHICH NOTIONS ARE CONSTITUTED. 

The elements of which all notions are constituted, are, as 
we have seen, of two kinds — contingent and necessary. A 
proper philosophical analysis of notions would lead us to con- 
template them in the light of these two distinct classes of 
elements. 



10 



110 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Contingent Elements. 

The contingent elements entering into every notion are all 
expressed by the general term phenomenon. Now, phenom- 
ena present themselves under the following entirely distinct 
relations : 

1. That of inherence, or those particular qualities which 
inhere in particular substances, and by which the substances 
in which they thus inhere, are distinguished from other sub- 
stances. That all substances shall have qualities of some kind 
or other, is a necessary element of our idea of substance. 
The particular qualities which, in fact, inhere in particular sub- 
stances, however, are contingent elements of our notions of 
such substances. Thus, whiteness should be reckoned as a 
contingent element of our idea of snow, sweetness of that of 
sugar, form of that of body, and thought, feeling, and will, of 
that of Mind. Those phenomena, then, which we contem- 
plate as inhering in particular substances, as distinguishing 
clear characteristics of the same, we denominate Quality. 
One great object of observation and scientific research, is to 
determine what are the specific qualities which inhere in par- 
ticular substances. 

2. There is still another point of light in which substances 
are contemplated. One substance, we well know, is affected, 
or determined, in its state or states, by other substances. This 
property of being thus affected, we denominate Susccptihility. 
Thus gold is susceptible of fusion by heat, and water of exist- 
ing in a solid, fluid, or vaporous state, from the different degrees 
in which it is penetrated by the same substance. Body is di- 
visible, and Mind is susceptible of being pleasurably or 
painfully affected from an endless diversity of causes. The 
particular effects which particular subjects are capable of 
receiving, enter as contingent elements of our notions of such 



ELEMENTS or NOTIONS. Ill 

substances, effects which, as intimated above, we designate by 
the term susceptibility. 

3. Substances have what may be called external relations 
to each other, relations which we designate by the term Coher- 
ence. Thus individuals sustain to each other the relations of 
employer and agent, physician and patient, teacher and pupil, 
&c. Accordingly, when we think of one individual, we think 
of him as the child of some other particular person, and this 
last as the parent of that particular child. We thick of par- 
ticular objects, a farm for example, as the particular property 
of some particular individual, and such individual as the par- 
ticular owner of said property. All such facts enter as con- 
tingent elements into our specific notions of particular objects 
as individuals, and such facts, I repeat, we designate by the 
general term Coherence. When we would complete our no- 
tions of such objects or individuals, one specific inquiry which 
we make is. What are the particular mutual relations existing 
between them and other objects or individuals ? 

4. The next class of contingent phenomena which consti- 
tute corresponding elements of our notions or conceptions, may 
be denominated accidental. The fact that any individual now 
existing was born somewhere^ constitutes an essential element 
of our conception of him as a man. The fact that he was 
born in London, Paris, England, America, or any one particu- 
lar place instead of some other, does not enter as such an ele- 
ment into our conception of him as a man, but constitutes a 
contingent element of our conception of him as such a being. 
That every living individual is either poor or rich, wise or ig- 
norant, learned or unlearned, or that he occupies some inter- 
mediate position between these extremes, we know very well, 
from the nature of the case, cannot but be true of him. The 
particular position which he does occupy, or has occupied, 
however, enters as a contingent element into our conception 



112 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of him. Every object is conceived by us not only in lespect 
to its inherent qualities and susceptibilities, and to the mutual 
relations existing by which it stands, in special coherence with 
other objects, but in reference to facts which accidentally per- 
tain to it. 

5. The relation of phenomena pertaining to place, next 
claim our attention. Thus, when any phenomenon appears, 
we ask, where is it ? If one individual, for example, who is 
ignorant of the facts, should hear others speaking of the Astor 
House, he would at once ask after its location. The particular 
place where the house is located, is a contingent element of 
our conception of it. The same holds true of all other sub- 
stances. 

6. Phenomena present themselves under one other relation 
still, that of antecedence, and succession. When any event is 
announced to us, as having occurred, we ask the question, ichen 
did it occur ? The answer to this question, that is, the par- 
ticular time of the event, enters as a contingent element into 
our conceptions of it. 

As far as my present investigations extend, the above pre- 
sent a complete enumeration of the contingent elements of all 
our notions. Whenever we contemplate an object, we always 
think of it in relation to what is intrinsic in the object, irre- 
spective of other objects — to what we have witnessed in re- 
gard to the effects resulting from the action of other powers 
upon it, or from its action upon them — to its external rela- 
tions to other objects — to accidental circumstances connected 
with it — to the place where it is located, or its phenomena 
have appeared, — and the time of such occurrences. I have 
hesitated considerably in respect to the question whether the 
last two classes should not be ranged under the fourth, and 
classed as accidents. To me, however, they appear sufficiently 
distinct to justify the arrangement above made. 



I 



ELEMENTS OF NOTIONS. 113 



NECESSARY ELEMENTS. 



Of the necessary elements which enter into, and determine 
the characteristics of all our notions, a complete enumeration, 
in the present state of mental science, is hardly to be expected. 
We may hope, however, to make an approach somewhat near 
to that result. 

Substance and Cause the fundamental elements of all Notions. 

One fact, pertaining to this department of our inquiries, is 
quite evident. It is this : The fundamental elements which 
enter into all our notions, and which, as laws of thought, de- 
termine the character of such phenomena, are two : sidjstance 
and cause. If we make inquiries respecting any object, for 
the purpose of perfecting our notions or conceptions of it, it 
is as substance or cause, that such object is contemplated. All 
our inquiries are but different forms in which these two ideas 
evolve themselves in the Intelligence. 

Evolution of these Laws not Arhitrary. 

A careful analysis will also convince us, that the forms in 
which these two laws of thought evolve themselves, are by no 
means arbitrary. On the other hand, their principles of evo- 
lution are perfectly fixed. Whenever we would make inquir- 
ies respecting substances or causes, for the purpose of perfect- 
ing our notions of them, we, on reflection, find that certain 
specific inquiries we do and must put, and that none others we 
can make. In the light of the answers obtained to such in- 
quiries, are all our notions of substance and cause determined. 
An elucidation of these laws of thought, and as a consequence, 
an evolution of the direction of the Understanding in all le- 
gitimate inquiries after right notions of substances, constitutes 
one of the great problems in philosophy. A development of 
10* 



HI INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

these laws, in other words, of the Categories of the Under- 
standing, will now be attempted. Whether that development 
shall be complete or incomplete, the result will determine. 

I. — TIME AND SPACE. 

I begin with the categories of time and space. These are 
entirely distinct from each other. As the same remarks, how- 
ever, are equally applicable to each, I shall consider them 
together. 

Whenever any substances or phenomena are thought of, 
two inquiries arise in respect to them, When and lohere do, or 
did they exist or occur? When we think of the world, for 
example, we naturally raise the inquiries, When was it cre- 
ated ? how long has it stood ? what p^ace does it occupy in the 
universe ? So also when we think of any occurrence in, or on 
the earth, we raise inquiries precisely similar, to wit, When and 
where did they occur ? The same holds true in respect to all 
objects of the Understanding. All substances, all causes, all 
phenomena are thought of in relation to time and space. The 
ideas of time and space, as laws of thought, enter into all our 
notions, or Understanding-conceptions. 

ERRORS OF KANT. 
1. In respect to the relation of Phenomena and Nbumcna to 
Time and Space. 
Kant makes a distinction obviously correct, between the 
impressions which objects make upon us, and the causes of 
these impressions, or the objects themselves. The former he 
denominates phenomena. The latter, that is, what he regards 
as the unknown objects which produce impressions in us, he 
calls noumena. Now phenomena, he says, we necessarily con- 
ceive of, as in time and space. Noumena, on the other hand, 
have no such relation, indeed, no relation whatever, to either 
time or space. Here a great mistake of this profound analyzer 



ERRORS or KANT. 115 

of the human mind presents itself. Reason affirms absolutely, 
that noumena have as real a relation to time and space as phe- 
nomena do. Whatever is to us an object of thought, whether 
it be an object, as it exists in itself, or whether it be a phe- 
nomenon of such object, we do, and must, put the questions, 
When ? — how long ? — and where ? — in respect to it. Nou- 
mena, as well as phenomena, do and must have their locations 
in time and space. In the language of Dr. Murdoch, we may 
triumphantly ask, '* How can physical effects be limited to 
time and space, and not also the physical causes which produce 
them ? Can a material thing operate or produce effects, where 
it is not present to produce them ? Or can Reason any more 
conceive, d priori, of a necessity for phenomena to exist 
only in time and space, than for noumena to exist in the 
same manner ? If, then. Reason decides a priori, or intui- 
tively, that phenomena must so exist, does she not equally de- 
cide, a priori, or intuitively, that noumena must so exist?" 
The overlooking of this obvious and undeniable fact, led this 
great philosopher to accord to time and space a necessary re- 
ality, as laws of sensible intuition, that is, of external percep- 
tion, and to deny all reality of them, as realities in themselves. 

2. Relation of the Ideas of Time and Space to Pheriomena. 

Another error of this philosopher consists in representing 
the ideas of time and space as laws of sensible intuition, that 
is, of external perception, and not as categories of the Under- 
standing. They are, Kant maintains, the ^^ forms of the phe- 
nomena of external Sense, or the aspects in which those phe- 
nomena present themselves to our Senses." They not only 
determine the forms of phenomena, but alone render perception 
possible to us. Now a moment's reflection will convince us, 
that these ideas have no relation whatever to perception, exter- 
nal or internal, but exist in us exclusively as laws of the Un- 
derstanding, or notion-forming power. 



116 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

lu the first place, these ideas, instead of existing in the 
mind prior to, and thus determining the form of phenomena, 
are chronologically, as we have seen, developed in the Intelli- 
gence subsequent to phenomena, external and internal. We 
must first perceive extension, for example, and thus form a no- 
tion of something extended, before we can conceive of space 
in which such objects exist. It is not, therefore, as this phi- 
losopher maintains, through the idea of space that objects pre- 
sent themselves to us, in perception, as extended. On the 
other hand, without the perception of extension, the idea of 
space, as the place of the object perceived, would not be de- 
veloped at all. The same illustration holds equally in regard 
to time. This idea does not first exist in the mind, and then 
determine our perception of events, as simultaneous or succes- 
sive. The prior perception of succession, on the other hand, 
develops the idea. Perception, in all forms and degrees, exists 
wholly independent of the ideas of time and space. The mis- 
take of Kant, in this case, consists in putting the antecedent 
for the consequent. 

Equally manifest is it, on the other hand, that these ideas 
do not gwQ form to perception, but, as laws of thought, deter- 
mine the characteristics of conceptions or notions. When we 
perceive or think of phenomena, and of substances also, then, 
as the ideas of time and space are developed, we put the in- 
quiries. Where? when? how long? &c., in respect to them. 
We do not perceive, but conceive or think of objects, as in 
time and space. The ideas of time and space are, therefore, 
categories, not of Sense, but of the Understanding. 

II. IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY, RESEMBLANCE AND DIF- 

EERENCE. 

An essential element of our ideas of substance, is that of 



ERRORS OF KANT. 117 

identity and diversity. As the relation between substances 
and their phenomena is that of necessity, a necessary kiw of 
conceptions, or of notions, is that substances are as their phe- 
nomena. Hence the two great necessary laws which deter- 
mine our notions of substances, to wit, similar phenomena, 
suppose similar substances ; dissimilar phenomena suppose dis- 
similar substances. Under the categories of Identity and 
Diversity, Resemblance and Difference, all classification, as we 
shall see, in a subsequent chapter, proceeds. The conception 
of the likeness or unlikeness of an object to something else, 
enters, as an essential element, into all our notions of it. 
Perhaps some might be inclined to place the above ideas under 
a category hereafter to be considered — that of Kelation. They 
are no less distinct from it, however, than either of those next 
to be mentioned. 

III. — THE IDEA OP A WHOLE, AS INCLUDING ITS PARTS, OR 
PARTS IN REFERENCE TO THE WHOLE. 

Every notion pertains to its object as a whole, including 
parts, or as a part relatively to a whole. This is a universal 
and necessary law of all Understanding-conceptions, or notions. 
Thus, when we conceive of the Mind, we necessarily conceive 
of it as a whole, including the Intelligence, Sensibility, and 
Will; or we think of some department of mental operation 
relatively to the whole Mind. If we would form a notion of 
any material substance, any body, the same holds true in a 
more specific and special sense. Body, as given in all Under- 
standing-conceptions, or notions, is a whole, a compound, con- 
stituted of simple parts. 

KANT's ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. 

According to this philosopher, all transcendental ideas, that 
is, all the necessary elements of our notions of substances 



118 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

around us, involve palpable contradictions. Two disuinct and 
opposite propositions are susceptible of equal and absolute de- 
monstration from these ideas. For example, the two following 
propositions, which are perfectly contradictory to each other, 
are equally susceptible of demonstration : 

1. " Every compound substance in the world consists of 
simple parts, and there exists everywhere nothing but the 
simple, or that which is compounded of it.'' 

2. "No compound thing in the world consists of simple 
parts, and there exists not anywhere therein anything simple." 

The amount of the proof of the first, which he denomi- 
nates the Thesis, is this : If the compound is not made up of 
simple parts, then, if all composition were done away in thought, 
no compound part could remain ; and as there is, in that case, 
none simple, nothing would remain, and, consequently, no com- 
pound would be given. 

His proof of the second, denominated Anti-Thesis, is, that 
the simple, whatever it may be, must occupy space, and there- 
fore be made up of parts existing externally to each other, and 
consequently compounded. The conception of the simple, 
which is not a compound of something which is itself com- 
pounded, is a contradiction, and of course an impossible con- 
ception. No simple, therefore, does or can exist. Fi-om the 
contradictions necessarily involved in the Thesis and Anti- 
Thesis above given, each of which, from the nature of Under- 
standing-conceptions, he afiirms, is susceptible of equal and 
absolute demonstration, he infers, as demonstrably evident, the 
non-reality of all material existences, such as we conceive of 
them ; inasmuch as the supposition of their real existence in- 
volves contradictions perfectly synonymous with the affirmation 
that the same thing, at the same time, may be and not be. In 
reply, I remark, 

1. That the proposition, that that which is compounded 



UNDERSTANDING. 119 

must be made up of simple parts, is an intuition of Reason, 
and therefore incapable of demonstration, in the same sense 
that all other intuitions are. We may show, as in the Thesis 
above given, that the opposite proposition involves a contra- 
diction, and that is all. 

2. The conception of the simple is a pure idea of Reason, 
and not an Understanding-conception at all. The compound 
only is an object of perception, and consequently of Under- 
standing-conceptions. All bodies, therefore, as the Under- 
standing forms notions of them, must be compounded. Not 
so with the simple, as given by the Reason. 

3. In his Anti-Thesis, Kant assumes the idea of the simple 
as an Understanding-conception, which, of course, involves the 
idea of composition, and hence his boasted demonstration is 
nothing but a singular paralogism. If we assume that the 
idea of the simple is a notion, that is, that it is complex and 
not simple, then we have the contradictions presented by Kant 
in his Thesis and Anti-Thesis. Take away this assumption, 
and the contradictions wholly disappear. I believe that it can 
be shown that all the antinomies of pure Reason, as given by 
this philosopher, involve paralogisms similar to the one under 
consideration. 

IV. — THE CATEGORY OF QUANTITY. 

Whenever we contemplate a notion which lies under any 
term whatever, we find that it always does and must refer to 
some one object, to a number or midtitude of objects, or to 
a total race or class of objects. For example, the term man 
may be used to designate some one individual, or a plurality 
of men, or the total race of men. This is what is meant by 
the logical quantity of a notion or conception, and presents 
us with the category of Quantity — with its sub-categories. 
Unity, Plurality, and Totality. Under the first, we have the 



120 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

notion of an individual. Under the second, that of a number 
of individuals. Under the last, we have a multitude of indi- 
viduals classed together as a total race, on the ground of com- 
mon qualities. Whenever we inquire after the extent or logical 
quantity of any term, or of that of the notion which lies un- 
der that term, we ask in which of the senses above named is it 
to be taken ? 

The Category of Quantity distinct from that previously 
considered. 

At first thought, the category of Quantity may be regarded 
as identical with that previously considered. The ideas of 
whole and of parts, however, are correlative ideas. It is not 
so with those of unity and totality. A class supposes individ- 
uals ; but the individual does not necessarily suppose a class. 
Totality, as distinguished from individuality, is distinct from a 
whole as distinguished from parts. 

V. OF QUALITY. 

To complete and perfect our notions of substances, a fun- 
damental inquiry arises, to wit, what is this substance ? When 
we would answer the question pertaining to the nature of the 
object, but one thing is considered — the qualifies of the ob- 
ject. As it is a necessary intuition of Reason, that substance 
supposes quality, and that substances are as their qualities, 
hence arises the category of Quality. 

In all distinct notions of an object, certain qualities are 
positively affirmed, others denied, and others affirmed in a lim- 
ited degree, of the object. Thus, in our notions of an indi- 
vidual, for example, distinguished intellectual powers may be 
affirmed, prudence denied, and courage affirmed in a limited 
degree. This "principle is observed when we would describe 
an object to others, for the purpose of conveying distinct con- 



UNDERSTANDING. 121 

eeptions of it to their minds. We designate the positive qual- 
ities which appear in it. We deny other qualities of it, which 
might appear, but do not. We then designate others which 
might appear in all its parts, or in a certain degree of perfec- 
tion, but which appear only in a limited degree. Thus the cate- 
gory of Quality presents itself in three forms, or sub-categories, 
those of Affirmation, Negation, and Limitation. When an 
object has been placed in the light of all these, then our no- 
tions of its nature are full and distinct. 

VI. — OF RELATION. 

Another form in which objects are given to us in notions, 
or Understanding-conceptions, is their relations to other ob- 
jects. According to Kant, the category of Relation also de- 
velops itself in three forms. When two objects are brought 
together for the purpose of comparing them with each other, 
we consider the question, what qualities inhere in one which 
do not in the other ? Here we have the first sub-categnvy 
of Relation, that of Inherence. Each substance is thus c ju- 
templated in its relations to its distinctive attributes or quali- 
ties. 

Objects also are contemplated relatively to their powers of 
affecting other objects and determining their states, or their 
susceptibilities of being affected by such objects. The metals, 
for example, are conceived of, as susceptible of fusion from 
heat, and caloric as possessed of the power of producing such 
effects in metals. In the one case, we give our notions of the 
powers of substances, and in the other of their susceptihiliiies. 
Two substances also may be compared relatively to their pow- 
ers and susceptibilities. Thus we have the relation, or sub- 
category of causality and dependence. 

A third relation is that of reciprocity, denominated by 
Kant the sub-category of Community. When objects, for 
11 



122 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

example, mutually attract or repel each other, this relationship 
differs entirely from that of cause and effect. All objects in 
the universe around are, in some form or other, thus correlated 
to each other. The relation of employer and agent falls under 
the principle under consideration. 

Such is the category of Relation. When we have contem- 
plated objects till we know them, in the light of their compar- 
ative qualities, or attributes — in reference to their powers of 
affecting other objects, or of being affected by them — and 
as they mutually and reciprocally affect each other, then our 
notions are complete, as far as the idea of relation is concerned. 

VII. OF MODALITY. 

Every Understanding-conception respects its object, as a 
possible or impossible — a real or unreal existence — and as 
existing of necessity or contingently. These ideas enter, as 
necessary elements, into all our notions, and constitute what 
is denominated the modality of Understanding-conceptions. 
Suppose I convey the conception I have of some object, to 
any individual. He will naturally and necessarily inquire, 
Can such a thing be ? Is it a reality ? Does it exist of neces- 
sity, or contingently ? 

VIII. — THE IDEA OF LAW. 

When we have formed our notions of objects, in the light 
of the preceding principles, another inquiry of great impor- 
tance arises, to wit, according to what law, or laws, do those 
powers act? The forms in which the nomological idea, as 
it is denominated by Prof. Tappan, develops itself are vari- 
ous, according to the nature of the objects to which it pertains, 
and the point of view in which the object is contemplated. 
Still, as a necessary element, it enters into, and determines 
the character of all our notions of substances within and 



UNDERSTANDING. 123 

around us. When we come to speak of the Reason again, 
this idea, together with the conditioDs of its development, and 
the varied forms in which it appears will be the object of spe- 
cial remark. I deemed it important to simply refer it to here, 
on account of its omnipresent influence, in determining the 
character of all our Undei-standing-conceptions. 

Such are the elements which enter into all our notions, or 
Understanding-conceptions. That the above analysis presents 
us with real elements of such phenomena there can be no 
doubt. But whether that analysis is complete, will be ascer- 
tained in the more perfect developments of mental science, 
n ;., 

CONCEPTIONS AS DISTINGUI.^^EP FROM NOTIONS. 

Conception, as commonly defined by philosophers, is a 
past perception recalled in Memory or Recollection. It is 
rather, as it appears to me, the recalling of the notion formed 
of the object when perceived. Perceptions may be renewed 
but not recalled. The conceptions of individuals will vary, as 
the notions which they formed of objects when perceived. 
The terms notion and conception are often used as synonymous. 

A FACT OFTEN ATTENDING PERCEPTION. 

It is a fact with which all are familiar, that when we unex- 
pectedly meet an object before unknown to us, but which, in 
certain particulars, resembles one well known, we seem for a 
time to see the latter with perfect distinctness. The reason 
of this phenomenon I suppose to be this : Under such cir- 
cumstances, the notion we have of the known object is recalled 
with such vividness, that it almost exclusively occupies the at- 
tention of the mind. 

MISTAKE OF MR. STEWART. 

According to this philosopher, in all conceptions, the ab- 



124 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

sent object is, in the first instance, always believed to be pres- 
ent, as an object of direct perception. Universal conscious- 
ness afiirms the error of such a dogma. The mistake of Mr. 
S. arose, as I suppose, from his definition of conception, that 
is, that it is a past perception recalled. If this were true, I 
do not see but wc must, not only at first, but at all times, re- 
gard the object of our conception, as directly present. 

NOTIONS AND CONCEPTIONS CHARACTERIZED AS COMPLETE OR 
INCOMPLETE, TRUE OR FALSE. 

In the former part of this Chapter, we have contemplated 
the elements, contingent d necessary, which enter into all 
Undertstanding-conceptioii«r It now remains to consider these 
phenomena in their relation to their objects. All Understand- 
ing-conceptions pertain to their objects, in two important rela- 
tions, as complete or incomxplete^ or as true or false. 

Such conception is complete, when it represents all the ele- 
ments really existing in the object. It is incomplete, when it 
fails to do this. Absolute completeness characterizes probably 
none of our conceptions. 

An Understanding-conception is true, when it represents 
completely or incompletely, the real attributes of its object, 
and nothing else. It is false, when it attributes to the object 
unreal attributes, or denies of it what is real. 

Two facts are obviously true from the above definitions. 
1. A conception may be incomplete, and yet true, it being 
true, when it attributes to the object nothing but what is real. 
Or a notion might be complete, and yet, in a certain sense, 
false ; as it might attribute to the object all that is real, and 
something not real. 2. Conceptions may be wholly true, or 
wholly false ; or partly true, and partly false. That is, they 
may attribute to their objects nothing but what is real, or noth- 
ing that is real ; or they may attribute to them some things 



UNDERSTANDING. 125 

real, and some not real. Unmingled error seldom characterizes 
any of our conceptions. 

MISTAKE OF COLERIDGE IN RESPECT TO THE UNDERSTANDING. 

Coleridge defines tte Understanding as the "faculty of 
judging according to Sense/' a definition which he copied from 
Kant and other German philosophers. According to such phi- 
losophers, the Understanding pertains only to external mate- 
rial substances. It has nothing to do with the subjective, with 
Mind. 

Now this is a great error in Philosophy. As a matter of 
fact, we form notions and conceptions of Mind as really as we 
do of anything not ourselves. Notions subjective as really ex- 
ist, in Consciousness, as those which are objective. Nor can 
any reasons be assigned, why we should attribute the forma- 
tion of the latter to one faculty of the Intelligence, and that 
of the former to another. The appropriate sphere of the Un- 
derstanding is evidently limited only by the Finite. Reason 
alone pertains to the Infinite, the Absolute, and the Universal. 
All other realities fall within the range of the Understanding. 



11* 



CHAPTER VIII. 

FACULTY OF JUDGMENT. 
ABSTRACTION. 

All our notions, or Understanding-conceptions, are, as we 
have seen, complex, constituted of elements furnished by the 
primary faculties. Sense, Consciousness, and Reason. To 
make an abstraction of a notion is, in thought, on the ground 
of the ideas of resemblance and difference, to separate these ele- 
ments from one another, giving special attention to some one, 
or more, or each of them in particular. Into our conceptions 
of body, for example, the elements of form, soldity, color, &c., en» 
ter. Now in the light of the ideas of resemblance and difference, 
the Intelligence perceives at once, that the element of solidity 
differs from that of form, and that of color from either of the 
others. In thought, therefore, either of these elements may 
be so separated from all the rest, that it shall be the object of 
special observation. Thus our conceptions of each element of 
the object, and consequently our notions of the entire object 
may become more or less distinct and complete. 

ABSTRACT NOTIONS, WHAT, AND HOW FORMED. 

When the Intelligence, in the sense above explained, 
makes abstraction of a particular element of an object or con- 
ception, it may, ever after, conceive and speak of that element 
without reference to the particular object from which it was 
abstracted. Then we have what is denominated an abstract 



FACULTY OP JUDGMENT. 127 

notion, such as is designated by the terms redness^ sweetness, 
hardness, &c. 



GENERAL NOTIONS, HOW FORMED. 

Originally all Understanding-conceptions are particular. 
From these, all notions, abstract and general, are formed. How 
is the general evolved from the particular ? Let us suppose 
that, in conformity to the process above described, the Intellect 
has formed notions of two particular objects, mountains, for 
example. These two notions lie together under the eye of 
Consciousness. In the light of the idea of resemblance and 
difference, the mind at once perceives that there are certain el- 
ements, common to the two. Abstraction is made of these 
elements, and a third notion is formed, embracing them alone. 
Here is the first appearance of a general notion. When a 
third mountain is perceived, and a notion formed of that, the 
general notion undergoes a new modification, and now em- 
braces those elements only common to the three. Thus the 
process of abstraction goes on, till the general notion pertains 
to those elements only common to all mountains. This same 
process takes place in all instances in which general notions are 
evolved from particular ones. 

CLASSIFICATION. 

The process of classification can now be readily explained. 
We will refer back to the case when two particular notions 
were in the mind, and the general was evolved from them. As 
soon as the notion last named appears, the two particulars are 
subsumed or classed under it. In the same manner every 
particular previously perceived is arranged under the general, 
in all the successive modifications which it subsequently un- 
dergoes. 



128 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Forms of Classification. 

There are three distinct points of view from which objects 
are classified. 

1. In view of general resemblances, they are classed, on the 
ground of common qualities, under general notions, such as 
man, animals, &c. 

2. In view of some one quality without reference to resem- 
blance in any other particular, they are classed under notiuns 
purely abstract, such as redness, whiteness, &c. We often 
class objects together, as white, hard, sweet, &c., without ref- 
erence to their relations, in any other particulars. 

3. Objects are classed together, in view of their corres- 
pondence to pure rational conceptions, such as a circle, square, 
right and wrong, &c. 

Classification, in what sense arhitrary. 

It will readily be seen that classification from one point of 
view, will run directly across and break up that which is 
formed from another. How distinct and opposite, for exam- 
ple, will classification be which is founded in view of some one 
abstract quality, such as redness, from that which is based 
upon general resemblance, and formed under a general concep- 
tion. Equally distinct and unlike either of the others will be 
the arrangement of objects which are classed together under 
some pure rational conception. 

For these reasons classification has, by many, been regarded 
as perfectly arbitrary. It is true, that we are at liberty to 
adopt either of the principles of classification above described 
we please. In this respect, the process is perfectly arbitrary. 
If we classify at all, however, we must adopt one or the otlier 
of the forms under consideration, no other forms being con- 
ceivable. When we have selected our principle also, the 



FACULTY OF JUDGMENT. 129 

[uent arrangement of objects in conformity to it is ne- 
cessary. In very important respects, therefore, classification 
has its laws, which are by no means arbitrary. 

GENERA AND SPECIES. . 

In the process of classification, objects are ranged together 
as genera and species. Thus we have the genus tree, and the 
diflTerent classes, or species of fruit-bearing and forest trees, 
ranged under it. A species also is often itself a genus rela- 
tively to particular and distinct classes belonging to that spe- 
cies. If fruit-bearing be assumed as the genus, then we have 
the apple, plum, peach, cherry trees, &c., ranged as species 
under this generic term. The illustration might be extended 
indefinitely, from the highest to the lowest forms of genus and 
species. Our present concern is with the principle on which 
objects are thus classed. It is that to which we have fre- 
quently referred in this Chapter, the idea of resemtlance and 
difference. The genus is formed on the perception of remote 
resemblances. Species under the genus are formed on the per- 
ception of important differences; while objects are classed 
under the species, on the perception of resemblances more near 
and special. Thus the genus tree is formed on the perception 
of qualities common to all trees. The species fruit-bearing 
and forest trees, are separated from each other, on the percep- 
tion of important differences, each species being formed on the 
ground of resemblances more near and particular than those 
designated by the general term tree. 

In illustration of the process in which classes, as genus and 
species, are formed, we will take the case of the child. A 
certain object stands near the paternal mansion, which he has 
learned to designate by the term tree. By and by he sees 
another object resembling this in all important particulars. 
Here, he says, is another tree. In his mind they are distia 



130 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

guished as greater and less, and in respect of location. Here 
is the obscure development of the ideas of genus and species. 
At length, however, he perceives a tree differing iu very im- 
portant particulars from either of the others. He now aska 
the question, what kind of tree is this ? The answer is, we 
will suppose, a maple tree. Then the inquiry arises, what tree 
is that which stands near the house ? He is told that it is an 
elm tree. He has now the idea of the genus tree, formed on 
the perception of common qualities, and of two species, sepa- 
rated from each other on the perception of important differ- 
ences. All trees subsequently perceived, presenting similar 
resemblances and differences, will be separated and arranged 
accordingly. As other trees, differing from either of these, 
are perceived, they will be separated and classed in a similar 
manner. Throughout the whole process, one idea guides the 
mind, that of resemblance and difference. 

GENERALIZATION. 

But few words are requisite in the explanation of the men- 
tal process called Generalization. A general fact is a quality 
commim to every individual of a given class. It may be pe- 
culiar to that class ; or, while it belongs to each individual of 
the class, it may appertain to individuals of other classes. 

Rules in respect to Generalization. 

1. No fact must be assumed as general, which does not be- 
long to each individual of the class to which it is referred. 

2. No general fact must be assumed as peculiar to one 
class, which, though strictly general in respect to that class, 
nevertheless appertains to individuals of other classes. 

3. No fact must be assumed as general without a sufficient 
induction of particulars, to remove all doubt in respect to the 
question whether it is, or is not, a general fact. 



FACULTY OF JUDGMENT. 131 



The Term General sometimes used in a limited sense. 

In common usage, a fact is called general, when it belongs 
to a majority of the individuals of a certain class. In such a 
case, its existence in connection with an individual of the class 
is only probable. Great injury is often done to individuals in 
the application of facts of this kind. 



GENERAL TERMS. 

In the progressive developments of mental science, the 
question has long been agitated among philosophers, whether 
when we use general terms, such as man, animal, there are 
ideas in the mind, and objects in the universe around us, cor- 
responding to these terms, or whether they are mere terms, 
without corresponding ideas and objects. In respect to such, 
terms, three distinct theories have been formed by as many 
different sects of philosophers. 

Theory of the Realists. 

The first was maintained by a particular class of the school- 
men, and deduced from certain principles, real or supposed, 
maintained by Aristotle. The theory was this : There exists 
in nature, not only individual substances, but certain essences, 
corresponding with the general ideas which exist in the mind. 
When, for example, we use the term man, it was maintained 
that there exists in the world around us a certain essence, 
which is found in no individual of the species, and which ex- 
ists in connection with no individual, but which corresponds 
with the idea in the mind, whicb idea is designated by the 
above term. So of every other general term. The sect of 
philosophers maintaining this theory was called Realists. Their 
dogmas have been long since exploded. 



132 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY 

Theory of the Nominalists. 

Anotber theory directly opposed to the above, was main- 
tained by a sect of philosophers which arose in the eleventh 
century. " According to those philosophers," says Mr. Stew- 
art, " there are no existences in nature, corresponding to gen- 
eral terms; and the objects of our attention, in all speculations, 
are not ideas, but words." This sect was called the Nominal- 
ists. As there are no existences in nature, according to this 
sect, corresponding with general terms, all our speculations 
and reasonings, but for our knowledge of such terms, must be 
confined to individuals. The following from Mr. Stewart, who 
was an avowed Nominalist, will illustrate the meaning of the 
above remarks, as well as show their correctness : " It has 
been already shown, that without the use of signs, all our 
knowledge must be necessarily limited to individuals; and 
that we should be perfectly incapable, both of classification, 
and general reasoning." If the author means that without 
the use of signs, we should be unable to communicate our 
thoughts to each other, what he says is a mere truism, which 
is no less applicable to individuals. But if he means, as he 
evidently does, that without the use of signs, we could not 
reason upon general subjects, I reply, 

1. That the existence of the names themselves implies the 
previous process of reasoning and classification, to which he 
supposes these terms give birth. A class must first be formed, 
and a judgment affirmed, before any particular term can be 
chosen to designate them. Now as the process of classifica- 
tion gives existence to general terms, which process must al- 
ways be anterior to the terms themselves, the mind must pos- 
sess the power of classification and general reasoning, in the 
absence of such terms. The mistake of the author consists in 
changing the order of sequence, putting the effect for the 
cause. 



FACULTY OF JUDGMENT. 133, 

2. Individuals have been known who have lost entirely all 
recollection of general terms, and who have yet retained the 
power of classification and reasoning upon general subjects 
unimpaired. 

3. If our reasonings upon general subjects respect not 
ideas, nor things, but words merely, then all general conclu- 
sions must be absolutely useless in all the concerns of real life. 
In such circumstances, we have to do with realities exclusively, 
and shall find no place for conclusions in respect to abstrac- 
tions, or rather in respect to the relations of abstractions which 
have no existence in nature. 

4. The fact, that general terms are always defined by a 
reference to individuals, shows clearly, that there are, in such 
individuals, realities corresponding to the terms employed. 

Theory of the Gonceijitualists. 

We come now to notice the doctrine of the sect denomi- 
nated Conceptualists, or Notionalists. According to the doc- 
trine of this sect, a general term, when considered ohjectiveJy, 
denotes those qualities which exist alike in all individuals of a 
given class — when considered suhjectively, it designates the 
conception of these qualities in the mind. Instead of there 
being no existences in nature, according to the doctrine of the 
Nominalists, corresponding to general terms, the Conceptual- 
ists maintain, that there is in every individual of a given class, 
that which corresponds with those terms. The doctrine of 
this sect, as will be seen, is equally removed from that of the 
Realists and Nominalists both. That the doctrine of this sect 
IS correct, and the only correct view of the subject, is evinced, 
because : 

1. "When the mind afiirms of any particular object, as soon 
as perceived, that it is a man, a horse, an animal, such afiirma- 
tion supposes the existence in the mind of a certain notion, or 
12 



134 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

conception of a given class of objects, and the perception of 
the agreement of the given object, with that conception. It 
can be accounted for upon no other supposition. 

2. Every person, when he appeals to his own Conscious- 
ness, knows, that when using general terms, he is designating 
conceptions really existing in his own mind, conceptions per- 
taining to real qualities of classes of objects existing around him. 

3. General terms are always defined by a reference to the 
qualities existing in individuals of a given class, and no defini- 
tion is allowed to be correct, which does not designate the 
qualities common to the whole class to which it is applied. 

4. General conclusions, when correct, must be appliciible 
to all the individuals of the particular class to which they are 
applied. This shows that such conclusions are based upon the 
conception of the common qualities of each individual of the 
class. 

UNDERSTANDING AND JUDGMENT DISTINGUISHED. 

Having explained the process of abstraction and classifica- 
tion, it now remains to compare this process with the action 
of the Understanding. A moment's reflection will convince 
us, that this process, and that of forming notions, are entirely 
distinct from each other, and must be referred to functions of 
the Intelligence equally distinct. To form a notion of A and 
B, and to affirm that they agree or disagree, are intellectual 
operations, entirely distinct from each other. The former pro- 
cess is called conception ; the latter is called judgment. So 
also when the Understanding combines the elements given by 
the primary faculties into notions, particular and general, that 
is one thing. When the Intelligence classes an individual 
under a general notion, in the affirmation, this is a man, an 
animal, &c. — that is quite another thing, an intellectual 
process entirely distinct from the formation of notions. In 



FACULTY OF JUDGMENT. 135 

this last process we conceive, that is, combine intuitions. In 
the former, we judge. 

As the function of the Intelligence by which we form notions 
is called the Understanding, so that by which we judge, that is, 
abstract, classify, and generalize, is denominated the Judgment. 

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UNDERSTANDING AND JUDGMENT 
VERIFIED. 

A single additional consideration will fully verify the dis- 
tinction above made between the Understanding and Judg- 
ment. We often meet with individuals in whom the Under- 
standing is strongly developed, and embraces a wide range of 
objects. Yet the same individuals may be almost totally want- 
ing in respect to the faculty of Judgment. They conceive 
distinctly and vividly of objects presented, yet make no impor- 
tant discriminations between them. They will read a book, 
for example, and give a full and distinct account of what it 
contains, and yet appear to be none the wiser for what they 
know. They, as is commonly said of them, appear to know 
everything, and yet can make little use of their knowledge. 
They form notions of objects just as they present themselves, 
without making important discriminations between them. This 
is owing to the fact that the Understanding, which simply knows 
objects as they appear, is exercised, while the Judgment, which 
separates things that differ, and ranges together those that 
agree, and then abstracts, classifies, and generalizes our concep- 
tions, or rather the objects of thought, is wanting or inactive. 

On the other hand we meet with individuals who, with a 
very limited acquaintance with particular objects, yet possess a 
great amount of what is called practical wisdom. Their infor- 
mation is limited, yet what they know is analyzed, classified, 
and generalized. In other words, in such individuals the fac- 
ulty of Judgment is fully developed. 



136 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Such considerations clearly show that the function of the 
Intelligence denominated Understanding is one thing, while 
that of Judgment is quite another. With the facts upon 
which the distinction under consideration is based, all men are 
familiar. They recognize readily the distinction between in- 
formation and knowledge, between conceiving of objects, and 
in this sense knowing them, and making important discrimina- 
tions between them. In short, the basis for the distinction 
between the Understanding and Judgment is laid in facts rec- 
ognized by all men. 

OBSERVATIONS OF KANT. 

The remarks of Kant upon the subject under consideration 
are so much to the point, that I will present one or two quota- 
tions from his Critick on the faculty of Judgment. *' If the 
Understanding," he says, ''in general be explained as the fac- 
ulty of rules, the faculty of Judgment is that of subsuming 
under rules; that is to say, of distinguishing whether some- 
thing does or does not stand under a given rule." Again : 
'' The faculty of Judgment is a particular talent, which is not 
to be taught, but only exercised; and this, consequently, is 
the speciality of the so-called mother-wit, the want of which 
no schooling can supply; for although this may offer to, and, 
as it were, graft upon a limited Understanding, rules in abund- 
ance borrowed from another mind, still the fliculty of availing 
himself correctly of these must belong to the hearer himself: 
and no rule which we could prescribe to him with this inten- 
tion is, under the deficiency of such a natural gift, secure from 
misuse. A physician, therefore, a judge, or politician, may 
have many excellent pathological, judicial, or political rules in 
his head, to such a degree that he himself may become therein 
a profound teacher, and yet in the application of them will 
easily make a mistake, either because he is deficient in natural 



FACULTY OP JUDGMENT. 137 

Judgment (although not in Understanding), and certainly can 
see the general in abstracto, but cannot distinguish whether a 
case in concreta, fall under it, or from this cause, that he has 
not sufficiently been trained by examples and real business to 
this judgment." 

Two characteristics, entirely distinct and opposite, of dif- 
ferent individuals of distinguished minds, may very properly 
be alluded to here, as illustrating and confirming the distinc- 
tion between the Understanding and Judgment above made. 
We often meet with individuals, public speakers, for example, 
distinguished for strong and vivid conceptions of whatever 
subject their minds are occupied with. Yet one of their dis- 
courses shadowing forth some bold and grand conception, will 
contain elements manifestly contradictory to those contained in 
a prior discourse of a similar character. Yet the speaker him- 
self appears wholly insensible of such contradiction. He con- 
tradicts himself, without at all being sensible of the fact. A 
bold and strong conception with such a mind is, of course, true, 
together with all the elements embraced in it. 

The productions of other minds are distinguished not only 
for logical and scientific arrangement, but for the consistency 
and harmony of the elements introduced into one discourse 
with those introduced into others. Such individuals seldom, 
to use a phrase commonly applied in such cases, cross their 
own tracks, and if they do this at any time, they will perceive 
it quite as soon as others. 

How shall we account for such diversities ? The answer 
is, that in the first instance, the Understanding, and frequently 
the imagination, are strongly developed, while there is a de- 
ficiency of Judgment. In the latter cases, there is a strong 
development of the faculty last named. Now, phenomena so 
diverse and opposite necessarily suppose faculties fundamentally 
distinct from each other. 
12* 



138 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

KELAriOyS OF THE UNDERSTANDING AND JUDGMENT. 

Having shown the distinction between these faculties, it 
now remains, rn the conclusion of the present Chapter, to show 
the relatione between them. The Judgment pre-supposes the 
Understanding. The former can analyze, abstract, classify, 
and generalize only what is furnished by the latter. Under- 
standing might exist without Judgment; but the latter cannot 
exist, or rather cannot act, without the former. 

The Understanding also not only precedes, but succeeds 
the action of the Judgment. When the Judgment has ab- 
s?r.icted, analyzed, classified, and generalized objects of the 
Understanding, the latter faculty then combines into its con- 
ceptions of such objects all the discriminations of the former 
faculty pertaining to them. When, for example, we have 
passed a judgment upon any individual, affirming that he be- 
longs to a pariirular class, that judgment, ever after, enters as 
an essential element into our conception of him. This is 
universally true of all judgments and notions. 



CHAPTER IX. 

ASSOCIATION. 
TERM DEFINED. 

"That one thought is often suggested to the mind by an- 
other, and that the sight of one external object often recalls 
former occurrences, and revives former feelings, are facts," 
says Mr. Dugald Stewart, " which are perfectly familiar, even 
to those who are least disposed to speculate concerning the 
principles of our nature." This is what is meant by the term 
Association. It is that principle of our minds by which past 
thoughts and states are recalled, and revived, through the in- 
fluence of present perceptions, thoughts and feelings. This 
law of the human mind was denominated by the old philoso- 
phers, " Association of ideas " By Dr. Brown it was denom- 
inated " Suggestion." By others, it is designated by the 
simple term, Association. 

Term Association, ivhy preferred. 

I prefer the latter term to either of the former, because it 
alone expresses all the phenomena which require consideration, 
when treating of the subject before us. We find by experi- 
ence, that not only thoughts and events are associated, but 
thoughts, events, and feelings also. The term Association of 
ideas, can be properly applied to ideas only. The same is true 



140 INTKLLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY, 

of Suggestion. An idea or event cannot properly be said to 
suggest feelings. Thoughts and events may be said to revive 
feelings; and feelings may be said to suggest thoughts and 
events. Association is the term, and the only term, which 
can properly be applied to all these different classes of phe- 
nomena. 

THE ASSOCIATING PRINCIPLE NOT WITHOUT LAW. 

Although the Mind is so constituted, that certain states 
follow certain other states, these phenomena, as philosophers 
have long since observed, not only do not follow each other at 
random, but are known to follow some one or more fixed law 
or laws. To ascertain and illustrate the operation of these 
laws, has been considered one of the great problems in Intel- 
lectual Philosophy ; and has accordingly occupied a conspicu- 
ous place in almost every treatise upon the science. Mr. 
Hume, I believe, was the first philosopher who attempted to 
settle definitely the number of these laws. According to this 
philosopher, they are all reduced to three : Resemblance, 
Cause and Effect, and Contiguity in time and place. Others 
have since added that of Contrast. 

LAW OF ASSOCIATION STATED AND DEFINED. 

It is somewhat remarkable that while philosophers have 
observed, that the principle of Association acts, as a matter 
of fact, in accordance with the above so-called laws, they have 
not inquired after the ultimate cause of its action in these 
forms, and have not raised the inquiry, whether this cause is 
not always one and the same. Some bodies, vapor for exam- 
ple, rise from the earth, while others descend towards it. 
Some bodies float upon the surface of water, while others sink 
to the bottom. Philosophy has long since demonstrated the 
fact, that the cause of all these diverse effects is one and 



ASSOCIATION. 141 

identical, in all instances. The same law which causes the 
stone to descend towards the earth, causes the vapor to rise 
above it. The same law which causes lead to sink to the bot- 
tom of a mass of water, causes other substances to float upon 
its surface. Does not a similar unity obtain, in the action of 
the associating principle ? May not all the facts of Associa- 
tion be reduced to one common principle, and the laws of As- 
sociation, as presented by philosophers generally, be shown to 
be but different forms in which this one principle develops it- 
self ? I think that this may be done, and that the principle 
referred to, may very readily be pointed out. 

When the mind has once been in a given state, we are all 
aware that there is in it a strong tendency to return to that 
state again. Hence, if any one element of that state is repro- 
duced from any cause whatever, a recurrence of that state to a 
greater or less degree, is very likely, from the known principle 
under consideration, to be occasioned. Every perception, every 
thought in the mind, induces a certain mental state. Now 
suppose, that by some new perception or thought, some ele- 
ment of this state is revived. By the law of mind under con- 
sideration, is not the state itself likely to be revived, in a 
greater or less degree, and with that state, is not the remem- 
brance of the perception or thought referred to, likely to be 
recalled ? Have we not here the universal law of Association ? 
A train of thought passed through my mind on yesterday, for 
example. Another is now passing. As a consequence, the 
former train is recalled. What is the reason of this fact? It 
is this : Something in the present train has reproduced some 
element of the state of mind induced by the one which passed 
through the mind on yesterday. By means of this common 
state, and that exclusively, the latter train has been recalled. 
So in all other instances. The law of Association, then, 
may be thus stated: When present thoughts or trains of 



142 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

thought, recall former ones, it is always and exclusively be- 
cause the present has induced the state of feeling, or some ele- 
ment of the state induced by the former. It is always, and 
exclusively by means of this common state, that such Associa- 
tions arise in the mind. The truth of this proposition it will 
now be my object to establish. 

THE PRESENT HYPOTHESIS, WHEN ESTABLISHED AS THE LAW 
OF ASSOCIATION. 

To establish the hypothesis under consideration, as the law 
of Association, two conditions must be fulfilled : 

It must be shown, in the first place, that all phenomena re- 
ferred to the commonly admitted laws, can be accounted for on 
this hypothesis. 

It must be shown with equal clearness, in the second place, 
that there are facts of Association which cannot be accounted 
for by these laws, but which admit of a ready explanation on 
this hypothesis, and upon none other conceivable by us. These 
positions being established, the Judgment affirms the hypoth- 
esis, as the exclusive and universal law of Association. 

We are now prepared to take up the question, whether 
there are many, or but one law of Association, and whether 
the hypothesis under consideration gives us that law '( 

A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 

It will be admitted on a moment's reflection, that there is 
a very strong a priori probability in favor of the supposition, 
that the facts of Association are controlled by one law, instead 
of many. The opposite position supposes a departure, in this sin- 
gle instance, from what we find true of all other classes of facts 
which lie within and around us in the universe. The phenom- 
ena of attraction in the material universe, for example, are 
many, and endlessly diversified. Yet they are all controlled 



ASSOCIATION. 143 

by one law. Why should we suppose the phenomena of Asso- 
ciation to be an exception ? Should we not expect, in the ul- 
timate analysis of facts, to find unity amidst diversity here, as 
well as everywhere else ? This argument is adduced as of 
weight, simply in favor of the supposition of one instead of 
many laws, and not at all in favor of any one hypothesis, in 
distinction from another. Any one principle, which would 
lay claim to the prerogative of universal law, must fulfill the 
conditions above presented. We are now prepared for a direct 
investigation of the question, whether the hypothesis under 
consideration fulfills these conditions. 

ALL THE PHENOMENA REFERRED TO THE COMMONLY RECEIVED 
LAWS, CAN BE EXPLAINED ON THIS HYPOTHESIS. 

That many of the phenomena of Association can be ac- 
counted for, in consistency with the commonly admitted laws, 
will be denied by no person of reflection. That objects which 
resemble each other, that those which have been perceived at 
the same time or place, that sustain to each other the relation 
of contrast, or cause and effect, do mutually suggest each other, 
is undeniable. But do such phenomena necessarily suppose 
the existence of a plurality of laws ? May they not all be re- 
ferred to one, and that the one under consideration ? Those 
of resemblance, obviously may. The same is true of those 
which sustain to each other the relations of contiguity of time 
and place, and of cause and effect. For they undeniably have 
co-existed with the same feelings or states of mind. The only 
phenomena which present the appearance of difficulty, are those 
of Contrast. That a giant and a dwarf resemble each other 
in but few particulars, and that they stand in striking contrast 
to each other, is readily admitted; but that, as objects of per- 
ception, or recollection, they may have co-existed with the 
same feelings, or states of mind, and as causes also of the same, 



144 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

I as fully believe, as I do that the conception of a hero and a 
lion have co-existed in a similar manner. A giant and a dwarf 
are strongly contrasted, but each, as striking departures, though 
in different directions, from the common stature, may have co- 
existed with similar feelings of wonder or surprise, and as com- 
mon causes of the same; and this may be the only reason 
why one suggests the other. In conversing upon this subject 
on a particular occasion, an individual present remarked, that 
he recollected having, at a particular time, seen a dwarf A 
giant, which he had previously seen, was not suggested at all, 
but another dwarf whom he had before met with. I at once 
asked the speaker, if the giant referred to, was not a familiar 
acquaintance of his. He replied that he was. This fact read- 
ily accounted for the phenomenon of Association, presented by 
him. Familiarity had destroyed the feeling of strangeness, 
which had formerly co-existed with the perception or recollec- 
tion of the giant. The same feeling, however, co-existing with 
the perception of the two dwarfs ; the perception of one would 
of course suggest the other. In the same manner all the phe- 
nomena of Contrast may be reduced to the hypothesis before us. 

PHENOMENA EXIST WHICH CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON THIS, 
AND ON NO OTHER HYPOTHESIS. 

1. Tliose falling under the relation of Analogy. — But 
how can we account for those associations which fall under the 
relation of analogy ? A hero and a lion sustain no relation 
of external resemblance, by which one would suggest the 
other. Equally removed are they from the relations of conti- 
. guity, cause and effect, or contrast. But as causes of similar 
feelings, or states of mind, the conceptions of them have co- 
existed in the mind, in connection with such states; and this, 
I believe, is the only reason that can be assigned, why the con- 
templation of one suggests the other. 



ASSOCIATION. 145 

Milton's account of the figlit of Abdiel and Satan, may- 
present a striking illustration of the principle under consider- 
ation : 

" So saying, a noble stroke lie lifted high, 
Which hung not, but so swift with tempest fell 
On the proud crest of Satan, that no sight. 
Nor motion of swift t^jought, less could his shield, 
Such ruin intercept. Ten paces huge 
He back recoiled ; the tenth on bended knee 
His massy spear upstpyed ; as if on earth 
Winds under ground, or waters forcing way, 
Sidelong had pushed a mountain from his seat, 
Half simk with all his pines." 

Now, why did the conception of Satan, thus smitten down, 
suggest to the mind of Milton that of a mountain pushed 
from his seat? The only answer that can be given is, thai 
the contemplation of each induces similar feelings or states Ot 
mind. So of all the phenomena of association falling under 
the relation of analogy. Suppose, further., that an individual 
relates to a number of men some incidents of a sublime, beau- 
tiful, heroic, horrid, or ludicrous character. How happens it 
that each hearer instantly recollects almost every incident of a 
similar character, which he has ever met with ? These inci- 
dents resemble each other in one particular only, and sustain 
no other relation to each other than this : they have, as objects 
of perception or contemplation, existed in the mind as causes 
of similar feelings to those awakened by the incident under 
consideration. The hypothesis before us is the only one con- 
ceivable, which accounts for such phenomena. 

2. Phenomena of Dreaming. — The phenomena of dream- 
ing can readily be accounted for on this hypothesis, and, as I 
conceive, upon no other. In consequence of peculiar attitudes 
of the body, or states of the physical or mental system, certain 
13 



146 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

feelings are awakened in the mind. Those objects of thought 
or perception, which have formerly co-existed with similar 
feelings, are consequently suggested ; and these are judged to be 
the causes of existing feelings. A sick man, for example, with 
a bottle of hot water at his feet, dreamed that he was walking 
■upon the crater of ^tna, and that this was the cause of the 
burning sensation which he felt. He had formerly felt similar 
sensations when walking upon the crater of Vesuvius, and had 
just been reading of a traveler's walking upon the crater of 
JEtna. These facts fully account for his dream. In a similar 
manner, all the phenomena of dreaming may be accounted for. 
Can they be accounted for by the common laws of Association ? 
I answer, no. 

3. Phenomena of Somnambulism. — Some of the phe- 
nomena of somnambulism here deserve an attentive consider- 
ation. It is well known that somnambulists frequently pass 
from a state of wakefulness to that of sleep, and vice versa, 
very suddenly ; and that in each change, there is an entire ob- 
livion of what passed in the preceding state ; while the train 
of thought, or the employment left, when passing from the 
present state, is, on returning to that state, instantly resumed, 
at the very point where it was left. Sentences left half fin- 
ished, when passing out of one state, are completed as soon as 
the individual enters upon the same state again. How 
manifest, from such phenomena, is the fact, that the uni- 
versal law of suggestion is based upon similarity of states or 
feelings. 

4. Facts connected tcitJi particular Diseases. — There are 
many facts connected with particular diseases, which more 
fully confirm and illustrate the principle which I am endeavor- 
ing to establish. Take, as a specimen, the two following cases 
stated by Dr. Abercrombie, in his Intellectual Philosophy. I 
give them in the words of the author : 



ASSOCIATION. 147 

" Another very remarkable modification of this affection is 
referred to by Mr. Combe, as described by Major Elliot, pro- 
fessor of Mathematics in the United States' Military Academy 
at West Point. The patient was a young lady of cultivated 
mind, and the affection began with an attack of somnolency, 
which was protracted several hours beyond the usual time. 
When she came out of it, she was found to have lost every 
kind of acquired knowledge. She immediately began to apply 
herself to the first elements of education, and was making 
considerable progress, when, after several months, she was 
seized with a second fit of somnolency. She was now at once 
restored to all the knowledge which she possessed before the 
first attack, but without the least recollection of anything that 
had taken place during the interval. After another interval 
she had a third attack of somnolency, which left her in the 
same state as after the first. In this manner she suifered 
these alternate conditions for a period of four years, with the 
very remarkable circumstance that during the one state she 
retained all her original knowledge; but during the other, 
that only which she had acquired since the first attack. Dur- 
ing the healthy interval, for example, she was remarkable for 
the beauty of her penmanship, but during the paroxysm wrote 
a poor, awkward hand. Persons introduced to her during the 
paroxysm she recognized only in a subsequent paroxysm, but 
not in the interval ; and persons whom she had seen for the 
first time during the healthy interval, she did not recognize 
during the attack.^' 

" Dr. Prichard mentions a lady who was liable to sudden 
attacks of delirium, which, after continuing for various periods, 
went off suddenly, leaving her at once perfectly rational. The 
attack was often so sudden that it commenced while she was 
engaged in interesting conversation, and on such occasions it 
happened, that on her recovery from the state of delirium she 



148 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

instantly recurred to the conversation she had been engaged in 
at the time of the attack, though she had never referred to it 
during the continuance of the aflfection. To such a degree 
was this carried, that she vpould even complete an unfinished 
sentence. During the subsequent paroxysm, again, she would 
pursue the train of ideas which had occupied her mind in the 
former. Mr. Combe also mentions a porter, who in a state of 
intoxication left a parcel at a wrong house, and when sober 
could not recollect what he had done with it. But the next 
time he got drunk, he recollected where be left it, and went 
and recovered it." 

Here are manifest and striking facts of Association. On 
the commonly received laws of the associating principle, they 
cannot be explained at all. On the hypothesis under consider- 
ation, however, they admit of a most ready explanation. How 
can they be explained on any other hypothesis ? 

I will adduce another fact taken from the same author. 

" A case has been related to me of a boy, who at the age 
of four received a fracture of the skull, for which he under- 
went the operation of trepan. He was at the time in a state 
of perfect stupor, and after his recovery retained no recollection 
either of the accident or the operation. At the age of fifteen, 
during the delirium of a fever, he gave his mother a correct 
description of the operation, and the persons who were present 
at it, with their dress, and other minute particulars. He had 
never been observed to allude to it before, and no means were 
known by which he could have acquired the circumstances 
which he mentioned." 

But one explanation can be given of such a remarkable 
fact. During the interval between the surgical operation and 
the sickness referred to, the feelings existing in connection 
with the operation had never been revived, and from the pecu- 



ASSOCIATION. 149 

liarity of the feelings could not have been. During this sick- 
ness, in consequence of the action of the fever upon the brain 
and skull, these feelings were revived. The consequence was, 
that the circumstances attending their existence were recalled. 
No other hypothesis can explain such facts. 

5. This Hypothesis established and illustrated, hy reflect- 
ing upon the facts of Association. — Every true explanation 
of the facts of Consciousness, will, as soon as it is understood, 
be confirmed in the conviction of every one who understands 
it, as he subsequently reflects on what passes in the interior 
of his own mind. This is, in a special manner true of the 
hypothesis under consideration. Every person who under- 
stands it, subsequently finds its truth confirmed and illustrated 
by his own reflections upon the facts of Association, as they 
fall under the eye of his Consciousness. 

ARGUMENT SUMMARILY STATED. 

The argument in support of the principle of Association 
under consideration may be summarily stated, in the following 
propositions : 

1. It is known to exist as a law of Association, in certain 
cases — in all instances of Association founded on the rela- 
tions of analogy. No other reason can be assigned why the 
conception of a hero, for example, suggests that of the lion, 
but the fact that they have each co-existed with similar feel- 
ings, and as causes of such feelings. 

2. All the phenomena, explicable by the commonly received 
laws of Association, admit of an equally ready and consistent 
explanation, upon the hypothesis before us. 

3. All other phenomena, which cannot be explained by the 
commonly received laws, admit also of a ready explanation, 
when referred to the above hypothesis. 



13^ 



150 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

4. No other hypothesis yet known, explains all the phe- 
nomena of Association. 

We are at liberty then to assume, that the hypothesis with 
which we started, ceases to be an hypothesis. It jiay be re- 
garded as the law of Association. 

EXPLANATORY REMARKS. 

To understand fully the operation of the associating prin- 
ciple, two circumstances pertaining to it demand special at- 
tention. 

The first is the fact, that when a deep impression has been 
made upon the mind by any thought or perception, the feeling 
excited may not only be revived by some subsequent thought 
or perception, but those feelings may afterwards recur sponta- 
neously/, without any other apparent cause, than the well-known 
mental tendency to return to states in which our minds have 
previously existed. When we have listened to an enchanting 
musical performance, for example, who has not, months subse- 
quent to the event, felt, in the depths of the inner being, the 
spontaneous movements of the cords of melody, which were 
so powerfully swept on the occasion referred to, and which, at 
once, bring the whole past scene into distinct remembrance ? 
The law of Association is this : When any feeling which has 
co-existed with any past intellectual state is revived, whether 
that revival is spontaneous, or is occasioned by some present 
thought or perception, that state will recur again, as a conse- 
quence of the revival of this feeling. 

The second remark is this : The feeling which has co- 
existed with any former intellectual state, need not be wholly, 
but only partially revived, in order to occasion the recurrence 
of that state. Let some present occurrence produce feelings 
of joy, wonder, surprise, or regret, for example. Should any 
subsequent event excite these feelings in only a very slight 



ASSOCIATION. 151 

degree, the former occurrence would thereby be suggested. 
This is a universal characteristic of the action of the principle 
of Association. 

REASONS WHY DIFFERENT OBJECTS EXCITE SIMILAR FEEL- 
INGS IN OUR MINDS. 

The law of associations has been stated and illustrated. 
We are now prepared for another important inquiry, to wit, 
On what 'principle is it that different objects, or rathe?- thoughts 
and perceptions, excite similar feelings in our minds, and thus 
mutually suggest each other ? The following may be specified 
as the most important reasons why different objects excite such 
feelings : 

1. In consequence of natural resemblance between the ob- 
jects themselves. That objects naturally alike should excite 
similar feelings, is a necessary consequence of personal identity. 
Such objects do not suggest one another, because they are 
alike, but because, that being alike, they excite similar feel- 
ings. The principle of association in such instances, is the 
same as in all others. 

2. Objects excite similar feelings, and thus mutually sug- 
gest each other, in consequence of similarity of relations to 
the original principles of our nature. Sweetness, beauty, and 
harmony, as mere objects of sense, are totally unlike. But 
they may and do sustain such a relation to the original prin- 
ciples of our nature, as to induce similar states of mind. 
Consequently, the perception of one may suggest that of the 
other. Thus the origin of figurative language, such as sweet 
or beautiful sounds, admits of a ready explanation. Also the 
sublime comparisons of poetry and oratory, founded upon the 
relations of analogy. An Indian orator, speaking of the 
American Revolution, said, " That it was like the whirlwind, 
which tears up the trees, and tosses to and fro the leaves, till 



152 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

we cannot tell from whence they come, or whither they will 
fall. At length the Great Spirit spoke to the whirlwind, and 
it was still." Says another, whose age numbered more than 
one hundred years : " I am the aged hemlock. The winds of 
an hundred winters have whistled through my branches, and I 
am dead at the top." " And I heard," says the sacred writer, 
" as it were the voice of a great multitude, and as the voice of 
many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunderings, saying, 
Allelujah ; for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth." Milton, 
speaking of the breaking up of the counsel of Pandemonium, 
says : 

" Their rising all at once, was as the sound 
Of thunder heard remote." 

An aged soldier, in one of the tragedies, says of himself: 

" For I have fought when few alive remained, 
And none unscathed ; when but few remained, 
Thus marred and mangled — as belike you've seen 
0' summer's night, around the evening lamp. 
Some scorched moths, wingless, and half consumed, 
Just feebly crawling o'er their heaps of dead." 

How different, as mere objects of sense, are all the things 
compared together in the above quotations. But sustaining a 
common relation to the original laws of the mind, they induce 
similar feelings or states of mind. Consequently, the appre- 
hension of one, suggests that of the other. 

3. Objects co-exist with, and excite similar feelings, in 
consequence of a perceived relation hetween the objects them- 
selves; such, for example, as the relations of cause and effect 
— parent and child, &c. Why it is that the feelings excited 
by one of these objects are transferred to the other as soon as 
the relation between them is perceived, we cannot tell. All 
that we can say is, that such is the constitution of our minds, 



ASSOCIATION. 153 

that when two objects are known to sustain such relations to 
each other, they will, in all ordinary circumstances, excite 
similar feelings, and the idea of one will, consequently, sug- 
gest that of the other, 

4. Objects co-exist witb similar feelings in consequence of 
mere accidental association. Whenever the mind has been 
brought from any cause whatever, into any particular state, 
the accidental perception of any object, or suggestion of any 
thought, however foreign to the cause of the present state, 
will so modify that state, that the new object will ever after 
sustain an entirely new relation to the Sensibility of our na- 
ture. To the present state of the mind, thus modified, it sus- 
tains the relation of a cause. Consequently, its subsequent 
presence as an object of perception, or of conception, will 
excite, in a greater or less degree, that state, and will of course 
recall the objects which formerly co-existed with the same 
state. Thus the same object may, at different periods of our 
lives, be associated with entirely different, and even opposite 
states of mind, and states of mind totally different from what 
they are naturally adapted to produce. Thus of course they 
may, and will recall entirely different objects to our remem- 
brance. In many instances, we find it wholly impossible to 
account for the change which has taken place in the effect 
of particular objects upon our Sensibility, and consequently 
upon our trains of association ; so gradual, and accidental, has 
been the transfer of the object from one state of feeling to 
another. 

APPLICATION OP THE PRINCIPLES ABOVE ILLUSTRATED. 

The law of Association which has been confirmed and illus- 
trated, has many and very important applications. To a few 
of these special attention is invited, as we conclude the present 
Chapter. 



164 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Ground of the Mistake of Philosophers in respect to the Laws 
of Association. 

We are now prepared to state distinctly the ground of the 
mistake of philosophers, pertaining to the laws of Association. 
Because objects sustaining certain relations to each other do 
mutually suggest one another, they have fastened upon these 
relations as the laws of Association. In this manner, they 
have overlooked the fact, that objects suggest each other, only 
on the ground of a common impression made by each upon the 
mind, and that the relations existing between them present 
the reason why they make a common impression, instead of 
revealing laws of the associating principle. Philosophers have 
noticed the fact, that some objects are associated on the exclu- 
sive ground of a common impression. Yet they have singu- 
larly overlooked the universal law of Association revealed in 
that fact. " Things," says Mr. Stewart, " which have no 
known relation to each other, are often associated, in conse- 
quence of their producing similar effects on the mind. Some 
of the finest poetical allusions are founded on this principle ; 
and, accordingly, if the reader is not possessed of sensibility 
congenial to that of the poet, he will be apt to overlook their 
meaning or censure them as absurd." Now, had the question 
suggested itself to this philosopher, Is not this the condition 
and ground of all Association of every kind, and do not 
objects sustaining to each other the relations of resemblance, 
contiguity in time and place, contrast, cause and effect, and 
analogy, mutually suggest each other, because, that being thus 
related, they produce a common impression ? he would have 
perceived, at once, that his mind had dropped down upon the 
universal law of Association. 



ASSOCIATION. 155 

Action of the associating Principle in different Individuals. 

We are all familiar with the fact, that the action of the 
associating principle is very diiferent in different individuals. 
This is evidently owing to two circumstances — natural tem- 
perament, and the diverse pursuits of individuals — one there- 
by being more deeply interested in, and consequently more 
deeply impressed with different objects, and with different ele- 
ments of the same object, than another. Let any number of 
individuals of diverse temperaments, for example, contemplate 
the same painting, each will be more forcibly impressed with 
those features of it particularly correlated to his own peculiari- 
ties of natural temperament. Hence the corresponding diver- 
sity of the action of the associating principle, in such a case. 
So with a gentleman on a tour of observation, a merchant en- 
gaged in the purchase and sale of grain, and a farmer seeking 
a location for his family, in looking over the same plantation. 
Each will contemplate it in the light of the leading idea in his 
own mind. A corresponding diversity will of course exist in 
the impressions received, and in the consequent action of the 
associating principle. 

Influence of Hahit. 

That actions and trains of thought, to which we have been 
long familiar, are performed and carried on by us with a de- 
gree of ease and exactness perfectly unaccountable to a new 
beginner, is obvious to every one. In respect to the ease and 
exactness with which trains of physical actions to which we 
have become habituated are repeated, two reasons may be as- 
signed. 

The first is, a certain conformation of the physical organi- 
zation, so that, as soon as the train is commenced, the action 



156 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of the muscles in obedience to the will is spontaneous and ne- 
cessary in a given order of action. 

The second is, the fact that all the actions under considera- 
tion have become indissolubly associated with the same state of 
mind. Of course, as soon as that state is reproduced, those 
actions are spontaneously suggested in their proper order. 

The same remarks are equally applicable to trains of 
thought to which we have become habituated. When the 
mind has often existed in a certain state, there is, as shown 
above, a strong tendency, spontaneously, or on the slightest 
impression, to recur to that state again. The train of thought 
having become associated with this state is, of course, pursued 
with precision and facility. 

Standards of Taste and, Fashion. 

"A mode of dress," says Dugald Stewart, "which at first 
appears awkward, acquires in a few weeks or months, the ap- 
pearance of elegance. By being accustomed to see it worn 
by others whom we consider as models of taste, it becomes as- 
sociated with the agreeable impressions which we receive from 
the ease, and grace, and refinement of their manners." Thus 
the pronunciation common to the higher classes in Edinburgh, 
while it remained the capital of Scotland, and which was then 
regarded as the standard of purity in diction, has now become 
barbarous, in consequence of the removal of the capital to 
London. 

Vicissitudes in respect to such Standards. 

Every one is familiar with the perpetual vicissitudes in 
dress, and everything, tlie chief recommendation of which is 
fashion. The remarks of Mr. Stewart on this point also, are 
so much to the purpose, and so well expressed, that I will ven- 



ASSOCIATION. 157 

ture another citation from him. " It is evident that, as far as 
the agreeable effect of ornament arises from association, the ef- 
fect will continue only while it is confined to the higher orders. 
When it is adopted by the multitude, it not only ceases to be 
associated with ideas of taste and refinement, but it is associa- 
ted with ideas of affectation, absurd imitation, and vulgarity. 
It is accordingly laid aside by the higher orders, who studi- 
ously avoid every circumstance in external appearance, which 
is debased by low and common use ; and they are led to exer- 
cise their invention in the introduction of some new peculiari- 
ties, which first become fashionable, then common, and last of 
all are abandoned as vulgar." There is one circumstance 
which Mr. Stewart has not mentioned, which has perhaps quite 
as much influence in inducing these vicissitudes as that pre- 
sented above. " The higher classes " are pleased with revolu- 
tions in society which are visibly produced by themselves, and 
which do not diminish, but increase and render manifest, to 
themselves and the world, their own controlling influence. In 
the perpetual vicissitudes of costume proceeding from and con- 
trolled by themselves, they are continually manifested to them- 
selves as the " glass of fashion, and the mould of form." 
Thus a continued gratification of the love of power is enjoyed, 
a motive not the most commendable to be sure, but yet quite 
as real as that above presented 

Peculiarities of Genius associated with Judgment^ or correct 
Taste. 

We are now able to state distinctly the pecularities of true 
genius, when associated with good Judgment. It consists in 
distinguishing those things which please simply in consequence 
of accidental associations, like those above referred to, from 
those which are correlated to the original and changeless prin- 
14 



158 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ciples of our nature, and in thus shadowing forth the real and 
permanent forms of beauty, sublimity, and fitness. Those 
forms of thought which stand correlated to the current opin- 
ions of the day, may have a wide-spread ephemeral popularity, 
after which they sink to a silent or dishonored grave, and a 
long oblivion. The productions of true genius, associated with 
good taste, on the other hand, will please as long as human na- 
ture remains what it ia. 

Influence of Writers and Speakers of splendid Genius, hut 
incorrect Taste. 

It is well known, that very strong conceptive and imagina- 
tive faculties (the peculiarities of true genius), sometimes ex- 
ist in the absence of a well-balanced Judgment, and consequent 
good taste. The productions of such individuals will be char- 
acterized by surpassing excellencies, and glaring defects. Yet 
the mass of their admirers will, in time, become as well pleased 
with the latter as with the former ; and the defects will be more 
frequently copied by imitators, perhaps, than the excellencies. 
The reason is this : The defects come to be associated with 
the feelings of interest and delight which the excellencies ex- 
cite. The former are thus embalmed and consecrated by the 
latter. Every individual who would preserve his taste unvi- 
tiated, should be, in a special sense, on his guard under such 
circumstances. 

Danger of vicious Associations. 

Great genius and great vices, polished manners and corrupt 
morals, and productions the most finished in respect to style 
and imagery, and the most foul in respect to sentiment, are 
not unfi-equently associated among men. The imminent peril 



ASSOCIATION. 159 

of intercommunion with sucli minds and witli such produc- 
tions, is manifest, in the light of the law of Association above 
illustrated. The feelings of sublimity, beauty, and delight, 
awakened by the contemplation of great minds, polished man- 
ners, and the perfections of style and imagery, at first weaken, 
and finally entirely supplant the feelings of disgust, abhor- 
rence, and repellency, which the contemplation of vice, and 
corrupt principle, in their unassociated grossness, excites. The 
final result is, the acquirement of polished manners and style, 
with the loss of virtue and virtuous principles. That " which 
cannot be gotten for gold/' and for " which silver cannot be 
weighed as the price thereof," in comparison with which " no 
mention shall be made of coral or of pearls, and the price of 
which is above rubies," has been exchanged for that which 
might have been attained in much higher perfection without 
this irreparable loss ; but which may exist in connection with 
the foulest morals, and an equal pre-eminence in guilt. 

Unrighteous Prejudices, how justified. 

Every individual is familiar with the fact, that persons and 
classes of men, placed in circumstances degrading in public 
estimation, often become the victims of cruel and unrighteous 
prejudice. Some circumstance, aside from condition, is fast- 
ened upon as the cause of this feeling, which is thus justified, 
on the assumption that it is natural, and therefore necessary, 
designed and sanctioned by Providence. Feelings connected 
with individuals by accidental association, are assumed as re- 
sulting from the original constitution of our nature, and are 
justified on that assumption. 



160 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Giving Individuals a bad Name, spreading false Re- 
ports, &c. 

It is very frequently asserted as a proverb, that the evils 
resulting from giving persons a bad name, and spreading false 
reports respecting them, will ere long correct, and more than 
correct themselves, in consequence of a reaction of public 
feeling, as the truth comes to be known. This would be true, 
were men disposed to render impartial justice in all instances. 
But this is far from being the case. Pre-eminent virtues and 
endowments, together with a commanding influence, may often, 
under such circumstances, occasion a reaction of public feeling 
which will perfectly overwhelm the authors of the mischief. 
The standing of the mass of mankind, however, is not such as 
to occasion such reaction, even when the wrong done comes to 
be known. Hence it often happens that the feelings first 
awakened come to be permanently, to a greater or less degree, 
associated with them in the public mind. If this is not so, no 
thanks are due to those who first set the ball rolling. 

Influence of the associating Principle in perpetuating existing 
mental Characteristics. 

" To the pure," says the Sacred Writer, " all things are 
pure; but to the corrupt and unbelieving, there is nothing 
pure." In other words, a mind truly pure comes to be so 
correllated to objects in respect to not only the action of the 
voluntary power, but also in respect to the Sensibility and 
Intelligence, that all things awaken thoughts and feelings 
tending to perpetuate and increase that purity. The same is 
true with the vicious. Every object of thought and perception 
is brought into such a relation to their Minds, as to generate 
thoughts and feelings which tend only to develop and confirm 



ASSOCIATION. 161 

existing tendencies to corruption. This law of self-perpet- 
uation which virtue and vice respectively possess, is found 
in the associating principle. In a Mind which, has long been 
the cage of impure thoughts and feelings, those feelings at 
last come to be associated with all objects of thought, and 
thus the entire current of thought and feeling is turned into 
an impure channel. 

There are no limits to the application of the associating 
principle, as above illustrated. Its importance in mental sci- 
ence will be appreciated as it is understood in its endlessly 
diversified applications. 



14 = 



CHAPTER X. 

MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. 
TERMS DEFINED. 

Memory aud Recollection are treated by philosophers only 
as important departments of the principle of Association. 
This, as we shall see, is demanded by sound philosophical 
analysis. The two terms above named are often used inter- 
changeably, and never distinguished but by the following 
circumstances. In the process denominated Memory, notions, 
or conceptions of facts and events, are spontaneously recalled 
to the Mind. In that called Recollection, these Intellectual 
states are recalled by an effort of Will. 

states of mind entering into and connected with 
these processes. 

There are three distinct mental operations connected with 
each of these processes of Mind. 

1. Some feeling or state of Mind which has formerly co- 
existed with the perception or apprehension of the object re- 
called — a feeling or state spontaneously recurring, or revived 

,by some object of present thought, perception, or sensation. 

2. A simple apprehension of the object or event itself — 
an apprehension attended with no belief or judgment whatever 
pertaining to the object. 

3. A recurrence, in thought, of the circumstances of time 



MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. 163 

and place connected with the perception or apprehension of the 
object. 

The above statement verified. 

That objects of Memory and Recollection are not recalled 
directly and immediately, but are suggested, in the manner 
above described, is obvious from two considerations. 

1. From universal Consciousness. Those who are least 
accustomed to analyze the operations of their own minds, as 
well as philosophers, have noticed this fact. Hence the com- 
mon aflB,rmations : " This reminds me of,'' or " This suggests 
to my mind such and such occurrences," clearly showing, not 
merely that such events are suggested, but that the subjects 
of them are conscious of it. 

2. When we wish to recollect any events, or in the com- 
mon phrase, to recall them, we do not attempt to do this 
directly, but by directing the attention to various objects, at 
present before the Mind, that they may suggest those which 
we wish to recall. Memory and Recollection are, in this re- 
spect, subject to precisely the same law, and the law which 
governs each is the same which governs the entire phenomena 
of Association. The above remark is so obviously true, that 
philosophers, as stated above, almost universally treat of these 
subjects in the same connection, Memory being considered 
only as one department of Association. 

PRINCIPLE ON WHICH OBJECTS ARE REMEMBERED WITH 

EASE AND DISTINCTNESS. 

Taking this position for granted, or as having been already 
proved, it will follow, as a necessary consequence, that the 
ease and distinctness with which any objects or events will be 
recalled to the Mind, will always be proportioned to the depth 
and intensity of the impressions formerly received from them, 



164 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and with the number of objects and events with which such 
impressions have heretofore co-existed, or may hereafter co- 
exist. This conclusion we also find to be confirmed by univer- 
sal experience. "When you hear the declaration, " Such and 
such events I shall never forget," suppose you ask the reason 
for such an afiirmation. The answer will invariably be, " It 
made such a deep impression upon my Mind." On the 
other hand, if a person is asked for the reason why he recalls 
with such difficulty any particular event, he will uniformly 
answer, " It made such a feeble impression upon my Mind." 
Assuming that the state of the Sensibility is the regulating 
principle of suggestion, the fact is self-evident, that the ease 
with which any particular event will be recalled, depends not 
only upon the depth and intensity of the impression which it 
formerly made, but upon the number of objects or events with 
which such impression may have co-existed, and shall hereafter 
co-exist. 

Deep and distinct Impressions, on what conditioned. 

One inquiry, of no small importance in mental science, 
here claims our attention, to wit, the circumstances under 
which impressions received from objects of thought or percep- 
tion are rendered deep and distinct. Among these I notice 
the three following, as the most important : 

1. Attention. In former Chapters it has been shown that 
attention is the condition of distinct perception, both in re- 
spect to the phenomena of Sense and Consciousness. In 
walking, for example, we do not remember the particular acts 
of volition, which directed each particular step. Yet we know 
that we must have been conscious of such acts. The eye 
runs carelessly over a particular landscape, and nothing but 
the most general outline is remembered, while we know that 
each particular part must have been seen by us. For the 



MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. 165 

want of attention, however, these objects were not distinctly 
perceived. Of course no distinct and vivid impression was 
made upon tho Mind, and consequently they are not remem- 
bered. The manner in which attention influences Memory is 
twofold. It not only impresses deeply and distinctly on the 
Mind particular scenes, each taken as a whole, but all the 
parts of such scenes. Hence the whole of such scenes will be 
recalled by the perception or suggestion of any particular part 
which may be met with in other scenes. That Memory, how- 
ever, does not depend primarily upon attention, but on the 
impression made by an objects of attention, is evident from the 
fact, that the ease with which any particular event is recalled, 
is not proportioned to the degree of attention devoted to it, 
but to the vividness of the impression received from it. 

2. The impressions made upon the mind by a particular 
event, and consequently the ease with which it will be remem- 
bered, depends upon the circumstances in which the event oc- 
curred — circumstances external to the Mind; such for exam- 
ple, as its occurrence at a time or place unexpected, in 
connection with other events deeply interesting to us, &c. 

3. The impression which events make on the Mind, de- 
pends upon the state of the Mind itself, when they occur. 
Offices of kindness, when we little need them, make a com- 
paratively slight impression upon the Mind. They are accord- 
ingly forgotten with comparative ease. But the stranger who 
watched over us when we were sick in a strange land, we 
never forget, for the obvious reason that such occurrences are 
deeply impressed upon the Mind. Who is not aware that the 
impression made upon the Mind in reading a book, Hstening 
to a discourse, or witnessing any scene, and conse<]uently the 
ease and distinctness with which they are recalled, depends 
greatly upon the state of Mind at the time ? 



166 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



DIVERSITY OF POWERS OF MEMORY, AS DEVELOPED IN DIF- 
FERENT INDIVIDUALS. 

Assuming the principle, that those things of which we 
have formed distinct conceptions, and which have deeply moved 
and affected our Sensibility, will be easily and distinctly re- 
membered, the diverse kinds of Memory, as they appear in 
different individuals, may be readily explained. 

Philosojyliic Memory. 

The philosopher is, above all things, interested in universal 
truths and general principles, and in facts which illustrate such 
truths and principles. With names, and minor circumstances 
of time and place, he has little or no interest. These, of course, 
he seldom recalls ; while general principles and facts connected 
with, and illustrative of general principles, he never forgets. 
Here we have the peculiarities of what may be called Philoso- 
phical Memory. 

Local Memory. 

With general principles, however, the mass of men are 
very little interested. Events, as mere events, with all their 
circumstances of time, place, &c., are the things which chiefly 
interest them. In such cases, general principles, if under- 
stood at all, will readily pass from the Mind, while facts and 
events, with all their adventitious circumstances, will leave their 
permanent impress upon it. Here we have the characteristics 
of what is called Local Memory. 

Artificial Memory. 

The third and only kind of Memory which it is necessary 
to notice, is called Artificial Memory, a method of connecting 
things easily remembered with those which are recalled with 



MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. 167 

greater difficulty, that the latter may be recalled by means of 
the former. The manner in which the principle of suggestion 
operates in this instance, may be readily espluined. The two 
objects are brought into the relation of co-existence with one 
and the same state of Mind; and the familiar object, by ex- 
citing that state, recalls the one less familiar. The inexpedi- 
ency of resorting to such associations, excepting upon trivial 
subjects, is so obvious as not to need any particular remarks, 

MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. . 

A few topics of a somewhat miscellaneous character, con- 
nected with our present inquiries will close tbis Chapter. 

A ready and retentive Memory. 

The distinction between what is called a ready, and reten- 
tive Memory, next demands attention. A philosophical Mem- 
ory is known to be the most attentive and least ready. General 
principles are regarded by the philosopher, as above all price. 
These of course he never forgets. For the same reason, facts 
and events connected with, and illustrative of general princi- 
ples leave an impress equally permanent upon his mind. The 
Memory of such a person however, will not, in ordinary cir- 
cumstances, be ready, for the obvious reason that when he 
wishes to recall any particular fact, he finds it necessary first 
to recall the general principle with which it was associated. 
For the same reason, Local Memory will be more ready, but 
less retentive. The qualities in objects with which such per- 
sons are interested, exist alike in such an infinite variety of 
objects, that when this quality is met with, a great multitude 
of similar objects will be at once suggested. They will gen- 
erally be those however, which have been most recently seen. 
Persons possessing Local Memory merely, will excel in com- 
mon conversation, and in what may be called loose and 



168 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

rambling composition. Philosophical Memory displays itself 
in the laboratory, the hall of science, on the bench, in the 
lecture room, and pulpit. 

The vast and diverse Power of Memory possessed hy different 
Individuals. 

The degree in which this faculty is developed in different 
individuals, may now be readily accounted for. It is owing, 
as I suppose, to two circumstances — natural diversities in 
which the power is possessed by different individuals, and an 
accidental direction of the power. Themistocles knew every 
citizen of Athens by name. Cyrus and Hannibal had each a 
similar knowledge of every soldier in his respective army. 
Their original endowments mode them capable of such acqui- 
sitions. They made such acquisitions, because they considered 
them necessary to the end they designed to accomplish. 

Improvement of Memory. 

But for the faculty under consideration, the past would be 
to us, as if it had not been. No advantages could be derived 
from experience of our own or that of others. Existence, at 
each successive moment, must be commenced anew. The 
same errors and follies, which formerly occurred, must be 
repeated, without the possibility of improvement. Through 
this faculty, the past furnishes the chart and compass for the 
future. The progress of improvement is onward, with perpet- 
ually accumulating force. The question, therefore. How can 
this faculty be improved? presents itself, as of special im- 
portance. The following suggestions may not be out of place 
on this point : 

1. The first thing to be kept distinctly in Mind, in all plans 
for the permanent improvement of Memory, is the principle 
on which its ready and retentive action depends, to wit, deep 



MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. 169 

and distinct impression. All our plans for the accomplish- 
ment of the object under consideration, should be formed with 
direct reference to this one principle. 

2. As impressions depend very much upon distinctness of 
conception, in all efforts, to improve this faculty, we should 
habituate ourselves to /or?jt c^is^mc^ conceptions of objects, es- 
pecially of those which we wish to recollect. In this manner, 
the impression will not only be deep and permanent, but the 
notion associated with it being distinct, will, when recalled, 
possess a corresponding distinctness. 

3. In thought, the object should be located, in distinct 
relation to the circumstances of time and place with which it 
is associated. In this manner the impression and conception 
both will not only be rendered deep and distinct, but each cir- 
cumstance referred to, as it recurs in connection with other 
thoughts and perceptions will, by exciting the feelings under 
consideration, recall the object associated with it. 

4. Knowledge, in order to be retained permanently, must 
be systematized and reduced to general permanent prijiciples. 
Otherwise, it will be exclusively subject to the law of local 
Association which is so temporary in respect to retention. 

5. To converse with others, and write down our thoughts 
which we wish to retain, contributes to permanency and dis- 
tinctness of recollection. Knowledge, by this means, is ren- 
dered distinct, the corresponding impression deep and perma- 
nent, and the whole subject of thought most likely to be 
systematically arranged. All these circumstances tend to ren- 
der Memory distinct and permanent. 

6. Memory also, to be improved, must be trusted, but at 
the same time, not overburdened, as is the case when every- 
thing is committed to it, without the aid of a judicious 
diary of important thoughts and occurrences. That faculty 
which is not exercised will not be developed and improved, 

15 



170 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Memory is not exempt from this law. At the same time, to 
overburden a faculty is a sure way to palsy its energies. 
Nothing but Reflection and Judgment, properly exercised, c;in 
fix upon the line where memory should and should not be 
trusted, without the aid of written records of our thoughts, 
and thus secure a proper development of this faculty. 

Memory of the Aged. 

One of the first indications of the approaching feebleness 
of age, is the failure, in a greater or less degree, of the power 
of Memory. A characteristic precisely the opposite is also 
sometimes presented in the experience of aged persons — a 
wonderful revival of the Memory of the occurrences of early 
life. A lady of my acquaintance, for example, aged about 
ninety years, had occasion to amuse some of her great-grand- 
children one day. She thought she would, as a means to this 
end, relate to them the substance of a story, related in verse, 
■which she had read, when quite young. She had never com- 
mitted it to memory, and doubtless had thought little of it for 
more than half a century. As she commenced the story, the 
entire poem came fresh to her recollection. She could repeat 
it all, word for word. These two facts in the experience of the 
aged, the failure, on the one hand, and the wonderful revival 
of this power, on the other, need to be accounted for. 

In respect to the first class of phenomena, two reasons 
may be assigned for their existence : 

1. The failure of the faculty of perception and attention. 
As a consequence, distinct notions are not formed of objects 
of present thought and perception. Nor do they affect the 
Mind as they formerly did. For these reasons, the peculiar 
feelings which have co-existed with former thoughts and per- 
ceptions, and would, if revived, suggest theui, are not revived. 

2. In the failing of the perceptive faculty, there is a cor- 



MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. 171 

responding change in the correlation of the Sensibility to ob- 
jects of thought and perception. Hence the same feelings 
precisely are not now excited by objects of thought and per- 
ception, as formerly, and consequently former intellectual states 
are not reproduced. 

In respect to the second class, I would remark, that every 
one is aware, that amid the hurrying scenes of ordinary life, 
such crowds of associations rush upon the mind, at one and 
the same time, that no one entire scene of the past, is often 
distinctly recalled. On the other hand, when we are in a 
state of temporary isolation from the varying tide of events 
which is floating by and around us, then is the time when our 
recollections of the past become full and distinct. Now the 
aged are in a state of isolation of a more permanent character. 
Hence when a past scene is recalled, the Mind is in a state of 
comparative freedom from all diverting and distracting associa- 
tions. Consequently the scene, in its entireness, is brought 
into full and distinct remembrance. 

Duration of Memory. 

If the law of Association illustrated in the preceding Chap- 
ter be admitted as true, it will follow, as a matter of course, 
that Memory is absolutely indestructible. Thought can never 
perish. If the impression with which any thought has co- 
existed, should, at any period, however remote, be in any form 
revived, the thought itself may be recalled. If any element 
of a given impression be reproduced, no reason can be assigned 
why a thought which co-existed with it, myriads of ages ago, 
should not thereby be recalled, as well as the one which co- 
existed with it but yesterday. 

Numberless facts also, which lie around us in society, fully 
confirm the principle under consideration as a law of Memory. 
The case of the aged lady referred to above, presents a fact 



172 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of the kind. The most striking one that now recurs to my 
recollection is given by Coleridge. It is the case of a German 
girl who had always labored as a domestic. While Coleridge 
■was on a visit to Germany, and in the vicinity of her resi- 
dence, she sickened, and if I mistake not, died. During her 
Bickness, she began to utter sentences in languages unknown 
to all her attendants. Learned men, from a neighboring Uni- 
versity, were called in. It was then found that she was recit- 
ing, with perfect con-ectness, entire passages from the Hebrew, 
Greek, Arabic and Syriac Scriptures, and also from the writ- 
ings of the ancient Fathers. The occurrence was, by many, 
regarded as miraculous. A young physician in attendance, 
however, determined to trace out her past history, for the pur- 
pose of finding a clue to the mystery. He found at last, that 
when quite small, the young woman had lived in the family of 
an aged clergyman of great learning, who was in the daily 
habit of reading aloud in his study from the writings above 
referred to. As the child was at work in a room contiguous, 
she was accustomed to stop, from time to time, and listen to 
those strange sounds, the meaning of not one of which did 
she understand. There was the clue to the mystery. Those 
sounds were imperishably impressed upon the Memory. Hence 
their repetition, under the circumstances named. Cases of a 
similar nature might, to any extent, be adduced. They point 
with solemn interest, to the nature of the immortal powers 
within, as well as to facts of portentous moment in the future 
development of those powers. 



CHAPTER XI. 

IMAGINATION. 

There is hardly any department of the present Treatise, in 
respect to which I feel a greater solicitude, than that npou 
which we are now to enter. I freely acknowledge, that I have 
not been satisfied with the views given upon the subject by 
authors held in general repute. It is by no means certain, 
however, that, when we have discovered real or apparent de- 
fects in the productions of others, we can produce anything 
more perfect ourselves. It not unfrequently happens, also, 
that the supposed defects lie in our own ideal, and not in that 
in which we suppose ourselves to have found them. All are 
aware that there is such a function of the Intelligence as the 
Imagination. When we meet with any of its real creations 
also, all recognize them as such. But then, when the ques- 
tions are asked. What is this power ? What are its functions ? 
or. What are the laws of its action ? a true answer does not so 
readily occur, as, at first thought, might be anticipated. 

DEFINITION or DISTINGUISHED PHILOSOPHERS. 

In further remarking upon the subject, I will first present 
some of the definitions of this faculty, given by distinguished 
philosophers. I begin with the definition of Dr. Brown : — 
" We not only perceive objects," he observes, '' and conceive 
and remember them as they were, but we have the power of 
combining them with various new assemblages — of forming, 
15* 



174 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

at our will; with a sort of delegated omnipotence, not a single 
universe merely, but a new and varied universe, with every 
mceession of our thoughts." 

*' What is imagination," says Mr. Payne, " but Memory 
presenting the objects of pure perceptions (in a manner after- 
wards to be explained) in groups, or combinations which do 
not exist in nature ? " 

" In the exercise of the Imagination," says Abercrombie, 
*' We take the component parts of real scenes, events or char- 
acters, and combine them anew, by a process of the mind 
itself, so as to form compounds, which have no existence in 
nature." 

"But we have the power of modifying our conceptions,'' 
says Mr. Dugald Stewart, " by combining the parts of differ- 
ent ones together, so as to form new wholes of our own crea- 
tion. I shall employ the word Imagination, to express this 
power." 

"Imagination," says Professor Upham, "is a complex ex- 
ercise of the mind, by means of which various conceptions are 
combined together, so as to form new wholes." 

It will be perceived at once, that, according to some of 
these definitions, the Imagination has a primary reference to 
the objects of sense; and according to all, its creations are 
fictions, which have no corresponding realities in nature. Such 
creations are composed of elements of perceptions of real 
scenes; but yet these elements are so combined, that the crea- 
tions, in all instances, have nothing corresponding to them in 
the universe within or around us. 

OBJECTIONS TO THE ABOVE DEFINITIONS. 

If these definitions be admitted as correct, and as present- 
ing the entire and appropriate sphere of the Imagination, we 
must find some other faculty to which to attribute a large por- 



IMAGINATION. ' 175 

tion of the bes^ poetry in existence. I will present a few 
familiar quotations, as examples. 

Take, in the first instance, Wordsworth's description of the 
White Doe of Rjlstone : 

" White she is as the lily of June, 
And beauteous as the silver moon 
When out of sight the clouds are driyen, 
And she is left alone in heaven ; 
Or like a ship, some gentle day, 
In sunshine sailing far away — 
A glittering ship that hath the plain 
Of ocean for its wide domain." 

Nothing is here presented but what really exists in nature. 
Yet nothing but a creative Imagination, of a very high order, 
could have shadowed forth such a beautiful conception. 

Take, as another example, the 19th Psalm, as given in 
our Bibles, or as thrown into verse in our common hymn 
books : 

" The heavens declare thy glory, Lord, 
In every star thy wisdom shines." 

" Thy noblest wonders here we view, 
In souls renew'd, and sins forgiven," &c. 

Who will pretend that we have not here the creations of 
the Imagination, in its purest, highest flights ? Yet in the 
first instance there are no new combinations of sensible objects 
presented, but a simple statement of facts in regard to objects 
perfectly familiar. In the second instance, no invisible object 
is referred to, but simple facts in regard to spiritual objects. 
Again : 

"Along the banks where Babel's current flows, 
Our captive bands in deep despondence strayed. 



176 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

While Zion's fall in sad remembrance rose, 

Her friends, her children, mingled with the dead. 

" The tuneless harp, that once with joy we strung, 
When praise employed, and mirth inspired the lay, 
In mournful silence on the willows hung, 

And growing grief prolonged the tedious day." 

No one, surely, will pretend that here is a combination of ob. 
jects of perception, which had no existence in nature. 

Take the following lines from a poem, designed to present 
the scene which transpired in the wilderness where Elijah 
lodged, after he fled from the wrath of Jezebel : 

"Amidst the wilderness, alone. 

The sad, foe-hunted prophet lay ; 
And darkened shadows round him thrown, 
Shut out the cheerful light of day. 

" The winds were laden with his sighs. 
As resting 'neath a lonely tree. 
His spirit, torn with agonies. 

In prayer was struggling to be free." 

I make but one other selection, taken from Wordsworth's 
Boy of Winander Mere : 

" Who 
Blew mimic hootings to the silent owls, 
That they might answer him. And they would shout 
Across the watery vale, and shout again 
With long halloos, and screams, and echoes loud, 
Redoubled and redoubled, concoui'se wild, 
Of mirth, and jocund din. And when it chanced 
That pauses of deep silence mocked his skill. 
Then sometimes in that silence, while he hung 
Listening, a gentle shock of wild surprise 
Has carried far into his heart, the voice 



IMAGINATION. 177 

Of mountain torrents ; or the visible scene 
Would enter, unawares, into his mind, 
With all its solemn imagery, its rocks. 
Its woods, and that uncertain heaven, received 
Into the bosom of the steady lake." 

Surel}'-, in none of these instances, have the poets given 
to "airy nothing a local habitation and a name." Yet no 
one fails to notice in all of them the appropriate results of the 
Imagination. 

I have still another objection to these definitions, A cor- 
-ect definition always gives at least the leading characteristic 
of the object to which it pertains. Now the simple recombi- 
nation of the elements of thought into conceptions which have 
no corresponding realities in nature, if it be the exclusive 
work of imagination, is the action of that faculty in its lowest 
functions, a function in which its action is hardly to be dis- 
tinguished from those of Understanding and Judgment. I 
have seen a man, and I have seen a horse. To conceive of the 
body of the man substituted in the place of the neck and head 
of the horse, gives the conception of a non-reality. It is 
hardly needful, however, to suppose the action of a new power, 
to account for such a creation as that. No one ever thinks of 
saying of a given conception. This is the work of Imagination, 
because no corresponding reality exists in nature. On the 
other hand, when the child Milton presented to the judges 
who were to award a prize to the pupil who should present the 
best poem on the miracle of turning water into wine, the sin- 
gle line, 

" The conscious water saw his God and blushed," 
it is no matter of wonder, that those judges looked at each 
other with astonishment, and instantly awarded the prize to 
the child-poet and genius before them. If they could not 
have given a correct definition of the Imagination, they could 



178 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

not fail to recognize themselves as in the presence of one of 
its sublime creations, and its author as possessed of a mind in 
which that peculiar faculty was energizing with wondrous 
power. The reason why they thus regarded this production 
was not the fact, that it presented "a new whole,^' but that in 
the creation itself there was the realization of a particulai 
idea, and its realization in a form adapted to impress the mind 
with a peculiar sentiment. Hence we propose a new definition 
of this faculty. 

ANOTHER DEFINITION PROPOSED. 

It now remains to attempt, at least, an enunciation of the 
true conception of the Imagination, An object may some- 
times be best explained by comparing it with another of which 
we have distinct apprehensions. Of the Understanding we 
have such apprehensions. The fundamental elements of all 
its conceptions are, as we have seen, substance and quality, 
cause and effect. It combines the elements given by the pri- 
mary faculties as given, without modifying them at all. It is 
the faculty, in short, which takes cognizance of realities as 
they are. Now we have in our minds other ideas than those 
of substance and quality, cause and effect ; such, for example, 
as the ideas of the beautiful, the grand, and the sublime. 
These ideas last named, do not respect objects as they really 
exist (for they may, or may not, exist in harmony with such 
ideas), but as arranged and combined in a given manner. We 
have in our minds, therefore, two entirely distinct classes of 
conceptions — those which respect objects just as they exist in 
the universe of matter and mind, within and around us, and 
those in which the elements of such objects are in thought 
combined, in harmony, more or less perfect, with fundamental 
ideas in the mind itself; as those of the beautiful, grand, sub- 
lime, &c., which do not respect objects as they are, but certain 



IMAGINATION. 179 

arrangements of such objects. The function of the Intelli- 
gence which gives us the former class of conceptions, we have 
denominated th3 Understanding. That which gives us the 
latter, that which "hovering o'er" all the elements of thought 
appearing upon the field of Consciousness, combines them 
into conceptions, more or less perfectly conformed to funda- 
mental ideas, like those referred to above, is the Imagination. 
By Coleridge it is called the " Esemplastic, or into-one-form- 
ing power." It recombines the elements of thought into 
conceptions which pertain not to mere existences, but ideas 
of the beautiful, the perfect, the sublime, &c., in the mind 
itself. A conception of the understanding is perfect, when 
it represents its object as it is, whatever the object may 
be. A conception of the Imagination is perfect when it 
shadows forth forms of beauty, grandeur, sublimity, &c., which 
correspond with the idea in the mind. Understanding-con- 
ceptions are compared with the object. The only standard 
with which the creations of the Imagination are compared, is 
the idea. 

IMAGINATION AND FANCY DISTINGUISHED. 

Mr. Dugald Stewart is the first philosopher that I have met 
with, who makes a distinction between the Imagination and 
Fancy. I will give the remarks to which I refer, as it will 
prepare the way for the distinction which I wish to make. 
"It is the power of Fancy," he observes, "which supplies the 
poet with metaphorical language, and with all the analogies 
which are the foundation of his allusions. But it is the power 
of the Imagination, that creates the complex scenes he de- 
scribes, and the fictitious characters w'hich he delineates." 
According to the distinction here made, it was the Imagina- 
tion of Milton, which created the whole scene and the partic- 
ular characters presented in " Paradise Lost." His Fancy, on 



180 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the other hand, furnished the figurative language, analogies,- 
and illustrations with which it is adorned. The Fancy, as thus 
described is, as it will readily be perceived, nothing but a par- 
ticular department of the operation of the principle of Asso- 
ciation. It collects the materials from which the Imagination 
creates its scenes and characters, and then furnishes the attend- 
ant embellishments. In conformity to this view of the subject. 
Fancy is defined by Coleridge, as the ''aggregate and asso- 
ciative power." Thus defined, while the Imagination is that 
function of the Intelligence which is correlated to ideas of the 
beautiful, the grand, the sublime, &c., the Fancy is that func- 
tion of the associative principle, which is correlated to the 
same ideas. 

Another Dejinition of the term Fancy. 

There is another use of the term Fancy called " arbitrary 
Imagination," or Imagination not governed by the pure ideas 
of truth and beauty. In this use of the faculty of Imagina- 
tion, instead of the beautiful being shadowed forth, grotesque 
images are produced with intentional violation of all laws of 
esthetics. In the present Treatise, the term Fanpy will be 
used in conformity to the definition first given. 

IMAGINATION AND FANCY ELUCIDATED. 

Preliminary Remarks. 

I will here introduce two remarks, which it may be impor- 
tant to keep in mind, in order to a full appreciation of what is 
to follow, and will then proceed to the illustration and elucida- 
tion of the subject before us : 

1. The imagination pre-supposes the Fancy, as the aggrega- 
tive power J while the latter does not pre-suppose the former. 

2. Upon these distinctions are founded the epithets com- 



IMAGINATION. 181 

monly applied to each, the Fancy being, in different individ- 
uals, denominated rich, luxuriant, or the opposite; the Imag- 
ination being denominated sublime, beautiful, or the opposite, 
according to the nature and character of its creations. 

Elucidation. 

We now proceed to a further elucidation of the nature of 
the Imagination, as distinguished from the Fancy, and of the 
characteristics of each. We ■will commence as the basis of 
our illustrations, with a work familiar to all, and for that rea- 
son the more to our purpose, to wit, ' Paradise Lost.' Before 
Milton existed, the various parts of the entire scene presented 
in this work, had been for ages before the minds of millions. 
Every one that had read his Bible was perfectly familiar with 
the revolt of Satan and his legions — the war in heaven — the 
creation of man, and his fall, through the wiles of Satan — the 
Eden of man's first abode, and his subsequent expulsion, &c. 
These scenes, by the aggregative powers of the Fancy had 
often been brought together in the same mind at the same 
moment. But here they remained in scattered fragments, 
" without form and void," as far as unity and identity are con- 
cerned, till a new creative power in the mind of Milton, 
" moving upon the face of the waters," brought all the disor- 
dered and scattered elements into one harmonious whole. Now 
what is this power which gave unity to all these endlessly di- 
versified scenes? It is the Imagination. The Fancy first 
aggregates the materials^ — the elements. The imagination 
then calls into being the "new heavens and the new earth," 
formed into a harmonious unity out of the elements thus 
brought together. The same remarks apply to all the individ- 
uals, &c., real or imaginary, presented to our contemplation in 
the above poem. For the further illustration of these remarks 
X will now present a few extracts from the poem itself: 
16 



y 



182 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

" He scarce had ceased when the superior fiend 
Was moving towards the shore ; his pond'rous shield, 
Ethereal temper, massy, large, and round. 
Behind him cast ; the broad circumference ^ 

Hung on his shoulders like the moon, whose orb 
Through optirj glass the Tuscan artist views, 
At evening, from the top of Fesole, 
Or in Valdarno to descry new lands, 
Rivers or mountains in her spotty globe." 

The character and scene here presented, were created by the 
Imagination. The comparison of the shield to the moon, was 
the suggestion of the Fancy. Again : 

"Which when Beelzebub perceived, than whom 
Satan except, nohe higher sat, with grave 
Aspect he rose, and in his rising seemed 
A pillar of state ; deep on his front engraven. 
Deliberation sat, and public care ; 
And princely counsel in his face yet shone, 
Majestic though in ruin ; sage he stood 
With Atlantean shoulders fit to bear 
The weight of mightiest monarchies ; his look 
Drew audience and attention, still as night 
Or summer's noon-tide air, while thus he spake." 

The operation distinct and separate of the two faculties under 
consideration, is too obvious here to need any remarks. 
To the same purpose I make one more quotation : 

" He, above the rest, 
In shape and gesture proudly eminent, 
Stood like a tow'r ; his form had yet not lost 
All its original brightness, nor appear'd 
Less than archangel ruined, and th' excess 
Of glory obscur'd : as when the sun new risen 
Looks through the horizontal misty air 
Shorn of his beams : or from behind the moon, 



IMAGINATION. 183 

In dim eclipse, disastrous twilight sheds 

One half the nations, and with fear of change 

Perplexes monarchs." 

Here you perceive the propriety of the epithets, rich, and lux- 
uriant, beautiful, and sublime, as applied to the Imagination 
and Fancy. — An imagination, the creations of which are beau- 
tiful, grand or sublime, is characterized accordingly. As the 
Fancy adorns such creations with analogies varied, multiplied, 
and appropriate, it is denominated rich, luxuriant, &c. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CREATIONS OP THE IMAGINATION. 

The Imagination is exclusively a secondary faculty. It oper- 
ates only upon elements which the other faculties furnish. As 
the laws which control the Imagination, are the ideas of unity, 
beauty, grandeur, sublimity, &c., it is by blending, in a 
peculiar manner, the elements of thought and feeling which 
lie under tbe eye of Consciousness, that this faculty shadows 
forth those forms which correspond to these ideas. My pres- 
ent object is to mark some of the principles in conformity to 
which a creative imagination blends, unifies, and shadows forth 
the forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, 

1. Elements of Diverse Scenes blended into one new Whole. 

The first that I mention is that already noticed in the case 
of "Paradise Lost;" that in which the elements of difi'erent, 
and widely diversified scenes, are combined ^nto one harmoni- 
ous whole — into one beautiful, grand, or sublime conception. 
The character of the conception will depend upon two circum- 
stances — the elements introduced into it — and the manner in 
which they are blended. To move upon the elements of 
thought, and blend them into form, in harmony with some one 
conception, is the principal law which controls the Imagina- 



184 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tion, in shadowing forth the beautiful, the grand, and the sub- 
lime. Nothing, almost, has greater influence in awakening in 
us the sense of the beautiful, the grand, or the sublime, than 
thus to contemplate parts of widely diversified scenes, which, 
in our thoughts, have lain in scattered fragments, all harmoni- 
ously blended into one grand conception. Thought is beauti- 
ful, and that which is brought into harmony with thought, has 
great power in awakening in us the sense of the same. To 
blend into one that which in thought has before been discon- 
nected, and thus to unify our conceptions, and excite in us the 
sense of the perfect, the true, the beautiful, the grand, and 
the sublime, is the peculiar function of the Imagination. 

2. Blending the Diverse. 

The poet had heard, with feelings of awe and rapture, from 
the neighboring hills and mountains, the reverberations of the 
trumpet's notes, as they were sounded forth from some high 
cliff, on the mountain side. Amid similar scenes he had lis- 
tened to similar sounds from the waterfall. His Imagination 
blends the two, and thus shadows forth the conception of the 
beautiful : 

"The cataracts blow their trumpets from the steep." 

The Fancy, or associative faculty, may connect, but not blend 
This is the peculiar function of the Imagination. Under the 
influence of the former faculty, the poet would have said, 

" The cataracts sound like trumpets from the steep." 
" The sunshine is a glorious birth." 

To blend the conception of the production of light, with 
that of a birth, reveals the plastic power of the Imagination. 

"But now, when every sharp-edged blast 
Is quiet in its sheath." 



I5IAGINATI0N. 185 

It requires some reflection to appreciate the beauty of diverse 
thoughts here blended. Yet reflection -will draw it forth. 
"We have all conceived of the 'sharp-edged sword/ ceasing 
from the work of death, and lying quiet in its sheath. "We 
have also heard the chill wind of winter spoken of as having a 
keen edge. As the poet walks forth amid the bland and mel- 
low air of May, when the keen edge of winter has passed en- 
tirely from the atmosphere, his plastic Imagination unites the 
two conceptions above referred to into one. Hence the beauti- 
ful thought, ''every sharp-edged blast is quiet in its sheath." 

I might multiply examples of the kind under consideration 
to any extent. But these are sufl&cient to illustrate the prin- 
ciple. 

3. Blending Opjposites. 

Another principle in conformity to which the Imagination 
shadows forth the forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, 
is by blending things opposite to each other, such as the ani- 
mate and inanimate, material and mental, the rational and irra- 
tional. I will give a few examples, the most of which will 
illustrate the principle under consideration with such obvious- 
ness as to render any particular remarks upon them unneces- 
sary. 

'"Twafi night: the sultry atmosphere 

Half palpable with darkness seemed, 
Save when the lightnings, quick and clear, 

Across wide heaven in grandeur gleamed, 
Bousing along the fields of air, 
The growling thunders from their lair." 

Every one is aroused to a deep sense of the grand and sublime on 
reading such a. stanza. Two circumstances impart special grand- 
eur and sublimity to the thought here presented — separating 
and presenting as opposites, things sustaining the relation to 
16* 



186 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

each other of cause and effect, as the lightning and the thun- 
der — and blending opposites, the animate and inanimate, and 
thus representing the thunders as growling monsters in their 
lair, roused to rage and fury by "the lightnings gleaming in 
grandeur across the fields of air. 

I cite another passage from the same author — a -poet i/et 
unknown to fame. The language quoted, the poet has put 
into the mouth of an ancient lloman chieftain slave, dying in 
his humble shed, amid his comrades whom he was about to 
lead forth in a struggle for liberty, and who were assembled 

•' To hear his last and solemn charge, 
Ere Death should set his soul at large. 
Half-raising up his giant form, 

With awful luster in his eye, 
He spake : 

■ ' Ye spiiits of the storm, 

Careering chainless, through the sky, 
Your thunder-trumpet peals for me 
A glad and glorious jubilee. 
Like you, unmock'd by man's control. 
When on the clouds your chariots roll. 
My free and disembodied soul 
Soon makes the Elysian fields, long sought. 
The play-ground of its deathless thought,' " &c. 

I shall not spoil the passage, by particular comments. 
Every one will perceive, that it is combining things opposite, 
things in themselves grand and sublime, that imparts peculiar 
grandeur to this grand conception. 

In similar strains the same writer represents the imprisoned 
eagle, as longing to 

"Rise tlirougli tempest-shrouded air. 

All thick and dark, ivith wild winds swelling, 
To brave the lightning's lurid glare. 

And talk with thunders in their dwelling." 



IMAGINATION. 187 

Here the rational, in its sublimest forms, is first blended with 
the irrational, and then with the inanimate; and then one 
of these beings is represented as longing to rise amid scenes 
of fearful grandeur and sublimity, to converse with the other 
in his awful dwpUing-place. Thus a creative Imagination 
evolves the forms of grandeur and sublimity. 

It is the peculiar manner in which opposites are blended, 
that imparts such peculiar beauty to that most beautiful of 
almost all compositions, the 19th Psalm. The imaginatiou 
of the poet rejjresents the entire material universe, especially 
the luminaries of heaven, as all held in a blissful and devout 
contemplation and study of the perfection and glory of the 
Creator — all learning, and each imparting to the other a 
knowledge of the Infinite and Perfect. Day speaks to day, 
and night to night, of some new- discovered excellence revealed 
in the manifold works of God. 

" Hark ! his hands the lyre explore. 
Bright-eyed Fancy hovering o'er, 
Scatters from her pictured urn, 
Thoughts that breathe, and words that burn." 

Fancy, as a bright-eyed, embodied spirit, hovering over, breath- 
ing thoughts, and burning words — opposites, in themselves 
beautiful, so beautifully blended, are what impart such sur- 
passing beauty to this beautiful thought. 

"But trailing clouds of glory do we come 
From God, who is oui- home." 

By blending things so opposite as spirits and trailing clouds, 
does the poet impart an ineffable beauty to the idea of the 
soul coming from the hands of its Maker. 

4. Blending Things in their Nature alike. 
Sometimes the Imagination evolves the beautiful, by blend- 



•188 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ing things in their nature identical. I will give a single 
example of this kind, the subjective influence of maternal af- 
fection, as the poet has presented it : 

•' Her love to me, in strong control, 

Form'd of her life the dearest part ; 
It seem'd a soul loithin her soul, 
The \&vy pulse within her heart." 

No comments are requisite here, in pointing out the blending, 
plastic influence of the Imagination, in thus evolving the forms 
of the beautiful. 

5. Covibining Numhers into Unity, and dissolving and sepa- 
rating Unity into Number. 

Perhaps in no way does the Imagination more frequently 
body forth the forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, than 
by ** consolidating numbers into unity, and dissolving and sep- 
arating unity into number." 

" How beautiful are thy tents, Jacob, 
And thy dwelling-places, Israel, 
As rivers spread themselves abroad, 
As gardens by the river side. 

He coucheth and lieth down as a lion, 
As a young lion, who shall rouse him up. 
Blessed is he that blesseth thee. 
And cursed is he that curseth thee." 

The main force and beauty of this passage consists in the 
manner in which a vast number of people are presentee^ as one 
venerable personage. Every one is so familiar with ei Amples 
of this kind, that I need not multiply them. 

I will give a single example or two of the opposit '»»<i, 
that of dissolving and separating unity into number : 



IMAGINATION. 1«9 

"And too oft 
Even wise men leave their better sense at home, 
To chide and wonder at them when return'd." 

No individual can fail to recognize the beauty of the thought 
here expressed. Yet it mainly consists in dissolving the unity 
of the Mind itself. 

" Between the acting of a dreadful thing 
And the first motion, all the interim is 
Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream : 
The genius and the mortal instruments 
Are then in council ; and the state of man, 
Like a little kingdom, suffers then 
The nature of an insurrection." 

6. Adding to, or abstracting some Qualify from, an Ohj'ect. 

When a property is added to an object which it does not 
possess, the object then, as Mr. Wordsworth observes, "reacts 
upon the mind which has performed the process, like a new 
existence." This is one of the ways in which the Imagination 
delights us with the conception of the beautiful. For example : 

" Cuckoo ! shall I call thee bird, 
Or but a wandering voice ? " 

The cuckoo, though almost continually heard through the sea- 
son of spring, is herself almost always invisible. This fact 
imparts a surpassing beauty to the conception evolved, in ab- 
stracting from her the idea of substantial existence, and repre- 
senting her as a " wandering voice." 

Examples of the former kind — that of blending with ob- 
jects qualities which do not belong to them — have been given 
under the preceding topics. I will not forbear, however, the 
presentation of a single additional instance : 

" Sweet day ! so cool, so calm, so bright, 
The bridal of the earth and sky : 



190 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY, 

The dew shall weep thy fall to-night, 
For thou must die." 

The beauty of this inconceivably beautiful thought, consists 
in representing the dew drop, which in itself is the pure result 
of physical causes, as a tear which Nature sheds over the fall 
of a bright and gladsome day. Adding this new quality to 
the dew-drop, makes it act upon us as a new existence. 

7. Blending toith external Ohjects the Feelings ivJiich they 

excite in us. 

The Imagination often imparts a surpassing beauty to what 
is in itself beautiful, by blending with the object the feelings 
which the contemplation of it excites in our minds : 

" then what soul was his, when on the tops 
Of the high mountains he beheld the sun 
Eise up, and bathe the world in light ? He look'd — 
Ocean and Earth, the solid frame of Earth, 
And Ocean's liquid mass, beneath him lay 
In gladness and deep joy. The clouds were touch'd, 
And in their silent faces he did read 
Unutterable love." 

' ' The moon doth with delight 
Look round her when the heavens are bare." 

No particular remarks, after stating the principle, are re- 
quisite, to show how that principle is illustrated by such 
creations. 

8. Abstracting certain Characteristics of Ohjects, a7id blend- 

ing them into Hai^mony with some leading Id,ea. 

The same object, in respect to different features of it, may 
be contemplated relatively to different ideas in the mind. la 
the light of how many leading ideas, for example, may the 



IMAGINATION. 191 

bright worlds that hang around us, in the immensity of space, 
be contemplated. Now, the Imagination often evolves the 
forms of the beautiful, the grand, and the sublime, by throw- 
ing these objects before the mind, in harmony with one or 
more of these leading ideas. Take, as an example, the follow- 
ing stanzas from a poem entitled " A Psalm of Night : " 

" Fades from the West the farewell light, 

Flung backward by the setting sun, 
And silence deepens as the Night 

Steals with its solemn shadows on ! 
Gathers the soft, refreshing dew 

On spiring grass and flowret stems — 
And lo ! the everlasting blue 

Is radiant with a thousand gems ! 

Not only doth the voiceful Day 

The loving kindness, Lord ! proclaim — 
But Night, with its sublime array 

Of worlds, doth magnify Thy name ! 
Yea — while adoring seraphim 

Before Thee bend the willing knee. 
From every star a choral hymn 

Goes up unceasingly to Thee I 

Day unto Day doth utter speech, 

And Night to Night thy voice makes known ; 
Through all the earth where Thought may reach, 

Is heard the glad and solemn tone — 
And worlds, beyond the farthest star 

Whose light hath reached the human eye, 
Catch the high anthem from afar, 

That rolls along Immensity ! " 

Every one who contemplates the thought here embodied, aside 
from the sentiment of devotion awakened in his mind, will 
have a sense of beauty, majesty, and sublimity of the works 
of Divinity, unfelt before. In the stanzas, also, 



192 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

"And beauteous as the silver moon, 
When out of sight the clouds are driven, 
As she is left alone in heaven," 

that beautiful orb is thrown before the mind in the light of 
one idea only, that of the beautiful. To blend thus into one 
conception, the elements of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, 
existing in objects which may be contemplated in the light of 
other ideas, is one of the peculiar functions of the Imagina- 
tion. In the light of the conceptions which it shadows forth, 
objects the most familiar put on new forms, and stand before 
the mind in an array in which we never contemplated them 
before. New fountains of thought and feelings are thus awak- 
ened in the depths of our own minds. 

9. Throwing tlie fleeting ThouyJits, Sentiments, and Feelings, 
of our past Existence, into one heautiful Conception. 

I mention but one other form in which the Imagination 
delights us with the forms of the beautiful, the perfect, and 
the true, &c. It is by throwing into distinct and hallowed 
embodiment, those deep thoughts and sentiments which have 
had a fleeting existence in our experience, but which above all 
things, we desire never to forget. Who does not feel like 
dropping a tear of gratitude for that divine gift which ena- 
bled the poet thus beautifully to embalm, for eternal remem- 
brance, what we have all experienced, but might otherwise 
forget ? 

" The tear, whose source I could not guess, 
The deep sigh, that seem'd fatherless, 
Were mine in early days." 

Every one feels himself richer, when he has found such a 
thought as this. Of the same character is the following : 

"To me the meanest flower that blows can give 
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.". 



IMAGINATION. 193 

Every one, also, who is familiar with Death as the " sha- 
dow of the rock Eternity/' finds his o:/n hallowed experiences 
embalmed in lines like the following : 

" The clouds that gather round the setting sun, 
Do take a sober coloring from an eye 
That hath kept watch o'er man's mortality." 

I forbear further citations. To embalm in beautiful forms 
the hallowed experiences of the race, is one of the high pre- 
rogatives which he enjoys who has been favored by his Maker 
with the higher functions of the Imagination. 

REMAKKS ON THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS. 

It is not professed that the preceding analysis has presented 
all the forms in conformity to which the Imagination moulds 
its creations. All that was designed, is to give a sufficient 
number of particular forms, to aid the student in his inquiries 
into the operations of this mysterious power. 

Another remark is this : The examples presented in illus- 
tration of one particular form, often contain elements equally 
illustrative of other forms. This was unavoidable. It was 
enough for my purpose to present, in each example, the ele- 
ment illustrative of the principle to which it was referred. 

REIVIARK OF COLERIDGE. 

Coleridge has somewhere made a remark, which I regard 
as of great importance in guiding the judgment in detecting 
the peculiar operations of the Imagination, and separating 
them from the operations of other intellectual faculties. The 
amount of his remark is this : It is not every part of what is 
called a productiojQ of the Imagination, that is to be attributed 
to that faculty. Much often is mere narration, and much the 
mere filling out of the grand outline of the conception which 
17 



194 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the Imagination has combined, and which as properly belongs 
to the Understanding and Judgment, as the filling up of the 
outlines of any other discourse of which the Intelligence has 
conceived. With a great portion of the filling up of Paradise 
C, Lost, for example, Imagination had no more to do than with 
that of filling up the grand outline of a sermon, or oration. 
In the sublime conception itself, and in the mysterious blend- 
ing of the elements of thought often met with, in throwing 
that conception into form, here we find the workings of this 
creative, plastic faculty. To evolve principles which would 
enable the student, under such circumstances, to discern the 
operations of this faculty, has, as before said, been the main 
object of the preceding analysis. 

CREATIONS OP THE IMAGINATION, WHY NOT ALWAYS 
FICTIONS. 

In the preceding part of this Chapter, it has been shown, 
that the creations of the Imagination are not always, as it has 
been often stated by philosophers, " new wholes which do not 
exist in nature." It becomes an important inquiry, when and 
why is not this statement true ? It will be evident, at first 
thought, that when the elements of thought which enter into 
particular conceptions, are wholly recombined, the new wholes, 
thus produced, must exist purely in thought, without any cor- 
responding existence. On the other hand, when the elements 
of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity exist in objects in connec- 
tion with other and difi'erent elements, elements also related to 
other and difi'erent ideas, and when the Imagination, as in the 
Psalm of Night, above cited, blends these elements first named 
into some one beautiful, grand, or sublime conception, every 
element in the conception may be in strict correlation to reali- 
ties. Take as a further illustration, a single stanza from a 
familiar hymn : 



IMAGINATION. 195 

"His word of grace is sm-e and strong, 
As that which built the skies ! 
The voice that rolls the stars along 
Speaks all the promises." 

Every element in this beautiful thought is strictly conformed 
to realities, as they are. Yet in the blending of these elements, 
particularly in the last two lines, we distinctly mark the plastic 
power of the Imagination, in its sublimest and most beautiful 
form. 

The same is equally true, where, as shown above, the same 
power embalms, in similar conceptions, the hallowed sentiments 
and experiences of the past and present. Who that ever saw 
the tear of gratitude lying in the eye of affliction — a thing 
far more beautiful than the dew-drop, when it holds in its em- 
brace the image of the morning sun — a tear started by some 
gift that eased, for a time, the pressure of woe, and then 
turned away with a sorrowful heart, that such worth should be 
crushed beneath such a weight, does not recognize the truth, 
as well as beauty, of the thought contained in the following 
stanza, especially in the last two lines ? 

"I have heard of hearts unkind, kind deeds 
With coldness still returning : 
Alas ! the gratitude of men 
Has oftener left me mourning." 

In another sense, all the proper creations of the Imagina- 
tion are true. They are true to thought. In the depths of 
our inner being, there lie thoughts too deep for any words 
which we can command. Nothing but an overshadowing Im- 
agination can call them forth, and give them an external em- 
bodiment. Whether the forms in which they are embodied 
are correlated to substantial realities or not, they are true to 
thought, the most important of all realities. We feel grateful. 



196 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

therefore, when we find thoughts which we had vainly endeav- 
ored to express, moulded into form, and thus assuming "a 
local habitation and a name." 

I mention one other, and a very important sense, in which 
the creations of the Imagination are true. They sustain, in 
many instances, relations to realities analogous somewhat to 
that sustained by general notions. In a very important sense, 
these last have no realities in nature corresponding to them ; 
that is, there is no one object, that in all respects corresponds 
to a general notion, that is, that contains the elements it repre- 
sents, and nothing more nor less. The elements belonging to 
it, however, are found in each particular ranged under it. Let 
us now, in the light of this illustration, contemplate the forms 
of the beautiful, for example, shadowed forth by the Imagina- 
tion. We may not be able, in all instances, to find any one 
particular object which contains, and nothing more nor less, 
the elements which enter into this form. Yet, whenever we 
meet with an object containing the elements of beauty, we find 
that element represented in the forms of the beautiful bodied 
forth by the Imagination. In these forms, we do not find any 
one particular shadowed forth, but each particular blended in 
the universal. In the most perfect forms of statuary, for ex- 
ample, we do not find any one human form, in distinction from 
all others, represented, but we find whatever is beautiful in 
every form there embodied. As the Understanding there rep- 
resents the particular in the general, so the Imagination repre- 
sents all particulars relating to the beautiful, &c., in the uni- 
versal. 

SPHEKE OF THE IMAGINATION NOT CONFINED TO POETRY. 

Most of the examples introduced into this Chapter are 
poetical. From this I would not have it supposed, that, in 
my judgment; the Imagination is confined to this species of 



IMAGINATION. 197 

composition. We meet with its finest creations, on the other 
hand, in painting, in statuary, in prose^ and in every kind of 
discourse in which the elements of thought can be blending in 
harmony with pure ideas. It admits, at least, of a doubt, 
whether the Imagination of Milton ranged with a more dis- 
cursive energy in his highest prose compositions, or in his 
Paradise Lost. 

LAW OP TASTE RELATIVE TO THE ACTION OP THE IftlAGI- 

NATION. 

It is, as we have seen, the peculiar province of the Imagi- 
nation to dissolve, recombine, and blend the elements of 
thought. Its procedure in all these respects, however, is not 
arbitrary. Every thought cannot be blended with every other, 
without violating the laws of good taste. Here, then, an im- 
portant question presents itself, to wit : What is the law which 
guides the Imagination, in blending the elements of thought ? 
I will present my own ideas on this subject, by an example 
taken from the book of Job : 

" Hast thou given the horse his strength ? 
Hast thou clothed his neck with thunder? " 

The propriety of blending the two conceptions, that of the 
mane of the war-horse and of thunder, has been questioned 
by some, on account of the total dissimilarity of the objects 
of those conceptions. It is readily admitted, that no two ob- 
jects are in themselves more dissimilar. Yet it is confidently 
maintained, that there never was a figure of speech more ap- 
propriate. The reason is obvious, and every one feels it, though 
he may not have an analytical consciousness of it. When two 
objects are, as objects of sense, totally dissimilar, the concep- 
tion of each may excite precisely similar feelings. Hence the 
propriety and force of the figure employed by the sacred writer, 
17* 



198 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

in blending the two conceptions into one. This I conceive to 
be the universal law of good taste, relative to the action of the 
plastic power of the Imagination. Whenever tico conceptions 
sustain a similar relation to any one common feeling or sen- 
timent, they may he blended into one. The more diverse the 
objects of those conceptions, the more striking the figure, under 
such circumstances. I will give one other example : 

" The twilight hours like birds flew by, 

As lightly and as free ; 
Ten thousand stars were in the sky, 

Ten thousand in the sea ; 
For every wave with dimpled cheek 

Tliat leaped upon the air, 
Had caught a star in its embrace, 

And held it trembling there." 

Who is insensible to the exquisite beauty of the thought here ? 
Yet the wave of the sea or lake, reflecting the stars of night, 
no more, as an object of sense, resembles the dimpled cheek of 
beauty, or the mother catching up her babe and holding it in 
her embrace, than the mane of the war-horse resembles thun- 
der. Why, then, are we struck with such delight at the blend- 
ing of conceptions, the objects of which, are, in themselves, so 
unlike ? The answer is : These conceptions are mutually cor- 
related to the same or similar feelings. When such concep- 
tions are thus blended into a beautiful emotion common to both, 
there is shadowed forth the perfection of beauty. For this 
reason our hearts leap up, when we meet with such thoughts as 
the following, taken from the same effusion, as that above cited : 

"I have heard the laughing wind behind, 
When playing with my hair — 
The breezy fingers of the wind, 
How cool and moist they were ! " 



IMAGINATION. 199 



IMAGINATION THE ORGAN OP IDEALS. 

Another important function of the Imagination now claims 
our attention ; its functions as the organ of Ideals. In illus- 
trating this function, the first thing to be accomplished is to 
distinguish between Ideals and Ideas. 

Idea defined. 

An Idea, properly defined, is a conception of Reason. As 
such it has the characteristics of universality and necessity, 
and is consequently incapable of change or modification. 
Thus when certain conditions are fulfilled. Reason evolves the 
ideas of time, space, substance and cause, which we have 
already considered, together with such as the beautiful, the 
right, the true, and the good, &c., hereafter to be consid- 
ered. 

Ideal defined. 

An Ideal is a form of thought intermediate between an 
idea, and the conceptions or notions which the Intelligence 
generates of particular objects, and presents archetypes in con- 
formity to which the elements of such conceptions may be 
blended in harmony with ideas. In the mind of Milton, for 
example, the ideas of the beautiful, the grand, and the sub- 
lime, &c., existed, as pure conceptions of Reason. When the 
varied conceptions, the elements of which are blended together 
in Paradise Lost, lay under the eye of his Consciousness, his 
Intelligence, brooding over those elements, at last blended 
them together into that grand conception, of which the poem 
itself is the external embodiment. This conception was the 
Ideal after which the poem was formed, to realize his ideas of 
tiie grand, the beautiful, and the sublime. 



i 



200 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Ideals, Particular and General. 

Ideals, like notions, are particular and general. Thus, in 
the mind of Milton, there existed a general ideal of what a 
poem should be, in order to realize, in greater or less perfec- 
tion, the pure ideas of Reason. At the same time, there ex- 
isted a particular Ideal of the manner in which the elements 
entering into that poem should be blended, in order in that 
particular production, to realize those ideas. 

Ideals not confined to ideas of the Beautiful, the Grand, and 
tJie Suhlime. 

Ideals are not confined to any one class of ideas. Every 
individual, in all departments of human action, has an ideal of 
the form to which the objects of his action should be brought 
into conformity, and in the light of which he judges of all 
productions which meet his eye. Ideas of fitness, of the true, 
the perfect, and the good, are archetypes of Ideals, as well as 
that of the beautiful. 

Ideals not fixed and changeless like Ideas. 

Ideals, as compared with ideas, may be perfect or imper- 
fect. They are consequently capable of continued modifica- 
tions. We often hear it said of individuals, that their Ideals 
are imperfect or wrong. As intermediate archetypes between 
conceptions of particular objects, and pure ideas of Reason, 
Ideals may, in the future progress of the Intelligence, undergo 
endless modifications, always advancing towards the perfect and 
absolute, without reaching it. 

Ideals the Foundation of Mental Progress. 

As intermediate archetypes between particular conceptions, 
and universal and necessary ideas, Ideals constitute the founda,- 



IMAGINATION. 201 

tion of endless progress ia the development of the mental 
poTvers. Every new elevation which the Intelligence gains, 
presents new conceptions of particular objects, and conse- 
quently new elements of thought. Every new element of 
thought involves a new Ideal, more nearly approaching the per- 
fect and the absolute, and thus lays the foundation for fresh 
activity, and further progress in the march of mind. Some- 
times also Ideals degenerate, and thus the foundation is laid 
for the backward movements of society. 

It is hardly necessary to add that the Imagination is the ex- 
clusive organ of ideals. To form such conceptions is not a 
function of Reason, nor of the Understanding or Judgment, 
It remains, then, as the exclusive function of the Imagination. 

Ideals in the Divine and Human Intelligence. 

In the Divine mind, the action of the Imagination is always 
in perfect and absolute correspondence to the Reason. As a 
consequence, there is a similar correspondence between the 
Divine ideal and idea. All of God's "works, therefore, are 
perfect." Not so with the finite. Man may eternally progress 
towards the infinite and perfect, but can never reach it. 

ACTION OF THE JUDGMENT RELATIVE TO THAT OF THE 
IMAGINATION. 

Taste defined. 

Taste is that function of the Judgment hy which the charaC' 
teristics of productions, especially in belles-lettres and the fine 
arts, are determined in the light of ideals and ideas of beauty, 
order, congruity, proportion, symmetry, fitness, and whatever 
constitutes excellence in such productions. The Judgment may 
be exercised upon Ideals relatively to ideas, and upon particu- 
lar productions relatively to both. Thus Milton when he ap- 



202 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

prehended the conception realized in Paradise Lost, might, 
and doubtless did, often compare that conception with his own 
idea, to determine the fact whether the former made a near ap- 
proach to the latter. In filling out the conception, he would 
continually compare the external embodiment with the internal 
Ideal. In all such operations, he was exercising those func- 
tions of the Faculty of Judgment denominated Taste. The 
existence of good taste depends upon the existence in the In- 
telligence of correct Ideals, together with a well balanced, and 
well exercised Judgment pertaining to the ideas of beauty, fit- 
ness, &c. If a man's Ideal is false, his Taste is of course 
vitiated. If his Ideal were ever so correct, and he was not 
possessed of a well balanced, and well exercised Judgment, 
pertaining to such productions, he would also lack the charac- 
teristics of good Taste. 

Productions of the Imagination when not regulated hy correct 
Judgment or good Taste. 

In some individuals in whom the Imagination exists and 
operates with a high degree of energy, its action is not guided 
and chastened by good Taste, or a well-regulated Judgment. 
In such cases we find the most perfect forms of beauty and 
sublimity shadowed forth in connection with the grossest de- 
formities. The subject also will, in most instances, be wholly 
unable to distinguish the one from the other. In listening to 
such men, we, at one moment, are perfectly electrified with 
the forms of beauty, grandeur and sublimity which are shad- 
owed forth to our ecstatic vision ; but the next, perhaps, we 
are equally shocked and disgusted with images worse than gro- 
tesque, and forms of speech in strange violation of all the laws 
of good Taste. Under such circumstances we have special 
need of two things, Patience and good Judgment. The former 
will enable us to endure the evil for the sake of the good : the 



IMAGINATION. 203 

latter to separate the one from the other, that we do not re- 
ceive the good and the bad, as is too often the case, as alike 
good, nor reject both as alike bad. 

The most perfect of all human productions are the results 
of genius associated with good judgment. Of these the pro- 
ductions of Milton may be referred to as striking examples. 
Grandeur and sublimity are the pre-eminent characteristics of 
his genius. And how seldom are his sublime conceptions 
marred with violations of good Taste. 

PEODUOTIONS IN WHICH THE ACTION OP THE EANCY OR 
IMAGINATION IS MOST CONSPICUOUS. 

The productions of different authors we read with almost 
equal interest, but for entirely different and opposite reasons. 
I now refer to two classes of productions only, in one of which 
the operation of the Fancy is most prominent, and in the 
other, that of the Imagination. In productions of the former 
class, there will be an exuberance of metaphor, and beautifully 
appropriate comparisons and illustrations, and these wiU be the 
main source of the interest felt. In contemplating the pro- 
ductions of a creative Imagination, on the other hand, the 
grand conception will be the chief, and in some instances, the 
exclusive source of interest. 

COMBINATIONS OF THOUGHT DENOMINATED WIT, AS DISTIN- 
GUISHED FROM THOSE RESULTING PROM THE PROPER 
ACTION OP THE IMAGINATION OR PANCY. 

By the imagination different conceptions are hlenthd on the 
ground of co-existence with similar feelings. The feeling into 
which they are blended will be the leading one with which each 
is associated. By the Fancy different conceptions are asso- 
ciated on precisely the same principle. Now Wit consists in 
blending and associating conceptions on the ground of remote 



204 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and generally merely accidental elements found in them in 
common. Such combinations and associations therefore sur- 
prise and amuse us. When the Irishman, for example, re- 
plied to the question, what he would take to go, on a cold win- 
ter's night, a certain distance, in a state of nudity, " That he 
thought he should take a very bad cold," all recognize the re- 
ply as an example of genuine Wit. On an analysis we find 
that two thoughts are blended here, on the ground merely of 
an accidental element common to both. The term tahe is per- 
manently associated with the phrase taking cold, and has a 
mere accidental association with the question proposed, since 
some other term (as what will you ask ? ) would have answered 
just as well. The blending of the two thoughts, in conse- 
quence of such an accidental element, is what surprises and 
amuses us, and constitutes the real wit involved in the reply. 

A clergyman once delivered a discourse on the Divine 
works. In the progress of his remarks, he said that every- 
thing God had made was perfect in its kind. As the speaker 
descended from the pulpit, he was accosted at the door by an 
ill-formed hunchback of a man, who, looking him in the face, 
with a kind of malicious grin, asked the question, " What, 
sir, do you think of my form ? Do you think that to be per- 
fect ? "Yes," replied the speaker, "you are a perfect hunch- 
back." Here is genuine Wit. It consists, as every one will 
perceive, in assuming the idea of a hunchback as a conception 
of the perfect, and then classing the individual present under 
it as an embodied realization of that idea. 

A combination, in its nature, not unlike the above, was 
made by a celebrated convict at Botany Bay, in respect to 
himself and associates : 

' ' True patriots we, 
For, be it understood. 
We left our country 
For our country's good." 



IMAGINATION. 205 

Wit may not inappropriately be denominated shallow 
sense, being, in most instances, the antithesis of a blunder, or 
a blunder from design. As two Irishmen were walking to- 
gether, for example, the one after the other, the individual 
foremost took hold of the limb of a tree, which extended 
across the path (the end being broken off), and holding it in 
his hand as he passed along, as far as his strength would 
allow, suddenly let it. fly back. His companion behind receiv- 
ing the blow in the forehead, was thereby thrown from a per- 
pendicular to a horizontal position. On recovering his stand- 
ing, however, as he was rubbing his eyes, he very gravely re- 
marked to his associate, " In faith, it is well you held the limb 
back as long as you did. Had you not done so, it would 
probably have killed me." Here was a blunder. Now sup- 
pose that a bystander had witnessed the occurrence, and had 
made a remark precisely similar in respect to it. This would 
have been genuine Wit. I would here drop the suggestion, 
whether the most of what is denominated Irish wit, is not, 
after all, amusing blunders ? 



In the appropriate exercise of the Imagination, the ele- 
ments of some important and deeply interesting subject lie out 
with distinctness under the eye of the mind. The Imagina- 
tion, brooding over these elements, combines and blends them 
together into forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, ac- 
cording to the leading idea in the light of which they are 
viewed. Now, when the Intelligence, in any department of 
the empire of thought energizes upon some subject of deep 
and glowing interest, it will never throw upon its conceptions 
the attire of bombast. It may shadow forth figures homely, 
and in opposition to the laws of good Taste. There will be 
no forms of expression, however, swollen or bombastic. But 
18 



206 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

this presents the inquiry, What is bombast ? There are three 
forms which this style of writing and speaking assumes. 

The first is that in which an individual, without any object 
of thought before him, attempts to form and shadow forth 
some vast and sublime conception. Thus the subject attempts 
to grasp and express '' some boundless thing," by a simple 
efi'ort of self-inflation. If anything is generated under such 
circumstances, it will, of course, be windy, and inflated with 
"great swelling words of vanity." 

" 0," said a miscalled clergyman, as he rose to address a 
congregation amidst the solemnities of the Sabbath, " that 
this very refined, polite, intelligent, and virtuous audience 
would soar — and soar — and soar with me — to some un- 
known — planet." He arose, of course, without thought, ex- 
cepting the conception that he must say something very fine. 
In his eff"orts at self-inflation, the idea of soaring would most 
naturally suggest itself, and with that, the rhapsody that fol- 
lowed. 

The second form is, when an individual endeavors to im- 
part to a thought of trifling importance in itself, a very great 
interest, by arraying it in the attire of objects of great beauty, 
grandeur, or sublimity. We are all necessitated, from time to 
time, to speak of subjects of little or no great importance. 
We ought, in such circumstances, to show our good sense, by 
letting such thoughts pass from us " with the naked nature, 
and living grace," if they have any, which naturally belong 
to them. But no. Some individuals can never speak upon 
any subject, without showing their want of sense, by throwing 
around it a drapery which subjects really beautiful and sub- 
lime would be ashamed to wear. I will give a specimen from 
memory. I will attribute it to no individual, because I do not 
know that any individual ever said it. I give it as what a son 
of Erin is reported to have said : An individual who wished 



IMAGINATION. 207 

to express the simple conception, that he might have stayed in 
his native country, but chose to emigrate to this, and came 
accordingly; a conception, surely, which it required but few 
and very simple words to express. To him, however, it was a 
conception of vast interest. His Fancy was accordingly sent 
abroad for jSgures with which to adorn it, and thus the con- 
ception appears : 

" Silent in some hermit's grot, and lulled to rest on mossy 
carpets, he might have spent his truant hours. But as he 
sped his trackless footsteps through the labyrinthian wastes 
of Fancy's rich, enchanted landscape, a voice re-echoed from 
the vaulted palace of the skies, and in sounds seraphic dwelt, 
and hung upon his ear. Obedient to the heavenly call, he 
bade adieu to fair Hibernia's hills, and with his staff, like 
Bunyan's Pilgrim, he followed the guiding star, till it shot its 
sparkling beams, and mingled with its mates around Columbia's 
banner." 

The third form in which the vice we are considering ap- 
pears, is when an individual has a very meager, feeble, and 
faint conception of a subject of great interest in itself, and 
when he attempts to inflate his conceptions to the vastness of 
his subject, by swelling words and pompous imagery and illus- 
trations. How often is a great subject marred and defaced, 
by being daubed over with the "gloss and fustian" of minds 
who never had an adequate conception of it. 

" Poets and painters alike unskilled to trace 
The naked nature, and the living grace, 
With gloss and fustian cover every part, 
And hide with ornament their want of art." 

I will not forbear doing myself the pleasure, nor the reader 
the profit, of the following quotation from the " British Spy," 
as it presents one of the sources of bombast in public speak- 



208 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ing — the conception, that in some part of a discourse an in- 
dividual must be pathetic : 

" This leads me to remark a defect which I have noticed 
more than once in this country. Following up too closely the 
cold conceit of the Koman division of an oration, the speakers 
set aside a particular part of their discourse, usually the pero- 
ration, in which they take it into their heads that they will be 
pathetic. Accordingly, when they reach this part, whether it 
be prompted by the feelings or not, a mighty bustle com- 
mences. The speaker pricks up his ears, erects his chest, 
tosses his arms with hysterical vehemence, and says everything 
which he supposes ought to affect his hearers ; but it is all in 
vain : for it is obvious that everything he says is prompted by 
the head ; and, however it may display his ingenuity and fer- 
tility, however it may appeal to the admiration of his hearers, 
it will never strike deeper. The hearts of the audience will 
refuse all commerce, except with the heart of the speaker; 
nor, in this commerce, is it possible, by any disguise, however 
artful, to impose false ware on them. However the speaker 
may labor to seem to feel, however near he may approach the 
appearance of the reality, the heart nevertheless possesses a 
keen unerring sense, which never fails in detecting the impos- 
ture. It would seem as if the heart of man stamps a secret 
mark on all its effusions, which alone can give them currency, 
and which no ingenuity, however adroit, can successfully coun- 
terfeit." * 

* When I listen to such an attempt at the pathetic as the above, I 
am reminded of a fact which an individual used to tell the students, 
when I was in college ; — an individual who was accustomed to visit 
us statedly two or three times a year, and whose visits were not the 
most welcome to those of us who never were able to pay our bills, and 
others especially who had had money enough, and could not give a good 
account of the manner in which they had got rid of it. This individual, 



IMAGINATION. 209 



BURLESQUE. 



Burlesque sustains the same relation to bombast, that wit 
does to a blunder. Each copies its antithesis from design. 
The proper, and only proper object of burlesque, is bombast, 
and faults of a kindred character. To attempt to burlesque 
that which is in itself deserving of veneration, is to render 
one's self most criminal. 

In genuine burlesque, the original will be copied to a cer- 
tain extent, but yet with such variations as to leave no doubt 
of the design of the speaker or writer. One of the finest 
specimens of genuine burlesque, that I recollect to have met 
with, was given some years since in a foreign review of the 
works of an Irish orator of some celebrity, especially for what 
the reviewer termed bombast. He accordingly presents a 
speech professedly after the style of the orator, a speech de- 
signed to show the great advantages which the poor man has 
over the rich, in respect to happiness. I quote a single para- 
graph from the speech, as it occurs in memory : 

" Happiness, Mr. Speaker, is like a crow seated upon the 
top of a mountain, which the hunter vainly endeavors to re- 
proach. The hunter looks at the crow, Mr. Speaker, and the 

notwithstanding his unwelcome errands, was accustomed to render 
himself very agreeable, by amusing anecdotes, which he would relate 
for the benefit of the students. Among these he was accustomed to 
relate the following, which he himself had heard : After the death of 
"Washington, a Dutch orator in one of the villages on the Mohawk was 
appointed to deliver an oration on the character of that great man. 
The people assembled, and were entertained for about an hour and a 
half, with a most bathotic eulogy of the hero. At last the speaker 
came to a sudden and solemn pause. "Boys!" he exclaimed, "be 
very still now dere in de gallery ; — now I be'sh come to de patetic. — 
Vashington died vidout a grunt, or a groan, or a grumble." 
18* 



210' INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

crow looks at him. But if he should attempt to reproach him, 
he banishes away, like the schismatic tints of the rainbow, 
which it was the sublime, and astonishing genius of Newton 
that developed and deplored." 



Analogous to burlesque is sarcasm. Its appropriate sphere 
is to burlesque false claims to merit — claims which may not 
be assumed in a bombastic style. It attributes to the individ- 
ual his claims, but does it in such a manner, that the irony 
shall be visible. " No doubt ye are the people, and wisdom 
will die with you." 

PROPRIETY OP USING THE IMAGINATION AND FANCY IN WORKS 
OP FICTION. 

I close this protracted chapter with two or three suggestions 
of a general nature. 

The first is, the propriety of employing the Imagination 
and Fancy in the production of fictitious composition. Of 
the propriety of employing such a noble faculty in bringing 
out such productions, some persons, whose opinions are deserv- 
ing respect, have serious doubts. To me it appears that such 
doubts have been occasioned exclusively by an abuse of what 
is in itself proper. Suppo.se I am contemplating a statue. It 
presents all the forms almost of grace and beauty that appear 
in all beautiful human forms. I ask the question. What indi- 
vidual does this statue represent ? The answer is, that it rep- 
resents no one human form, but the statuary's own ideal of 
beauty and grace, as it may be embodied in a human form. 
Am I offended at the fact contained in the reply ? By no 
means. Why may not an individual as properly embody, in 



IMAGINATION. 211 

external form, an Ideal in his own mind, as copy an object less 
beautiful without ? The Ideal within is just as much a reality, 
as the object without, and may as properly be represented with 
the chisel, the brush, or the pen. To shadow forth concep- 
tions more perfect than the real around, is to lay a foundation 
for human improvement. But let us suppose, that an indi- 
vidual, gifted with the power of thus blessing his race, em- 
ploys that power, not in shadowing forth the forms of truth, 
beauty and perfection, but in throwing such attractions over 
vice and error, as tend to draw the young, the thoughtless^ 
and the ignorant from the paths of truth, purity and peace ; 
— such individuals deserve the deepest reprobation of the 
universe, as having abused and perverted one of the highest 
gifts with which any intelligent being has ever been intrusted. 
The individual also who will familiarize himself with the pro- 
ductions of such authors, subjects himself to an influence of 
all others, best adapted to sap the foundations of moral char- 
acter. The maxim of ancient wisdom, " The companions of 
fools shall be destroyed," is no more true, than the maxim 
that the reader of impure books will himself become impure. 



FALSE IDEA IN RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF FAMILIARITY 
WITH THE POPULAR FICTITIOUS WRITINGS OF THE DAY. 

A very common impression exists, that familiarity with 
fictitious writings, especially with the popular fictions of the 
day, tends to improve the Imagination, and that because they 
are fictitious. Now this is a grand mistake. It by no means 
follows, that because a work is fiction, and not sober history, 
the perusal of it tends to improve the Imagination. It may 
tend, on the other hand, to no other end, than to vitiate the 
Fancy, by generating impure associations. For myself, I am 
persuaded, that the study of such works as Prescott's ' Con- 



212 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY, 

quest of Mexico/ and '■ Alison's History of Modern Europe/ 
tends incomparably more to develop the Imagination than the 
perusal of the great mass of fictitious works that are floating 
upon the surface of society. The question whether the peru- 
sal of a work tends to improve the Imagination, depends, not 
upon the fact whether it is fiction, but upon the manner in 
which the elements of thought are therein blended. Without 
departing at all from the path of truth in the narration of facts, 
the Imagination of the historian may be almost continually 
energizing, in blending into the forms of beauty, grandeur, 
and sublimity, the elements of thought which the narrative pre- 
sents. In contemplating history, as its glowing facts are set 
forth in such forms, the Imagination may receive its most 
rapid development. The remark of Coleridge, that but a small 
part of even the best poems that we meet with, presents the 
appropriate creations of the Imagination, is pre-eminently true 
of fictitious writings. The question, then, whether the peru- 
sal of a particular work of fiction tends to improve the Imagi- 
nation, depends not upon the fact that it is fiction, but upon 
the manner in which the elements of thought are therein 
blended. 

IMAGINATION AND FANCY — HOW IMPROVED. 

Every power is developed in one way only — in being ex- 
ercised upon its appropriate objects. Each of the functions 
of the Intelligence under consideration, has its appropriate 
sphere. To develop the power, we must find its legitimate 
sphere, and in that sphere exercise it upon its appropriate ob- 
jects. The Fancy is improved, by developing in the mind the 
sense of the beautiful, the true, the perfect, and the sublime, 
by furnishing the Intelligence with distinct apprehensions of 
the forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, which the uni- 
verse of matter and mind, nature and art presents. 



IMAGINATION. 213 

The Imagination will be improved by familiarizing the 
mind with the true functions of the power itself, with the laws 
which regulate its action, in blending into form the elements 
of thought, and with its actual creations, as given in the 
works of minds most highly gifted with this function of the 
Intelligence. 



CHAPTER XI. 

REASON. 

The preceding Chapters have occupied more than the en- 
tire ground which is traversed in the common systems of Phi- 
losophy, so far as an analysis of the Intellectual Powers is 
concerned. Such an analysis, however, leaves untouched many 
of the more important phenomena of the human Mind. Con- 
sciousness and Sense, which lie at the foundation of all the 
faculties which have been the subject of the preceding analysis, 
can never give us infinite, eternal, absolute, universal, and 
necessary truths, nor can they account for the existence of the 
ideas of such truths in the Mind. Such ideas demand the ad- 
mission of another power, not supposed in the existence of 
conceptions of contingent and relative phenomena. These last 
might exist in a Mind totally destitute of a knowledge of uni- 
versal and necessary truths. 

REASON DEFINED. 

That faculty which apprehends truths, infinite, eternal, 
absolute, universal, and necessary, is the Reason. It bears 
precisely the same relation to such truths, that Consciousness 
and Sense do to contingent phenomena, Like those faculties, 
all its affirmations are direct and intuitive. 

Coleridge's Characteristics of Reason as distinguished from 
the Understanding. 

Coleridge has taken great pains to establish and elucidate 
the distinction between the Reason and the Understanding. 



REASON. 215 

Before proceeding to a further analysis of the phenomena and 
functions of the former faculty, I will present some of the 
characteristics of these faculties — characteristics which he has 
given to distinguish the one from the other. In giving their 
characteristics, I shall use the term Understanding in the sense 
in which Coleridge himself appears to use it, as including the 
Judgment as well as the notion-forming power. I desire this 
fact to be kept distinctly in mind. In all other parts of this 
Treatise I use the Understanding and Judgment in strict ac- 
cordance with the definitions given in preceding Chapters. 
Here I use the term Understanding in accommodation to the 
usage of the author whose distinctions I shall endeavor to 
elucidate. What then are the great distinctions between the 
Keason and Understanding, as laid down by this Philosopher? 

1. ''The Understanding, in all its judgments, refers to 
some other faculty as its ultimate authority." " The Reason in 
all its decisions appeals to itself." Take as an illustration of the 
above distinction the following proposition : " This is a book." 
" Space is, or exists." The first proposition supposes three 
things in the Mind — the conception designated by the term 
book — the perception of the particular object, a judgment that 
the object corresponds to the conception — and a consequent sub- 
sumption of the object under the conception. Now this judg- 
ment is an affirmation of the Understanding. Is it self-affirmed, 
or is it based upon the authority of some other faculty ? Ask 
the speaker, how he knows that this is a book ? He refers at once 
to Sense (" I see it "), and to a notion of a class derived from 
previous perceptions. The same may be shown to be true of 
every other affirmation of the Understanding, or generalizing 
power. • 

Let us now look at the second proposition — Space is. On 
what authority is this affirmation made? Upon no other 
authority than that of the faculty which apprehends the idea. 



216 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

So of the proposition, " Every event has a cause." All men 
know it to be true. In all minds, however, the faculty which 
aflBirms it is the sole authority for the affirmation. The same prin- 
ciple holds in respect to all the judgments of the pure Reason. 

2. "The judgments of the Understanding admit of de- 
grees. Those of the Reason preclude all degrees." In refer- 
ence to some particular object of the perception, for example, 
under certain circumstances, we conjecture that it is a man j 
under others, we believe it to be a man ; under others, we are 
sure that it is ; and under others still, we know it to be a man, 
&c. But who merely conjectures or believes that every event 
has a cause? We know it absolutely. In respect to this 
subject, the affirmation of the child and of the man, of the 
philosopher and of the peasant, are equally positive, and 
equally preclude all degrees. 

3. The laws which govern the Understanding in all its 
judgments are imposed upon it by the Reason ; while the laws 
of the Reason are self-imposed. I feel, for example, a painful 
sensation. Instantly I apply my Understanding to determine 
the particular cause. By what law is my Understanding gov- 
erned, under such circumstances? By an idea or law, cer- 
tainly, which exists, not in the Understanding itself, to wit, 
the affirmation of the pure Reason, that every event must have 
a cause. The same is true in regard to all other inquiries and 
affirmations of the Understanding, in regard to material sub- 
stances. It obeys laws prescribed by another faculty. The 
Reason, however, obeys no laws but those which are self- 
imposed. When the Reason affirms absolutely that every 
event must have a cause — that succession supposes time — 
and that body supposes space, what law prescribed by another 
faculty or faculties does the Reason obey in such affirmations? 
None, surely. 

4. All the judgments of the Understanding are contingent. 



REASON. 217 

All the aflirmations of the Reason are universal and necessary. 
I have before me, I will suppose, a right-angled triangle. I 
•wish to knov7 what relation exists between the square of the 
hjpothenuse and the sum of the squares of the two sides. I 
first determine this question by actual measurement, and find 
that they are equal. I have now before me a particular fact. 
Why it is so, I know not, or whether this fact holds true in 
regard to other triangles, I know not. I repeat the experiment 
upon similar triangles of various sizes, and find that they all 
give me precisely the same result. I very soon begin to con- 
jecture that this fact holds true of all similar triangles. Re- 
peated experiments ripen this conjecture into such a conviction 
as to preclude all doubt. Still there is no absolute knowledge. 
Nor does there appear any necessity, from the nature of the 
subjects of these experiments, that the conclusions should not 
be different from what they are. Now let a person, in whose 
mind the principles of Geometry are developed, construct a 
figure and demonstrate the fact under consideration, in respect 
to that one particular triangle. What is the conclusion de- 
duced from this demonstration ? Not only that this fact holds 
in regard to this particular triangle, but that it does and must 
bold true in regard to all other similar triangles. In the 
former instance, we obtained a particular, contingent truth, as 
conceived by the Mind. In the latter we obtained a truth, 
universal and necessary. 

5. The '^ Understanding is discursive.'' " The Reason ia 
fixed." The judgments of the Understanding admit of de- 
grees, and are perpetually passing and repassing from mere 
conjecture to positive afiirmation; from doubt and disbelief to 
positive faith, and the opposite. The decisions of the Reason, 
however, have ever been characterized by the total absence of 
all degrees. They are, and always have been, positive, abso- 
lute affirmations. 
19 



218 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

6. The Understanding is the faculty of helieving. The 
Reason is the faculty of knowing. Those 'who have never 
been in London or Paris, believe, with greater or less degrees 
of confidence, according to their knowledge of the facts, that 
there are such cities in existence. Yet they cannot, with strict 
propriety, be said to know these facts. But every person, in 
whose mind Reason exists at all, knows absolutely that space 
is — that every event must have a cause, &c. 

The above distinctions, most of which are specifically 
stated, though none of them are illustrated, by Coleridge, not 
only distinguish the Understanding and Judgment from the 
Reason, but tend to elucidate the functions of each. I will 
now proceed directly to a further elucidation of the functions 
of Reason. 

SECONDARY IDEAS OF REASON. 

In former Chapters it has been shown, that Reason sustains 
this relation to the faculties of Sense and Consciousness : It 
gives the logical antecedents of phenomena affirmed by these 
faculties. Thus, on the perception of phenomena, we have 
the ideas of time, space, substance, personal identity, and 
cause. 

Now Reason sustains a relation to the Understanding pre- 
cisely similar to that which it sustains to Sense and Conscious- 
ness. It gives the logical antecedents of notions and concep- 
tions, as well as of primary intuitions. The idea of right and 
wrong, of obligation, is not the logical antecedent of mere 
phenomena given by Sense and Consciousness. Before obliga- 
tion can be conceived of or affirmed, the notion or conception, 
not of mere phenomena, but of an agent possessed of certain 
powers, and sustaining certain relations to other agents, must 
be developed in the Intelligence. The idea of obligation, then, 
is not the logical antecedent of phenomena affirmed by Sense 



REASON. 219 

and Consciousness, but of notions given by the Understanding. 
These considerations fully establish the propriety of the dis- 
tinction between ideas of Reason as primary and secondary. 
The former are the logical antecedents of phenomena given by 
the primary contingent faculties. The latter sustain the same 
relation to those of the secondary faculties. The distinction 
here made seems hitherto, as far as my knowledge extends, to 
have escaped the notice of the analyzers of the human Intelli- 
gence. Its reality and importance to a correct understanding 
of the operations of the human Mind, will appear manifest, as 
we proceed with our analysis of the secondary ideas of Rea- 
son. An exposition of all the ideas comprehended under this 
class will not be attempted. All that will be attempted will 
be the induction and elucidation of a sufficient number of par- 
ticulars to serve as lights to the philosophic inquirer, in his 
researches in the domain of mental science. 

IDEA OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 

Of the Secondary ideas of Reason, that which claims the 
first, and more special attention, is the one mentioned above, 
that of right or wrong, together with those dependent upon it, 
OJ necessarily connected with it. 

This Idea exists in all Minds in which Reason is developed. 

It is an undeniable fact, that in the presence of certain 
actions, the human mind characterizes them as good or bad, 
right or wrong; that the mind affirms to itself, that one class 
of the actions ought, and the other ought not to be performed ; 
that when we have performed certain actions, we deserve re- 
ward, and that when we have performed others, we deserve 
punishment; and that when this takes place, there is moral 
order, and when it does not, there is moral disorder. Such 
judgments are passed alike by all mankind, the old and the 



220 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

young, the learned and the ignorant, the savage and the civil- 
ized. Should it be said, that mankind diiFer in diiferent cir- 
cumstances in their judgment of the moral qualities of actions, 
I reply : 

1. This objection itself implies the universality of moral 
distinctions. As men may differ in referring particular effects 
to particular causes, while all agree in the judgment, that 
every event must have a cause, so it is with moral distinctions. 
Men may not always attribute the same moral qualities to the 
same actions ; yet they universally agree in this, that actions 
are either right or wrong. 

2. But when we refer to intentions, in which alone the 
moral quality of actions consists, we find a more extensive 
agreement among men than is generally supposed. A man 
wills the good of an individual possessed of moral excellence. 
Where is the intelligent being in existence who does or can 
regard such an act as any other than virtuous ? Who is not 
aware, that men always justify wrong actions, if at all, by a 
reference to their intentions, showing by such reference, that 
in their judgment of the great law of love, all agree. 

3. Vicious actions are seldom regarded as virtuous. Men 
may persuade themselves that it is not icronr/ to perform such 
actions, but never that they are bound to do them, or deserve 
a reward for having done them. 

4. When an intention morally right is submitted to the 
contemplation of mankind, all agree in admitting it as virtuous 
and meritorious. Thus the sacred writer speaks of himself 
and associates, as through a " manifestation of the truth, com- 
mending themselves to every man's conscience.'' This could 
not have been the case, had not the consciences of all men 
been in fixed correlation to the moral law. The idea of right 
and wrong, then, is universal. 



221 



Idea of Right and Wrong necessary. 

It is also necessary. When the Intelligence affirms an 
action or intention to be right or wrong, it is impossible even 
to conceive of it, as possessed of the opposite character. We 
can no more form such a conception, than w^e can conceive 
of the annihilation of space. It has the same claim to the 
characteristics of universality and necessity, that any other 
idea has. 

Ideas dependent on that of Right and Wrong. 

A moment's reflection will convince us, that the idea of 
right and wrong is the foundation of that of obligation j and 
this again, of that of merit or demerit ; and this last of that 
of reward and punishment. When men would justify the be- 
stowment of reward, or the infliction of punishment, they 
always refer to the merit or demerit of the individual. This 
judgment is sustained by a reference to the obligation of the 
same individual, and his obligations are shown by a reference 
to the idea of right and wrong. Such facts clearly indicate 
the relation of these ideas, the one to the other. 

Chronological Antecedent to the Idea of Right and Wrong, &c. 

It has already been remarked, that the ideas under consid- 
eration are the logical antecedents, not of the phenomena of 
the primary contingent faculties, but of Understanding-con- 
ceptions. Before we can conceive of ourselves as subjects of 
moral obligation, we must be conscious of the possession of 
certain powers, and of existence in certain relations to other 
beings. This knowledge is the chronological antecedent of the 
ideas of right and wrong, while these ideas sustain to these facts 
of Consciousness the relation of logical antecedents. The 
question now is. What are the elements of moral agency, 
19* 



222 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

necessarily pre-supposed, as the condition of the existence of 
the ideas of right and wrong, of obligation, &c., in our minds? 
They are the following : 

1. Power to know ourselves together with our relations. 

2. The actual perception of such relations. 

3. Power to act, or to refuse to act, in harmony with these 
relations. 

That the ideas of right and wrong sustain to such concep- 
tions the relation of logical antecedent, is evident from the 
following considerations : 

1. When we conceive of a being possessed of these powers, 
and existing in such relations, we necessarily affirm obligations 
of him. An intelligent being is revealed to me, as possessed 
of capacity for virtue or vice, together with susceptibilities for 
happiness or misery. I have a consciousness of the power to 
will his virtue and happiness, or his vice and misery. I in- 
stantly affirm myself under obligation to will the former in- 
stead of the latter. No other conceptions are necessary to the 
existence of this affirmation. These facts also being postu- 
lated, obligation must be affirmed. We can no more conceive 
it right to will the evil instead of the good, or, that we are not 
under obligation to will the latter, than we can conceive of the 
annihilation of space. 

2. If any of these elements are not postulated, obligation 
cannot be conceived of, nor affirmed. If we deny of a crea- 
ture intelligence to perceive his relations to other beings, we 
cannot conceive of him as under obligation to them. What- 
ever degree of intelligence be attributed to him, this involves, 
in our apprehensions, no obligation to one act of Will instead 
of another, in the absence of all power to put forth the re- 
quired, instead of the prohibited act. Suppose a creature has 
any degree of intelligence whatever. This creates no obliga- 
tion to locomotion in the absence of corresponding power. 
Suppose the mind located in a body totally de.stituto of the 



REASON. 223 

power of locomotion. Would the existence of intelligence create 
obligation to locomotion ? Certainly not. Such would be the 
response of universal Mind. Now the power to will is just as 
distinct from the Intelligence, as that of locomotion is. Hence, 
intelligence, of whatever kind or degree, can no more create 
obligation to one than the other, in the absence of correspond- 
ing power. To the conception of an agent, then, possessed of 
intelligence to know his relations, and power to act, or refuse 
to act, in harmony with those relations, the ideas of right and 
wrong, of obligation, &c., sustain the relation of logical ante- 
cedents. 

IDEA OP FITNESS. 

Every person who has attentively noticed the operations 
of his own mind, must have observed, that under certain cir- 
cumstances, certain actions, or certain states of mind, appeared 
to him fit and proper. When asked to give a reason for such 
judgments, no other account can be given, than a simple refer- 
ence to the nature of the thing itself, and to the circumstances 
supposed. For illustration, take the following passage of 
Scripture : " It was meet that we should make merry and be 
glad ; for this thy brother was dead, and is alive again ; and 
was lost, and is found." Suppose that father to have been re- 
quired to give a reason for the judgment, that under the cir- 
cumstances supposed, joy and merriment were fit or proper. 
What answer could he have given ? No other answer than for 
the judgment, that no phenomena exist without a cause. In 
both instances, the mind knows absolutely that its judgments 
are, and must be true. No other reason for their truth, how- 
ever, can be given, than this : The circumstances being given, 
they are self-afi&rmed. 

This Idea synonymous with that of Right and. Wrong, &c. 
Now the idea of fitness, when applied to moral rel<itions^ 



224 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is identical with that of right and wrong. It is the founda- 
tion of the idea of merit and demerit; and consequently of 
that of reward and punishment. 

It is also* identical with the idea of moral order. When 
it is asked, Why is that state in which virtue is rewarded and 
vice punished, regarded as a state of moral order ? no other 
reason can be assigned than this : Such a state is fit and 
proper. 

IDEA OF THE USEFUL, OR THE GOOD. 

Whenever we conceive of a creature capable of pleasure or 
pain, happiness or misery, we necessarily conceive of a state in 
which all the capacities of such a creature for pleasure and 
happiness are perfectly filled. This state we designate by the 
term good, a term sometimes used in another sense, as synony- 
mous with that of right. Whatever tends to fill out the mea- 
sure of pleasure and happiness, we designate by the general 
term, useful. 

The ideas of the useful and the good, above defined, give 
birth to all the varied forms of human industry, such as agri- 
culture, the mechanic arts, commerce, &c. All are moving on 
to the realization of one great leading idea, the filling up of 
the capacities of man for pleasure and happiness. 

THE SUMMUM BONUM. 

There is one idea of Reason, expressed by the words, the 
great good, the summum honum, and the <ro xaXo'v, about which 
philosophers have long disputed, and in respect to which they 
have been about equally divided in opinion. The question 
may be thus put : When we think of ourselves, or of the 
universe at large, what is that state to which our nature is 
correlated, so that we regard it as preferable to any other, ac- 
tual or conceivable ? 



REASON. 225 

Some have placed the great good in happiness merely. To 
this position, however, we find that our nature is not exclu- 
sively correlated. If happiness were the only thing to which 
our nature is correlated, as in itself alone to be desired, if 
happiness exists, we should be totally indifferent in respect to 
the means, or conditions of its existence. We are not 
pleased, but pained at the thought, for example, that perfect 
happiness should be associated with great wickedness. 

Others, in departing from this idea, have placed the great 
good in virtue. To this position, also, we find that our nature 
is not correlated. If virtue is the only thing that the Mind 
regards as good, it would be indifferent in respect to the con- 
dition in which it should exist; whether, for example, the 
virtuous agent were happy or miserable. We are pained, on 
the other hand, at the thought, that virtuous beings should 
not be happy. Happiness our Intelligence affirms to be the 
right of the pure and the virtuous. 

The true solution is, no doubt, to be found in the blending 
of the two above given, or, as Cousin expresses it, " In the 
connection and harmony of virtue and happiness, as merited 
by it." If we conceive of a state of perfect virtue, associated 
with perfect happiness, this conception contains a realization of 
our idea of the summuni bonum. Every department of our 
nature is correlated to that idea. We can conceive of no state 
so much to be desired as this. Nor can we perceive any ele- 
ment in this state to which the laws of our being do not fully 
respond. 

RELATIONS OF THE IDEAS OF RIGHT AND WRONG AND OF 
THE USEFUL TO EACH OTHER. 

We have seen above, that the ideas of right and wrong are 
the foundation of obligation, and this of merit and demerit, 
&e. The question has long been agitated among philosophers, 



226 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

whether there is any idea that sustains a similar relation to 
that of right and wrong, and of obligation By some it is 
maintained, that this is not an ultimate idea of Reason, but 
that it has its foundation in another, to wit, that of the useful. 
This question I regard as of such fundamental importance in 
mental and moral philosophy both, that I shall enter into a dis- 
cussion somewhat protracted of it. The question then is, 
What is the foundation of moral obligation ? Is utility this 
ground ? 

This purely a Psy etiological Question. 

The object of Mental Philosophy, it should be borne in 
mind, is to explain human nature. When the Intelligence, 
for example, makes particular affirmations, the object of this 
science is, to ascertain the reasons in view of which such af- 
firmations are made. 

It is admitted by all, that in the presence of certain actions, 
the Mind does, as a matter of fact, affirm its obligation to per- 
form them. The question, and the only question, for the phi- 
losopher to solve here is. What is the element or elements, in 
view of which this affirmation is made ? The Utilitarian 
affirms that the perceived utility of the action, or its perceived 
tendency to promote happiness, is the only element in the ac* 
tion, and the only circumstance connected with it, in view of 
which obligation to perform it is, or can be affirmed. In view 
of nothing else, if this theory is true, can such affirmation be 
made ? Now, as every one will perceive at once, the question 
whether this theory is true, is exclusively a psychological ques- 
tion. It can be truly answered, only by an appeal to Con- 
sciousness. 

The theory under consideration is also given as a universal 
theory. If obligation is, in any instance, affirmed in view of 
any other consideration, this theory falls to the ground. 



REASON. 227 

Further, if the Utilitarian, as is sometimes done, assumes 
the position, that perceived tendency is not the sole reason, 
why obligation is, in all instances affirmed, while it is in fact 
tlic only element which gives existence to obligation, his the- 
ory, instead of explaining the human Intelligence, convicts it 
of fundamental error, inasmuch as it asserts, that the Intelli- 
gence affirms obligation in view of considerations, which do not 
give existence to obligation. Having thus convicted the Intel- 
ligence of fundamental error, how is he afterwards, through 
the same Intelligence, to find out the truth ? Now, at this 
point, we join issue with the Utilitarian. We assert that his 
theory does not correctly explain the human Intelligence rel- 
atively to the question under consideration, and is therefore 
wrong. To show this we will inquire, 

Nature of Virtue. 

In the first place, What is virtue ? I answer, virtue is not 
a, phenomenon of the Intelligence or Sensibility, but of the 
Will. As a phenomenon of Will, it must consist in right will- 
ing. This is a definition sufficiently explicit for the present 
argument. Should any one feel disposed to question the 
statement, that virtue consists exclusively in right willing, he 
will not deny that it is in part, at least, found here. This is 
all that is requisite to the present argument. The question 
then to be settled is this : Is obligation to will in a given di- 
rection alioays aj/irmed, and affirmed exclusively, in view of 
the perceived tendency of thus willing ? 

Happiness a Phenomenon of the Sensibility. 

While virtue is, in this discussion, postulated as a phenom- 
enon of the Will, happiness, on the other hand, is a phenom- 
enon, neither of the Intelligence, nor Will, but of the Sensi- 
bility exclusively. This no one will deny. 



228 INTELLECTUAL i-HILOSOPHT. 

Relation of Willing to Happiness. 

Now the tendency of willing of every kind, to promote 
happiness, or its opposite, depends entirely upon the correla- 
tion between the nature of the Will and Sensibility. To un- 
derstand, in this respect, the nature of willing, that is, its 
tendency to promote happiness, or its opposite, this correlation 
must be known. How can such knowledge be obtained ? By 
experience only. This is self-evident. Prior to experience, I 
know not even that I have a Sensibility. Much less, if possi- 
ble, can I know, prior to experience, the adaptation of any 
cause whatever, as for example, willing in one direction or an- 
other, in view of affirmed obligation, to produce in the Sensi^ 
bility, happiness or misery. 

Conclusion necessarily resulting from the Facts above stated. 

Now as I can know from experience only, the tendency of 
willing in one way or the other, in view of affirmed obliga- 
tion, to promote happiness or misery, it is demonstrably evi- 
dent, that obligation must, in all instances, be in the first case 
affirmed, in total ignorance of such tendency. It must be af- 
firmed, in view of other considerations exclusively. Per- 
ceived tendency, or utility, therefore, is not the exclusive rea- 
son in view of which obligation is affirmed. It is not the 
element which enters at all into original and primary affirma- 
tions of this nature. Utility, then, is not the exclusive ground 
of right. 

Argument Expanded. 

The above argument is as susceptible of absolute demon- 
stration, as any proposition in mathematics. To show this, let 
A represent a moral action, B its results, the results which A 
tends to produce. As A is the cause of B, the relation of A as 



REASON. 229 

cause to B, as effect, must be learned exclusively from experi- 
ence. For the same reason, A must be, in the mind, the chro- 
nological antecedent of B. Now as A is willing in view of 
affirmed obligation, it implies two things, obligation affirmed, 
and action or willing, in view of it. Let C then represent the 
former, that is, obligation affirmed, and D the latter, or willing 
in view of such affirmation. Now C must have been in the 
mind prior to D, because D is action or willing in view of C. 
But B is known subsequently to the existence of D, the former 
being an effect of the latter, an effect learned by experience 
alone. Now as D is known prior to B, much more must C 
have been known and affirmed prior to all knowledge of B. 
Because C is affirmed prior to the existence even of D, which is 
the chronological antecedent of B. Obligation, therefore, is in 
all instances, first affirmed in view of totally different consider- 
ations than the perceived tendency of action in view of such 
affirmation, and the theory of the Utilitarian fails to the ground. 

Additional Considerations. 

The nature of willing may be contemplated and known in 
another and different point of light still, not in relation to the 
phenomena of the Sensibility, but of the Intelligence. A 
mountain, we will suppose, is before the mind. Prior to expe- 
rience, we cannot know, but that such is the correlation be- 
tween our Wills and the mountain, that willing its removal to 
a certain place will cause its removal. In total ignorance of 
this relation, we may conceive of the removal of the mountain, 
and know what would be the effects of such an event, and un- 
derstand perfectly what it is to will it. Our knowledge of the 
nature of willing in this respect, cannot be increased or dimin- 
ished, by our knowledge of the tendency of willing in the 
other respect above mentioned. Now the question arises, 
whether, in total ignorance of the tendency of Willing to 
20 



INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 230 

produce this result, the Intelligence may not affirm, and affirm 
absolutely, that it is proper or improper, right or wrong, for us to 
will the removal of the mountain ? Suppose we know, that 
the removal of the mountain would occasion the death of a 
thousand individuals ; but we do not know at all, whether our 
willing it has any tendency to produce the result. Would not 
the Intelligence under such circumstances affirm absolutely our 
obligation not to will the removal of the mountain ? Who 
does not know, that it would make this affirmation ? Obliga- 
tion to right willing is therefore affirmed, in view of consider- 
ations entirely distinct and separate from the perceived tenden- 
cies of thus willing to promote happiness. 

Argument stated in view of another Example. 

God, we will suppose, is present to the contemplation of 
a rational being as capable of an infinite amount of happiness 
or misery. Before we can know whether willing God's happi- 
ness or misery has any tendency to produce the one or the 
other, we must understand the correlation between the nature 
of our Will and the Divine Sensibility. In total absence of 
this knowledge, however, we can understand perfectly the na- 
ture of willing in another respect, that is, what it is to will the 
infinite happiness, instead of misery of God. Now in total 
ignorance of the tendency of willing, to produce the result, 
and in view exclusively of its nature, in the other respect 
named, may not the Intelligence affirm absolutely the obliga- 
tion of the creature referred to, to will the infinite happiness, 
instead of the infinite misery of God ? If so (and who will 
deny that the Intelligence would, under the circumstances sup- 
posed, make the affirmation under consideration,) we have de- 
monstrative evidence, that utility, or the perceived tendency 
of right willing, is not the reason in view of which obligation 
thus to will, is affirmed. 



REASON. 231 

To bring this question to a final issue, let us suppose the 
being of God present, in the sense above explained, to the 
contemplation of one of his rational oflfspring, and that no 
other creature but this exists. In view of the divine capaci- 
ties, this creature affirms absolutely his obligation to will God's 
infinite happiness, instead of his misery. In view of God's 
infinite excellence he affirms his obligation to love him. Now 
the question is, in view of the nature of willing, in which of 
the senses above named has this affirmation been made ? In 
answering this question I remark, that the happiness of God 
may be assumed as an infinite quantity, incapable of any in- 
crease or diminution from any finite cause ; or it may be as- 
sumed as a finite quantity, capable of increase or diminution 
from such a cause. Or (the only remaining supposition con- 
ceivable) the mind may be in doubt which of the above posi- 
tions is true. Of these positions, the first, as I suppose, is 
the general impression of the race, and it certainly accords 
with the Bible. 

Now, in whichsoever of these states the mind is, it affirms 
with equal absoluteness its obligation to will the infinite hap- 
piness, instead of misery, of God. When it holds that the 
happiness of God cannot be increased or diminished by any 
act of any finite will, still it affirms its obligation to will the 
infinite happiness of God, instead of his infinite misery. Now 
an affirmation made in the absence of a certain element cannot 
be based upon that element. 

Further, the thing which this creature affirms himself 
bound to will, under the circumstances supposed, is the infinite 
happiness of God. Now it is demonstrably evident, that our 
willing cannot have any tendency to produce this result, a 
cause in its nature finite having no tendency to produce an 
«fiect that is infinite. The utmost that can be said of the 
tendency of willing is, that it is adapted to effect the happiness 



232 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of Grod in a finite degree. Now, is it in view of such a result 
that we affirm our obligation to will a result that is infinite ? 
Willing an infinite good derives, in our judgment, all its obli- 
gation from the perceived tendency of such willing to produce 
a finite good. Such is the doctrine of Utility. 

Result of the Discussion thus far. 

The result of the discussion thus far, is this : The per- 
ceived adaptation of willing the infinite happiness of God to 
promote that end, cannot be the reason of the affirmation that 
we are bound to will his infinite happiness, — 

1. Because this affirmation is, as a matter of fact, made 
with the most perfect absoluteness, in the full belief that such 
willing has no tendency to effect his happiness at all. 

2. Because that this affirmation is made with equal abso- 
luteness, while the mind is in perfect suspense in respect to 
the fact whether our willing has any tendency to affect at all 
the happiness of God. 

3. Suppose we adopt the conclusion that our willing has 
such tendency, this conclusion we can adopt only as the result 
of a process of reasoning. Before we have arrived at this 
result, the above affirmation was made with perfect absolute- 
ness, and could not, therefore, have been based upon such 
conclusion. 

4. When this conclusion is arrived at, the absoluteness of 
the affirmation under consideration is neither increased nor 
diminished. 

5. To suppose that the obligation to will the infinite hap- 
piness of God is based upon the perceived tendency of thus 
willing to affect his happiness in a finite degree, is to abandon 
entirely the position that intentions, or what a man willp, de- 
termines moral character. 



233 



Other important Considerations. 

Other considerations, bearing upon this point, now demand 
our attention. 

1. No one is conscious of a reference at all to the tendency 
of our willing to affect the happiness of God, as the ground 
of the affirmation that we ought to will it. 

2. When this tendency is pointed out and proved to exist, 
no one recognizes it as the reason of the affirmation under con- 
sideration. 

8. No one who attempts to assign to others the reason why 
they are bound to love God, or to will his happiness, ever as- 
signs this as the reason. Assuming the position, on the other 
hand, that we affirm ourselves bound to love God, or to will 
his happiness, for the sole and exclusive reason that the char- 
acter of God is intrinsically excellent, and that his happiness 
is a thing in itself of infinite value, this assumption I affirm 
to be correct, 

1. Because universal Consciousness affirms its truth. 

2. When this fact is pointed out, universal Reason responds 
to it, as the real ground of the affirmation under consideration, 
and as an all-sufficient ground. 

3. This fact is invariably referred to, when we attempt to 
convince others of their obligation to love God, or to will his 
happiness, and of their guilt in not doing it. 

4. Upon this ground Utilitarians, as well as others, found 
their affirmations of obligation to will what is right, whenever 
their theory is not distinctly before their minds. 

5. The more perfectly the mind is abstracted from all con- 
siderations but the simple relation of willing to what is intrin- 
sic in the object presented, the more distinct and vivid will be 
the affirmations of Reason in respect to the moral character of 
our determinations Of this every one is conscious. 

20* 



234 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The above Argument of universal Application. 

The argument thus far has been based mainly upon one 
example, •willing the happiness instead of the misery of God. 
It will readily be perceived, however, that this example is of 
universal application in respect to all duties which, as crea- 
tures, we owe to Grod. If obligation to will God's happiness 
is not based upon perceived tendencies of willing it, to produce 
that result, no more surely can obligation to love him, submit 
to his authority, or be grateful for his mercies, be based upon 
perceived tendencies of yielding to such claims to produce the 
same result. 

Obligation not affirmed in view of the subjective Tendencies 
of Right or Wrong Willing. 

Suppose the Utilitarian shifts his ground, and assumes the 
position that we affirm our obligation to will the happiness of 
God, or to love him, in view of the perceived tendencies of 
such willing to advance our own or the happiness of others. 
I reply — 

1. That, as shown above, obligation must have been per- 
ceived, affirmed, and complied with, or transgressed, prior to 
the perception of any such tendencies. Such perceptions, 
therefore, cannot have been the basis of such affirmations. 

2. The testimony of universal Consciousness is opposed to 
this supposition. When we affirm our obligation to love God, 
for example, nothing is further from our views than the thought, 
that this affirmation is based upon the perceived tendencies to 
make us happy. 

3. No person ever assigns this as the reason why we are 
bound to will the happiness of God. 



235 



Another general Consideration. 

I have one consideration further, of a general nature, in 
favor of the position which I am endeavoring to establish. It 
is this : The more perfectly a man is emancipated from the 
belief of the doctrine of utility, the more perfectly he is "rooted 
and grounded" in the belief of the opposite doctrine, the 
more sacred in his estimation does right, does duty appear. 
As proof of this assertion I appeal to the consciousness of 
those who have had experience of the influence of this belief 
upon their minds. That error should have such an influence, 
is the strongest anomaly in the history of human nature. 
" That which maketh manifest is light," and nothing, surely, 
but light can sanctify duty in our estimation. 

Once more, according to the showing of Utilitarians them- 
selves, the tendency of willing, as, for example, the happiness 
of God, is a consideration, in view of which, it is impossible 
for us to will. Now that fact in view of which it is impossible 
for me to act, is a fact in view of which I cannot affirm my 
obligation to act. On the other system, the very considera- 
tion, in view of which we affirm our obligation to will what is 
right, is the very consideration in view of which alone, as all 
admit, right willing is 



Mutable Actions. 

The way is now prepared to consider a class of actions de- 
nominated 3Iutable. Here, at first thought, it would appear 
that utility must be the ground of right. For example, the 
parent says to his child, " You must not strike your brother 
or sister;" and the reason assigned for this prohibition is, 
" because it will hurt." Now this prohibited act is composed 
of two elements. 1. The physical part, or the motion of the 
hand. 2. The volition or act of the Will, as willing such mo- 



236 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tion. The real meaning of the prohibition is, "You shall not 
will this motion of your hand." The reason of the prohibi- 
tion, and consequently the ground of obligation to comply, is 
the perceived connection between the motion and the well- 
being of the person exposed to its effects. Now here also it 
is demonstrably evident that utility is not the ground of the 
right. For the obligation to avoid willing arises from the per- 
ceived connection between the motion under consideration and 
its effects, and not from the perceived connection between 
willing and the motion itself Because, when we suppose all 
such connection between willing and the motion destroyed, the 
obligation of the subject to avoid willing such motion remains 
equally sacred. The connection between willing and its effects 
is accidental. The character of willing, however, remains the 
same, whether this connection exists or not. This principle is 
of universal application. Whenever we are bound to will any 
end, we affirm ourselves under obligation to will every means 
which we judge adapted to secure that end. In neither in- 
stance is our obligation to will affirmed in view of the per- 
ceived connection between our willing and the object willed ; 
but on account of what is intrinsic in the object itself 

I here close this protracted discussion of the relations be- 
tween the ideas of obligation, and of the useful. It is not 
intended to be denied that perceived tendency is a ground of 
obligation, but that it is the exclusive ground. Less than I 
have said upon this subject, I could not have said, and satis- 
fied my own mind. We will now proceed to the analysis of 
other ideas of Keason. 

IDEAS OF LIBERTT AND NECESSITY. 

Ideas defined. 
These ideas, like those of right and wrong, are opposites. 



REASON. 237 

The elements entering into one, are excluded from tte other. 
The question is, What are the characteristics which separate 
and distinguish one of these ideas from the other ? In an- 
swer, I would remark, that they represent two entirely dis- 
tinct and opposite relations, which may be supposed to exist 
between an antecedent and its consequent. The first is this : 
The antecedent heing given, hut one consequent is possible, 
and that must arise This relation we designate by the term 
necessity. The second relation is, The antecedent being given, 
either of two or more consequents are possible, and consequently, 
when any one does arise, either of the others might arise in its 
stead. 

These Ideas Universal and Necessary. 

These ideas have the characteristics of absolute universal- 
ity and necessity. Every antecedent and consequent, actual 
and conceivable, must fall under one or other of the relations 
which they represent. These ideas have nothing to do with, 
the nature of antecedents and consequents. They simply and 
exclusively represent the relations existing between them. As 
representing such relations, they must bear the fundamental 
characteristics of all other ideas of Reason, inasmuch as no 
other relation, differing in kind from either of these, and not 
included in one or the other of them, is even conceivable. 

Idea of Liberty realized only in the Action of the Will. 

The relation between all antecedents and consequents, with 
the exception of motives and acts of Will, are conceived by 
the Intelligence as necessary. If the idea of Liberty is not 
realized in the action of the Will, it exists in the Intelligence 
without an object, or any element in any object corresponding 
to it, in the universe. 



238 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Chronological Antecedents of these Ideas. 

No idea of Reason does or can exist in the Mind, without 
the appearance of some phenomena, through which it is re- 
vealed. The existence of the idea of Liberty can be accounted 
for only on the supposition of the appearance in Consciousness 
of the element of Liberty in the action of the-^Will. In all 
other phenomena of which the Mind is conscious, the element 
of necessity appears. The appearance of these phenomena, 
then, are the chronological antecedents of the ideas of Liberty 
and Necessity. 

IDEA OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME. 

Opinions of Philosophers. 

All men agree in pronouncing some objects beautiful, and 
some sublime, and others the opposite. By many philosophers, 
the beautiful and sublime are contemplated as simple emotions. 
Some suppose, that all objects are to the Mind originally alike 
in this respect, that they are unadapted to awaken any such 
emotions in the Mind, and that these feelings come to be con- 
nected with particular objects by accidental association. Pleas- 
ing emotions are from some cause awakened in the mind. 
While in this state, we perceive, we will suppose, a rose. 
These emotions are thus associated with that object, so that 
when it is perceived again, they reappear. Hence, not be- 
cause the rose is in itself more beautiful than any other ob- 
ject, but on account of the feelings thus associated with it, 
it is ever after regarded as beautiful. Now to this theory 
there exists this insuperable objection. Accidental association 
can never account for the absolute universality of judgment 
which exists among mankind, in respect to particular objects. 
Why, for example, do all the world agree in pronouncing the 



REASON. 239 

rose and lily more beautiful than the poppy or sun-flower ? 
Accidents never produce perfect uniformity. 

Others suppose, that there are in the mind ideas of Reason 
represented by the terms beautiful and sublime, and that ob- 
jects are referred to one or the other, as they present cor- 
responding characteristics. I will now present certain con- 
siderations designed to show, that this last is the true concep- 
tion. 

Considerations indicating the existence in the Hind of Ideas 
of Reason, designated by the terms Beautiful and Sublime. 

One fact which has a very important bearing upon this 
question, strikes the mind at first view. It is this : No human 
form or countenance is regarded by any person as perfect. 
How can this fact be accounted for, except on the supposition, 
that every such judgment is based upon a comparison of the 
external object, with an idea more perfect, existing in the mind 
itself? 

Again, the ancient sculptors and painters, when they at- 
tempted to give to the world, what all men would alike regard 
as the forms of perfect beauty, copied after no living model; 
but took from all the forms of beauty in the world around 
them, those parts which were most beautiful, and from these 
combined new forms more beautiful than any realities actually 
existing. Does not this show, that they were endeavoring to 
realize, not the forms of beauty actually existing in the universe 
around them, but an idea in their own minds more perfect than 
these forms ? 

With this supposition also, and with this only, consists the 
fact, that the pleasure derived from the contemplation of cer- 
tain forms of beauty is permanent, and becomes more intense,* 
the more intimate and protracted our acquaintance with them;' 
while the pleasure derived from the contemplation of other 



240. INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

forms ceases on a protracted and intimate acquaintance. The 
reason of this obviously is, that the first mentioned forms cor- 
respond very nearly, in all their parts, to the ideal in the 
mind. An intimate acquaintance with the others, however, 
gives us a knowledge of their defects, and in time destroys the 
pleasure which we felt when those defects were not perceived. 

I will present one other consideration bearing upon the 
subject, which I regard as perfectly decisive. The particular 
elements which mark objects as beautiful or sublime, do in 
fact correspond with fundamental ideas. In respect to the 
sublime, all agree in fixing upon the Infinite as the chief source 
of emotions of sublimity. In finite objects one element only 
is correlated to these emotions, that of vastness. 

The characteristics of the beautiful are determinate form, 
regularity, uniformity, and variety. A waving, instead of a 
orooked line, a line realizing the ideas of uniformity and va- 
riety, has universally been fixed upon, as the line of beauty 
and grace. Now that which proceeds according to fundamen- 
tal ideas, must be itself the representative of such ideas. 

Ohjection to the Universality of these Ideas. 

An objection to the principle above elucidated, to wit, the 
difierent standards of beauty adopted by different nations, and 
by the same nations, at difierent periods, has sometimes been 
adduced. In reply, the following considerations are presented 
as deserving special attention : 

1. It may be questioned whether the savage when he paints 
and tattoes his form, and the civilized person when he adorns 
his with the ornaments of civilized society, are endeavoring to 
realize the same idea. The one may be aiming to realize the 
idea of the beautiful, and the other (the savage), that of the 
terrible. The same holds true of architecture. The prominent 
idea in the Grecian style is the beautiful. That in the Grothio 



REASON. 241 

is the grand, the solemn, the sublime. The former and the 
latter then, had not different standai'ds of beauty. They were 
aiming to realize different ideas. 

2. While the idea may exist alike in all minds, the ideal, 
that is, the form in which the idea shall be embodied, may 
exist in different minds, and among mankind at different 
periods, in different degrees of development. Consequently 

gthe forms in which they will embody the idea will be various. 

* 3. In contemplating particular forms of beauty, in which 
many defects of course exist along with the beautiful, these 
may be mistaken for the particular features which are the 
source of the pleasurable emotions felt under these circum- 
stances. These defects then will be copied instead of the 
actual beauties. 

4. But in the midst of all this apparent variety, there is a 
more general agreement than is commonly supposed ; an agree- 
ment that is fundamental to the inquii'y before us. Introduce 
men of all ages, and of every nation into the sdime family, and 
ask them which of the children in that particular family is the 
most beautiful, and you will find but little diversity in their 
judgments, and no diversity which is not perfectly consistent 
with the supposition of a common ideal in their minds, while 
the striking coincidence in their judgments can be explained 
on no other supposition. 

5. There are actual forms of beauty, in respect to which 
all men do agree. The most perfect specimens of ancient 
sculpture and painting may be adduced as an illustration. Also 
forms of beauty in the world around us; as the rose and the 
lily. Such circumstances we should find it difficult to explain 
on any other supposition than the one before us. 

Clironological Antecedent of these Ideas. 

The condition of the development of the idea of beauty 
21 



242 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and sublimity in the mind, is the perception of the elements 
of the beautiful and sublime in some external object. In the 
Divine mind, these ideas, among others, existed eternally as 
the prototypes after which creation was formed and moulded. 
The human Intelligence is so constituted, that in the presence 
of objects, in the conformation of which the Divine idea is 
more or less nearly realized, the same idea is awakened in the 
mind of man. This idea then becomes the standard by which 
the external object is characterized as beautiful, grand, or 
sublime. 

Illusb-ation from Cousin. 

Cousin thus beautifully explains the origin of the idea of 
beauty in the mind : " The idea of the beautiful is equally in- 
herent in the mind of man, as that of the just and good. In- 
terrogate yourselves, when a vast and tranquil sea, when 
mountains of harmonious proportions, when the manly or 
graceful forms of men or women, are present to your view, or 
some trait of heroic devotion, to your recollection. Once im- 
pressed with the idea of the beautiful, man seizes, disengages, 
extends, develops and purified it in his thought, and by the 
assistance of this idea, which external objects have suggested 
to him, he re-examines these same objects, and finds them 
inferior to the idea which they themselves have suggested." 

Explanatory Remarks. 

The remarks above made have directly respected the beau- 
tiful and sublime, as they are embodied in external form. By 
this I would not be understood as implying that nothing else is 
beautiful or sublime, or that this is their chief source. There 
are beauty and sublimity in thought, and if possible, higher 
still in action. 



243 



IDEA OP HARMONY. 



The remarks and illustrations above presented, pertaining 
to the ideas of the beautiful and sublime, are equally applica- 
ble to that of harmony. The ear tryeth sounds, as the eye 
doth form and color. In harmony words and sounds are ar- 
ranged according to fundamental ideas, just as other elements 
are in the beautiful and sublime. That this is the true expli- 
cation of the subject will appear, I think, from the following 
considerations : 

1. When highly excited by musical performances, those 
who attentively watch the operations of their own minds, can- 
not fail to notice, that under such circumstances they uni- 
formly conceive of the same pieces as performed infinitely bet- 
ter ; and that it is this conception which constitutes the main 
source of delight. 

2. Persons in whose minds the principle of harmony is 
most fully developed, enjoy an exquisite piece of music quite 
as highly, when reading it alone, in the absence of all musical 
sounds, as when hearing it performed by the best trained 
choir, clearly showing that the idea in the mind far surpasses 
realities without. 

3. Skillful performers on the organ or piano, who have lost 
the faculty of hearing, enjoy these instruments no less than 
before. I recollect to have read of a celebrated musician in 
Germany, who in his old age lost his hearing entirely. Yet, 
as his fingers would run over the keys of his piano, the instru- 
ment used being (a fact unknown to him) totally destitute of 
power to produce any sound whatever, he would rise in his 
feelings to perfect ecstacy of delight. In his own mind there 
was harmony deep and profound. It was harmony in idea. 

4. The principles of harmony are all found to be reducible 
to mathematical formulas. These principles are not deduced, 



244 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

in the first instance, from observation, irrespective of funda- 
mental ideas. Such ideas must first be developed, before the 
principles of harmony can be understood. 

REFLECTIONS. 

Two reflsctions suggest themselves from the above analysis. 

1. Mind constituted according to fundamental Ideas. 

The first is, that a profound knowledge of mind clearly shows 
that our nature is constituted according to absolute principles 
of pure science, or of fundamental ideas of Reason. Nothing, 
at first thought, would appear to be at a further remove from 
the principles of pure science, especially of the pure mathe- 
matics, than the laws of harmony. Yet, when we have devel- 
oped the laws of proportion in the pure mathematics, we find 
that we have developed those principles without the knowledge 
of which the laws of harmony could not be understood. The 
same results are equally applicable to external existences. In 
the study of pure science we have not departed from nature. 
We are only in the depths of our own Reason, developing the 
forms and laws to which nature, material and mental, is con- 
formed. We are only developing those formulas and princi- 
ples which enable us to understand the universe as it is. The 
more deep and profound our descent into the depths of pure 
science, the more profound and perfect is our knowledge of 
nature. What do such facts indicate in respect to the charac- 
ter of the Author of our being ? He must be a pure Intelli- 
gence, in whose mind absolute science pre-existed as the 
patterns and laws after which all things, visible and invisible, 
are constituted. Hence, when the principles of the same sci- 
ence are developed in our own minds, we are then able to com- 
prehend our own nature, and the constitution of things around 
us. Because we are from our nature scientific beings, for this 



REASON. 245 

reason alone it is that we can understand the works of God. 
Thus it is that 

" Trailing clouds of glory do we come 
From God who is our home." 

How little is the student accustomed to reflect that in the 
study of the laws and principles of the triangle, the square, 
the circle, the ellipse, the parabola, and hyperbola, together 
with the science of number and proportion, he is developing 
in his own mind, those formulas and principles by which alone 
the wonders of astronomy, and the laws of attraction which 
bind the universe of matter in harmony together, &c., can be 
understood and explained by him. In our descent into the 
deep profound of the pure and abstract sciences, we find our- 
selves, whenever we come to recognize our position, in the deep 
profound of nature, and of the Infinite Intelligence of Nature's 
God. 

2. Poetry defined. 

We are now prepared for a definition of poetry, properly 
so called. A mere rythmical jingle of words at the end of 
lines of a given length, does not constitute poetry, according 
to the true signification of the term. Nor have I been satis- 
fied with the popular definitions of the subject which I have 
met with. I will present, as an example, that given by Cole- 
ridge : " A poem is that species of composition which is op- 
posed to works of science, by proposing for its immediate 
object pleasure, not truth ; and from all other species (having 
this object in common with it) it is discriminated by propos- 
ing to itself such delight from the ichole as is compatible with 
a distinct gratification from each component part." The great 
objection to this definition is, that many prose, as well as poet- 
ical compositions, would fall under it I will now propose 
21* 



246 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

another and a different definition. Poetry, or more properly, 
perhaps, a poem, is the creations of the Imagination embodied 
in language arranged in conformity to the idea of harmony. 
I leave the definition to speak for itself. 

IDEA OF TRUTH. 

Idea defined. 

Another fundamental idea of Reason — an idea •which 
controls the Intelligence in all its movements — is the idea of 
truth. The term Truth may be contemplated objectively and 
subjectively. Objectively, it comprehends and expresses all 
realities, whatever they may be. Subjectively, it designates an 
intellectual conception in harmony with the object of the con- 
ception. 

Chronological Antecedent of this Idea. 

The chronological antecedent of this idea, or the condition 
of its development by the Reason, is the perception of phe- 
nomena, and the consequent development of the idea of sub- 
stance. Then the great question, '' What is truth ? " becomes 
the leading idea in the Intelligence. 

IDEA OF LAW. 

The term law is used in a great variety of significations. 
Two general divisions, howev3r, include all the meanings ever 
attached to this term, to wit, Natural or Physical, and Moral 
Law, words which are applied to the action of two distinct and 
opposite classes of powers. 

In general, Law may be defined as a ride of action. Nat- 
ural or Physical Law is that rule in conformity to which the 
natural or physical poicers of the universe do act. Moral 
law is that rule in conformity to which moral agents are re 



REASON. 247 

quired to act. Natural or Physical Law is a rule of action. 
Moral Law is a rule /or action. 

The words Natural or Physical Law are used, among others, 
in the two following senses : 

1. To designate the rule in conformity to which each par- 
ticular power in nature acts, in the production of specific results. 
Between all material substances, for example, there exist two dis- 
tinct and opposite principles, those of Attraction and Eepul- 
sion. The rules in conformity to which these principles act are 
called the Laws of Attraction and Piepulsion. It is also a 
fixed and immutable principle, with such substances, that a 
body at rest, or in motion, will continue in the same state, till 
that state is changed by the action of some power external to 
the body itself, and that with such bodies, action and reaction 
are always equal. Here we have the laws of Eest and Motion, 
and of Action and Eeaction. Every power in nature, mental 
and physical, has its laws. Thus we speak of theLaws of Mat- 
ter and of the Laws of Mind. 

2. To designate the rule in conformity to which certain pow- 
ers of nature are or may be arranged for the production of 
certain results. The motion of the heavenly bodies, for exam- 
ample, the balance of the material Universe, the phenomena 
of animal and vegetable life and production, &c., arise not from 
the original properties of the powers of nature, irrespective of 
their present arrangement and organization, but from the mu- 
tual action and reaction of those powers consequent on that 
peculiar arrangement and organization. Each particular power 
manifests many, to say the least, of its present peculiar qual- 
ities, in consequence of its present position and arrangement 
relatively to other powers around it. Thus we have that class 
of the laws of nature comprehended under the idea of Means 
and Ends. In this respect, the Universe is one vast whole, 
throughout all departments of which an absolute unity of de- 



248 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

sign and arrangement obtains. Everything in nature exists 
and acts as a means to one all-comprehending whole. The 
wants of mind is the end. The entire arrangement and action 
of the powers of nature throughout, are subordinated as a sys- 
tem of means for the realization of this one end, and this is 
the law of nature, all particular princii^les pertaining to the 
arrangements of the powers of creation, such as those above 
referred to, being only particular parts of this all-comprehend- 
ing whole. It is to this idea of law, that Coleridge refers in 
the following paragraph, to which I will append some illustra- 
trations : 

Coleridge's definition of law. 

" The first is that of Law, which, in its absolute perfec- 
tion, is conceivable only of the Supreme Being, whose creative 
idea not only appoints to each thing its position, but in that 
position, and in consequence of that position, gives it its qual- 
ities, yea, it gives its very existence, as that particular thing. 
Yet in whatever science the relation of the parts to each other 
and to the whole, is predetermined by a truth originating in 
the Mind, and not abstracted or generalized from observation 
of the parts, there we affirm the presence of a law, if we are 
speaking of the physical sciences, as of Astronomy, for in- 
stance ; or the presence of fundamental ideas, if our discourse 
be upon those sciences, the truths of which, as truths abso- 
lute, not merely may have an independent origin in the Mind, 
but continue to exist in and for the Mind alone. Such, for in- 
stance, is Geometry," &c. 

To set the above definition in a clear and distinct light, take 
the following illustration : Let us suppose a body of men, say 
one hundred thousand in number, assembled together, all per- 
fectly armed and equipped with all the implements of war, but 
without officers, without discipline, without order. Here is a 



EEASON. 249 

congregated mass of powers, but the absence of law In other 
words, these powers act in conformity with no rule. What is 
the condition of this army ? It is powerless, except for self- 
destruction, and that in exact proportion to its numbers. Con- 
template now this army, oflBicered, disciplined, and all brought 
into perfect order under some experienced commander. You 
have the same powers as formerly, but now acting in con- 
formity with certain rules or laws. The army now becomes 
powerful, not for self-destruction, but for attack and defense. 
But what is the law which these powers obey, or in conformity 
with which they act ? It is an idea in the mind of the com- 
mander. It is this idea which gives to each part of this army 
its particular position, and in consequence of that position, 
gives it its qualities, its very existence, as that particular part. 
The army receives its existence and qualities as that particular 
army from the law or idea which it obeys, or in conformity 
with which it acts. 

You will now readily apprehend the meaning of the remark 
of Coleridge : " Law in its absolute perfection is conceivable 
only of the Supreme Being, whose creative idea not only ap- 
points to each thing its position, but in that position, and in 
consequence of that position, gives it its qualities, yea, it gives 
its very existence, as that particular thing." The meaning, 
as far certainly as it is correct, is this : An idea in the mind 
of God appoints to every power in nature its particular posi- 
tion, and in consequence of that position, gives it its qualities, 
its very existence, as that particular thing. 

In illustration, I would remark, that if we conceive of the 
powers of nature, as existing each one by itself alone, or as 
existing in different relations to each other from that which 
they now sustain, few of the peculiar qualities which they 
now exhibit would appear. All the phenomena of vegetation, 
for example, result from the peculiar arrangement of the 



250 INTELI.ECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

powers of the material creation relatively to each other. 
Change this arrangement, and nothing but barrenness and 
universal desolation, or phenomena totally different from those 
which now appear, would appear. Each particular particle, 
therefore, receives its qualities, yea, its very existence, as the 
particular thing manifested to us, in consequence of its posi- 
tion relative to surrounding particles. Everything we behold 
or contemplate is to us what it is, in consequence of its exist- 
ence, position, and consequent action in harmony with an idea 
in the infinite Intelligence. 

Law, svhjective and objective. 

Law, in this sense, may be contemplated in two points of 
light, suLJcctive and objective. In the first sense, it is an idea, 
in which powers are contemplated as arranged relatively to 
each other, so that their mutual action and reaction shall pro- 
duce results in correspondence to a certain end conceived of, 
and chosen by the mind. In the second sense, it is the exist- 
ence, arrangement, and consequent action of these powers, in 
harmony with that idea. 

Conclusion from the above. 

We come to this conclusion : that wherever powers act in 
conformity with law, they are acting in obedience to some idea 
existing in some intelligent mind. To illustrate this, let us 
suppose an army of one hundred thousand men all dressed 
and equipped alike, arranged in a given order, and all perform- 
ing perfectly harmonious motions and evolutions. You here 
perceive the presence and all-pervading influence of law. Is 
it possible to conceive all this, and not suppose this law to be 
some idea in some intelligent mind — a mind that comprehends 
all the parts, and assigns to each pa.rt its position, &c. ? If 
this could not be supposed of intelligent powers, much less 
could we suppose a similar action of necessary and unintelli- 



REASON. 261 

gent ones. The grand problem, then, the solution of which 
is the final object and distinctive character of philosophy, 
when once solved, leads the mind to the direct apprehension 
and contemplation of the Infinite, of Grod, whose creative idea 
is the law of all existences. The problem referred to is this : 
For all that exists conditionally (i. e. the existence of which 
IS inconceivable, except under the condition of its dependency 
on some other as its antecedent) to find a ground that is un- 
conditional and absolute, and thereby to reduce the aggregate 
of human knowledge to a system. Now, this ground can be 
found in nothing but in the mind of God. 

Chronological Antecedent to the Idea of Law. 

As Mind wakes into conscious existence, and contemplates 
the action of the powers of nature within and around it, it at 
once perceives all things existing and acting as a means to an 
end. Everywhere diversity blended with harmony, presents 
itself. Now, this presentation of the powers of nature is the 
chronological antecedent of the idea of Law in the Reason. 
Hence the great inquiry ever after imposed upon the Intelli- 
gence, to wit : What are the laws in conformity to which these 
powers act ? In this inquiry, the Intelligence begins to '' feel 
after" the Infinite, and it never rests until it finds itself in the 
presence of " that creative idea, which appoints to each thing 
its position, and in consequence of that position, gives it its 
qualities, yea, its very existence as that particular thing." 

APPARENT MISTAKE IN RESPECT TO LAW. 

Philosophers, as well as others, often appear at least to 
speak on this subject, as if, in their judgment, the powers of 
nature, with their present arrangement, on the one hand, ex- 
isted, and Law on the other, as a separate something control- 
ling their action. Coleridge maintains, that law (and by law. 



252 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

he means thought) is the only reality. Now, it should be 
borne in mind, that when we depart from ideas, nothing rela- 
tive to the powers of nature exists, but the powers arranged in 
such a manner, that their mutual action and reaction shall 
produce results in harmony with such ideas. Look, as an il- 
lustration, at the steamboat. There is not here powers ar- 
ranged in a given order, and then a something else, which con- 
trols their action. All the results we witness arise from the 
nature, and the peculiar arrangement of the powers here com- 
bined. So in all other instances. 

THEORY AND LAW DISTINGUISHED. 

The term theory is used in two senses somewhat different. 
The first meaning may be illustrated by a reference to what is 
denominated the Theory and Practice of Medicine. The end 
for which medicinal substances are used, in cases of disease, is 
the controlling of the disease, and its consequent removal. 
Now, when a certain disease appears, a particular course is 
adopted. The results are marked down. That course which, 
in given circumstances, is attended with the most favorable 
results, is set down as the course to be pursued in the treat- 
ment of this disease. The course becomes a Theory, to which 
medical practice is conformed. According to this usage, the 
term Theory supposes certain powers arranged under some one 
point of view, and certain principles of action adopted for the 
purpose of controlling these powers. 

According to another usage, Theory means a certain hy- 
pothesis which has been adopted for the explanation of a given 
class of facts; an hypothesis, in conformity to which, it is 
supposed, the facts may be explained. In respect to a given 
class of facts, it frequently happens that all admit of an 
equally ready explanation, on either of two or more distinct 
and opposite hypotheses, and hence a corresponding number 



REASON. 253 

of Theories are adopted for their explanation. Thus we have 
two distinct and opposite Theories of electricity, all the facts 
presented being equally explicable in conformity to each. 

Now Law, as distinguished from Theory, is an hypothesis 
which sustains to a given numher of facts the relation of a 
logical antecedent. The facts being given, the hypothesis must 
be assumed as the ground of their explanation. The facts 
must not only be explicable by the hypothesis, but affirmed by 
it, in such a form as to contradict every other hypothesis 
which can be adduced for their explanation. This condition 
we find realized in the facts adduced by Newton, in demon 
stration of the law of attraction. 

NATURE OE PROOE. 

One thought suggested by the preceding analysis demands 
special attention — the nature of proof. No proposition is, 
properly speaking, proven, till facts or arguments are adduced, 
which not only affirm its truth, but contradict every opposite 
proposition. How often is this fundamental law of evidence 
overlooked and disregarded in almost every department of 
human investigation. In Theology, for example, how often is 
an hypothesis denominated a doctrine, which merely consists 
with a given class of passages of Holy Writ, assumed as abso- 
lutely affirmed by these passages, when, in reality, they equally 
consist with the contradictory hypothesis. Let it ever be 
borne in mind, that no passage or passages of Scripture prove 
any one doctrine which do not contradict every opposite doc- 
trine. No facts affirm any one hypothesis which do not 
equally contradict every contradictory hypothesis. 

EUNDAMBNTAL AND SUPEREIOIAL THINKERS. 

Another suggestion which presents itself is this — the dif- 
ference between superfcial and fundamental thinkers. The 

22 



254 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

former dwell only upon the surface of subjects, and having 
there found certain hypotheses which consist with mere ex- 
terior facts, they gravely conclude that they " have heard the 
conclusion of the whole matter." They have discovered all 
that can be known, and " wisdom will die with them." The 
latter class, on the other hand, retire into the interior of sub- 
jects, and taking their position upon some great central facts, 
announce the existence and operations of universal laws sus- 
taining to exterior facts the relation of logical antecedents, and 
explaining them all. The reason why the positions assumed 
by such men are uniformly so impregnable is, that the error 
of every hypothesis, in opposition to that which they have 
assumed, as well as the truth of their own, becomes visible at 
once, in the light of the great central facts on which they 
have taken their stand. 

THE PHILOSOPHIC IDEA. 

The philosophic idea realized, or objectively considered, is 
the reduction of phenomena to fundamental ideas, the reduc- 
tion of the sum of human knowledge to a system, the finding, 
amid the infinity of facts which are floating in the universe 
around us, some great central fundamental facts or laws, which 
are afiirmed by all others, and explain them all. 

This idea subjectively considered is a conception lying 
down in the depths of the Eeason, that all substances exist 
and act in harmony with such ideas. Hence the questions 
perpetually imposed upon the Understanding and Judgment, 
in all departments of human research, to wit, what are the 
laws which explain the facts here presented? Science is 
everywhere now on the high road tending to the realization of 
this great idea. Happy the eyes that shall see it realized. 



REASON. 255 

Chronological Antecedents of this Idea. 

The chronological antecedents of this idea are the same 
as those which sustain a similar relation to that of law. In- 
deed this idea is but one form in which the idea of law mani- 
fests itself. 

Other ideas of Reason will be considered, when we speak 
of matter and spirit, the soul, Grod, &c. 

FIRST TRUTHS, OR NECESSARY PRINCIPLES OP REASON, AS 
DISTINGUISHED FROM CONTINGENT PRINCIPLES. 

Contingent and necessary Principles defined and distinguished. 

" Contingent principles," in the language of Cousin, " are 
those which force belief, though, without implying any contra- 
diction in the denial of them, and which are not therefore ne- 
cessary, but irresistable, natural beliefs, actual, primitive, and 
instinctive, such, as the belief in the stability of the laws of 
nature, the perception of extension," &c. 

A necessary truth or principle, on the other hand, is one 
which not only forces assent, but which is always attended 
with absolute conviction of its necessity, of the total impossi- 
bility of supposing the contrary; such as the proposition, 
Every event must have a cause. The above distinction per- 
fectly corresponds with those made by Dr. Reid. " Truths,' 
he observes, " which fall within the compass of human knowl- 
edge, whether they be self-evident, or deduced from those that 
are self-evident, may be reduced to two classes. They are 
either necessary or immutable truths, whose contrary is impos- 
sible; or they are contingent and mutable, depending upon 
some effect of Will or power, which had a beginning, and may 
have an end." 

That a cone is a third part of a cylinder of the same base, 



256 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and the same altitude, is a necessary truth. It depends not 
upon the will or power of any being. It is immutably true, 
and the contrary impossible. That the sun is the center, 
about which the earth, and the other planets of our system, 
perform their revolutions, is a truth, but it is not a necessary 
truth. It depends upon the power and will of God. 

First Truths defined. 

First truths are those principles, whether contingent or 
necessary, which lie at the foundation of all science, of all 
reasoning. " They admit," says Dr. Reid, " of no other proof 
than the following : 1. All men do admit them, as a matter 
of fact in all their reasoning. 2. All men, even those who 
deny their validity, act upon them. 3. If denied, the validity 
of all reasoning fails." 

Kind of Proof of ivhich necessary Ideas or Principles admit. 

The above remarks of Dr. Reid are strictly applicable to 
contingent principles. Necessary ideas and principles, on the 
other hand, admit of a kind of proof, that, as far as my knowl- 
edge extends, has escaped the notice of philosophers. All 
such ideas and principles sustain, as we have seen, to contin- 
gent phenomena and principles, the relation of logical antece- 
dents, while the former sustain to the latter, the relation of 
chronological antecedents. Now, in addition to the kind of 
proof, adduced by Dr. Reid, necessary ideas and principles 
admit of this also : We can designate the phenomena or prin- 
ciples to which they sustain the relation of logical antecedents. 
Thus we may prove the reality of time, by refering to succes- 
sion, of the reality of which every one is conscious. This is, 
in fact, the highest kind of proof of which any pnnciple w 
susceptible. 



257 



Statement illustrated hy a Reference to the Idea ^f God. 

The idea of God is a first truth of Reason. In refei-ence 
to the proof of the Divine existence, two errors, as it appears 
to me, have been committed by philosophers and theologians. 
Some have afl&rmed, that this truth is wholly insusceptible of 
any proof of any kind. Others have supposed that it admits 
of logical demonstration from given premises. Now the truth 
pertaining to the subject lies between the two errors above 
named. The Divine existence admits of the same proof that 
other necessary ideas of Reason do ; that is, we may find the 
contingent phenomena or principles to which this great truth 
sustains the relation of logical antecedent. This, in common 
with the kind of proof common to all first truths, is the only 
kind of which it is susceptible ; and when philosophical and 
theological research takes this direction, we shall find the 
highest kind of demonstration of the Divine existence. But 
this subject will claim attention in a subsequent part of this 
Treatise. 

IDEA AND PRINCIPLE OP KEASON DISTINGUISHED. 

An idea of Reason is the pure conception of an object of 
Reason, irrespective of any other object; as the idea of space, 
time, substance, cause, &c. 

A principle of Reason is the conception of the necessary 
relation of such objects to some other reality, as the princi- 
ples. Body supposes space, succession supposes time, phenom- 
ena suppose substances, and events causes. Here the relation 
existing between contingent and necessary ideas is affirmed. 
This is what is meant by a principle of Reason. 

AXIOMS, POSTULATES, AND DEFINITIONS. 

An axiom is a first principle of Reason. Axioms which 
22* 



258 ^ INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

are employed in particular sciences do not belong to those 
sciences exclusively. On the other hand, they pertain to all 
sciences, and are only in the form in which they are presented 
adapted to the particular science to be treated of. The axioms 
in Geometry, for example, The whole is greater than any of 
its parts, things equal to the same thing are equal to one an- 
other, &c., are not peculiar to Greometry, but are common to 
all sciences. The last named is the same thought expressed 
in a somewhat different form, as the axiom in logic, to wit, 
Where two terms agree with one and the same thing, they 
agree with one another. 

Postulates are assumed axiomatic principles of Reason, 
wbich pertain exclusively to the particular sciences to be treated 
of The postulate in Geometry, for example, that a straight 
line may be drawn between any two points in space, belongs 
exclusively to this and other cognate sciences. 

Definitions, scientifically considered, give the objects, and the 
qualities of the objects to be investigated in the light of given 
axioms, and postulates. The conception, for example, of a 
straight line, a triangle, square, &c., of which the science of 
Geometry treats, are given by definition. 

These principles are applicable to all sciences whatever. 

IDEA OF SCIENCE, PURE AND MIXED, 

Idea of Science defined. 

The idea of Science, which of course is a pure conception 
of Reason, is knoidedge reduced to fundamental ideas and 
principles; or the j^roperties and relations of objects, systemat- 
ically evolved in the light of such ideas arid principles. Thus 
in Geometry, we have the proprieties and relations of partic- 
ular objects systematically evolved in the light of axioms and 
postulates, which are, in reality, fundamental ideas of Rea- 



REASON. 259 

son. Whenever this end is accomplished, in reference to 
any phenomena, or objects, then we have the scientific idea 
realized. 

Pure Sciences. 

When the axioms, postulates, and definitions are all alike 
pure conceptions of Reason, and when the Judgment evolves 
the properties and relations of the objects of such definitions 
in the light of such axioms and postulates, then we have what 
are denominated pure sciences. Such is Geometry, and the 
mathematics generally. 

Mixed Sciences. 

When the axioms and postulates are ideas or principles of 
Reason, and when the definitions pertain to phenomena or ob- 
jects contingent and relative, as in natural philosophy, and 
when the Judgment evolves the relations and properties of 
such objects in the light of such ideas and postulates, then we 
have mixed sciences. 

FUNCTION or REASON DENOMINATED CONSCIENCE. 

Conscience defined. 

Conscience is that function of Reason which pertains to 
the ideas of right and wrong, of obligation, of merit and de- 
merit, &c. It is a testifying function of Reason, pertaining 
to the relation which ought to exist between the action of the 
Will and the idea of right and wrong. 

General Remarlcs. 

1. Conscience always commands us in the name of Grod. 
Her mandates are regarded as the voice of Grod speaking 
within us, and when disregarded, we always hold ourselves 



260 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

amenable to the Divine tribunal. Conscience in the heathen 
is not only a law, but a law of God ; and so it is regarded by 
them. 

2. As Conscience is the voice of God within us, it follows 
that it can never, in its appropriate exercise, put right for 
wrong, and the opposite. In other words, no man acts con- 
scientiously when doing wrong, nor in opposition to Conscience, 
when doing right. " Conscience," as Coloridge remarks, " in 
the absence of direct inspiration, bears the same relation to 
the will of God, that a good chronometer does to the position 
of the sun in a cloudy day.'^ 

? Objection. 

In opposition to the principle above stated, it is very com- 
mon to refer to the contradictory standards of moral obliga- 
tion adopted by diflferent nations, communities, and individuals. 
The following considerations are deserving of special attention 
in reply to this objection : 

1. To suppose that the heathen, for example, in all their 
rites and ceremonies, are endeavoring to realize the idea of 
right, is as absurd, as to suppose that the savage is endeavor- 
ing to realize the idea of the beautiful, when he is tattooing 
his body. 

2. The Bible affirms that the heathen are actuated hy fear 
and not by Conscience, " And deliver them who through fear 
of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage." 

3. The judgment that a thing is not wrong, is often mis- 
taken for the testimony of Conscience to its rightness. 

4. When a reference is made to the intention, the only 
appropriate object of Conscience, we find a more universal 
agreement among men than is generally supposed, an agree- 
ment of such a nature as to demand the truth of the above 



REASON. 261 

proposition, while every shade of difference may be explained 
in perfect consistency with it. 

Term Conscience as used in the Scriptures. 

A good conscience, as the words are used, in the Scrip- 
tures, is the testimony of the mind to the agreement of the 
Will, or moral action, with the moral law. An evil conscience 
is the opposite, the testimony of the mind to the fact of the 
disagreement of the action of the Will with that law. 

GENERAL REMARKS PERTAINING TO REASON. 

Relation of Reason to other Intellectual Faculties. 

The relation of Reason to other functions of the Intelli- 
gence may now be readily pointed out. Of the phenomena, 
or truths affirmed by those faculties, Reason gives the logical 
antecedents. This is its exclusive function. The Judgment, 
in all its operations, is exclusively analytic. It simply evolves 
what is embraced in the affirmations of the other faculties. 
Reason is synthetic. It always adds to the affirmation of 
the other faculties something not embraced in the affirmation. 
The element added, however, always sustains to that to which 
it is added a fixed relation, that of logical antecedent. Thus 
when Sense or Conscience affirms phenomena, Reason adds to 
the affirmation an element not embraced in it, that of Sub- 
stance, an element, however, sustaining to the affirmation a 
fixed relation, that of logical antecedent. 

Through Reason Man is a religious Being. 

As possessed of Reason alone is man a religious being. 
Through this awful power he attains to a knowledge of the 
soul, of moral obligations and retributions, of immortality, of 



262 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

God, and enters into inter-communion with the Infinite and 
Eternal One. 

Reason common to all Men. 

Keason also exists in all men, and equally in all who pos- 
sess it at all. This is evident from the fact that if an individ- 
ual knows a truth of Reason at all, he does and must know it 
absolutely. There are no degrees in such knowledge. The 
difference, and only difference, between men lies in their per- 
ceptive and reflective faculties. Newton differed from other 
men not because he knew any more absolutely than they that 
events suppose a cause, that things equal to the same things 
arc equal to one another, &c., but because he possessed powers 
of perception and reflection which enabled him to see (whal 
they could not discover) the consequences involved in such 
truths. 

Error of Coleridge. 

Reason is not, as Coleridge maintains, an " organ identical 
with its appropriate objects." "Thus God, the soul, eternal 
truth," he adds, " are not the objects of the Reason, but they 
are the Reason itself." Space and duration he would admit 
are the objects of the Reason ; but are they Reason itself? If 
God and the soul are the Reason, then they are identical, and 
Pantheism is eternal truth. Philosophers, as well as others, 
are accustomed to take many things for granted which need to 
be proved. We must, if we are not willing to be greatly mis- 
led, be careful what assumptions we permit them to make. 
Otherwise we may find ourselves under the direction of princi- 
ples which may lead us we know not whither. 

Paralogism of Cousin. 

In order to do justice to this great philosopher, I must 
make quite a lengthy quotation from him, on the important 



REASON. 263 

point next to be considered. The extract is taken from his 
remarks on enthusiasm, and commences with a quotation from 
Locke. 

" ' Intuitive knowledge is certain, beyond all doubt, and 
needs no probation, nor can have any, this being the highest 
of all human certainty. In this consists the evidence of all 
those maxims which nobody has any doubt about, but every 
man (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) knows to be 
true as soon as ever they are proposed to his Understanding. 
In the discovery of and assent to these truths, there is no use 
of the discursive faculty, no need of reasoning, but they are 
known by a superior and higher degree of evidence ; and such, 
if I may guess at things unknown, I am apt to think that 
angels have now, and the spirits of just men made perfect shall 
have in a future state, of thousands of things, which now 
either wholly escape our apprehensions, or which, our short- 
sighted Reason having got some glimpse of, we, in the dark, 
grope after.' I accept this statement, let it be consistent or 
not with the general system of Locke. I hold likewise that 
the highest degree of knowledge is intuitive knowledge. This 
knowledge, in many cases, for example, in regard to time, 
space, personal identity, the infinite, all substantial existences, 
as also, the good and the beautiful, has, you know, this pecu- 
liarity, that it is not grounded upon the Senses nor upon the 
Consciousness, but upon the Reason, which, without the inter- 
vention of any reasoning attains its objects and conceives them 
with certainty. Now, it is an attribute inherent in the Reason 
to believe in itself : and from hence comes faith. If, then, 
Intuitive Reason is above Inductive and Demonstrative Reason, 
the faith of Reason in itself in intuition, is purer and more 
elevated than an induction and demonstration. Recollect,!^ 
likewise, that the truths intuitively discovered by Reason are" 
not arbitrary, but necessary ; that they are not relative, but 



264 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

absolute. The authority of Reason is absolute ; it is then a 
characteristic of the faith attached to Reason, like Reason ab- 
solute. These are the admirable characteristics of Reason, 
and of the faith of Reason in itself. 

" This is not all. When we come to interrogate Reason 
about itself, to inquire into its own principle, and the source 
of that absolute authority which characterizes it, we are forced 
to recognize that this Reason is not ours, not constituted by us. 
It is not in our power ; it is not in the power of our Will to 
cause the Reason to give us such or such a truth, or not to give 
us them. Independent of our will. Reason intervenes, and, 
when certain conditions are fulfilled, gives us, I might say, im- 
poses upon us, these truths. The Reason makes its appear- 
ance in us, though it is not in ourselves, and in no way can it 
be confounded with our personality. Reason is impersonal. 
Whence, then, comes this wonderful guest within us, and what 
is the principle of this Reason which enlightens us, without 
belonging to us ? This principle is God, the first and the last 
of everything. Now, when the faith of Reason in itself is at- 
tached to its principle, when it knows that it comes from Grod, 
it increases not merely in degree, but in nature, by as much, 
so to say, as the eternal substance is superior to the finite sub- 
stance in which it makes its appearance. Thus comes a re- 
doubled faith in the truths revealed by the Supreme Reason in 
the shadows of time, and in the limitations of our weakness. 

" See, then, Reason become, to its own eyes, divine in its 
principle. Now this mode or state of Reason which hears it- 
self, and takes itself as the echo of God on the earth, with the 
particular and extraordinary characteristics connected with it, 
is what is called Enthusiasm. The word sufficiently explains 
the thing; Enthusiasm \_@sog sv '/j/aiv] is the spirit of God 
within us ; it is immediate intuition, opposed to induction and 
demonstration ; it is the primitive spontaneity opposed to the 



REASON. 265 

ulterior development of reflection ; it is the apperception of 
the highest truths by Reason in its greatest independence both 
of the senses and of our personality. Enthusiasm in its high- 
est degree, in its crisis, so to say, belongs only to particular in- 
dividuals, and to them only in particular circumstances ; but 
in its lowest degree. Enthusiasm is as much a fact as anything 
else, a fact sufficiently common, pertaining not to any particu- 
lar theory, or individual, or epoch, but to human nature, in all 
men, in all conditions, and almost at every hour. It is Enthu- 
siasm which produces spontaneous convictions and resolutions, 
in little as in great, in the hero, and in the feeblest woman. 
Enthusiasm is the poetic spirit in everything ; and the poetic 
spirit, thanks to God, does not belong exclusively to poets. It 
has been given to all men in some degree, more or less pure, 
more or less elevated ; it appears above all, in particular men, 
and in particular moments of the life of such men, who are 
the poets by eminence. It is Enthusiasm, likewise, which 
produces religions, for every religion supposes two things : 

1. That the truths which it proclaims are absolute tfuths; 

2. That it proclaims them in the name of God himself who re- 
veals them to it." 

It requires a great philosopher to conceive of a great absurd- 
ity, and to give a professed demonstration of that absurdity 
by a great paralogism. In all these respects, I give it as my 
sober judgment, that the above passage is almost unequaled 
among the absurdities and paralogisms of modern times. 
What are the conclusions to which we are conducted in this 
strange rhapsody? They are the following : 1. Reason is in 
us, but belongs not to us. It constitutes no part of our per- 
sonality. It is not a faculty of the soul, like the Understand- 
ing and Judgment, but is a light in the soul. 2. Reason is 
God, "the spirit of God within us." 3. In its own eyes Rea- 
son is God, " is divine in its principle." 
23 



266 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

What are the arguments by which these dogmas are af- 
firmed to be proven ? The following : 

1. Knowledge by Reason is " intuitive knowledge." 
" Without the intervention of any reasoning, it attains its ob- 
jects a»d conceives them with certainty." This peculiarity, I 
remark, Reason possesses only in common with Sense and 
Consciousness, with this advantage on their part, that intui- 
tions through these faculties are prior, in the order of time, 
to any through Reason. If for such a consideration Reason is 
to be deified, and deemed no part of ourselves, much more 
should Sense and Consciousness. 

2. " Truths intuitively discovered by Reason, are not arbi- 
trary, but necessary; they are not relative, but absolute." 
Now what a leap in logic is that, to go from such a premise 
to the conclusion, that therefore Reason is God, "the spirit 
of God in us," and no part of ourselves. Cousin himself, in 
another place, has fully demontrated the fallacy of his own 
conclusions here. He has laid it down as a fundamental prin- 
ciple in mental philosophy, that the fact of knowledge of any 
kind in man, implies in him corresponding powers of knowl- 
edge. He himself afiirms, that we do know by direct intui- 
tion, truths, absolute, universal, and necessary. The knowledge 
of such truths belongs to us, just as much as knowledge of any 
other kind, and implies in us corresponding power. If we 
had not the power to know such truths, the knowledge of them 
would never belong to us as phenomena of our intelligence. 
Now, the faculty by which, when certain conditions are ful- 
filled, we know such truths, is Reason, a faculty which belongs 
as much to us as any other functions of our Intelligence, and 
is no more impersonal than any of them. 

3. His third and last argument is this, "Reason is not 
constituted by us. It is not in our power ; it is not in the 
power of our Will to cause Reason to give us such or such a 



^ REASON. 267 

truth, or not to give us them," &c. In view of such a con- 
sideration, to hear the philosopher exclaim, '' See, then, Rea- 
son become, to its own eyes, divine in its principle." The 
man that, in such a premise, can see any such conclusion, 
must throw away his Reason, and see without his eyes. Rea- 
son, instead of deifying itself, and then falling upon its knees 
to worship its own image, exclaims, 

"for my single self, 
I had as lief not be, as live to be in awe 
Of such a thing as I myself." 

No, Reason is too noble, too truthful a faculty to perform 
such an act of self-apotheosis. Reason stands in awe of noth- 
ing but the Infinite, which it apprehends, without ever con- 
founding itself with that which it knows, adores, and worships. 

He also whom Reason reveals, has said, '' Thou shalt have 
no other gods before me." The man who deifies Reason, and 
gets upon his knees before that, is, in '' Reason's eye," as well 
as in the light of inspiration, a heathen, as much as the man 
who worships devils. 

In the paragraph above cited. Cousin himself furnishes us 
with a full demonstration of the fallacy of all his reasonings 
here. Reason, he says, " when certain conditions are fulfilled, 
gives us — I may say, imposes upon us — those truths." Now 
if Reason was really divine, God in us, knowledge through 
Reason would be unconditioned, as it is in God. Must the 
Divine Intelligence, as is true with ours, first perceive phenom- 
ena, before the Divine Reason can apprehend the idea of sub- 
stance, space, time, &c. ? Certainly not. We have Reason 
just as we have Free Will, because '* we are made in the im- 
age of God." Yet Reason in us is not God, any more than 
Free Will is. Reason, too, has a sphere in the human Intelli- 
gence — a sphere which marks it as a function of that Intelli- 



268 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

gence, just as much as any other faculty, and as impersonal in 
no other sense than all other intellectual functions are. 

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

Every one is surprised that, because, when certain intel- 
lectual faculties have given, by direct intuition, phenomena, 
another faculty should then give us the logical antecedents of 
such phenomena, philosophers should hence conclude, that this 
last faculty is God — is no part of our Intelligence, but the 
" spirit of God in us." Yet upon just such paralogisms is 
the entire fabric of German Transcendental Pantheism founded. 
When philosophers discover any power in nature before unrec- 
ognized, they are very apt to worship it as a God. Kant de- 
veloped Reason as a function of the Intelligence — a function 
which philosophers had before failed to recognize. Germany 
at once raised the cry, " The gods have come down to us." 
Great is Reason. " God in us." There is no God but Rea- 
son, and Reason is everything. Everything, therefore, is God. 
Sorry am I to record the fact, that the great high priest of 
philosophy in France "has brought oxen and garlands" to do 
sacrifice to this new divinity. 

REASON, IN WHAT SENSE IMPERSONAL. 

From what has been said above, one thing is perfectly evi- 
dent, to wit, in reason we are impersonal in the same and in 
no other sense, than we are in the exercise of all other intel- 
lectual faculties. What Cousin has said in respect to the 
action of Reason being independent of our Wills, is equally 
applicable to every intellectual faculty. ''It is not in the 
power of our Will," he says, " to cause Reason to give us such 
or such a truth, or not to give us them." Nor is it in the 
power of our Will to cause Sense or Consciousness to give us 
such or such phenomena, or the Understanding or Judgment 



to give such or such notions or affirmations, or not to give them, 
when certain conditions are fulfilled. In one department of 
the Intelligence, we are impersonal in the same sense, and for 
the same reason, that we are in another. 

REASON, IN WHAT SENSE IDENTICAL IN ALL MEN. 

From the fact that, in all men. Reason gives precisely the 
same truths, it has been inferred that Reason does not exist 
subjectively in us, as other intellectual faculties do. It is like 
the atmosphere, it is said, which is in the lungs of all, but 
subjective to none. So Reason is a light in all, but a function 
of the Intelligence of none. Now it by no means follows from 
the fact, that the same phenomena appear in all men, that 
therefore, the power to perceive such truth, is subjective in 
none. The same phenomena appear in all, because the power 
to which they are to be referred is in all of precisely the same 
nature. Reason in all men is alike, in the same sense that 
powers which produce precisely similar phenomena are in their 
nature one. 



23* 



CHAPTER XIII. 

EECAPITULATION, WITH ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS. 

The last Chapter completes our analysis of the IntellectUAl 
powers. This analysis has led to the following classificatioq 
of the powers, or functions of the Intelligence, distinguished 
63 primary and secondary : 

INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES ENUMERATED. 

The former include Consciousness, the faculty which gives 
ws a knowledge of whatever passes in the interior of our own 
minds, or subjective phenomena — Sense, the faculty which 
gives the qualities of external, material substances, or objec- 
tive phenomena — and Reason, the faculty which apprehends 
»nd affirms the reality of necessary, universal, spiritual, infinite, 
and eternal truths. 

The secondary faculties comprehend the Understandings 
the conceptive or notion-forming power — the Judgment, the 
elassifying, generalizing, and realizing power — the associating 
principle, with its varied functions, as simple association oi 
suggestion, Memory, Recollection and Fancy — and the Imagl 
nation, or esemplastic power. 

All these faculties we have found distinctly marked, and 
separated, the one from the other, by fundamental phenomena 
Into these, we have found, that all the phenomena of humaii 
[ntelligence may be resolved. These, then, we conclude to be 
the faculties of the human Intelligence. 



RECAPITULATION. 271 

Feeling a deep solicitude that the grounds of the above 
distinctions may be understood and appreciated, I have deter- 
mined upon a cursory review of the various topics discussed in 
the preceding analysis. For particular reasons, I shall base 
this recapitulation upon the principle of classification of mental 
phenomena adopted by Kant in his Critick of Pure Reason — 
a principle, as we have seen, leading to the same classification 
of the intellectual powers, and to the advanced student, on 
some accounts, preferable to the one adopted in the preceding 
analysis. 

" That all our cognition," he says, " begins with experi- 
ence, there is not any doubt ', for how otherwise should the 
faculty of cognition be awakened into exercise, if this did not 
occur through objects which affect our senses, and partly of 
themselves produce representations, and partly bring our Un- 
derstanding-capacity into action, to compare these, to connect, 
or to separate them, and in this way to work up the rude 
matter of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects, 
which is termed experience ? In respect of time, therefore, 
no cognition can precede in us experience, and with this all 
commences. 

" But although all our cognition begins with experience, 
still on that account, all does not precisely spring up otU of 
experience. For it may easily happen that even our empi- 
rical cognition may be a compound of that which we have 
received through our impressions, and of that which our prop- 
er Cognition-faculty (merely called into action by sensible 
impressions) supplies from itself, which addition we cannot 
distinguish from the former original matter, until long exer- 
cise has made us attentive to it, and skillful in the separation 
thereof" 

All cognitions, or intellectual phenomena, are therefore 
divided by Kant into two classes — those derived from experi- 



272 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ence, and those not thus derived. The former he denominates 
empirical, the latter d priori cognitions. Cognitions d priori 
all have these fundamental characteristics, and by these they 
are distinguished from the empirical of every kind, to wit, 
universality and necessity. The proposition, for example, An 
event supposes a cause, is not only true of every event of 
which we have had experience, but we know absolutely that it 
must be true of all events actual and conceivable. These 
characteristics can never pertain to phenomena which have 
their source in experience, which is always limited, and in no 
instance can affirm anything more than that a thing really is, 
without ever affirming that it must be. 

INFLUENCE OP THE ABOVE DISTINCTIONS. 

The student who has followed this philosopher thus far, 
and has understood the ground of his classification, will never 
after, whatever his philosophic destiny may be, range himself 
as a disciple of Locke, maintaining and believing that all our 
knowledge comes from experience. He may fall into vagaries 
incomparably more wild and extravagant than ever appeared 
among the disciples of the sensual school. Yet between him 
and Empiricism "there is a great gulf fixed," and he will 
never pass over it to the school from which he has been sepa- 
rated. His destiny lies in another direction. Having dis- 
covered in the depths of his intelligence, cognitions bearing 
the characteristics of absolute universality and necessity, he 
never will, and never can, adopt the principle, that all our 
knowledge comes from sensation and reflection. 

ERRORS OP KANT. 

While we admit the reality and validity of cognitions d 
priori, as distinct from the empirical, it becomes a matter of 
fundamental injportance in philosophy to settle definitely the 



RECAPITULATION. 273 

relations between these two classes of phenomena thus distin- 
guished. This point has been settled in the preceding analy- 
sis. Gogmiions a priori universally sustain this relation to the . 
empirical, that of logical antecedents, while the latter are the 
chronological antecedents of the former. Now these relations 
Kant overlooks entirely. Here lies his first error. On the 
other hand, he assumes, without argument or any attempt at 
proof, that there are cognitions d priori — cognitions more im- 
portant than all others — which not only do not spring out of 
experience, but" which transcend all experience, and extend the 
compass of our judgments wholly beyond its limits. " And 
exactly," he adds, ^' in these last cognitions, which transcend 
the sensible world, where experience can afford neither guide 
nor correction, lie the investigations of Reason, which we, as 
far as regards their importance, hold to be highly preferable, 
and in their object, far more elevated, than all the Understand- 
ing can teach in the field of phenomena, even with the danger 
of erring, rather than that we should give up such impor- 
tant investigations from any ground of doubtfulness, or disre- 
gard, or indifference. These unavoidable problems of pure 
Reason itself, are God, Liberty, and Immortality." The prin- 
ciple announced in this passage is this, That the cognition- 
faculty, once roused into action by experience, evolves through 
its own laws, and wholly irrespective and independent of what 
is given in experience, the conceptions above named — concep- 
tions which sustain the relation of logical antecedents to no 
empirical cognitions whatever, and that the chief investigations 
of Reason pertain to these conceptions. Here lies the great 
error of this philosopher. From this single assumption flow 
out the most important peculiarities of his philosophy, together 
with all the wild vagaries of Transcendentalism. If these 
ideas are in the mind as logical antecedents of no empirical in- 
tuitions whatever, they are there as splendid conceptions to be 



274 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

sure, but with no claims whatever to objective validity— with 
no evidence that any corresponding realities exist. Yet as laws 
■ of thought, they determine our Understanding conceptions 
pertaining to ourselves, the external universe, and the origin 
of each. Such notions, therefore, as far as they depend upon 
and receive their character from these ideas, have no claim to 
objective validity. They are realities to us, simply and exclu- 
sively because our Intelligence, by virtue of its own in- 
herent laws, has made them, relatively to ourselves, what 
they appear to be. Further, if these ideas of Reason exist 
in the Mind thus independent of experience, and at the same 
time exist there as regulative principles of experience-concep- 
tions, should we not suppose, and does it not follow as a logi- 
cal consequent, that all other d priori ideas have the same 
characteristics, and sustain the same relation to experience — 
such ideas, for example, as those of time, space, cause and 
substance ? 

These last ideas have the same characteristics of universal- 
ity and necessity as those of God, Liberty, and Immortality; 
and, as laws of thought, sustain precisely the same relations to 
all Understanding-conceptions. All d priori ideas, therefore, 
exist in the Intelligence without any claim to objective valid- 
ity. As those ideas, also, as laws of thought, determine the 
character of all Understanding-conceptions, these last are alike 
destitute of any claim to objective validity. Neither ourselves, 
nor the external world, nor that which our Intelligence gives 
us, as the cause of each, "are what we take them to be." 
They are all mere fictions of our Intelligence. Such Kant 
himself denominates them. Since this philosopher passed off 
the stage, his successors, such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, 
have been laboring to build up the fabric of human knowledge 
upon the assumption above named, all agreeing in laying the 
foundation of their glorious temple upon " airy nothing," upon 



I 



RECAPITULATION. 275 

the wise assumption that the very temple they were building 
with so much toil and trouble was not " what they took it to 
be." Such, however, is the logical consequence of the as- 
sumption on which all their conclusions rest. 

On the other hand, if we conceive the entire action of Rea- 
son to be in fixed correlation, in the first instance, to the intu- 
itions of Sense and Consciousness, and in the second to 
Understanding-conceptions, giving the logical antecedents of 
such intuitions and conceptions, if we suppose that such intui- 
tions and conceptions, in the order of actual development, pre- 
cede the ideas to which they are respectively correlated, and 
are consequently unmodified by them, then we have an entirely 
different system of knowledge. On this topic I shall have oo- 
casion to speak again hereafter. 

CLASSinCATION OF THE PRIMARY MENTAL FACULTIES. 

While the great principle which peculiarizes the system of 
Kant, and determines its destiny, is found to be a baseless as- 
sumption, his classification of the Intellectual faculties clearly 
designates him as one of the greatest analyzers of the human 
mind that has yet appeared. We will now proceed to a con- 
sideration of this subject. Knowledge, with us, commences 
not with judgments, but intuitions. This is evident from the 
fact that all judgments are composed of intuitions. Intuitions 
are of two classes, empirical, and d priori. The former also 
are subdivided as subjective and objective. This classification 
of intuitions gives us a threefold division of the primary fac- 
ulties, or functions of the Intelligence, to wit. Sense, which 
gives us the qualities of external material substances — Con- 
sciousness, which gives us the qualities of the mind, or sub- 
jective phenomena — and Reason, which gives us intuitions d 
priori. This classification is sustained by phenomena funda- 
mentally distinct from one another. 



276 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



REMARKS UPON THE RELATIONS OP INTUITIONS TO ONE 

ANOTHER. 

Before leaving the present subject it may be important to 
make a few remarks upon the relations of intuitions to one 
another, together with that of the faculties of intuition. 

Intuitions cannot he opposed to each other. 

My first remark is, that intuitions can never be in contra- 
diction to each other. The intuitions of Consciousness, for 
example, can never be in contradiction to those of Sense, in- 
asmuch as the exclusive office of the former, under such cir- 
cumstances, is to give to the mind itself, what the latter 
faculty has affirmed of its object. For similar reasons intui- 
tions d priori can never contradict the empirical of either class, 
because a logical antecedent can never, from the nature of the 
case, be contradictory to that to which it sustains such a rela- 
tion. How can the idea of Time be in opposition to that of 
succession, or that of space to that of body, or the idea of phe- 
nomena be opposed to that of substance or cause ? Nor can 
an d priori or empirical intuition be in opposition to another 
of the same class. The idea of substance, for example, cannot 
be in opposition to that of space, time, or cause ; nor can the 
phenomena of extension be opposed to those of resistance or 
color. The same holds true in all other instances. 

Different Intuition Faculties cannot contradict each other. 

From the above principles the conclusion is irresistible, 
that the affirmations of no one faculty of intuition can be op- 
posed to the other intuitions of the same faculty; nor can the 
intuitions of one faculty be opposed to the intuitions of 
another. For the same reasons it might be shown that, the 



I 



EECAPITULATION, 277 

afl&rmations of the primary and secondary faculties cannot be 
opposed to each other. These conclusions are so self-evident, 
that no remarks in confirmation are deemed requisite. 

The logical Consequents of no one Intuition can he in Oppo- 
tion to any primary Intuition, nor to the logical Conse- 
quents of the same. 

Another conclusion is equally self-evident, to wit, That the 
logical consequents of no one intuition can be in opposition to 
any primary intuition, or to the logical consequents of the 
same. As the ideas of time, space, substance, cause, and of 
the infinite cannot be in contradiction to one another, nor to 
the intuitions of phenomena, so the logical consequents of any 
one of these ideas cannot be in contradiction to any other of 
these intuitions, or to the logical consequents of the same. If 
the ideas of substance and space, for example, are not contra- 
dictory to each other, how can the logical consequents of one 
contradict the other idea, or its logical consequents ? So in 
all other instances. 

ERROR OF KANT AND COLERIDGE. 

We are now fully prepared to appreciate the theory of 
Kant, Coleridge, and the Transcendental school, generally, 
pertaining to the external world, or as Coleridge expresses it, 
pertaining to the " presumption that there exist things without 
us." All these philosophers acknowledge, in the first instance, 
that through the faculty of Sense we have intuitions of the 
qualities of external material substances, and that by means of 
such intuitions together with the ideas of substance, cause, 
space, time, &c., the Intelligence gives us the external universe 
as a real existence. They then profess to find other intuitions 
of Reason, from which the necessary conclusion is, that "the 
things which we envisage are not that in themselves for which 
24 



278 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

we take them." In other words, the logical consequents of 
one class of intuitions given by the Intelligence, are in opposi- 
tion to other intuitions of the same Intelligence, and to the 
logical consequents of the same. Thus one series of intuitions 
devours others, together with all their consequents. The pro- 
cedure of the Intelligence, according to this theory very much 
resembles that of the serpent in the fable, who seizing his tail 
in his mouth finally succeeded in burying his entire body so 
completely in his own stomach, that the body itself became 
wholly invisible. From the Intelligence in the first instance, 
proceed intuitions empirical and d priori, from which most log- 
ically result the apprehension, and knowledge of a vast and 
glorious universe of real existences. From the profound 
depths of the same Intelligence, there then proceed other in- 
tuitions through which the entire and before conceived sub- 
stantial system of knowledge 

" Is melted into air, into thin air : 
And like the baseless fabric of a vision, 
The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces, 
The solemn temples, the great globe itself, 
Yea, all that it inherit, are dissolved ; 
And like an unsubstantial pageant faded, 
Leave not a wreck behind." 

Most sublime philosophy that, surely ! And after these vo- 
racious intuitions have devoured all others that were before 
Sheni, together with their consequents, " themselves still being 
so ill-favored that it cannot be known that they have eaten 
anything," it would be easy to find others by which these, in 
their turn, would be devoured, and so on interminably. In- 
deed this is the necessary procedure of the Intelligence, ac- 
cording to the system under consideration. For if, as this sys- 
tem maintains, all other objects of knowledge " are not what we 
take them to be," we must of necessity conclude, that this sys- 



RECAPITULATION. 279 

tern of philosophy is not what we or its advocates take it to be. 
For the system itself is given by an intelligence, which, as they 
maintain, does not give things as they are, or as this same In- 
telligence " takes them to be.'' 

On what, then, does this whole theory rest ? On baseless as- 
sumptions, and nothing else. Coleridge directly acknowledges 
that his theory does rest upon assumptions. The same is true, 
however, he says, of the opposite theory. This is freely ad- 
mitted, with this diflFerence, however : His theory rests upon 
assumptions which are not affirmed as true by the Intelligence, 
The theory which gives us '• things without us," rests upon 
assumptions affirmed as true by the Intelligence. There is a 
wide difference between a theory resting upon assumptions iu 
opposition to intuitions, and one resting upon assumptions in 
harmony with such intuitions. 

SECONDARY FACULTIES. 

We are now prepared for a consideration of the secondary 
faculties or functions of the Intelligence. 

Understanding. 

After intuitions, the next class of phenomena which strikes 
our attention is notions, or Understanding-conceptions. Such 
notions are of two classes — those which pertain to individuals, 
and those which represent classes of individuals, or notions, 
particular and general. All such phenomena are found, on 
analysis, to be composed of intuitions given by the primary 
faculties. Now the act of combining intuitions into notions, 
particular and general, reveals an entirely new function of the 
Intelligence, a function not implied in the operation of either 
of the intuitive faculties, nor in all combined. This intel- 
lectual function we denominate the Understanding. 



280 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The Judgment. 

As soon as an Understanding-conception appears on the 
theater of Consciousness, an intellectual process entirely new 
succeeds, a process by which, under the influence of the ideas 
of resemblance and difi'erence, the particular elements which 
enter into the conception are separated from one another, and 
each is contemplated apart by itself. Here we have what is 
called the process of abstraction. When also one notion pre- 
sent in the Intelligence, suggests another of a similar charac- 
ter, by a similar process, to the one last stated, the qualities 
common to the two are separated. These the Understanding 
then combines into a general notion, a notion representing a 
class or classes of individuals. This notion being given by 
the process under consideration, the particular conceptions 
referred to, are subsumed, or classed under the general. Now 
this process differs entirely from the action of the notion- 
forming power. To combine intuitions into notions, particular 
and general, and in view of the ideas of resemblance and dif- 
ference, to separate the elements of a given conception from 
one another, or in view of the same ideas, to separate the ele- 
ments common to two or more conceptions, and finally when 
the Understanding has combined the elements thus separated 
into a general notion, to subsume the particulars under the 
general, are intellectual processes certainly entirely distinct 
from each other. The power to abstract and classify is not 
implied in the power simply to combine intuitions into notions, 
either particular or general. This function of the Intelligence, 
the power which separates things that differ, and ranges to- 
gether under some common designation those that are alike, 
we denominate the Judgment. This is the faculty also chiefly 
employed in processes of reasoning. Reason furnishes prin- 
ciples, the Understanding terms, and the Judgment affirms, in 



RECAPITULATION. 281 

the light of the principles of Reason, the agreement, or disa- 
greement of the terms. If the student will attentively reflect 
upon what is passing in his own mind, he will clearly recognize 
the distinction above made between the Understanding and 
Judgment. Who ever confounds the formation of a concep- 
tion of an object, with that action of the Intelligence which 
judges that such and such elements in the conception resem- 
ble, or are unlike each other? Who ever confounded the 
formation of general notions, such as are designated by the 
terms man, horse, &c., with that action of the Intelligence 
which affirms of individuals, This is a man. That is a horse ? 
Such intellectual operations differ not in degree, but in kind, 
and suppose two functions of the Intelligence entirely distinct 
from each other. 

The Associating Principle. 

That principle of the Intelligence by which the presence 
of one thought in the mind recalls another which has formerly 
existed there, is so manifestly distinct from all other intel- 
lectual functions, that no philosopher has ever confounded it 
with any of them. As the object of the present recapitula- 
tion is to give the grounds of the distinctions made in this 
Treatise between the different intellectual faculties, a simple 
allusion to the principle of Association is all that is requisite 
in this department of our subject. It remains only to speak 
of the 

Imagination. 

A reference to a distinction made in a preceding Chapter, 
between the ideas of Eeason, as primary and secondary, will 
enable us to explain very distinctly our own conception of the 
nature of this function of the Intelligence. With the former 
class of ideas, such as those of time, space, substance, and 
24* 



282 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

cause, objects exist in full and perfect harmony. The sphere 
of the Understanding, therefore, is actualities as they are. 
With most of the secondary ideas of Reason, however, such 
as those of the right, the just, the good, the beautiful, the 
grand, and sublime, realities may or may not exist in corres- 
pondence. Now we find a power of the Intelligence which is 
perpetually laboring to combine, in thought, the endlessly di- 
versified elements of objects given by the other faculties into 
harmony with those ideas last named, especially those of the 
beautiful, the grand, and sublime. This function of the In- 
telligence we denominate the Imagination. The Ideal gene- 
rated by this faculty, incomparably superior as it is to what 
the Understanding conceives in the sphere of realities, finds 
an external embodiment in poetry, sculpture, painting, and in 
all the varied adornments of art. The peculiar sphere, as well 
as phenomena of the Imagination thus clearly distinguish it 
from all other intellectual faculties. 

Such is the classification of the intellectual faculties pre- 
sented in this Treatise. Of two things pertaining to it, the 
author himself is fully persuaded — that the distinction here 
made between the intellectual faculties is real, being sustained 
by fundamental phenomena — and that the classification is 
complete, inasmuch as there is no intellectual operation, actual 
or conceivable, which may not be resolved into the appropriate 
action of one or more of these faculties. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

SPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE 
INTELLIGENCE. 

Having completed our analysis of the intellectual powers, 
other important questions pertaining to the action of the In- 
telligence nest demand our attention. We are all aware, that 
objects of observation and reflection are distinctly apprehended 
on one condition only, to wit, that we give attention to them. 
But we observe and reflect upon that, and that only, which 
has been given in the Intelligence prior to all acts of attention. 
When we give attention, it is to some definite thing, as this or 
that particular object. Now the object must have been given 
prior to the act of attention; else the direction of the act 
would be wholly indefinite, and without respect to any particu- 
lar object. The inquiry which will occupy our attention in 
the present Chapter is this : What is the state of the Intelli- 
gence, what are the characteristics of its affirmations relative 
to objects of Jcnoivledge, prior to observation and refection ? 
and what are the relations of such affirmations to the state 
of the Intelligence, in observation and reflection ? The former 
we denominate the spontaneous, and the latter the reflective 
developments of the Intelligence. 

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ALL OBJECTS OP KNOWLEDGE, 
AND OP OUR KNOWLEDGE OP THE SAME. 

Before proceeding further, I would invite special attention 
to two or three preliminary observations : 



284 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

1. All objects of thought are finite or infinite, and each of 
these bears the respective characteristics of contingency or 
necessity. 

2. All finite substances comprehend ourselves, and that 
which is not ourselves. The infinite substance sustains the 
relation to each of unconditioned and absolute cause. 

3. Consequently, all our knowledge consists in apprehend- 
ing the nature of the finite and of the infinite, together with 
the relations of the finite to the finite, and of the finite to the 
infinite. The Intelligence can never go beyond these ; because 
these comprehend all possible existences, and all the modes 
and relations of existence. 

DISTINCT APPREHENSION CONDITIONED ON ATTENTION. 

But these things, as I have remarked, we distinctly know 
only on one condition — that we attend to them; in other 
words, observe and reflect upon them. Yet they must, in 
some sense, have been apprehended before observation and 
reflection, because the objects of observation and reflection 
must have been previously given in Sense, Consciousness, or 
Reason. 

SPONTANEOUS DEVELOPMENT OP THE INTELLIGENCE. 

The question again returns upon us, What is the state of 
the Intelligence, as developed, previous to attention, i. e. pre- 
vious to observation and reflection ? To attend, to observe, 
and reflect, are acts of the Will, directing the action of the 
Intelligence. But, as before observed, the objects must have 
been in some sense apprehended previous to attention. For 
when we will to attend to anything, the act implies that the 
thing itself was in some sense in the mind, as an object of 
thought. How came this thought here ? Certain conditions are 



SPONTANEITY AND REFLECTION. 285 

requisite to its existence. But when these conditions are ful- 
filled, how does this thought arise ? I answer, by a spontane- 
ous action of the Intelligence, a spontaneity previous to all acts 
of the Will. ''* When Intelligence manifested itself for the 
first time," says Cousin, to whom I am indebted for almost 
everything I now say, "it is evident that its manifestation 
could not have been a voluntary act. It manifested itself, 
nevertheless, and you possess a consciousness of it, more or less 
vivid. Endeavor to take your thought unawares, in the act 
of thinking without having wished to think ; and you will find 
yourself at that point which the Intelligence takes as its point 
of departure ; and thus you may at the present moment observe, 
with more or less accuracy, that which did occur, and must ne- 
cessarily have occurred, in the first act of your Intelligence, at 
a time which is no more, and which can never return." Now 
what is contained in this primitive intuition, this spontaneity 
of human intelligence ? All that will subsequently be found 
in observation and reflection ; but as Cousin observes, " If all 
is there, all is there on certain conditions." 

CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS SPONTANEITY. 

The next inquiry demanding attention is the characteris- 
tics of this spontaneity. The most important are the two 
following : 

1. It is in all instances a positive affirmation, and not a ne- 
gation. " To think," says Cousin, " is to af&rm. The first af- 
firmation into which nothing of volition has entered, and by 
consequence, nothing of reflection, cannot be an affirmation 
mingled with negation ; for our first acts are not denials. It 
must therefore have been an affirmation without negation, an 
instinctive perception of truth, an entirely instinctive develop* 
ment of thought." 

2. The other characteristic of this primitive intuition is, 



286 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

that although it contains all that is subsequently found in ob- 
servation and reflection, it contains them obscurely. In obser- 
vation and reflection, and there only, all things are distinct, 
because that there, and there only, do we find not only affirma- 
tions, but negations. 

Characteristics illustrated. 

I have said, that in this primitive spontaneity there is con- 
tained all that is subsequently found in observation and reflec- 
tion, but somewhat obscurely. Consequently, there was a time 
when indeed mind was, and the universe also ; but to itself, as 
an object of knowledge, neither the mind, nor the universe, 
nor Grod existed. At the next moment, by a spontaneous de- 
velopment of the Intelligence, the mind was revealed to itself. 
At the same moment that which is not itself, and the cause of 
itself, and of that which it perceived as not itself, was also re- 
vealed. In other words, the mind apprehends but obscurely 
the finite and the infinite, with a mysterious consciousness of 
the relation of the one to the other. " We do not commence," 
says Cousin, again, " with seeking ourselves, for this would 
imply that we already know that we exist, but on a certain 
day, at a certain hour, at a certain moment, a moment solemn 
in existence — without having sought ourselves, we find our- 
selves ; thought, in its instinctive development, discloses to us 
that we are ; we affirm our existence with profound assurance 
— with an assurance unmingled with any negation whatsoever. 
We perceive our existence, but we do not discern, with all the 
distinctness of Reflection, our proper character, which is that 
of being limited and bounded; we do not precisely distinguish 
ourselves from the world, nor do we precisely discern the char- 
acter of this world ; and besides these, we perceive the exist- 
ence of something different from those, to which naturally and 
instinctively we refer both ourselves and the world; we distin- 



SPONTANEITY AND REFLECTION. 287 

guish all this, but without very strictly discriminating between 
its component parts. Intelligence, in developing itself, per- 
ceives all that is ; but it is not able to perceive it in a reflect- 
ive, distinct, and negative manner ; and although it perceives it 
with perfect assurance, it perceives it somewhat confusedly." 
Again — " Spontaneous and instinctive thought enters upon its 
functions by virtue of its own nature ', and first of all, it gives 
us ourselves, the world, and God; the world and ourselves, 
with boundaries confusedly perceived, and God, without 
bound — the whole in a synthesis, in which clear and obscure 
ideas are mingled together." 

But while these truths are thus revealed and aflSrmed, they 
are not, I repeat, clearly, but confusedly apprehended. The 
nature of the self, and of the not-self, which was the immedi- 
ate object of perception, together with that of the cause of 
each, was not distinctly given. Yet all were given, and given 
in such a manner, that observation and reflection would sepa- 
rate the one from the other, and render each distinct and pal- 
pable to the mind. But the basis of observation and reflection 
is given in this primitive spontaneity. Observation and reflec- 
tion may separate these elements, and determine their relative 
characteristics ; but they can add no new element to the compo- 
sition, unless it be themselves as facts of Consciousness, which, 
as facts, must also be first given in the manner above re- 
ferred to. 

Some additional remarks, designed to elucidate still fur- 
ther the subject before us, are here required. 

CATEGORIES OF SPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE REASON. 

I begin with noticing the distinction between the catego- 
ries of spontaneous and reflective Eeason, and with such illus- 
trations as will enable us to distinguish them. The categories 
of the reflective Reason are all abstract, universal, and 



288 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

necessary. Those of spontaneous Reason, are necessary, but 
concrete, and particular. With this difference, they are iden- 
tical. In other words, the categories of spontaneous Reason, 
are those of reflective Reason in a concrete and particular 
form. For example, the principle of causality, as a category 
of the reflective Reason, is this : Every event must have a 
cause — a truth, universal, necessary, and absolute. Now this 
principle, as a category of spontaneous Reason, is this : This 
particular event, — this particular sensation, for example, must 
have a cause. The principle of space, as a category of reflect- 
ive Reason, is. Body supposes space. As a category of spon- 
taneous Reason it is. This particular body is somewhere, or in 
space. Thus by determining the categories of reflective Rea- 
son, we can readily determine those of spontaneous Reason. 
For the former are the latter in a necessary, to be sure, but 
concrete and particular form. 

RELATION OF OBSERVATION AND REFLECTION TO THIS ORIG- 
INAL SPONTANEITY. 

The relation of observation and reflection to the original 
spontaneity of the Intelligence, next claims attention. Their 
exclusive object is to determine the nature, character, and re- 
lations of that, the reality of which has been previously affirm- 
ed. With the reality itself they have nothing to do. For 
example, what has reflection to do with determining the ques- 
tion whether I really exist, or not, the very truth which must 
be assumed as the basis of all reflection ? Reflection may de- 
termine my nature and character, but my existence must be 
first affirmed, and then assumed, before reflection becomes pos- 
sible. The same remarks apply equally to external existences. 
Observation and reflection may determine their character, but 
never their reality. Hence the reason of the universal inquiry 
in respect to external objects, which inquiry is, not whether 



SPONTANEITY AND REFLECTION. 289 

this particular object exists; but what are its nature, charac- 
ter, and relations ? the reality of the object being necessarily 
assumed as the ground of all such inquiries. Observation and 
reflection, then, assume an entirely wrong direction when we 
attempt by them to determine the reality of our own existence, 
or of the existence of the external world, or of that to which 
we necessarily refer ourselves, and the external world. The 
reason or ground of such affirmations we can know only by 
falling back upon the original spontaneity of the human Intel- 
ligence. There no man is or can be a skeptic, and he that 
makes himself such by observation and reflection, is, in the 
language of Inspiration, a fool. Yes, he is more than a fool ; 
he is supremely wicked. 

CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN THE FIRST TRUTHS OF REASON, 
HOW "WEAKENED. 

Tou see how it is, that the confidence of men, in the first 
truths of human Reason, is often weakened. They expect, 
by a process of reasoning, to demonstrate the reality of those 
very truths which must be assumed, or all reasoning becomes 
impossible ; and which, as the ground of such reasoning, have 
been previously affirmed with absolute certainty, in the primi- 
tive spontaneity of the human Intelligence. They expect also 
to have their convictions strengthened by the demonstration, 
an expectation not realized, of course. The result is, that the 
conviction is weakened, instead of strengthened. The man 
who expects to have his confidence in. the reality of his own 
existence, or in that of the external world, or of Grod, increased 
by any process of reasoning, is, in my judgment, seeking for 
truth in the wrong direction. Whenever we fall back upon 
the spontaneity of our own Reason, we find ourselves intui- 
tively affirming each of these truths with equal absoluteness 
25 



2a0 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and assuming them as the ground of all our inquiries. When 
we contemplate our own existence, and that of the external 
world, as we necessarily do, as conditioned and relative, we 
never inquire whether there is an existence unconditioned and 
absolute, to which the former may be referred ; but what is 
the character of that unconditioned and absolute existence, to 
which, by a previous, spontaneous, intuitive, and absolute 
affirmation of Reason, all that is conditioned and relative has 
been referred. 

USE OP THE COMMON DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE DIVINE 

EXISTENCE. 

Of what use, then, it may be asked, are the common de- 
monstrations of the existence of God? Of none, I answer, 
in satisfying our own minds of the reality of the Divine ex- 
istence. If this is expected from them, our confidence will be 
rather weakened than strengthened, and that, for this reason : 
The mind begins the investigation by suspending its belief in 
the reality of the Divine existence, upon the validity of the 
demonstration. It also expects and demands, as above re- 
marked, that the demonstration shall be such as to increase 
its previous confidence in the reality of the Divine existence. 
But such expectation will not be realized. Hence the demon- 
stration will, under such circumstances, rather diminish than 
increase our confidence in this fundamental truth. The most 
delightful feature of our holy religion, to my mind, is this : 
its great fundamental truths are all suspended, not upon the 
validity of demonstrations, but placed at the foundation of all 
demonstration, among the primitive, absolute, and necessary 
intuitions and affirmations of Reason ; intuitions which no one 
can deny without violating the fundamental laws of his own 
being, and rendering himself a fool, not only, but infinitely 
impious. Fur no man can possibly become so impious and 



SPONTANEITY AND REFLECTION. 291 

vdcked as the skeptic. The man who enters a family and se- 
duces every female there, but leaves a consciousness of guilt as 
a foundation for repentance, and reformation to virtue, is a 
saint, compared with the man who, without actual seduction, 
annihilates in the minds of such females, all regard to chastity, 
as a virtue, and to its opposite as a sin. This the skeptic does 
when he has obtained his object. Of what use then, the ques- 
tion returns upon us, are such demonstrations ? Of no use but 
this, to turn the weapons of the enemy against himself To 
substantiate his position, he appeals to science. Now science, 
when pressed into the field, must be shown to be on the side 
of his opposers. Till thus pressed she remains silent, because 
her influence is not needed. 

CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT BY A PROCESS OP REASONING, 
WHEN FALSE. 

We see when it is, that any conclusions to which we come 
by a process of reasoning are, and must be false. When they 
contradict any of the necessary and spontaneous intuitions of 
human Intelligence, as for example, the reality of our own ex- 
istence, or that of the external world. Every step in a pro- 
cess of reasoning must be intuitively certain. Now to bring a 
conclusion to which we have arrived by a series of intuitions, 
against another primitive intuition, is to afl&rm the falsity of 
one intuition upon the authority of another; and the non- 
reality of the primitive upon the authority of the derivative 
This is precisely what Coleridge has done, or rather, promises 
to do. He first acknowledges that the belief in the re- 
ality of things without us is an intuition, primitive and 
necessary, and then promises, by a series of intuitions, to 
demonstrate the non-reality of such existences. — See Biog 
Lit. p. 153. 



INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



EEASONS OF THE DIVERSITY AND DIFEERENCE OF THE 
OPINIONS OP MEN. 

In judgments, men differ, not in the spontaneous, but re- 
flective developments of their Intelligence. In the former 
state, all put essentially the same inquiries, and all believe the 
same things. There is no doubt or disbelief here. In this 
inner sanctuary of the Intelligence, skepticism has no place. 
In respect to the results of observation and reflection, here di- 
versity and contradiction appear. The reason is, that in the 
former state, nothing but the pure affirmations of the Intelli- 
gence are met with. In the latter, astsiim^ytions mingled with 
such affirmations, together with the logical consequents of as- 
sumptions, present themselves. 

SOURCES OF ERROR. 

Error has no place among the spontaneous affirmations of 
the Intelligence, for the obvious reason that here nothing but 
pure intellectual affirmations appear. The same would be true 
in the reflective operations, but for the fact, that assumptions 
are here mingled with such affirmations. When men contem- 
plate one class of facts, for example, various hypotheses may 
present themselves as grounds of the explanation of the facts, 
hypotheses none of which are affirmed as true by the Intelli- 
gence. The Will, however, may assume some one as true, 
which is not so. The assumption, together with all its logical 
consequents, is now mingled with the focts, and all together 
present a confused mass of error and truth. Here is the 
source of error of every kind, and in connection with all sub- 
jects of thought. Pure thinking, unmingled with assumptions, 
is never adulterated with error. 



f 



CHAPTER XV. 

ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 

In all our inquiries hitherto, one question has been left al- 
most wholly untouched, the question in respect to the origin 
OF OUR IDEAS. To this question special attention is now in- 
vited. 

THE TWO SCHOOLS IN PHILOSOPHY. 

Two great schools have, for the last century or two, divided 
the philosophical world, in respect to the question before us. 
These schools have been denominated the Sensual, and Ideal or 
Transcendental school. At the head of the former is Locke. 
At the head of the latter is Kant. A few remarks explana- 
tory of the principles of these schools, may prepare the way 
for a more distinct elucidation of the present subject. 

Principles of Loche. 

I begin with Locke. According to him, all ideas existing 
in the mind, are derived from two sources. Sensation and Re- 
flection. To establish his principles, he first proves that there 
are no innate ideas in the mind, that is, ideas previous to expe- 
rience. Having disposed of this question, he starts the fol- 
lowing as the great problem in philosophy : 

" Let us suppose," he says, " the mind to be, as we say, 
white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas, how 
comes it to be furnished ? Whence comes it by that vast store 
which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, 
with an almost endless variety ? Whence has it all the mate- 
25* 



294 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

rials of Reason and knowledge ? To this I answer," he adds, 
" in one word, from experience ; in that all our knowledge is 
founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself." 

In a subsequent section, he shows that the sources of ex- 
perience are twofold, as observed above, Sensation, and Reflec- 
tion or Consciousness. 

" Our observation," he says, " employed either about ex- 
ternal, sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our 
minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which 
supplies our Understandings with all the materials of thinking. 
These two are the fountains of knowledge from whence all the 
ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring." Experience 
being the watchword of the school of Locke, and of his sys- 
tem, the system itself has been denominated Empiricism. 

It should be borne in mind, that Locke does not speak of 
experience, as the mere condition of all our knowledge. In 
that case, his system would be undoubtedly correct. Nor 
would his principles be doubted by any school in philosophy. 
Ou the other hand, he speaks of experience, as furnishing the 
materials of all our knowledge. All knowledge is exclusively 
constituted of elements furnished by experience. 

Theory of Kant. 

In opposition to Empiricism, Kant and the Transcendental 
school maintain that experience is so far from giving us neces- 
sary truths, that these truths themselves lie at the foundation 
of all experience. 

To understand the principles of Kant correctly, it is neces- 
sary to keep in remembrance the fact, that he evidently uses 
the term experience in two senses — in respect to the Sensi- 
bility and the Intelligence. When he says that all our cogni- 
tion begins with experience, he then refers to the Sensibility ; 



SPONTANEITY AND REFLECTION. 295 

for he speaks of the " faculty of cognition being awakened into 
exercise/' by this experience. To suppose that by experience 
here, he refers to the action of the Intelligence, would make 
him say, that the " cognition-faculty is awakened into exercise" 
by the action of the cognition-faculty. He supposes, and very 
correctly, that the condition of the primary action of the In- 
telligence, is some effect from some cause upon the Sensibility. 
By the term experience here, he refers to this effect. 

On the other hand, when he aflS.rms that d priori or neces- 
sary ideas, are the condition and ground of all experience, he 
here uses the term under consideration with reference to the 
Intelligence exclusively. His meaning is, that ideas d i^iori 
are the condition and ground of all other mental perceptions 
and affirmations. In conformity with this statement, he first 
attempts to show that the ideas of time and space are the ne- 
cessary condition of all affirmations of Sense and Conscious- 
ness pertaining to the qualities of all substances subjective and 
objective. When, for example, a certain effect is produced 
upon the Sensibility by some unknown cause — a cause, as his 
theory affirms, existing nowhere and in no time — the ideas 
of time and space are developed, while the effect is postulated 
as the quality of some cause external to the mind, and existing 
in time and space. This mental act postulating a subjective 
effect as the quality of some external cause, is what he calls 
perception. But for these ideas, no such perception could 
have taken place. 

He then goes on to show (and, as we shall see, he is here 
correct), that other d, priori ideas are the condition of all Un- 
derstanding-conceptions and affirmations of the Judgment. 

Such are the principles of these schools. In their funda- 
mental affirmations, both are alike wrong. This I will now 
attempt to show. 



INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE TESTED WITH KEPERENCE TO NECES- 
SARY IDEAS. 

We begin with Empiricism — the proposition that all our 
knowledge, all ideas now in the mind, come from experience, 
from sensation and reflection. Take as an example the idea 
of space. Here I lay down this proposition as self-evident, 
that that which cannot give th*e essential fundamental charac- 
teristics of an idea, cannot give the idea itself. Now the fun- 
damental characteristics of the idea of space, are injinify and 
necessity. The Reason apprehends space as infinite, and not 
only affirms that it is — that is, that it exists, but that it must 
be. On the other hand, everything of which we are consci- 
ous and which we perceive, is finite, and as we have seen in 
former Chapters, is also contingent. Nor can these faculties 
reach beyond the finite. But the idea of the infinite is in the 
Mind, because the idea of space is there, which is infinite. 
The idea of space, then, cannot come from Sensation or Reflec- 
tion. But suppose that Sensation or Reflection, or both to- 
gether, could give space as infinite. They could merely affirm 
that it is, not that \imust be. The system of Locke, and 
of the entire sensual school, falls to the ground, when tried 
upon the idea of space. The same fact might with equal dis- 
tinctness be shown to be true with respect to all ideas which 
lie beyond the limits of the contingent. Thus far and no 
further can Empiricism go. Necessary, universal, absolute, 
and eternal truths, can never be derived from experience, for 
the obvious reason that they are not the objects of experi- 
ence. They lie entirely beyond the limits of Sense, and Con- 
sciousness or Reflection, which constitute the sole ground and 
source of experience. 



ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 297 

PRINCIPLES OP LOCKE PAIL IN RESPECT TO UNDERSTAND- 
ING-CONCEPTIONS. 

But Empiricism not only fails entirely, when tried upon all 
necessary truths, but also upon all the phenomena of the Un- 
derstanding. Every notion existing in the Understanding, is 
composed, as we have seen, of two classes of elements, the 
phenomenal and the rational, the contingent and the necessary. 
These elements are given by faculties entirely distinct the one 
from the other. The phenomenal are given by Sense and Con- 
sciousness. The rational by the Reason. The first elements 
only are given by experience. The last lie beyond the bound 
of experience. Example : Sense perceives the quality of some 
external substance. No notion can be formed^ till the idea of 
substance is developed, by conceiving of this quality as be- 
longing to some substance. So of all the notions of the Un- 
derstanding. As they all embrace elements necessary as well 
as contingent, and as the latter only are derived from experi- 
ence, all such notions include elements which were never given 
by experience. 

ERROR OP KA.NT. 

The fundamental error of Kant, understanding the propo- 
sition, that necessary ideas are the condition and ground of all 
experience, as he employs it — that is, in its universal form, 
as including all intellectual afl&rmations — has been made suffi- 
ciently manifest in preceding Chapters. The intuitions of 
Sense and Consciousness, instead of being conditioned on the 
prior existence, in the mind, of the ideas of time and space, 
are themselves the necessary chronological antecedents of these 
ideas. Using then the term experience as pertaining to the 
intuitions of these faculties, the proposition of Kant is demon- 
strably false. All necessary ideas sustain to the contingent the 



298 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

relation of logical, while the latter sustain to the former the 
relation of chronological antecedents. It is the height of ab- 
surdity to represent the logical antecedent as the condition and 
ground of the existence of the chronological. 

POSITION OF KANT TRUE IN RESPECT TO UNDERSTANDING- 
CONCEPTIONS AND AFFIRMATIONS OF THE JUDGMENT. 

If we admit that contingent intuitions are the chronologi- 
cal antecedents of necessary ones, still it may be asked, is there 
not an important sense in which the proposition, that ideas d 
priori are the condition and ground of all experience, is true ? 
It is strictly true, I remark, if the term experience be used 
with reference, not to the phenomena of Sense and Conscious- 
ness, but as it is sometimes used, with reference to the Under- 
standing and Judgment. There is a wide diflference between 
vnerelj perceiviiif/ and understanding an object. An object is 
perceived when it is presented to the mind as an object of 
Sense. It is understood when, and only when, such questions 
as these have been resolved in respect to it, to wit : When 
and where does it exist? what are its qualities, its nature, sub- 
stance, quantity, and relations ? But the resolution of these 
questions necessarily pre-supposes the existence of the ideas of 
time, space, substance, quantity, quality, and relation, in the 
mind. Using the term experience in the sense of understand- 
ing objects, how perfectly manifest is the fact, that necessary 
ideas are not derived from experience, but are themselves, to- 
gether with the perceptions above referred to, the condition and 
ground of experience. Some object must first be perceived, 
not understood, but perceived — before necessary ideas can be 
developed in the mind. Perception and Consciousness, then, 
in the sense now explained, are the chronological antecedents 
of all necessary ideas, and these again are both the logical and 



ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 299 

chronological condition and ground of experience — that is, of 
understanding objects. But Perception and Consciousness do 
not give necessary ideas, only in this sense : when any object 
or phenomenon is perceived by Sense or Consciousness, the 
Reason, on occasion of such perceptions, enters into immedi- 
ate and spontaneous exercise, and apprehends the ideas of 
space, time, substance, cause, quantity, quality, relation, &c. 
These ideas are not derived from, but merely occasioned by 
such perceptions. These ideas thus developed, then become 
the laws of thought, under the influence and guidance of which 
all our knowledge of objects is derived — that is, all our ex- 
perience, using the term in the sense of understanding objects. 
Now if we understand the word experience as mere Sense 
and Consciousness, then, I repeat, it is the chronological con- 
dition or ground of all ideas in the mind. In this sense of 
the term Locke is, no doubt, right in the affirmation, that all 
our knowledge is derived from experience. But this is evi- 
dently not the sense in which the term was understood by him. 
But if experience be understood, as designating the notions 
(contingent and relative) formed in the mind, of objects of 
Sense and Consciousness, then I affirm that such notions, in- 
stead of being either the logical or chronological antecedents 
of necessary ideas, are themselves both the logical and chrono- 
logical CONSEQUENTS of such ideas. 

TRUE EXPLANATION. 

Intuitions. 

The question in respect to the origin of our knowledge, to- 
gether with its progress from its commencement to its devel- 
opment in its present form, now admits of a ready explanation. 
Knowledge, in all instances, commences (certain conditions be- 



800 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ing fulfilled) -with the intuitions of Sense and Consciousness. 
Reason then intervenes, and affirms the logical antecedents of 
each empirical intuition, as it is given. 

Notions. ' 

The next class of phenomena that appears is Understand- 
ing-conceptions, in which the intuitions referred to are com- 
bined into notions of particular things. At first all such 
notions are concrete and particular. The elements of the 
abstract, the general, and the universal exist, but they exist 
only in the concrete. 

The Judgment. 

The Judgment now intervenes, and undef the influence of 
the ideas of resemblance and difi'erence, separates the elements 
of the abstract, general, and universal, from the concrete and 
particular. Then notions, abstract and general, and ideas of 
Reason in their abstract and universal form, appear on the 
theater of Consciousness. A new action of the Judgment 
now takes place — an action in which the particular is sub- 
sumed under the abstract, the general, and the universal. 

Associating Principle and the Imagination. 

In the midst of all this movement, the associating principle 
is perpetually active, and over all the great deep of thought 
thus set in motion, the Imagination then hovers, and blends 
the endlessly diversified elements of mental conception, feeling, 
and action, into forms more perfectly harmonizing with the 
ideas of the just, the good, the beautiful, the sublime. 

Scientific Movement. 

The last movement of Mind is the scientific movement — 
a movement in which the properties and relations of the 



F 



ORIGIN OF IDEAS, 301 

varied objects of thought are systematically evolved iu the 
light of fundamental ideas and principles of Reason. Such is 
the origin of knowledge. Such, too, is the movement of Mind 
from the beginning, as it rolls on towards its final consumma- 
tion in pure and universal science. In beauty, grandeur, and 
sublimity, nothing can be compared with the movement of 
Mind. All that is external and visible but feebly reflects it. 

MANNER IN WHICH THE GENERAL, ABSTRACT, AND UNIVERSAL 
ARE ELIMINATED FROM THE CONCRETE AND PARTICULAR. 

But one additional topic, connected with the present sub- 
ject, requires elucidation, to wit : The manner in which no- 
tions, general and abstract, and ideas and principles, universal 
and necessary, are eliminated from notions and judgments, 
concrete and particular. 

General Notions. 

In answering this inquiry, I begin with general notions. 
We will take for example and illustration, the notion desig- 
nated by the word mountain. It is admitted, that in the first 
development of the Intelligence, there was no such general 
notion in the mind. The Intelligence began not with the gen- 
eral notion, but with the conception of some particular moun- 
tain which had before been an object of perception. How 
then is the general eliminated from the particular ? Another 
mountain becomes an object of perception. Under the influ- 
ence of the associating principle, the first notion is recalled. 
The Judgment, as these perceptions are present on the theater 
of Consciousness, separates the elements common to the two. 
The Understanding now combines these common elements into 
a new conception, under which the Judgment subsumes the 
two particulars. On the perception of a third mountain, the 
26 



302 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

general notion, iu a manner like that just described, undergoes 
a new modification, by whicb it embraces those elements only 
common to the three particulars, while each particular is again 
classed under the general. Thus the process goes on, till the 
notion under consideration assumes its most general form. 
This is the process by which general notions are, in all in- 
stances formed, a process so particularly elucidated in a former 
Chapter, that nothing further need be said upon it here. 

Abstract Notions. 

We will now consider the origin and genesis of abstract 
notions, such as are designated by such terms as redness, sweet- 
ness. These are distinguished from general notions, and also 
from necessary and universal ideas, by this characteristic : 
They designate some single quality of particular substances 
without reference to those substances. 

To form general notions, more than one object must be 
given. To form abstract notions but one is required. Ex- 
ample : This apple is red. When we have separi^ied the 
quality designated by the term red, from the subject to which 
it belongs, we then have the abstract notion designated by the 
term redness. The same holds in all other instances. 

Universal and Necessary Ideas. 

In explaining the origin and genesis of universal and neces- 
sary ideas, in their abstract and universal form, we will take 
as the basis of our explanation and illustration the principle 
of causality, to wit : Every event has a cause. 

It is admitted, that originally, this principle is not given in 
this form. What is given ? Some particular event, and the 
affirmation of the Reason, This particular event had a cause. 
It is also admitted and affirmed, that the universal principle is 
not here, as is true of contingent general principles, given by 



ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 303 

the succession of particulars. For if you suppose the event 
repeated a thousand or a million times, all that you have in 
each instance is the particular event, and the particular affirm- 
ation, This event had a cause. How then shall we account for 
the formation of the idea or principle under consideration? 
Let us recur to the individual fact above alluded to — the fact 
composed of two parts j the empirical and absolute parts. We 
will leave out of view the idea of succession, and confine our- 
selves to the one fact before us. 

By immediate abstraction let us suppose the separation of 
the empirical, and the disengagement of the necessary and 
absolute. We then have the pure idea of the absolute and 
necessary. This idea thus developed we find it impossible not 
to apply to all cases, real or supposed. We have then, and in 
this manner, the universal, necessary, and absolute idea or 
principle. 

This process might perhaps be more distinctly explained 
by a reference to the ideas of body and space. These ideas 
are not originally given in their present simple abstract form. 
They are given in such proportions as this : This particular 
body is somewhere, or in space. Here you have the empirical 
part, body, and the necessary and absolute part, space. Sepa- 
rate the two, and you have the contingent idea of body, and 
the necessary and absolute idea of space. Hence the princi- 
ple, universal, necessary, and absolute : Body supposes space. 

ERROR OP COUSIN. 

I have now a word to say upon a favorite principle of 
Cousin, that most necessary ideas, such as the idea of time, 
cause, &c., have their origin in Reflection, and what he calls a 
sentiment of the Will. The first succession of which we are 
conscious, he says, is some act of the Will, for the reason that 
we perceive nothing only on the condition that we attend to it, 



304 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and the condition of attention is the Will. To this I reply : 
It is admitted that we know nothing, i. e. have a distinct 
knowledge of nothing, only on the condition of attention, and 
that the condition of attention is the Will. But from this it 
does not follow, that the act of attention is the first thing of 
which we are conscious. It may be some feeling or thought, 
it being impossible for us to become distinctly conscious of the 
act of attention, till we attend to that. Equally false is his 
conclusion that the consciousness of our own proper causality 
precedes any conception of the principle of causality. We are 
not conscious of our Will as a cause, but of the acts of the 
Will as mere phenomena. Succession within and without is 
nothing but succession. The first phenomenon that is observed 
by the mind, whether it is within or without us, develops the 
principle of causality, or we can never account for its existence 
in the mind. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 
INVESTIGATION AND REASONING DISTINGUISHED, 

One department of inquiry of great importance still re- 
mains. When we have done with this, our inquiries in regard 
to the intellectual powers will have closed, only as far as we 
may find their operations combined with that of the other fac- 
ulties or susceptibilities of the mind. 

The department to which I refer, is the employment of 
these powers in what is called a process of Investigation and 
Keasoning. These processes, though intimately connected, are 
entirely distinct, and should be carefully distinguished the one 
from the other. In the former process our exclusive object is 
the discovery of truth. In the latter, the object equally exclu- 
sive is, to prove the truth already discovered. 

Your attention in the present Chapter will be directed to 
the first process. Our inquiry is, What are the laws which 
govern the mind, or ought to govern the mind, in a process of 
Investigation of truth ? 

SUBSTANCES, HOW KNOWN. 

All substances are revealed to us by their respective phe- 
nomena. Their existence, not only, but their nature, charac- 
ter, and powers, are revealed to us in this manner, and this 
manner exclusively. The induction of phenomena therefore 
lies at the basis of all our investigations pertaining to sub- 

26* 



306 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



INDUCTION OF PHENOMENA, FOR WHAT PURPOSES MADE. 

There are four purposes entirely distinct, for which an in- 
duction of phenomena is made : 

1. For the purpose of discovering the nature, characteris- 
tics, and powers of some particular substance. 

2. For the purpose of classification, into genera and 



3. For the purpose of discovering some general fact, or 
order of sequence. 

4. For the purpose of discovering universal laws, in con- 
formity to which the action of substances is subordinated. 

Now the principles which should guide us in the induction 
of phenomena, depend upon the object we have in view in such 
induction. 

INDUCTION PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR SUBSTANCES. 

In the induction of phenomena for the purposes of deter- 
mining the characteristics and powers of some particular sub- 
stance, the following principles are of fundamental importance 
in guiding our investigations : 

1. In marking the phenomena which appear, or the char- 
acteristics of particular phenomena, omit none which do exist, 
and suppose none which do not exist. 

2. In determining the particular powers of the substance 
in the light of phenomena thus classified and characterized, 
undeviatingly adhere to the following principles : Phenomena, 
in their fundamental characteristics alike, suppose similar pow- 
ers. Phenomena, in their fundamental characteristics unlike, 
suppose dissimilar powers. In strict conformity to those prin- 
ciples, an attempt has been made, in a preceding part of the 
present Treatise, to determine, among other things, the different 



LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 307 

functions of the human Intelligence. Whether the effort has 
been successful, time will determine. 

INDUCTION FOR PURPOSES OP CLASSTPICATION INTO GENERA 
AND SPECIES. 

In the induction of phenomena for the purpose of classifi- 
cation into Genera and species, the following principles should 
be strictly adhered to : 

1. Fix definitely and distinctly upon the jorinaiple of clas- 
sification, whatever it may be. 

2. With a rigid regard to principle, range with the given 
class every object, whatever its diversities in other respects, 
which bears the characteristic mark. 

3. Strictly exclude from the class, every individual in 
which the characteristic mark is wanting. 

The correctness and apparently easy application of the 
above principles are so obvious, that it would seem every 
one would find it very easy to apply them in all cases. But 
their rigid application, in cases where it is often most demanded, 
requires an intellectual integrity, and sternness of virtue, which 
the mass of mankind " very little wot of.'^ Every one almost 
would readily apply them to shells, and rocks, and earths, and 
beasts, and fowls, and fishes, and even to the objects in the 
firmament above us. But let us suppose that an individual 
has before him a correct definition of treason, murder, theft, 
and of kindred crimes punishable by the law, and that he 
should discover upon an only son, a dark spot, which, if care- 
fully examined, would mark him as a subject of one of the 
crimes above named; it would require the stern virtue of a 
Brutus, to be willing to have inquisition made according to the 
principles of immutable justice. Cases which thus try the 
virtue of mankind are of very frequent occurrence. 



308 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



FINDING A GENERAL FACT, OR ORDER OF SEQUENCE. 

A general fact, as we have seen, is a quality which attaches 
itself to each individual of a given class. Sometimes it may 
be peculiar to this one class; sometimes it maybe common 
to it and other classes. In other instances, it may be an es- 
sential quality of one class, and a mere accident in connection 
with another. When we have ascertained a fact to be gen- 
eral, then when an individual of a given class appears, we 
know, without particular investigation, that the quality is also 
present. In determining the question whether a fact is strictly 
general, the only difficulty which presents itself, is in distin- 
guishing between an essential and accidental quality. These 
two principles should determine our conclusions under such 
circumstances : 

1. The existence or absence of perfect uniformity of ex- 
perience. 

2. Experience in such decisive circumstances, as to render 
it certain that the fact is or is not an essential, and not an ac- 
cidental quality of the class. Nothing but good judgment can 
enable one to distinguish between decisive and indecisive facts 
under such circumstances. 

One of the most fruitful sources of error is based upon 
uniformity of experience in certain circumstances. The ab- 
sence of such uniformity is certain evidence that a fact has 
an accidental, and not a necessary connection with a certain 
class. Its presence, however, may constitute no certain ground 
for the opposite conclusion. The king of Japan, for example, 
reasoned very inconclusively, from an experience perfectly un- 
varying in his circumstances, to the conclusion, that water 
never, under any circumstances, exists in any other than the 
fluid state. To separate the decisive from the indecisive, and 
rest our conclusions upon the former class of facts only, is the 



liAWS OP INVESTIGATION. 309 

distinguishing characteristic of strong perceptive powers asso- 
ciated with good judgment. 

The Prohahle and Improbahle. 

Between the perfectly certain and uncertain lie the proba- 
ble and improbable. If, as has been already said, a fact has 
been ascertained to have a necessary connection with a given 
class, its presence, when any individual of the class is met 
with, becomes perfectly certain. But if its connection is acci- 
dental, its existence in connection with a particular individual 
of the class becomes probable or improbable in proportion to 
the uniformity or want of uniformity of experience under sim- 
ilar circumstances. Many, very many of the most serious 
transactions of life rest upon a calculation of probabilities. 

ORDER OP SEQUENCE. 

The object of investigation here is to ascertain, in refer- 
ence to given effects, those things which sustain to such effects 
the relation of real causes. The difficulty to be overcome, 
often consists in this : The real cause of a given effect may 
exist in connection with such combinations of powers, that it 
may be difficult if not impossible for the beholder to determine 
which produced it. Under such circumstances, careful experi- 
ments, in connection with close observation, can alone deter- 
mine the real order of sequence. There are four important 
principles which should be strictly adhered to, as tests of all 
our conclusions in relation to such investigations : 

1. When in each experiment, the combination has been 
different, with this exception, that one element has been pre- 
sent in all, and the given effect has in each instance arisen, we 
then conclude that this element is the real cause of the effect. 

2. When, on the removal of a certain element, the given 
effect disappears, while it remains, this being present when 



310 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

each of the others is removed, we then conclude that this par- 
ticular element is the particular cause. 

3. When the given eflfect is the invariable consequent of 
the addition of a new element to a given combination, while 
the effect does not appear, when this antecedent is not added, 
we then fis upon this particular antecedent as the real cause. 

4. When a number of consequents exist in connection with 
a number of antecedents, and when a particular consequent 
invariably disappears on the removal of a given antecedent, 
we fix upon the latter as the real cause of the former. 

THE DISCOVERY OF UNIVERSAL LA"W. 

In the induction of phenomena for the discovery of uni- 
versal law, three important principles are to be strictly ad- 
hered to. • 

1. The phenomena must not merely consist with this par- 
ticular hypothesis, but demand it as their logical antecedent. 

2. Consequently such phenomena must contradict, with 
equal positiveness, every other contradictory hypothesis. 

3. All phenomena to which the given hypothesis does not 
sustain the relations of logical antecedent, must be left wholly 
out of the account, as having no bearing upon the subject. 

But this subject has been so fully treated of in the preced- 
ing Chapter, that nothing further upon it is demanded here. 

TESTIMONY. 

It often happens, and that in reference to subjects of the 
greatest importance, that the facts which constitute the basis 
of our inquiries after truth, have never been given to us as 
objects of Sense or Consciousness. We are compelled to re- 
ceive or reject them on the testimony of others. From this 
source the greatest part of our knowledge, and of the most 
important of our knowledge, is derived. 



«■ 



LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 311 

The great inquiry here presents itself : What arc the laws 
of evidence under the influence of which we judge ourselves 
bound to receive and act upon phenomena revealed to us 
through the affirmations of other minds ? Testimony is used 
for the same purpose that the faculties of Sense and Consci- 
ousness are used, to wit, for the ascertainment of facts, or 
phenomena, which constitute the basis of judgment in regard 
to a given subject, 

CHARACTERISTICS OP THE STATEMENTS MADE BY A "WITNESS. 

The statements made by a witness may be contemplated in 
three points of light. 

1. In the light of the idea of possibility or impossibility. 
If an individual should affirm that an idiot, remaining such, 
had given a scientific demonstration of some of the most ab- 
struse problems in the higher mathematics, we should give no 
credit at all to his statement, on the ground of a perceived 
impossibility of the occurrence of such a fact. If, on the 
other hand, the witness should affirm that an individual re- 
maining an idiot up to a certain period, did, from that period, 
manifest a high degree of mental energy, we should pronounce 
the statement highly improbable, though not absolutely impos- 
sible in itself. The statement, therefore, is capable of being 
established by testimony. 

2. The statement may also be contemplated in reference 
to the question whether in itself, aside from the character of 
the witness, it is credible or incredible. A statement charac- 
terized as impossible, is absolutely incredible. No weight of 
testimony can render it worthy of belief. An event also may 
be contemplated as possible, and yet the statement that it has 
actually occurred may be almost wholly wanting in respect to 
credibility. If it should be said that a pure spirit before the 
throne had, without any form of temptation from without or 



312 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

within, violated his duty to his God, we should hesitate to 
pronounce the occurrence impossible in itself. Yet we should 
deem it hardly credible. A statement, to be credible, must 
assert what is in itself perceived to be possible. It must also 
fall within the analogy of experience. Thus, to the great 
mass of mankind, there is wanting entirely any experience of 
a direct revelation from God. Yet the existence of such a 
revelation for the good of the race, is analogous to what all 
have experienced of the Diviue beneficence to man. There 
is, therefore, nothing incredible in the statement, that such a 
revelation has been made. A statement, then, which affirms 
the occurrence of an event in itself possible, and which falls 
within the analogy of experience, is capable of being rendered 
worthy of all confidence by testimony. 

3. A statement is in itself probable or improbable, when it 
does or does not accord with general experience in similar cir- 
cumstances. A thing may be possible, and, at the same time, 
very improbable. No one would say that it is absolutely im- 
possible that a die, when thrown, should fall twenty times in 
succession with the same number uppermost. Yet all would 
pronounce such an occurrence in an extreme degree improba- 
ble. An improbable event may be rendered worthy of belief 
by testimony. A much higher degree, however, is demanded 
to establish such an occurrence, than one which accords with 
what we have had experience of in similar circumstances. 

CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH GO TO ESTABLISH THE CREDIBILITY 
OF A WITNESS. 

We will now consider the circumstances which go to estab- 
lish the credibility of a witness. Among them I will specify 
the following, without enlarging upon any of them : 

1. The most important characteristic is a character for 
veracity. 



LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 313 

2. The next is a capacity to comprehend the particular 
facts to which he bears testimony. 

3. Full opportunity to have observed the facts, together 
with evidence that adequate attention was given to them at 
the time. 

4. Evidence that the occurrence was of such a nature 
that the individual was not deceived at the time, and that it 
sustains such a relation to the individual, as to preclude the 
reasonable apprehension that his memory has failed him in 
respect to it. 

5. An entire consistency between the statements of the 
witness and his conduct in respect to the events, the occur- 
rence of which he affirms. If an individual affirms his entire 
confidence in the veracity of a certain person, and his entire 
treatment of him is in full harmony with his statements, we 
are bound to admit the truth of what the witness testifies in 
relation to his own convictions. 

CORROBORATING CIRCUMSTANCES ASIDE FROM THE CHARACTER 
OF THE WITNESS. 

But there are circumstances often attending the testimony 
of a witness, totally disconnected with the question of his 
veracity, which demand our confidence. Among these, I 
specify the following : 

1. The entire absence of all motives to give false testi- 
mony. This principle is based upon the assumption, that men 
do not act without some motive, and that consequently they 
will not ordinarily violate the principles of truth without some 
temptation to do it. 

2. When no assignable motives exist to induce an individ- 
ual to make a given statement, if he is not convinced of its 
truth, and when strong motives impel him to deny it, espe- 
cially if it be false, then we recognize ourselves as obligated to 

27 



314 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

believe his statements -without reference to his moral character 
at all. 

3. Another circumstance which tends strongly to corrobo- 
rate the statements of a witness is this : When the facts 
affirmed lie along the line of our own experience in similar 
circumstances. This, however, is not a safe principle to rely 
upon, in the absence of other circumstances of strong corrobo- 
ration. Villains often throw their statements into harmony 
with experience, for the purpose of covering their dark designs. 

4. When, though new, they accord with the known powers 
of the agent to whom they are ascribed. 

5. When these facts stand connected with the development 
of laws and properties in the agent, before unknown. 

Under such circumstances, the further removed from expe- 
rience the facts are, the greater the probability of their being 
true. Because the greater the probability that they would, if 
not true, have been unknown to the witness. 

CONCURRENT TESTIMONY. 

The confidence which we repose in the affirmations of a 
witness is greatly strengthened by the concurrent testimony 
of other individuals. Here the following circumstances should 
be especially taken into the account : 

1. When each witness possesses all the marks of credibility 
above refered to. 

2. When there is an entire concurrence in their state- 
ments, or a concurrence in respect to all material facts. 

3. When the characters of the several witnesses are widely 
different, as friends and enemies, &c., and who of course must 
be influenced by widely different motives, and even by those 
directly the opposite ; especially when their character, motives, 
and relations to the subject, are so different as to preclude the 
supposition of a collusion between the witnesses. 



rV 'i«»^ 



LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 315 

4. When one witness states facts omitted by others, and 
when all the statements together make up a complete account 
of the whole transaction. 

5. When there are apparent contradictions between the 
statements of the witnesses, which a more enlarged acquaint- 
ance with the whole subject fully reconciles. Such occurren- 
ces in testimony preclude the supposition of collusion, and 
present each individual as an independent, honest witness in 
the case. 

6. Coincidences often occur in the statements of witnesses 
which, from the nature of the ease, are manifestly undesigned. 
When such occurences attend the testimony of various individ- 
uals, all affirming the same great leading facts, they tend 
strongly to confirm the testimony given. This principle is 
most beautifully illustrated by Dr. Paley, in his Horse Pauli- 
nas — a work deserving more attention than almost anything 
else the Doctor ever wrote. 

Great care and sound judgment are requisite in the appli- 
cation of the principles above stated. When they are fulfilled 
in the case of testimony pertaining to any subject, it would be 
the height of presumption and moral depravity in us not to act 
upon it as true. Infinite interests may be safely based upon 
the validity of such testimony. We are often necessitated to 
decide and act, however, in the absence of testimony thus full 
and complete, and often upon testimony failing in many re- 
spects of the marks of credibility above laid down. To dis- 
cern between the valid and the invalid — to determine correctly 
when to trust and when to withhold confidence, requires stern 
integrity of heart, and a Judgment, "by reason of use exer- 
cised " to distinguish the true from the false. 



*,ie 



CHAPTER XVII. 



REASONING. 



T JE distinction between Reasoning and Investigation was 
-najte plain in the last Chapter. The former process has noth- 
j'Ari to do with the discovert/ of truth. Its exclusive object is 
the establishment of truth already discovered. It belongs to 
Intellectual Philosophy to develop the laws of Reasoning — 
that is, to develop those laws which control the action of the 
Intelligence, when drawing conclusions from premises laid 
down. 

THE SYLLOGISM THE UNIVERSAL FORM OF REASONING. 

I will introduce what I have to say upon this subject by 
the following quotation from Whately's Logic : 

" In every instance in which we reason, in the strict sense 
of the word, i. e. make use of argument, either for the sake 
of refuting an adversary, or of conveying instruction, or of sat- 
isfying our own minds on any point, whatever may be the sub- 
ject we are engaged on, a certain process takes place in the 
mind, which is one and the same in all cases, provided it be 
correctly conducted." Again : " In pursuing the supposed in- 
vestigation, it will be found that every conclusion is deduced 
in reality from two other propositions (thence called premises), 
for though one of them may be, and commonly is suppressed, 
it must nevertheless be understood as admitted ; as may be 



REASONING. 817 

made evident by supposing the denial of the suppressed premise, 
which will at once invalidate the argument.'^ 

Hence this author affirms, in opposition to the opinion of 
some on the subject, that the syllogistic is not a particular kind 
of reasoning, as distinguished from moral or inductive reason- 
ing, for example, but the sole and universal process. 

The above Principle verified. 

That this author is correct in the principle above stated, a 
very few considerations will render evident. 

That all reasoning, purely demonstrative, is strictly con- 
formed to the law of the syllogism, none will deny. As an 
example and illustration of this kind of reasoning, we may 
take the following : '' Things equal to the same thing, are equal 
to one another. A and B are each equal to C. Therefore 
they are equal to one another. The major premise, in all such 
processes, is either an intuition of Reason, or some proposition 
previously demonstrated. 

But inductive Reasoning has by some been supposed to be 
an exception, because that, in the syllogism, we go from the 
general to the particular ; whereas, in the inductive process, 
we reason from the particular to the general. This objection, 
if valid, would equally exclude almost the entire mass of de- 
monstrative reasoning. Here also we do in reality go from the 
particular to the universal — that is, the minor premise is 
particular. This objection assumes also what is not true of 
the syllogism — that is, that in all instances, in the syllogistic 
form, we reason from the general to the particular. All rea- 
soning is strictly conformed to the laws of the syllogism, 
•wherein a conclusion is legitimately drawn from two premises, 
a major and a minor. In induction, as well as everywhere else, 
these two premises appear, the major being almost universally 
suppressed. In no form of reasoning legitimately conducted 
27* 



318 INTELLECTUAL PHLLOSOPHT. 

is the conclusion more extensive than the major premise. 
When we reason from tlie particular to the general, we always 
do it under the assumption (and this assumption is the sup- 
pressed major) that what is true of the particular, is also true 
of the class to which the individual belongs. 

FORMS IN WHICH THE MAJOR PREMISE APPEARS. 

There are three forms in which what is called the major 
premise, that which asserts the universal or general fact, is 
expressed ; a circumstance which has led others to suppose 
that there are three kinds of reasoning, of which the syllogism 
is one. These forms are the categorical, in which the general 
fact is directly affirmed or denied — the hypothetical, in which 
the general principle is hypothetically affirmed or denied, as in 
the proposition, If A is B, C is D — and the disjunctive, in 
■which a fact is affirmed to attach to some one of a given num- 
ber, without determining which, as in the proposition A is 
either in C or D. 

The categorical we have already considered. It remains 
to consider the last two. Now a moment's reflection will con- 
yince us, that a hypothetical premise is nothing but a universal 
put into the form of a particular. The proposition, for exam- 
ple, If Caesar was an usurper he deserved death, is nothing 
more than the universal proposition, All usurpers deserve 
death, expressed in a concrete and particular form. The same 
holds in respect to all propositions of a similar character. A 
hypothetical proposition is nothing but a general or universal 
principle hypothesized in respect to a particular case. 

A careful analysis will show that a disjunctive proposition, 
also, is in reality nothing but a geileral, or universal proposi- 
tion, expressed in a concrete and particular form. When, for 
example, we say, A is either in B or C ; it is not in B, there- 
fore it is in C, we find, on analysis, that the first premise con- 



4 



REASONINa. 819 

tains a universal principle, expi-essed in a concrete and partic- 
ular form. The piinciple is this — when an element must 
exist in connection with some one of a given class, to prove 
that it does not attach to some one or more of the members, 
is to prove that it does belong to those, be they one or more, 
that remain. The syllogism, therefore, might be thus ex- 
pressed : If C is not in one of the two, it is in the other. It 
is not in one, to wit, B. Therefore it is in C. The syllogism 
then is not a particular form of reasoning, but the universal 
and exclu^ivi form. 

PRINCIPLLS -WHICH LIE AT THE BASIS OP ALL CONCLUSIONS 
FROM A PROCESS OF REASONING. 

All conclusions in a process of reasoning are, of course, 
either affirmative, as A is B, or negative, as A is not B. Such 
conclusions rest upon two distinct and opposite principles, on 
which all reasoning, legitimately conducted, rests. 

1. All terms which agree with one and the same term, 
agree with one another. 

2. All terras which agree with a particular term, differ 
from all others which disagree with the same term. 

Remarks upon these Principles. 

On the former principle all affirmative, and on the latter 
all negative conclusions rest. All reasoning strictly conformed 
to these principles, must be right, and all which transgresses 
them, must be wrong. 

It will be perceived also, that these principles are nothing 
more than particular forms of the axioms common to all sci- 
ences, as the axiom in mathematics, " Things equal to the 
same thing are equal to one another," &c. 

In the celebrated dictum of Aristotle, these two principles 



*■♦. 



320 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

are expressed in one formula, to wit : WJiafevcr tnay he af- 
firmed or denied of any term distributed (i. e. taken xmiver- 
sally), may he offirmcd or denied of every particular compre- 
hended under that term. 

REMARKS ON ARISTOTLE'S DICTUM. 

The two principles under consideration, thrown into this 
form, are not rendered more distinct and simple than they 
were hefore; nor, in my judgment, are they rendered as dis- 
tinct as when they appear in their separate form, the form 
in which they are announced in connection with all other 
sciences. Throwing them into this form has also, I believe, 
induced two quite common mistakes connected with the sci- 
ence of logic. 

The iirst is the impression noticed above, that the syllogism 
is exclusively confined to one kind of reasoning, to wit : that 
in which we proceed from the universal to the particular. 
From the form of the principles, as announced in the dictum, 
we should suppose that this must be the case in respect to all 
reasoning conformed to the syllogism j whereas no such diffi- 
culty even apparently attaches to these principles, when an- 
nounced in their distinct and separate forms. 

The second mistake is found in the somewhat harmless, 
but very useless labor, which we meet with in the common 
Treatises on Logic, of redxicing all the syllogisms in the last 
three figures to the first. This is done because that in this 
last-named figure only, is the dictum directly applicable to the 
syllogism. Now what is the real use of these reductions ? 
Are the two terms more fully compared with one and the same 
third, or is their agreement or disagreement with that term, 
and consequently with each other, more distinct, in the first 
figure, than in all the legitimate moods in either of the others ? 



KEASONING. 321 

By no means. Take, as an illustration, the following syllo- 
gism in Camestres, in the second figure. Every X is Z. No 
Y is Z. Therefore no Y is X. This syllogism reduced to 
Celarent in the first figure, would stand thus : No Z is Y. 
Every X is Z. Therefore no X is Y ; the converse of the 
conclusion above obtained, and which, by simple conversion, 
may be changed into the same, to wit, no Y is X. Now I 
ask, is the proposition. No Y is X rendered any more evident 
by all this process than it was before ? Are X and Y more 
distinctly compared with Z, or is the fact that one agrees, and 
the other disagrees with that term, and consequently that 
they disagree with each other, more distinct and palpable, in 
the last instance, than in the first ? If any person can see the 
difference between them, they can see what I cannot. Of 
what use then is all this labor at reduction ? This only : 
the student is taxed with much labor in the conversion and 
transposition of propositions, under the promise of additional 
light upon the correctness of conclusions previously obtained 
upon principles undeniably legitimate. The result is, that his 
conclusions are rendered not one whit more distinct or valid 
to his view than they were before. No science should be bur- 
dened with useless labor. Logic, like all other sciences, with 
these principles in their distinct and separate forms, is far bet- 
ter off without the dictum than with it. 



DIFFERENT KINDS OF REASONING. 

We are now prepared for a contemplation of the difi'erent 
kinds of reasoning resulting from the nature of the different 
subjects upon which the Intelligence is employed in such pro- 
cesses. I will introduce my remarks upon this department 
of our inquiries, with the following quotation from Cole- 
ridge : 



822 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

"Exirj man must feel, that though he may not he exert- 
ing different faculties, he is exerting his faculties in a different 
way, when in one instance he begins with some one self-evident 
truth (that the radii of a circle, for instance, are all equal), 
and in consequence of this being true, sees at once, without 
any actual experience, that some other thing must be true like- 
wise, and that, this being true, some fhh-d thing must be 
equally true, and so on, till he comes, we will say, to the prop- 
erties of the lever, considered as the spoke of a circle; which 
is capable of having all its marvelous powers demonstrated 
even to a savage who had never seen a lever, and without sup- 
posing any other previous knowledge in his mind, but this one, 
There is a conceivable figure, all poi^sible lines from the middle 
to the circumference of which are of the same length : or when, 
in the second instance, he brings together the facts of experi- 
ence, each of which has its own separate value, neither increased 
nor diminished by the truth of any other fact which may have 
preceded it; and making these several facts bear upon some 
particular project, and finding some in favor of it, and some 
ag;iinst the project, according as one or the other class of facts 
preponderates : as, for instance, whether it would be better to 
plant a particular spot of ground with larch, or with Scotch fir, 
or with oak in preference to either. Surely every man will ac- 
knowledge that his mind was very differently employed in the 
first case from what it was in the second, and all men have 
agreed to call the results of the first class the truths of science, 
such as not only are true, but which it is impossible to con- 
ceive otherwise : while the results of the second class are called 
facts or things of experience : and as to these latter we must 
often content ourselves with the greater prohahility, that they 
are so, or so, rather than otherwise — nay, even when we have 
no doubt that they are so in the particular case, we never pre- 
sume to assert that they must continue so always, and under 



REASONING. 823 

all circumstances. On the contrary, our conclusions depend 
altogether on contingent circumstances. Now when the mind 
is employed, as in the case first mentioned, I call it Reasoning, 
or the use of the pure Reason ; but, in the second case, the 
Understanding or Prudence." 

Without reference to the propriety of the peculiar use here 
made of the terms Reasoning, Understanding, and Prudence, 
I would observe, that no one can doubt the reality of the dis- 
tinction between the hinds of reasoning designated in this pas- 
sage. The question arises. What is this distinction ? What 
are the peculiarities which distinguish the one kind of reason- 
ing from the other ? 

Distinctions Elucidated. 

1. One ground of distinction is found in the nature of the 
objects of ratiocination in the two instances referred to. In 
the first example the objects are pure and necessary concep- 
tions of Reason. In the second, the objects are realities coa 
tingent and particular. 

2. In the first instance no elements exist in the objects 
but what are perfectly known to the mind. No unknown ele- 
ments exist to vitiate our conclusions. In the second instance 
what is known exists in connection with elements of which we 
are totally ignorant, and which may operate in the production 
of results precisely opposite to the conclusions which we have 
drawn from what we do know. 

3. Consequently, in the first instance, our conclusions in- 
volve nothing but universal, necessary, and absolute knowledge. 
In the second instance, the utmost that we obtain is, conclu- 
sions more or less probable, according to the degree in which 
the known may be affected by the unknown, to wit, conclusions 
not necessary but contingent. 



324 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



DISTINCTION BETWEEN DEMONSTRATIVE AND PROBABLE 
REASONING. 

The distinction between demonstrative and probable, or aa 
it is sometimes improperly called, moral i*easoning, can now be 
readily pointed out. When the properties and relations of 
objects embracing no elements which are not perfectly known, 
are systematically evolved in the light of axioms and postulates, 
which are the intuitions of Reason, the result is absolute de- 
monstration. If the objects themselves are pure ideas of Rea- 
son, the conclusions will be universal and necessary. If the 
objects are contingent, such will be the conclusions. The re- 
sult, however, is pure demonstration, in both instances alike. 
The syllogism, fa- example, every X is Y, every Z is X, and 
therefore every Z is Y, is perfect demonstration, whatever the 
objects represented by the terms may be. 

On the other hand, when we attempt to determine ques- 
tions pertaining to events depending in part upon circumstan- 
ces which we know, and in part upon others which we do not 
know, and in a state of ignorance of the influence of that which 
is unknown in determining the result, or when we attempt, in 
the light of fundamental principles, to determine the relations 
and properties of substances embracing elements known and 
unknown, and while we are ignorant of the extent in which 
these relations and properties depend upon the unknown ele- 
ments, then our conclusions are in no sense demonstration, but 
partake of probabilities greater or less, according to the degree 
in which the known or unknown elements preponderate. Thus 
we have a distinct view of the broad distinction between the 
two kinds of reasoning under consideration. It does not lie 
in the nature of the objects to which such reasoning pertains, 
but in the relations of the objects to our Intelligence. Were 
all objects as perfectly known to the mind, as the objects treated 



KEASONING. 325 

of in the mattematics, then all reasoning would be alike de- 
monstrative. 

COMMON IMPRESSION IN RESPECT TO THE EXTENT OE DEMON- 
STRATIVE REASONING. 

" If," says Mr. Dugald Stewart, " the account which has 
been given of demonstrative evidence be admitted, the pro- 
vince over which it extends must be limited almost entirely to 
the objects of the pure mathematics." With this statement 
there is quite an extensive agreement, I believe, among philos- 
ophers. The reasons assigned for the above conclusion are the 
following : 

1. The fact that the basis of all mathematical demon- 
strations, are axioms and postulates which are intuitively cer- 
tain. 

2. That every step from these axioms and postulates to the 
remotest conclusions, is equally intuitive. 

3. That the terms employed are so few, and distinctly de- 
fined, that they cannot be misapprehended. 

The principle assumed is, that no other science is capable 
of possessing the above characteristics, and consequently that 
no other science can so properly be called demonstrative. 

Let us first inquire, whether the mathematics is the only 
science based upon axioms and postulates intuitively certain. 
Take as an illustration the following axiom in mathematics : 
The whole of a thing is greater than any of its parts, and com- 
pare it with the following affirmation of Reason : Every event 
has a cause. Which is the least certain ? Neither. Thus 
I might show by an induction of many particulars, that all 
the fundamental principles of morals and religion are as in- 
tuitively certain as any of the primary intuitions of the math- 
ematics. 

Permit me in the next place to ask, whether there are no 
28 



826 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

important truths resulting with as intuitive certainty from the 
primary truths of morals as from those of the mathematics? 
Take the following intuition in morals : " Thou shalt love thy 
neighbor as thyself," and consider the following proposition 
based upon it : '' Love worketh no ill to his neighbor." Con- 
sequently the man that does his neighbor a deliberate injury 
cannot be actuated by the principle of love. The above con- 
clusion is of great practical importance, and yet I shall not 
hesitate to pronounce it as absolute a demonstiation as can be 
found in Geometry. So of the numberless other truths based 
upon the primary intuitions of morals and religion. 

In regard to the last peculiarity of mathematics I have only 
to say that when the principles of morals are as definitely set- 
tled as those of the mathematics (and no reason but a false 
philosophy can be assigned why they have not been thus set- 
tled long ago), we may expect the same precision in morals as 
in any other science. 

METHOD OF PROOF. 

Having shown that all reasoning resolves itself into two 
classes, demonstrative and probable, another topic demanding 
attention is the metliod of proof , or the general mode to be 
adopted in proving a proposition, the truth of which has been 
already ascertained. In the last Chapter I endeavored to de- 
velop those laws of belief which should guide the mind in ita 
inquiries after truth. Now when truth has been discovered 
and adopted in conformity with those rules, and we wish to 
present arguments for the purpose of conveying to other minds 
the same convictions which exist in our own, one rule of fun- 
damental importance presents itself Present those considera- 
tions by which our own mind has been convinced. This rule 
might, at first thought, seem to be so obviously proper, and so 
manifestly of universal application, as to render its statement 



REASONINa. 327 

entirely unnecessary. But there is no rule which is more fre- 
quently transgressed, and for the obvious reason, that few per- 
sons practice self-reflection sufficiently to render themselves 
distinctly conscious of the real ground of their assent to a vast 
majority of the truths which they believe. Hence it very 
commonly happens, that when individuals are called upon to 
assign reasons for propositions which they most firmly believe 
to be true, they for the first time, perhaps, begin to doubt the 
reality of the objects of their faith. This most frequently 
happens, perhaps, in reference to truths the most obvious, and 
with which the mind is most familiar. The reason of this 
most singular fact is obvious. We seldom recur to the grounds 
of our belief in truths so obvious and familiar, that they have 
been universally admitted. The evidence of such truths has 
come into the mind unsought. The reverse is the fact with 
respect to truths less obvious and familiar. 

Real proof found in no other Method. 

On reflection, it will appear evident, that in no other meth- 
od of argumentation is real proof to be met with. We may 
show an individual that the truth of a given proposition neces- 
sarily results from principles which he admits. But this (the 
argumentum ad homineni) is merely hypothetical, and not 
real proof. For if the principles of the individual are false, 
the argument is good for nothing, as far as the real establish- 
ment of truth is concerned. The same may be said of every 
other kind of proof but that of which we are speaking. 

SOURCES OP FALLACIES IN REASONING. 

Assuming the proposition which I have endeavored to es- 
tablish as true, to wit : That every conclusion in a process of 
reasoning is based upon two propositions called premises, the 
place where fallacies in reasoning are to be found, if they exist, 



3Z» INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

may be readily pointed out. They must be found in one or 
both of the premises, or in the conclusion. Hence, in exam- 
ining any particular process of reasoning, such questions as 
these are of fundamental importance. : What is the proposi- 
tion which the author is aiming to establish ? What principles 
has he assumed as previously established or as self-evident ? 
Are these principles legitimately assumed ? What statements 
does he propose as matters of fact ? Are they authentic ? Do 
they belong to the principle to which they are applied ? Do 
his conclusions legitimately result from the premises laid down ? 
By such questions as these, fallacies, if they exist, may com- 
monly be detected. Four great questions, I repeat, should be 
asked, if we would determine correctly whether a proposition 
has been proved by a given process of argumentation, to wit : 
What is the precise nature of the proposition which is the sub- 
ject of the argument ? What are the premises or arguments 
by which the proposition has been sustained? Are these 
premises sound ? And does the conclusion legitimately result 
from the premises ? If fallacies have been introduced into the 
process, we shall thus discover their particular hiding-places, 
and know how to bring them into the light. 

CONCEPTION OF LOGIC. 

The object of the present and preceding Chapter has been 
to lay down certain great principles, in respect to the discovery 
of truth, and its establishment by a process of argumentation. 
In this department of our investigations, it remains to speak 
of but one additional topic, the Conception of Logic. 

ALL THINGS OCCUR ACCORDING TO RULES. 

" Everything in nature," says Kant, and this is one of his 
most important thoughts, "as well in the inanimate as in the 
animated world, happens or is done according to rules, though 



A 



REASONING. 329 

we do not always know them. Water falls according to the 
laws of gravitation, and the motion of walking is performed 
by animals according to rules. The fish in the water, the bird 
in the air, moves according to rules." 

Again : '' There is nowhere any want of rule. When we 
think we find that want, we can only say that, in this case the 
rules are unknown to us." 

The exercise of our Intelligence is not an exception to the 
above remark. When we speak, our language is thrown into 
harmony with rules, to which we conform without, in most in- 
stances, a reflective consciousness of their existence. Gram- 
mar is nothing but a systematic development of these rules. 
So also when we judge a proposition to be true or false, or to 
be proved or disproved by a particular process of argumenta- 
tion ; or when we attempt to present to ourselves, for self-sat- 
isfaction, or to others for the purpose of convincing them, the 
grounds of our own convictions — that is, when we reason, 
our Intelligence proceeds according to fixed rules. When we 
have judged or reasoned correctly, we find ourselves able, on 
reflection, to develop the rules in conformity to which we 
judged and reasoned, without a distinct consciousness of the 
fact. In the light of these rules, we are then able to detect 
the reason and grounds of Fallacious judgments and rea- 
sonings. 

Logic defined. 

The above remarks have prepared the way for a distinct 
statement of the true conception of Logic. It is a systematic 
development of those rules in conformity to which the univer- 
sal Intelligence acts, in judging and reasoning. Logic, ac- 
cording to this conception, would naturally divide itself into 
two parts — a development of those rules to which the Intel- 
ligence conforms in all acts of correct judgment and reasoning, 



330 INTELLECTUAL THILOSOPHY. 

and a development of those principles by which false judg- 
ments and reasonings may be distinguished from the true. A 
Treatise on Logic, in which the laws of judging and reasoning 
are evolved in strict conformity to the above conception, would 
realize the idea of science as far as this subject is concerned. 
Logic, to judging and reasoning, is what Grammar is to speak- 
ing and writing. Logic pertains not at all to the particular 
objects about which the Intelligence is, from time to time, em- 
ployed, but to rules or laws in conformity to which it does act, 
whatever the objects may be. 

RELATIONS OP LOGIC TO OTHER SCIENCES. 

In the chronological order of intellectual procedure. Logic 
is preceded by judging and reasoning, just as speaking and 
writing precede Grammar. In the logical order, however, it 
is the antecedent of all other sciences. In all sciences the In- 
telligence, from given data, judges in respect to truths result- 
ing from such data. We also reason from such data for the 
establishment of such truths. Logic develops the laws of 
thought which govern the action of the Intelligence in all 
such procedures. As a science, it is distinct from all other 
sciences, yet it permeates them all, giving laws to the Intelli- 
gence, in all its judgments and reasonings, whatever the ob- 
jects may be about which it is employed. 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

mSCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 

There are a few topics of a miscellaneous character con- 
nected with our previous investigation, which I have reserved 
for a distinct and separate Chapter. The first to which I would 
direct attention is, 

THE BEARING OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE UPON SCIENCE 
PROPERLY SO CALLED. 

In the philosophy of Locke, axioms have no place, except 
as objects of ridicule and contempt. He directly denies that 
any science whatever is founded upon them. Equally removed 
from his philosophy are all ideas of pure Reason. All the ob- 
jects of knowledge are qualities external and internal. Now 
in what sense and in what form is science pertaining to any 
subject possible, according to the fundamental principles of 
this philosophy ? The answer which I give to this question is 
this : In no form whatever is science of any kind possible, ac- 
cording to the fundamental principles of this philosophy. We 
will take in illustration the science of external and material 
substances. All that we know of these substances, according 
to this philosophy, is by sensation — that is, qualities, and 
nothing else. Now the first step in a scientific process pertain- 
ing to these qualities, is that of making abstraction of them, 
in thought separating those which difi"er, and uniting those 
which agree. On what condition can this process take place ? 
On one condition only, to wit : that we have in our minds the 
ideas of resemblance and difference. But these ideas are pure 
conceptions of Reason, and are not given by sensation at all. 



332 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



1 



Sensation may give the colors red and yellow, for example ; 
but it can never give the fact, that the one color differs from 
the other. This judgment is conditioned on the prior exist- 
ence in the mind of pure conceptions of Reason, the ideas 
above named. But the reality of such ideas this philcsophy 
denies. It thereby, in its fundamental principles, renders the 
first step in a scientific process impossible. 

But let us suppose that this philosophy did admit of ab- 
straction. Simple classification and generalization would be 
possible — that is, these qualities, as they exist in combination, 
might be classed into genera and species, and then qualities, 
common to all individuals of given classes, might be found. 
This would be the utmost limit of scientific procedure, accord- 
ing to this philosophy, and this comprehends the limits of the 
sphere of the Intelligence as presented in the school of Locke. 
But this is the starting point of real science, properly defined. 
When substances have been classified and generalized, the In- 
telligence is then brought into circumstances to evolve their 
properties and relations in the light of fundamental ideas. 
This is science — a thing impossible according to the philoso- 
phy of Locke. 

In the denial of the axioms, also, as the foundation of sci- 
ence, Locke renders science of all kinds impossible. Suppose 
we did not know the axiom, Things equal to the same thing 
are equal to one another, how could we affirm that because 
A and B are equal to C, therefore they are equal to one 
another ? It would be impossible to make such an affirmation. 
The same holds in respect to every step in all the sciences, 
pure and mixed. Take away the axioms, and " darkness all, 
and ever-during night" enshrouds the sun of science. When- 
ever we meet with scientific Treatises in the school of Locke 
(and we meet with many), they exist in spite of his philoso- 
phy, and not as a consequent of it. 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 333 



KANT S DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETI- 
CAL JUDGMENTS. 

I have reserved for this place, the consideration of the dis- 
tinction above named, a distinction which constitutes one of 
the fundamental peculiarities of the philosophy of Kant, and 
which laid the foundation for the various systems which have 
risen out of the principles and fragments of his philosophy. 

Analytical and Synthetical Judgments defined and distin- 
guished. 

The first thing to be done is to define these judgments, a§ 
given by our author, and to distinguish the one from the other. 
All judgments pertain to the relation between a subject and 
predicate. This relation, he affirms, is possible only in two 
ways. Either the predicate is really contained in the subject, 
and the judgment evolves, or designates it as a quality necessa- 
rily embraced in our conception of the subject; or the predi- 
cate lies completely out of the subject, although it sustains a 
certain relation to it. Thus when we affirm that all bodies are 
extended, the predicate is really embraced in our conception 
of the subject; since it is impossible to conceive of a body 
which is not extended. The judgment in this case simply de- 
signates the quality named as thus embraced in the conception. 
All such judgments proceed on the principle of contradiction. 
No individual, for example, can deny the proposition. All 
bodies are extended, without contradicting the essential concep- 
tion which every one has of body. All such judgments Kant 
denominates analytical. To find them, we have only to ana- 
lyze our conceptions and find the elements essentially embraced 
in them. 

On the other hand, when we say all bodies are heavy, the 
predicate does not, as in the former case, lie within the subject, 



^ 



334 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

as an essential element of our conception of the subject. "We 
cannot conceive of body which is not extended. But we can 
conceive of body as extended, without including in the concep- 
tion the idea of weight. That all bodies have weight, we 
learn from experience alone. Through experience this element 
is added to our notions of body. All judgments of this char- 
acter, Kant denominates synthetical. 

All pure experience-judgments are synthetical, that is, 
when, by investigation, we have discovered, as connected with 
an object, or an essential element of it, some quality unknown 
before, we then, in thought, add that quality to our former 
conception of the object. 

But we find, on analysis of our judgments, that we have 
not only empirical, but c^^nor^ judgments, which are synthet- 
ical. Of this character are all the primary principles of Rea- 
son-judgments, such as, Body supposes space : succession 
time; events causes, &c. In all such judgments the predicate 
is not contained in the subject, as an essential element of our 
conception of that subject, but lies wholly without it, and the 
Judgment affirms the relation between them. 

Consequences which Kant has deduced from the above judg- 
ments as defined and distinguished hy himself. 

At first thought, it would appear that the principles above 
elucidated would be very harmless, at least in their results 
(and so they will be found to be when legitimately applied), 
and that they would lead to no disastrous conclusions pertain- 
ing to the validity of our knowledge relative to realities within 
and around us. Yet upon these principles, this philosopher 
has founded most of his conclusions, in which the validity of 
our faculties, in reference to all affirmations pertaining to reali- 
ties, material and mental, finite and infinite, is denied. The 






MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 335 

conclusions to which he pushes these principles, may be thus 
stated : 

1. Not only are all experience-judgments synthetical, but 
also all judgments of pure science, such, for example, as math- 
ematical judgments. 

2. As in all such judgments, the predicate lies wholly out 
of the subject, such judgments have no claim whatever to ob- 
jective validity. They are entirely foundationless. In them- 
selves the ideas represented by both the subject and predicate 
have no claim whatever to objective validity, and as the predi- 
cate lies wholly out of the subject, it can have no foundation 
in that. 

3. As such judgments are themselves without foundation, 
so also must be all sciences founded on them as principles. 

4. As all pure sciences rest exclusively upon such judg- 
ments, and as all judgments pertaining to such sciences, such 
for example, as mathematics, are purely synthetical, such sci- 
ences, with all judgments pertaining to them, are wholly with- 
out any objective validity. 

5. As synthetical judgments, d priori, precede as laws of 
thought, and determine the character of all experience-judg- 
ments, and all conclusions based upon them, these last judg- 
ments, like the former, are wholly destitute of all claims to 
objective validity. The entire fabric of human knowledge, 
consequently, falls. Our Intelligence is exclusively a faculty 
of cognizing as real, what has no existence out of the cognition- 
faculty itself. The universe, material and mental, God, liberty, 
and immortality, are the unreal objects of foundationless con- 
ceptions. Yet they are objects which we are bound to treat 
as real, because our cognition-faculty presents them as such, 
and practical Reason, that function of Reason which teache^? 
what we ought to do, affirms our obligation thus to treat 
them. 



% 
m 



336 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

6. On no other supposition than that such is the nature 
and procedure of the cognition-faculty, can we account for the 
possibility of a priori synthetical judgments of sciences all 
of whose judgments are synthetical, together with the relations 
above stated of synthetical judgments to experience. The ex- 
istence of synthetical judgments reveals the nature of the 
cognition-faculty, and determines the character of its whole 
procedure. The basis of the whole system of knowledge is 
synthetical judgments, having no claim to objective validity. 
The entire superstructure receives its form and dimensions 
from such judgments. The building, therefore, cannot be 
more substantial or real than the foundation on which it rests. 

Errors of Kant, in defining and applying the distinctions 
ichich he has made between these judgments. 

Such is the system of this philosopher, a system moulded 
from the airy materials, and built upon the airy foundation 
under consideration. It now remains to point out some of the 
errors into which he has fallen on this subject. 

1. It may be questioned whether he has rightly defined 
these judgments, and consequently given the true criterion by 
which the one class may be distinguished from the other. "We 
will propose another definition. When the connection between 
the subject and predicate in any given proposition is such, that 
we have no occasion to go beyond the proposition itself, to de- 
termine its validity, then the judgment expressed in that pro- 
position is analytical. When, on the other hand, this connec- 
tion is such, that we have to go beyond the sphere of the 
proposition, that is, to bring in other propositions, to determine 
its validity, then the judgment is synthetical. Take the two 
following propositions in illustration, the first of which is ana- 
lytical, and the second synthetical, according to Kant : Body is 
extended ; and Body supposes space. Why should the judg- 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 337 

ment expressed io one of these propositions, be denominated 
analytical, and that in the other synthetical ? In neither in- 
stance have we occasion to go beyond the sphere of the pro- 
^.usition or judgment itself to discern its validity; and it is 
exclusively by analysis and not by synthesis, that is, by an 
analysis of the nature of the subject and predicate, and of the 
necessary relations between them, and not by the introduction 
of other judgments, that that validity is in both instances 
alike and equally discerned. Both judgments also have pre- 
cisely the same characteristics of absolute universality and 
necessity, and this universality and necessity are in both cases 
alike and ec[ually discerned within the sphere of the judgments 
themselves. Nor is the predicate contained in the subject, in 
the former proposition, and not contained in it, in the latter, 
in any such form, as to make any fundamental difference be- 
tween the judgments themselves. In the one instance we 
compare the idea of body with that of extension, and perceive 
intuitively that if body is, it must have extension. _ In the 
next instance, we compare the same idea, that of body, with 
that of space, and perceive, with the same absolute intuitive- 
ness, that if body is, space must be. No important reasons 
can be assigned why one of these propositions should be de- 
nominated analytical, and the other synthetical. 

By Kant's own fundamental characteristic of analytical 
judgments also, the validity of our definition of these two 
kinds of judgments, and the error of his own, is rendered 
self-evident. The truth of all analytical judgments, he affirms, 
is discerned, on the principle of contradiction, that is, if you 
deny them, you deny what is necessarily involved in the very 
idea of the subject and predicate. Now this holds equally 
true of the two judgments above adduced. It is no more a 
contradiction of our idea of body, to affirm, that body is not 
extended, than it is to affirm, that body does not suppose space. 
29 



338 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

If then a^/ judgments, the truth and necessity of which may 
be discerned on the principle of contradiction, are to be reck- 
oned as analytical judgments, and they are according to Kant 
himself, and also according to all principles of sound science, 
then all of his cL j^riori synthetical judgments are, in fact, ana- 
lytical and not synthetical judgments at all. 

2. Hence I remark, in the next place, that Kant errs fun- 
damentally, in his assumption, that all the pure sciences, the 
mathematics for example, have their exclusive basis in synthet- 
ical judgments. All basis principles of such sciences, on the 
other hand, the axioms, I mean, are exclusively analytical 
judgments. There is not a single axiom in any of these sci- 
ences, the truth and necessity of which is not discerned exclu- 
sively on the principle of contradiction, the distinguishing 
characteristic of analytical judgments, according to Kant him- 
self The axioms, for example, things equal to the same 
things are equal to one another, and the whole is greater than 
any one of its parts, and equal to all its parts together, are 
discernible upon the principle of contradiction, and upon no 
other principle. So of all the basis principles of all the sci- 
ences without exception. 

3. But incorrect classification is not the only error of 
Kant, in respect to d, jyriori synthetical judgments, synthetical 
judgments as he has himself defined them. He has failed to 
mark the real relations between the subject and predicate 
in such judgments. Had he done this, a failure to do which 
is a capital omission in philosophy, he would have perceived 
at once that no such conclusions as he supposed, can be 
drawn from those judgments. In an d priori synthetical 
judgment, as defined by Kant (the d priori analytical 
judgment according to our definition), the predicate lies out 
of the subject, and is not included in it, as in empirical 
analytical judgments, the only analytical, according to 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 339 

Kant.* In the former judgments, the predicate to be sure is 
not contained in the subject as an essential element of the 
same. On the other hand, the former sustains to the latter 
the relation of logical antecedent. Now such a judgment is 
self-evidently as valid for things in themselves, as a judgment 
which affirms of a subject an element embraced in the concep- 
tion of that subject. The propositions, for example, If body 
is, there must be real extension and if body is, space must be, 
are in themselves equally self-evident, and equally valid for 
things in themselves. We have then, even granting that one of 
these judgments is analytical and the other synthetical, no 
more occasion to question, as Kant has done, the validity for 
things in themselves of one of these judgments, than we have 
to do the same thing in respect to the other. 

4. Another great error of Kant, in the use which he has 
made of the Judgments under consideration, is found in the 
affirmation which he makes, that in all the pure sciences, the 
pure mathematics for example, all judgments alike are exclu- 
sively snythetical ; when, in fact, they are all alike, as actually 
discerned, analytical. This is evident from the fact, that all 
such judgments are discerned on the principle of contradiction. 
In the mathematics, for example, the truth of all the axioms 
is discerned, exclusively on the principle of contradiction, and 
every conclusion is so deduced, that it must be admitted, or 

* The distinction between an empirical and a priori analytical judg-^ 
ment here becomes perfectly manifest. In the first case, the p-edi- 
cate is really contained in the subject as an essential element of the 
same, as in the judgment, Body is extended. In the latter case, the 
predicate lies out of the subject, but sustains to it the relation of 
logical antecedent, as in the judgment. Body supposes space. Both 
classes of judgments are analytical, for the fundamental reason, that 
their truth and necessity are alike discerned on the principle of con- 
tridiction. 



340 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the asioiBS denied. In other words, the whole procedure of 
such sciences is on the principle of contradiction — Kant's own 
critenon of analytical judgments. He himself admits, that 
all derivative judgments, in the mathematics, do proceed on 
the principle of contradiction, and yet affirms, that such judg- 
ments are, in fact, synthetical and not analytical. " Although," 
he says, " a synthetical proposition may at all times be dis- 
cerned by means of the principle of contradiction, yet only in 
this way, inasmuch as another synthetic proposition is pre-sup- 
posed from which it can be deduced — but never of itself." 
Now here are two important mistakes. The first is, that no 
synthetical proposition understood as he has defined it, is dis- 
cerned of itself on the principle of contradiction ; when, as 
we have already seen, all of his d priori synthetical proposi- 
tions are thus discerned, and that exclusively. On no other 
principle do we, or can we, discern the truth of the axioms, 
things equal to the same things are equal to one another, if 
equals be added to, subtracted from, multiplied or divided by 
equals, the products will be equal, and the whole is greater 
than any one of its parts, and all the parts together are equal 
to the whole, &c. Being thus discerned, they should, as al- 
ready shown, be ranked as analytical and not as synthetical 
judgments. Being also ranked by Kant as synthetical judg- 
ments, he is undetjiably in error, in affirming that no syntheti- 
cal judgments as defined by himself, are discerned, of them- 
selves, on the principle of contradiction. The second error 
into which he has fallen, is found in the affirmation, that all 
derivative synthetical propositions are discerned through some 
other synthetic proposition, when in the pure sciences, the 
mathematics, for example, all such propositions are discerned 
analytically through analytical and not synthetical propositions 
properly defined, that is, through propositions which are them- 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 341 

selves and of themselves, discerned, on the principle of con- 
tradiction. 

5. Hence, I remark finally, that Kant, for the reasons 
above stated, gives an entirely and fundamentally false account 
of the procedure of the Intelligence in the sciences. Accord- 
ing to him, the Intelligence, in all the Sciences, begins with 
synthetical judgments, judgments in which the predicate lies 
wholly out of the subject. From this predicate, as a subject, 
the next step is to another predicate lying in a similar manner 
out of that, and so on, each step being like the first purely 
synthetical. If this were the case, we should have, in none 
of the sciences anything like demonstration ; for this in all in- 
stances, rests exclusively upon the principle of contradiction. 
All demonstrative sciences are truly analytical, and not syn- 
thetical. Their basis principles are all analytical propositions, 
that is, propositions whose truth is discerned exclusively, on 
the principle of contradiction. Every deduction from these 
propositions is made exclusively on the same principle. No 
philosopher, therefore, has more fundamentally erred, on any 
subject, than Kant has, in his definitions of analytical and 
snythetical judgments, and in the use which he has made of 
those judgments. 

THE TRUE AND FALSE SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 

We are now prepared to contrast the system of Philosophy 
taught in this Treatise, with what we will take the liberty to 
denominate false systems, systems to which it stands opposed. 
All systems of philosophy take form and receive their funda- 
mental characteristics from the ideas which their respective ad- 
vocates entertain in respect to the question of Ontology, that is, 
in respect to the question, What shall we regard as real ? This 
question resolves itself into another, to wit, What do we know 

29* 



342 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

to be real? The true answer to eacli of these questions must 
be found in one of these three systems, to wit, Eealism, as 
taught in this Treatise, Materialism, or Idealism in one of its 
forms. As no other theories of Ontology are conceivable or 
possible, and as but one of these can be true, that one, which- 
soever it may be, must be true, in which the true answer to 
the questions under consideration is found. We will now con- 
sider these diverse systems in the order above named. 

CRITERION OR TESTS BY WHICH WE MAY DISTINGUISH THE 
TRUE FROM ALL FALSE SYSTEMS. 

Before proceeding, however, it may be well to fix definitely 
in mind some sure tests by which the true theory may be 
known and distinguished from all false ones. The following 
principles I lay down as involving such tests : 

1. The true theory will take into account all the facts of 
Consciousness with all then' essential characteristics, just as 
they are, supposing nothing which does not exist, and omitting 
nothing which does exist. 

2. The principles of this theory will readily account for 
all these facts with all their characteristics, and that without 
exception. 

3. The principles of this theory will be necessarily sup- 
posed by these phenomena, and all its deductions will be neces- 
sary logical consequents of these principles and phenomena, so 
that it will be manifest not only that this one system is true, 
but that all contradictory ones must be false. 

Every theory possessing these characteristics, it will readily 
be seen, cannot be false, and every one wanting or contradict- 
ing all or any of them, cannot be true. Suppose, for example, 
a theory is constructed which accords only with a part of the 
real facts of Consciousness, that one circumstance is an abso- 
lute demonstration of the fact that such theory is founded in 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 343 

error ; for if it were true, it would not only accord with but be 
demanded by the facts referred to. We are now prepared to 
consider the systems before us. 

THE SYSTEM OF REALISM. 

1. Knowledge, according to the teachings of the system of 
Eealism, implies two things, — an ooject of knowledge and a 
subject possessed of the power of knowledge. Between the 
nature of the subject and object such a correlation exists, that 
when the appropriate conditions are fulfilled real knowledge of 
such object arises, as the necessary consequent of this corre- 
lation. 

2. Between mind and realities within and around it, this 
correlation esists. It is relatively to them a power, and they 
are relatively to it, objects of real knowledge. 

3. As a faculty of knowledge, the action of the Intelli- 
gence is, and must be, as the essential characteristics and rela- 
tionsliips of the objects of knowledge. 

4. There are two classes of realities known as such, with 
equal absoluteness to the Mind — Spirit and Matter, on the one 
hand — and Time, Space, and Grod, &c., on the other. Of 
the real fundamental qualities of the first class, the Mind has 
a direct and immediate, or presentative knowledge, through 
Consciousness and Sense. The second class it knows as real, 
as necessarily supposed by the actual facts of which it has an 
absolute presentative knowledge. 

According to this system, " the things which we envisage 
are that in themselves for which we take them," and '' their 
relationships are so constituted as they appear to us." All 
" our intuition is" not " nothing, but the representation of phe- 
nomena," but that of real qualities of objects which have not 
a mere ideal, but a real existence. " Every qualit}'-," " all re- 
lationships of objects in space and time," and time and space 



344 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

themselves would remain what our Intelligence now affirms them 
to be, "whatever changes might take place in the subjective qual- 
tiy of our senses," or if the Sensibility and Intelligence both 
should be done away with. Matter and Spirit, in their essen- 
tial characteristics, are realities in themselves. The universe, 
material and mental, and God as the free, intelligent, self-con- 
scious author of each, are realities also. Mind knows not only 
its own manner of perceiving such objects, but the objects 
themselves, and has to do with each alike, because each alike 
is real. According to this theory. Mind is not in a universe 
of fictions of its own creation, but of realities, realities finite 
and infinite, realities which it knows because they are objects 
and it is a faculty of knowledge, and to which it sustains rela- 
tions infinitely solemn and momentous. That this is the true 
and only true theory, I argue from the following considerations : 

THEORY OF REALISM VERIFIED. 

1. It, and it alone, accords with the intuitive and necessary 
convictions of the universal Intelligence on the subject. All 
men do and must believe, whatever their speculative theories 
may be, that they have an actual knowledge not only of their 
manner of perceiving, but also and equally of the ohjects of 
perception themselves. To this statement there is absolut-ely 
no exception. Either the universal Intelligence is a lie, or 
this is the true theory of knowledge. 

2. By no possibility can this theory be shown to be false, 
and any one of an opposite character true. Suppose an indi- 
vidual should undertake to prove that " the things which we 
envisage are not that in themselves for which we take them." 
How could he do it ? He has in the whole procedure to em- 
ploy the very faculty which he affirms to " take things" and 
and their " relationships fir that in themselves" which they are 
not. Then, by the fundamental demands of his theory, we 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 345 

are bound to say, that his arguments and their relationships 
and bearings are not that in themselves for which he takes 
them. Nor is his theory of knowledge that in itself for which 
he takes it. No theory of knowledge, the opposite of that 
under consideration, can be devised, which does not render real 
knowledge on all subjects alike impossible. Now a theory 
which undeniably accords with the intuitive convictions of the 
universal Intelligence must be held to be true, until it is de- 
monstrated to be false. 

3. AW the facts and ojjerations of Mind, in all its need- 
lessly diversified procedures, can be explained in perfect ac- 
cordance with this theory, and cannot, as we shall hereafter 
perceive, be explained in accordance with any other. The ac- 
tual procedure of the Intelligence will be the same, whether we 
suppose the objects of knowledge to be real or not. Nothing 
in the supposition of such reality therefore can lie in the way 
of such explanation, though it may appear, as hereafter it will, 
that on any other theory, the facts of mind could not be what 
they now are. 

4. All the activities of universal humanity, the entire pro- 
cedure of the Intelligence in all the sciences mental and phys- 
ical, have their actual basis in the truth of the theory of know- 
ledge under consideration, and are the height of absurdity on 
any other assumption. The science of Mind is based through- 
out upon the assumption, that the phenomena of spirit, as 
given in Consciousness, phenomena which lie at the basis of 
that science, are to the Intelligence real objects, and it is to 
them a real power, of knowledge. The science of natural 
Philosophy and Astronomy, and all the natural sciences, pro- 
cede entirely upon the assumption that a relation precisely 
similar exists between the Intelligence, on the one hand, and 
the qualities of external material substances, on the other. 
The same is true of the Mathematics, and all the activities of 



S46 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

humanity. All have their basis in one assumption exclusively, 
to wit, that Mind, as a faculty of knowledge, knows things 
and their relationships as they are, and are the perfection of 
absurdity on any other supposition. How infinitely absurd 
was it in Kant, for example, to spend his life io writing books 
to convince the world that '* things which we envisage are not 
that in themselves for which we take them ;" when, according 
to his theory, there was no such world as he was writing to; 
there were no real beings, such as he took them to be, to be 
convinced; no real beings holding any theory at all; nor was 
his own theory that in itself for which he took it. So of all 
the activities of humanity, whatever their objects or directions. 
5. As a final reason for holding this theory, we remark 
that it is involved in no difficulties which are not common to 
all others, and rests upon the very principle, as far as the mode 
of knowledge is concerned, upon which, in the last analysis, 
all others must rest. If Intelligence be given, as in its nature 
a faculty, and realities as in their nature objects of real know- 
ledge, all difficulties, as far as the facts of knowledge are con- 
cerned, disappear, and that totally. The reason for knowledge 
is that the Intelligence is a faculty, and realities within and 
around it are objects of real knowledge. Now the same rea- 
son precisely must be assigned, if we assume that such a rela- 
tionship does not exist between the Intelligence and realities. 
Why is it, that they are not to it objects, and it to them, a 
faculty of real knowledge ? The answer, and the only answer, 
that, in the last analysis, can be given, is that such is the na- 
ture of Mind, on the one hand, and of realities on the other. 
Why is it that the Intelligence takes things and their relation- 
ships to be that in themselves which they are not ? The an- 
swer is, such is the nature of the Intelligence as a faculty, and 
of realities as objects of real knowledge. "Why is it, finally, 
that the Intelligence, in the first instance, envisages things and 



SnSCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 347 

their relationships as possessed of given real characteristics, 
and then the same Intelligence envisages the same things to 
be not that in themselves which it had previously envisaged 
them to be ? But one answer can be given, to wit, that such is 
the nature of the Intelligence, as an envisaging faculty. As 
this is the reason which, in the last analysis, must be given 
for all the procedures of the Intelligence, whatever their na- 
ture may be, it is surely infinitely more reasonable to stop just 
where the universal Intelligence, in fact, does stop, to wit, with 
the principle, that Mind is a faculty, and realities around it are 
objects of real knowledge. We are then involved in no diffi- 
culties not common, and escape those which are perfectly fatal 
to all others. 

MATERIALISM. 

Materialism assumes Matter to be, to the mind, the only 
possible object of knowledge, and consequently as the only 
reality. It is also a system of absolute Atheism. It admits 
and can admit of no overruling power, of no power whatever 
which is not itself a result of material development and ope- 
ration. All the facts of the universe, material and mental, it 
resolves into the necessary results of such development and 
operation. Now the material hypothesis can be sustained but 
upon the following conditions : 

CONDITIONS ON WHICH THE MATERIAL HYPOTHESIS CAN BE 

SUSTAINED. 

1. It must be admitted, that Matter, with all its qualities, 
properties, and laws, has existed from eternity, and has, from 
eternity, contained within itself, as an inherent property of its 
own nature, and that without change or modification, the un- 
conditioned and absolute cause of all its own dispositions, 



848 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

arrangements and operations; yes, of all the phenomena of 
Mind, and of all the facts of the universe just as they actually 
occur. 

2. All oui* reasonings and deductions must be based exclu- 
sively upon the known properties of matter. "We are not to 
assume, as the basis of our explanations of any of the facts 
of the universe, any unknown properties in this substance, 
unless the reality and character of such unknown properties 
are most clearly indicated and affirmed by those that are known. 

8. It must be shown, that nothing but the known proper- 
ties of Matter need be assumed to account for the entire facts 
of the universe, material and mental, just as they are, and that 
these facts can be better accounted for, by a reference to said 
properties, as the unconditioned cause of these facts, than to 
any other conceivable hypothesis. 

4. It must be admitted that all the known properties of 
matter are comprohonded in its Primary, Secundo-primary, 
and Secondary qualities, as elucidated in the Chapter on Sense. 
The known properties of Mind, on the other hand, are undeni- 
ably thought, feeling, and voluntary determination, and noth- 
ing else. Mind is given to itself as an absolute unity wholly 
incapable of composition. Matter is given as a multiple al- 
ways existing as a compound, and capable of an endless diver- 
sity of compositions, and in every new composition exhibiting 
properties wholly unknown before. Mind everywhere exists 
as the end, and Matter, in all its known dispositions and ar- 
rangements, exists as the means to this one end — the wants of 
Mind. Matter, so far forth as known to us, possesses no in- 
herent power of originating animal or physical organizations, 
such as now exist, the only power which, in this respect, it ap- 
parently possesses, being that oi perpetuating organizations 
already existing, and that according to fixed and immutable 
laws of propagation. The power of origination from a state 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. S49 

of total unorganizatioD, of any real or conceivable forms of 
animal or vegetable organization, bas never yet been proven to 
esist in Matter. No known facts indicate in it tbe existence 
of sucb a power, mueb less tbe power to originate tbe leading 
forms of organization actually existing on eartb. Yet tbe fact 
is absolutely undeniable, that tbe time was wben no sucb or- 
ganizations did exist, nor any of the embryo piinciples from 
which they now result. If science bas established anything, 
it has established tbe fact, that the present order of things 
throughout the universe had its beginning in time. The time 
was, when the heavens as now organized, had no existence, 
when " the earth was without form," and wben neither vege- 
tables nor animals, rational or irrational, bad any existence 
upon it. 

Mind, also, in all tbe higher and spiritual departments of 
its nature, is constituted in fixed and immutable adaptation to 
one all-overshadowing idea, that of Grod, as the unconditioned 
cause of all that conditionally exists, who, as a fi-ee, intelligent, 
self-conscious personality, presides over tbe entire movements 
of tbe universe, who, in absolute wisdom and righteousness, 
exercises a moral government over all moral agents in being, 
and who, as the creator, proprietor, and governor of all, is in 
himself possessed of all the attributes involved in the ideas 
of absolute infinity and perfection. The instinct of worship 
and prayer are absolutely universal principles of Mind, and tbe 
only appropriate object of these principles, is a personality 
possessed of the attributes above referred to. We never pi-ay 
to a principle, a blind, unconscious truth, whatever its nature 
may be, but to a person upon whom we recognize ourselves as 
dependent, and who bas tbe power to grant or withhold our re- 
quests. Worship, wben directed to any other object than in- 
finity and perfection, tends undeniably to limit and degrade the 
mind, and when dii-ected towards a personality possessed of 
30 



350 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

these attributes, as undeniably tends to expand, elevate and 
ennoble it. These facts clearly indicate, that such a pei-sonal- 
ity is the only appropriate object of those immutable principles 
of universal Mind. 

Miud, also, is fundamentally constituted to act under a 
system of moral government, presided over by such a person- 
ality. In all the circumstances of its existence, the Mind can- 
not but have a consciousness of actions as morally right and 
morally wrong. By the law of its conscience also, it cannot 
but feel impelled to do the one and avoid the other. When the 
voice of conscience is seconded by a positive command and pro- 
hibition from lawful authority, the Mind is under a much higher 
influence in favor of the right and against the wrong, than when 
left to the unseconded behests of conscience. Now suppose the 
Mind, under these circumstances, should regard itself as under 
an absolute command from a being possessed of absolute infin- 
ity and perfection, a being to whom it owes its existence, and 
upon whom it hangs in absolute dependence for all the bless- 
ings of that existence, and to whom it is bound by all the ties 
actual and conceivable, that can bind a creature to its creator, 
suppose the Mind, in the presence of the right and the wrong, 
ever regards itself as subject to a solemn command from such 
a being to do the right and avoid the wrong, it is then undeni- 
ably subject to the highest moral influence, and all in the right 
direction, of which we can possibly form a conception. Under 
precisely such an influence is the Mind while acting under the 
omnipresent conviction of the being and perfections of God. 
This is enough to show, that in all the higher and spiritual de- 
partments of its nature, it is constituted in fundamental corre- 
lation to the idea of such a supreme being. 

5. I remark finally, that it must be admitted that through- 
out the wide domain of Nature, one law obtains with absolute 
universality, unless the higher and spii-itual department of our 



- MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 351 

nature be an exception, to ■wit, that icherever there is a 
fundaviental want of sentient existence, there is a correspond- 
ing provision, and KJierever there is a fundamental adapta- 
tion, there is a corresponding object or sphere of action. This 
statement will be universally admitted, as all science pertaining 
to nature is based upon the assumption of its truth. With 
these conditions and facts in mind, I urge against Materialism 
the following considerations : 

OBJECTIONS TO MATERIALISM. 

1. It has not a shadow of positive evidence in its favor, 
evidence either a priori or d posteriori. The reality of an 
IMMATERIAL substance, endowed with the power of thought, 
feeling, and voluntary determination, is to the Intelligence 
just as conceivable, and therefore possible, in itself, as that 
of a material substance possessed of the attributes of ex- 
tension and form. From none of the known attributes of Mind 
can we derive the remotest evidence that it possesses any of 
the known attributes of Matter. Mind is an absolute unity, 
with not a solitary phenomenon indicating in it the properties 
of extension, form, solidity, or color, of any indeed of the 
Primary, Secundo-primary, or Secondary properties of Matter. 
Nor does Matter exhibit a solitary phenomenon indicating in it 
the remotest likeness to any of the properties of Mind. Nor 
do its powers indicate in it any unknown properties from which 
the phenomena of Mind can result. The proposition, then, 
that Matter is the only reality, is not only wholly incapable of 
being proved, but is absolutely unsustained by any form or de- 
gree of positive evidence whatever. 

2. The dogma that Matter is the only reality, is opposed to 
the intuitive convictions of the race. All mankind, however 
ignorant or barbarous, have a conception of two orders of ex- 
istence. The rudest savage in being, no more confounds his 



a02 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

soul with his body, or any of its phenomena with any of those 
of Matter, than he does night with day. Now this conviction 
indicating, as it does, the presence to the universal Intelligence 
of phenomena in these substances, phenomena which affirm 
them to be distinct and opposite in their nature, the one to the 
other, must be held as true, till the opposite is proven, M'hich, 
as we have seen, can never be done. The burden of proof is 
with the materialist. 

3. We' have precisely the same evidence of the reality of 
Mind as something not material, that we have of flatter, as 
something not qnritual. We have the same evidence of the 
reality of the phenomena of Mind, that we have of those of 
Matter, and we have as distinct a knowledge of one class of 
phenomena as we have of the other. We can as readily re- 
solve the phenomena of Matter, solidity, extension, and form, 
into those of Mind, thought, feeling, and voluntary determi- 
nation, as we can the latter into the former. We can, with 
the same propriety and logical consistency, assume spirit to be 
the only reality, and deny the existence of all solid and ex- 
tended substances, as we can assume Matter to be the only 
reality, and deny the reality of Mind, and we have absolutely 
no evidence whatever in favor of either of these exclusive 
assumptions. 

4. It is absolutely impossible, from the fundamental cha- 
racteristics of Matter, to deduce those of Mind, or to conceive 
Iww those of the latter can proceed from those of the former, 
any more than we can conceive how that creation itself can be 
the result of a power inhering in empty space. There is no 
resemblance or analogy between the one class of phenomena 
and the other. They are, in every conceivable respect, total 
opposites. How can phenomena, which are totally void of the 
characteristics of solidity, extension, and form, result from the 
phenomena last named ? How can a compound extended and 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 853 

solid substance^ every particle of whicli is absolutely void of 
thought, feeling, and free will, produce an absolute simple, 
■which is totally incapable of composition, which, as a simple, 
exhibits none of the known properties of that from which it is 
derived, and in which the power of thought, feeling, and vol- 
untary determination, as its sole and exclusive known proper- 
ties, inheres? Can any one perceive any intelligent adaptation 
in any or all of the known properties of Matter to produce 
those of Mind? Or do the known properties of the former 
substance indicate in it any unknown properties from which 
those of the latter substance can by any possibility result? 
Certainly not, and no one will pretend the opposite. Here is 
the burden that lies upon Materialism. Before it can lay the 
least shadow of claim to validity, it must take the known pro- 
perties of Matter just as they are, on the one hand, and those 
of Mind on the other, and then show an intelligent adaptation 
in the former to produce the latter. Or it must show from 
the known properties of Matter, that those which are unknown 
do inhere in it from which those of Mind may result. Now 
no one ever did or ever will even attempt to accomplish any 
such object, and until it is accomplished. Materialism must be 
regarded, not only as utterly void of all evidence to sustain its 
claims, but as contradicted by the highest possible evidence. 

5. Materialism also rests upon the assumption, that 
Nature, in the very highest departments of her creations, 
is fundamentally constituted in fixed and immutable adap- 
tation to the unreal instead of the real, and that the prin- 
ciple that for all the necessities or demands of the nature of 
sentient existences, there are corresponding provisions, and 
for every fundamental adaptation of such existences, there 
is a corresponding sphere of action, is totally false, as far as 
the highest wants and adaptations of such existences are con- 
cerned, and this system must be false, unless that assump- 
30* 



354 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tion is true, an assumptiou also unsustained by the least 
shadow of evidence of any kiud. Mind, as we have seen, is, 
in all the higher departments of its nature, fundamentally con- 
stituted in fixed and immutable correlation to one all-overshad- 
owing reality, that of a personal God, endowed, as the creatoi 
and governor of the universe, with all the attributes involved 
in the ideas of absolute infinity and perfection. Materialism 
takes away this greatest of all actual or conceivable realities, 
and thus assumes, that the great basis principle of all Science 
pertaining to the relations of sentient existences, is totally false 
as far as the highest wants and adaptations of such existences 
are concerned, to wit, the moral and spiritual nature of Mind. 
Nature never vibrates to the unreal. Why should we assume 
this principle to be false, in reference to the highest of all the 
wants and adaptations of that to which all things else sustain 
the exclusive relation of a means ? Should we grant the as- 
sumption without absolute demonstration of its validity ? ]Ma- 
terialism demands this assumption of us, without producing 
the least shade of evidence of its truth, and Materialism must 
fall unless this foundationless assumption is granted. 

6. Nor is it possible, in accordance with the principles of 
this system, to account for the great leading facts of the Uni- 
verse. Those of Mind, of all others the great central facts, 
we have already considered. To an explanation of not one of 
these facts, can this system make the least approach whatever. 
Equally impotent is it, in its attempts to explain the facts of 
the external material creation. If Matter is the only real sub- 
stance, it must contain within itself, as an immutably inherent 
law of its own nature, the unconditioned and absolute cause of 
all organizations animal and vegetable, in existence, and of 
the entire mechanism of the universe. As that cause existed 
from eternity, it must have acted from eternity, and that with 
all possible force. It must have thus acted, or it could never 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 355 

have acted at all. Those internal principles which prevented 
its acting from eternity up to any given or conceivable period, 
must have prevented its acting at all to eternity. Creation, 
then, the general organization of the universe, and all vegeta- 
ble and animal organization, must have been from eternity, or 
it could, by no possibility, have occurred at all. Creation is 
not from eternity, but had its origin in time. Its cause, then, 
can be no inherent law of Matter. The materialist may deny 
the fact of the origin of the present order of things in time, 
and then he is confronted by all the known leading facts of the 
universe ; or he may admit the fact under consideration, and 
then his own system is demonstrably false. It can no more be 
true, than that the same thing can exist and not exist, at the 
same time. That which, from eternity to a given period of 
time, had no existence, and then began to be, as is true of the 
present order of things throughout the universe, can, by no 
possibility, owe its existence to any inherent law of Matter. If 
this proposition is not self-evident, none other is, or can be. 

The time was when the earth existed with a total destitu- 
tion of all forms of vegetable or animal organization, and of 
all the embryo principles from which such organizations now 
result. Such are the absolute teachings of Science upon this 
subject. From what known law of Matter (and we are permit- 
ted to reason from such laws only), could existing and past 
organizations have originated ? With Matter given in a 
state of total and universal unorganization, and of corres- 
ponding destitution of all embryo principles from which ani- 
mal or vegetable organizations now arise, let the Materialist 
designate the known law of Matter from which he can deduce 
the organizations which do exist. Unless he can do this, every 
principle of true Science requires, that we refer the origin of 
such effects to a cause out of Matter and above it. 

It is also a well ascertained fact of Science, that the gen- 



356 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOjfHT. 

eral organization of the universe, as revealed by the science of 
Astronomy, is an event of time, and not a reality existing from 
eternity. The time was when Matter was not organized into 
systems of suns and worlds as it now is. As now organized, 
there are two classes of facts which demand special attention, 
those which result from the inherent latvs ox proj>erties of Mat- 
ter, and those which pertain to what may be called its acci- 
dents. The attraction of bodies towards a common center re- 
sults from the inherent properties of Matter. Motion, on the 
other hand, and especially in any given dii-ection, is not such 
a property, but a pure accident of this substance. The har- 
mony of the movements of the heavenly bodies results from a 
perfect equality of two opposite motions, one of which results 
exclusively from the inherent properties of Matter, and the 
other, both in its degree and direction is, as exclusively, a 
pure accident of the same substance. I refer, of course, to the 
centripetal and centrifugal forces, by the perfect equality of 
which the planets are held in their orbits, as they move about 
their central suns. Now this centrifugal force, both in its de- 
gree and direction, must have existed from eternity, or it can 
never be accounted for by a reference to the inherent proper- 
ties of Matter : because it in no form results from such proper- 
ties. Separate this motion in either form from Matter, and 
by no conceivable possibility, but by a power out of Matter, 
can that motion ever be attached to it. If this motion did 
eternally attach to this substance, the system of worlds, as they 
now exist, must have been from eternity. So of the world 
which we inhabit, with all its animal and vegetable organiza- 
tions. The Materialist may take the ground, that this motion, 
in both forms, did attach to Matter from eternity, and then he 
is confronted by all the teachings of Science, and by all the 
great leading facts of the Universe. Or he may admit that 
these accidents did not thus attach to this substance, and then 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 357 

his system leaves him no principles by which he can account 
for the organization of the system of creation. Upon one or 
the other of these rocks his system must be fatally impaled. 

7. Materialism, I remark finally, must fall to pieces upon 
its own favorite principle, to wit, that the laws of nature are 
absolutely uniform and invariahle in their operation. We 
grant this principle as of fundamental authority in interpret- 
ing the facts of the universe. But what are the laws of na- 
ture ? This question cannot be answered a priori, but exclu- 
sively dpos^enon. Nature's laws can be discovered only by 
careful observation of her actual operations. When we have 
discovered those laws, if we can find any undeniable facts in 
nature which could not have been produced through those 
laws, then we know absolutely that a power out of and above 
nature does exist, and that these facts are the result of the ac- 
tion of that power. Let us now notice some of these laws : 
1. Every species of vegetables and animals has an independent 
existence, that is, was not derived by transmutation from any 
other species. Not a solitary fact can be adduced, in the pre- 
sent or geological history of the earth contradictory to, and 
not confirmatory of this law. No advocate of the Develop- 
ment theory pretends to find, in the present or past facts of the 
earth's history, a solitary intermediate formation from which 
the truth of his theory can be deduced. The above then 
must be regai-ded as a law of nature, or no such law stands re- 
vealed through the known facts of the universe. 2. Every 
individual vegetable and animal derives its existence, as such 
a vegetable or animal, through a fixed and immutable law of 
projjagation. Every plant is derived from a seed, and every 
seed from a plant of its own species, and every animal is de- 
rived through the prior union of two individuals, a male and a 
female. If this is not a law of nature, no such law can be 
revealed to us through nature's operations. 3. Another 



358 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

equally manifest and universal law of nature is this, that all 
animals, and vegetables too, commence their existence in an 
embryo state, and that all the leading species of the former 
class can arrive at maturity but through parental caro and sus- 
tenance. 

Now if it is true (and no fact can properly be adduced as 
a fact of science, if this cannot), that the time was when no 
vegetables or animals, or any embryo principles from which 
such organizations now originate, did exist, then the following 
conclusions are undeniable : 1. Every species of vegetable 
and animal existence owes its origin, not to the laws of nature, 
but to a power not only out of and above Matter, but nature 
also. 2. The original pair from which all leading species of 
animals was derived, was originally produced, not in an em- 
bryo state, but in a state of maturity, a state in which they 
were capable of self sustentation. 3. The laws of nature, in 
accordance with which such species now derive their existence, 
owe their origin, not to nature herself, but to the very power 
above referred to. How can Materialism avoid these conclu- 
sions ? We affirm, that it cannot avoid them, and therefore, 
that it must fall to pieces upon its own principles. I hav^l^^ 
just alluded to a few of the considerations which lie against^ . ' 
this theory, a theory not only not sustained by any form or 
degree of evidence whatever, but also confronted by all the 
great central facts of the universe. I have said enough, how- 
ever, to enable the rftider to estimate duly its real claims to 
his regard, a theory which has no higher merit than the infi- 
nitely absurd attempt to resolve the highest conceivable orders 
of substances into the lowest, and to deduce from the lowest 
conceivable phenomena those which are absolutely the highest. 
Matter and Mind stand at the widest extremes of conceivable 
existence. To resolve the latter into the former, is an absurd- 



If 



mSCELLANEODS TOPICS. 359 

ity no less than the affirmation, that the whole is always less 
than any one of its parts. 



?y SYSTEMS OF IDEALISM. 

^» While Materialism resolves all substances into Matter, 

' Idealism denies all reality of Matter, and resolves all realities 
C^ into different forms of spiritual existence, or manifestation. 
"^ 'All that the Mind knows or can know, according to this sys- 
tem, is its own operations. Nothing out of the Mind, there- 
fore, can be to it an object of knowledge. Now the various 
forms of Idealism, to an elucidation of which special attention 
is here invited, take their rise wholly from the different prin- 
ciples on which the facts of Consciousness are explained. 

^ IDEAL DUALISM. 

One system assumes the reality of two unknown and un- 
knowable substances, called Noumena, to wit, the suhject which 
thinks, and the ohject which, in some unknown and unknow- 
able manner, affects the thinking something, and sets the ma- 
chinery of thought in motion. This is the system of Ideal 
'' Dualism, of which Kant is the great representative and ex- 
f pounder. The effect which the external object produces in the 
thinking subject, is denominated sensation. This sensation, 
through the idea of substance and phenomena, i« given in 
Consciousness, as a phenomenon of the subject, the Me, and 
thus we have the idea of ourselves. At the same time, the 
same phenomenon, the sensation, is, in the same Conscious- 
ness, through the ideas of time and space, perceived as a qual- 
ity of a substance external to the mind, a substance having 
extension, form, &c., the sensation constituting, as we have 
seen in former chapters, the content of the perception, while 
the ideas of time and space give \t form, and make the object, 



dOU INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the sensation itself, appear as a reality wholly external to and 
diverse fjom the Mind. Through ideas pre-existing in the Rea- 
son, the Understanding forms notions of this and other objects 
similarly envisaged in the Mind, and the Judgment, through the 
ideas of resemblance and difference, abstracts, classifies and gen- 
eralizes them. Thus we attain to our conceptions of the universe, 
material and mental. No real objects corresponding to these 
conceptions exist. '' The things which we envisage," in the lan- 
guage of Kant, " are not that in themselves for which we take 
them ; neither are their relationships so constituted as they ap- 
pear to us. If we do away with our subject, or even only the sub- 
jective quality of the senses in general, every quality, all rela- 
tionships of objects in space and time, nay, even space and time 
themselves would disappear, and cannot exist as phenomena in 
themselves, but only in us." We ourselves, and all things 
which we take as real, are mere phenomena to which no cor- 
responding realities do, or, as we shall see must be the case ac- 
cording to the fundamental principles of the theory, can exist. 

WHAT ARE REALITIES ACCORDING TO THIS SYSTEM? 

Such is the system of Ideal Dualism. While, according 
to its fundamental teachings, we can have no positive knowl- 
edge of noumena, that is, of things as they are in themselves, 
we can make some important declarations negatively in regard 
to them, declarations which cannot but be true. For example : 

1. According to the principles of this system, there can be 
no substances, or noumena, having real extension ov form. If 
space has no real existence, as this system affirms that it has 
not, and the sj'stem cannot be true if it has, then, by no possi- 
bility can any objects exist which really and truly have exten- 
sion and form. 

2. Nor, according to the principles of the same system, can 
there be any intelligent or sensitive existences which really 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 361 

have any mccessive experiences, that is, thoughts, or feelings, 
or purposes, which really succeed each other, nor can there be 
anywhere any really successive events? Time as well as space, 
is nothing in itself, according to this system. Then there can 
be no succession of events, or experiences, mental or physical. 

3. Neither can there be any G-od sustaining to this or any 
other universe, to noumena or phenomena of any kind, the 
real relation of creator or governor. Creator and creature, ru- 
ler and subject, of necessity, suppose events as really success- 
ive. No such realities can exist, according to this system 
The only idea of Grod that it can admit as valid, is that of an 
unknown and unknowable something, sustaining unknown and 
unknowable relations to unknown and unknowable noumena 
existing nowhere and in no time, and which have in them- 
selves neither extension, nor form, nor successive phenomena. 

4. According to the principles of this system also, it is total- 
ly unphilosophical to suppose a real Divinity of any kind. The 
supposition of such a reality is wholly unnecessary to account 
for the facts of Consciousness as given in the system, or any 
other facts whatevei'. This Kant himself perfectly under- 
stood. He was in theory, in consistency with the principles 
of his system, as blank an atheist as David Hume, though not 
as far from the just charge of hypocrisy. Kant gave out to the 
world that the doctrines of the evangelical faith would be im- 
mutably established by his system, that " only by means of 
this Critick can the roots themselves be cut off from Material- 
ism, Fatalism, Atheism, Free-Thinking, Unbelief, Fanaticism 
— and Idealism and Skepticism," and then taught positively 
that God is nothing, but like time and space " a regulative 
idea," " in many respects a very useful idea," that when we 
think of God, " it is only a being in idea that we think," and 
that in reference to the order and harmony of the universe, " it 
■must be the same thing to us where we perceive this, to say, 

31 



362 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

God has so •wisely decreed, or nature has so wisely ordered it. 
Practically we are to treat the idea of God as valid, just as we 
should that of nature ; but neither is to be intellectually re- 
garded as representing anything whatever that is real. It is 
enough to say, however, that if Kant was not a blank Atheist, 
it was because he refused to admit the necessary logical conse- 
quences of his own fundamental principles. Ideal Dualism is, 
and can be, in itself, nothing more than a system of absolute 
Atheism. 

REMARKS UPON THIS SYSTEM. 

In demonstrating, as we have done in former chapters, that 
all the fundamental principles of this system are false, and to- 
tally so, we have shown undeniably, that the system itself can- 
not be true. 

1. The system of Ideal Dualism, or that of Kant, rests 
fundamentally upon the assumption that all of our knowl- 
edge of Matter is exclusively through sensation, and therefore 
mediate, or representative. We have shown that but di. part of 
our knowledge of Matter is through sensation, and therefore rep- 
resentative ; that, on the other hand, our knowledge of all its es- 
sential qualities is really and truly presentative, and therefore 
just as valid for the reality of its object as is that of our own 
mental states. 2. Kant maintains, that the ideas of time and 
space give form to Sense-perceptions, and that those ideas are, 
consequently, the chronological antecedents of such perceptions. 
We have shown that these ideas, on the other hand, are the chro- 
nological consequents of such perceptions, that we do not have 
these perceptions because we have these ideas, but that we have 
these ideas, because we first have the perceptions, and that 
these ideas instead of being laws of Sense-perception, are in 
fact, categories of Understanding-conceptions. 3. Kant, in 
the next place, bases his system upon a distinction which he 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 363 

makes between analytical and synthetical judgments. We 
have shown that he has fundamentally erred, first, in his defi- 
nition of these judgments, and secondly, in the application 
•which he has made of them even as defined by himself, and 
consequently, that none of the conclusions which he deduces 
from them are valid. 4. Kant maintains, that all our ideas 
of an external material universe are self-contradictory, and 
therefore that no such universe can exist. We have shown, 
that his whole argument upon this subject is based upon a 
very gross psychological error, mistaking an idea of Reason for 
an Understanding-conception, and that no such contradictions 
as he professedly adduces do or can exist. 5. Kant maintains 
that none of the ideas or principles of Reason are valid for 
things in themselves. We have shown that all such ideas and 
principles must be thus valid. Ideal Dualism cannot be true, 
unless all the above-named principles of Kant are true, and, 
as we have seen, not one of them is or can be true. 

In addition to the above, I would here remark, that this 
system is totally self-contradictory . It maintains, that no 
ideas of Reason are valid for things in themselves, and then 
rests wholly upon the assumption, that some at least of these 
very ideas are thus valid. To explain the facts of Conscious- 
ness, it assumes the reality of two entities, the subject and 
object. Here then we have the idea of substance and quality 
as valid for things in themselves. Kant affirms also, '' that all 
our cognition occurs through objects which affect our senses, 
and partly of themselves produce representations, and partly 
bring our Understanding capacity into action.^' Here we have 
the idea of cause and effect assumed as valid for things in 
themselves, and also that of time ; for cause and eft'ect imply 
real succession, and consequently the objective validity of the 
idea of time. Now if these ideas of Reason should be re- 
garded as valid for things in themselves, all others would be. 



364 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Further, the entire system of Ideal Dualism is based upon the 
assumption, that knowledge has a real beginning and a real 
progress. But this not only assumes the reality of succession, 
and consequently the objective validity of the idea of time, 
but also bases the explanation of the facts of Consciousness 
upon an assumption which this philosophy denies, which cannot 
be true, if this philosophy is true, and which Kant himself 
formally denies in his Critick of pure Reason, page 41, to wit, 
that human knowledge has a real beginning and real progress. 
A system thus self-contradictory cannot be true. 

The system of Ideal Dualism also rests upon an assump- 
tion, the truth of which, as Kant himself admits, we cannot 
even conceive to be possible, and that system cannot be true 
unless the validity of this assumption be granted, to wit, the 
pure ideality of space. " We can never make to ourselves," 
he says, '' a representation of this, — that there is no space, 
although we may very readily think, that no objects therein 
are to be met with." In a few pages subsequent, he tells us, 
that " if we should do away with our subject, or even only the 
subjective quality of our senses in general, every quality, all 
relationships of objects in Space and Time, nay, even Time 
and Space themselves, would disappear, and cannot exist as 
phenomena in themselves, but only in us." In other words, 
that which we cannot but conceive of as real, whether we our- 
selves, or anything else exists or not, would, according to this 
philosophy, be totally annihilated, if even the subjective qual- 
ity of our senses was changed. The same idea is given in this 
philosophy, as unconditionally necessary and absolute, on the 
one hand, and as purely contingent on the other, and Ideal 
Dualism cannot be true, unless the same thing in itself cannot 
but be, and at the same time may or may not be, that is, un- 
less the same thing can, at the same time, exist and not exist. 

This philosophy also rests upon the assumption, that all 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 865 

departments of our nature, intellectual, sensitive, and volun- 
tary, are immutably correlated to the unreal, instead of the 
real, and that in respect to ourselves, the universe, and Gud. 
For a personal Grod whom, according to the fundamental de- 
mands of our higher nature, we can love, worship, pray to, 
and confide in, it substitutes a mere " regulative idea," an in- 
finite nonentity, without substance or real attributes. For a 
substantial and glorious universe, material and mental, to 
which as such a reality, as Kant admits, our nature is corre- 
lated, it substitutes an " airy nothing," without " a local habi- 
tation or a name." In other words, according to the funda- 
mental teachings of this philosophy, our entire nature is im- 
mutably correlated to the unreal, instead of the real. Unless 
nature vibrates exclusively to the unreal, this philosophy must 
be false. 

The entire deductions of this philosophy, I remark again, 
are immutably opposed to the necessary intuitive convictions 
of the universal Intelligence. This Kant himself admits. 
This philosophy gives the universe as a non-reality, but it can 
never, as he affirms, make that universe appear to the Intelli- 
gence as anything else than real. *' For," he says, " we have 
to do with a natural and unavoidable illusion, which itself 
reposes upon subjective principles," an illusion which, as he 
subsequently affirms, '' irresistibly adheres to human reason." 
In other words, his philosophy gives, as only true, what, as he 
himself affirms, human reason irresistibly affirms to be false. 
Need we any further demonstration of the fact, that such a 
philosophy must be " science falsely so called ?" Other consid- 
erations bearing upon this system are reserved till we come 
to speak of the general characteristics of Idealism in all its 
forms. 

31* 



SbO INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM. SYSTEM STATED. 

Ideal Dualism, as we have seen, affirms the reality of two 
unlcnowQ and unknowable entities (noumena), the one sus- 
taining to certain phenomena (sensations) in the other, the 
relation of a cause. This admission, as we have also seen, 
affirms the validity of certain ideas of Reason, for things in 
themselves, an admission perfectly fatal to the claims of Ideal- 
ism in every form, a system which, in no form, can be true, if 
any ideas of Reason are thus valid. To avoid this fatal rock, 
Fichte, who was at first a disciple of Kant, and who, as finally 
dissenting from him, became the author of Subjective Idealism, 
in its modern form, took away the external object entirely, re- 
solving all realities, the universe, and God into the subject, 
" the Me." Kant took for granted the validity of sensation 
for an external object or cause. The unity of scientific truth, 
as Fichte maintained, requires that nothing should be taken 
for granted, that beginning with self-evident truths, every sub- 
sequent step should be taken with absolute demonstrative cer- 
tainty. Of what then has the Mind an absolute knowledge, 
a knowledge so absolute, that no skeptic ever questioned its 
validity ? Of its own operations, its sensations, desires, per- 
ceptions, judgments, ideas, &c. These then are to be assumed 
as the only known realities, and whatever else is to be admitted 
as real, must be shown from these to be such, and that with 
demonstrative certainty. In the center of this one circle, 
therefore, — the mind's own operations, — Philosophy must 
take its stand. All without this circle must be held as unreal. 
Yet in this very circle, the Mind, the only reality according 
to this system, apprehends itself, as encompassed by an exter- 
nal universe, as the grand theater and cause of its own opera- 
tions. How shall we account for such phenomena? "We 
must find their cause wholly within the subject. 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 367 

In the subject, according to this system, two distinct and 
opposite principles exist — the principle of spontaneous self- 
activity and expansion — and that of certain "inexplicable 
limitations." In its spontaneous activities, its efforts after 
self-development and expansion, the Mind, through laws and 
principles inherent in its own nature, finds itself limited and 
confined. In itself, therefore, it experiences the feeling of re- 
sistance to its own activities, of confinement within certain 
limits beyond which it vainly endeavors to expand itself. This 
feeling may be called a sensation As seen by the eye of Con- 
sciousness, it is in the first instance, through the idea of sub- 
stance and phenomena, postulated by the Intelligence as a 
phenomenon of the Mind itself, and thus the idea of " the 
Me" is attained. In the next instance, this same feeling, as 
seen by the eye of Consciousness, in its exterior function, is 
perceived, through the ideas of Time and Space, as the quality 
of an object external to the Mind, an object having extension, 
form, &c. Thus we attain to the idea of a " Not-me," an exter- 
nal material universe, and to that of Grod, as the creator and 
governor of this universe. As the universe is no reality in 
itself, and has no existence out of the Mind, so Grod is nothing 
but an ideal of the Mind's own formation, an idea of moral 
order formed by the Mind, and in conformity to which it real- 
izes its own development. God is not the creator of "the 
Me," or of " the Not-me," but is himself created by " the Me," 
a favorite form of expression with certain leading disciples of 
this school. 

Ideas and principles of Reason have the same place in this 
system, that they have in that of Ideal Dualism, that of prin- 
ciples and laws which have no objective validity. Such is 
subjective Idealism. On this system I remark : 



368 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



REMARKS UPON THIS SYSTEM. 

1. That it is throughout irreconcilably self-contradictory. 
Its fundamental principle is this, that nothing is to be taken 
for granted, and then it bases its entire explanation of the facts 
of Consciousness upon a pure assumption which is taken for 
granted, to wit, the existence within the Mind of certain 
" spontaneous activities/' on the one hand, and of certain 
" inexplicable limitations," on the other. These entities, if 
they be such, lie as much without the circle of the Mind's 
conscious operations as the external universe. The latter may 
just as properly be taken for granted as the former. Further, 
this system rests upon the assumption that no ideas of Reason 
are valid for things in themselves, and then assumes that some 
of these ideas are thus valid, those of cause and effect, phe- 
nomena and substance, &c. 

2. The explanation of the facts of Consciousness, as given 
in this system, is based wholly upon mere assumptions, which 
are not only not self-evident, but whose validity can, by no 
possibility, be established by evidence. The reality of these 
" spontaneous activities," and " inexplicable limitations," can- 
not be shown to be either the logical antecedent or consequent of 
any one, nor of all of the facts of Consciousness together. In 
other words, this system is wholly based upon an hypothesis 
which is not only nut self-evident, but which is wholly inca- 
pable of being established by any form or degree of evidence 
whatever. 

3. But granting this hypothesis as true, it is absolutely 
impossible to deduce from it the entire facts of Consciousness 
just as they are, what every valid hypothesis must and will 
do. Take these activities and limitations, and how can it be 
shown, that from them, in connection with the known laws of 
mind, just the thoughts, feelings, and voluntary determinations 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 369 

actually given in Consciousness, would arise, and that none 
others could arise. There is no conceivable connection be- 
tween the antecedent and consequent, in this case, and no such 
consequent can be shown to exist. Yet such a connection 
must be shown to exist, or Subjective Idealism is void of all 
claims to our regard. 

4. This system also rests upon an assumption which we 
have already shown to be false, the assumption that the Mind 
has no absolute knowledge of anything but of its own opera- 
tions. We have already seen, that the Mind has the same 
direct, presentative knowledge of the qualities of Matter, that 
it has of its own operations. It would be no more a denial of 
the palpable facts of Consciousness to affirm the non-reality of 
the former than it would to deny that of the latter. This sys- 
tem cannot be true, unless Consciousness is " a liar from the 
beginning." 

5. The legitimate logical results of the fundamental principles 
of this system, is absolute Nihilism, a denial of the reality of 
all substances, objective and subjective, finite and infinite. 
Everything without the circle of absolute knowledge is, accord- 
ing to these principles, to be held as unreal, and nothing but 
the Mind's own operations are objects of this form of knowl- 
edge. These, then, should be assumed as the only realities, 
and the reality of all else denied. This is pure Idealism, or 
Nihilism, a system which must be true, if the fundamental 
principles of that under consideration are true. 

6. This system, I remark finally, is fundamentally subver- 
sive of all the principles of morality and religion. As far as 
God is concerned, it is a system of absolute Atheism. Equally 
subversive is it of all forms of obligation, arising from the 
civil, social and domestic relations of life. Nonentities have 
no moral claims upon us. All is unreal according to this sys- 
tem, without the circle of " the Me." " The Me" is the only 



370 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

reality. " The Me" begets its own parent as well as creates its 
own God, and things begotten and created are absolute nonen- 
tities. To whom, then, does it owe its moral allegiance ? To 
itself alone. There is not, and cannot be, any religious, so- 
cial, civil, or domestic moral tie, if this system is true. These 
are its legitimate logical consequents, the total subversion of 
all the principles of morality and religion. 

PANTHEISM, OR THE SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE IDENTITY. 

Subjective Idealism assumes the subject, " the Me," as the 
absolute principle of all things, thus resolving the universe and 
the Infinite into the Finite. Each individual being has this 
principle in himself, and hence there are as many such princi- 
ples as there are men. The unity of Science requires that 
there should be but one Absolute. Hence the assumption, 
that the Absolute, in the language of Morell, '' is not the indi- 
vidual * Me' that resides in every man, but the divine ' Me' 
of which every man is the image or reflection." Fichte, to 
escape certain insuperable difiQculties involved in the system of 
Kant, took away the object, and resolved all realities into the 
subject. Schelling, the author of the system of Absolute 
Identity in its modern form, to escape similar diflBculties in the 
system of Fichte, took away all subjects but one, the Infinite 
and the Absolute, and resolved all realities into that. The 
grand consummation to be sought, the Absolute unity of Sci- 
ence, required, that a principle should be found in which there 
should be an absolute identity between the Finite and the Infi- 
nite, the subject and the object, between bein(]f and knowing. 
The following propositions will present the fundamental ele- 
ments and characteristics of this system : 

ELEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS SYSTEM. 

1. Being and knowing are in fact one and identical. There 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 371 

is no such thing as an object to be known, and a poicer of knowl- 
edge, and then an act of knowledge consequent on the mutual 
correlation between the object and power referred to. The act 
of knowing and the thing Jcnowrij on the other hand, are one 
and identical. 

2. The universe, material and mental, is nothing but the In- 
finite and Absolute in a state of development. Before creation 
commenced, an infinite mind, essence, or thought — these words, 
according to this system, being identical in their meaning — 
filled the immensity of space. This infinite something is the 
only reality. All individualities, all finite objects, or person- 
alities, are nothing but the diverse forms which this one sole 
substantiality assumes, in the process of self-development. In 
the Infinite and Absolute, two opposite forces, each infinite and 
indestructible, exist, one tending to expand infinitely, and the 
other seeking to know itself in this infinity. The result of 
these two forces interpenetrating each other, each being infinite 
and indestructible, is a finite generation. Hence individual- 
ities finite and limited, arise. These individualites are not sep- 
arate existences, but only forms in which the Infinite and 
Absolute develops itself. In the finite the same contradiction, 
the same conflict of opposing forces, is repeated — the finite 
seeking to expand itself, and to know itself in this expansion. 
In this act of self-consciousness, the finite is present to itself 
as subject and object. The object is the external creation. 
The subject is the being who knows this creation. Yet the 
subject and object are not two, but one and the same. Neither 
is distinct from the Infinite and Absolute, but only a form in 
which the postulate lam in the Infinite is repeated. The I 
in the Finite and Infinite, in order to know itself, must see it- 
self in the act of perceiving an object. For how can we know 
what perception is, that is, know ourselves as percipients, only 
by knowing ourselves in the act of perceiving something, that 



372 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is, some object? But the object known cannot be diflferent 
from the subject which knows, since being and knowing are 
correlative, and must meet in the same subject. The subject, 
then, knows itself by seeing itself as its own object, an object 
postulated as external to the self, in order that the I may 
know itself in the act of perceiving something which to itself, 
that is, to the philosopher (since, as Coleridge remarks, none 
but philosophers who have a peculiar philosophical talent can 
descend to such depths), is both itself and not itself. In thus 
seeing ourselves in all things, and finding all things in our- 
selves, we at length, as streams in the ocean from whence 
they came, lose ourselves and all things in the Infinite and Ab- 
solute. The infinite projects itself into the finite in order to 
know itself in producing and perceiving the finite. The finite 
loses itself again in the Infinite, as bubbles in the ocean from 
which, for a moment, they appear as separate, without being 
in reality distinct existences. God is the sole reality, creation 
the mirror in which he sees himself, by an act of self-projec- 
tion in the finite. This is the Pantheistic System, which re- 
sulted as the " natural daughter" from the philosophy of Kant. 
I do not say, that I have made myself understood, in the hints 
above given, of this strange philosophy. How can that be 
rendered intelligible which its great expounder aifirms can 
never be symbolized by words, which must be thought in order 
to be understood, which can be thought only by the peculiarly 
gifted, and to these has no other claims to truth, than that it 
is thought ? 4» 

3. Prior to development in the universe, God exists in a 
state of undeveloped, unconscious impersonality, and exists 
simply and exclusively as the absolute essence from which all 
things, by a necessary law of development in said essence, pro- 
ceed. As developed in the universe also, the Absolute attains 



MISCELLANEOUS TOItCS. 373 

to Self-Consciousness, that is, to the exercise of real Intelli- 
gence, only in the consciousness of humanity. 

4. Creation, while it proceeds according to laws of Intelli- 
gence,- is not the result of intelligent foresight, and of a corres- 
ponding act of Will, but, as said above, of a necessary law 
acting potentially in the Absolute. This law renders it impos- 
sible that this process should not occur, or that it should take 
on a diflFeret form from what it actually does. 

5. This system, as a matter of fact, leaves us with no 
higher object of intelligent worship, and no more perfectly 
meets the demands of the religious sentiment in man, than 
does that of Subjective Idealism. An undeveloped uncon- 
scious impersonality is surely no object of intelligent worship, 
and this is God, as originally given in the system. Then, if 
the Absolute, in a state of development, is to be worshiped at 
all, it should be most undeniably, in the highest form in which 
He is therein presented, and that is the state in which He at- 
tains to self-conscious personality, that is in the Consciousness 
of man. Humanity, and that only, is God, in a state of de- 
velopment. Humanity, then, is to itself the only proper object 
of worship — humanity as the Absolute developed. But the 
same thing appears, only under another name, in the system 
of Subjective Idealism. Any system which presents the uni- 
verse in a state of development, or undevelopment, as God, is 
really and truly a system of blank Atheism, and nothing else. 

6. The necessary logical consequence of this system is that 
of Absolute Idealism, with g^denial of the existence of all sub- 
stances, finite and infinite. If being and knowing are one and 
identical, then, undeniably, thought without subject or object, 
is the only reality. Creation is nothing but a process of think- 
ing, and God is only an infinite thought in a state of undevel- 
opment. 



32 



374 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

REMARKS UPON THIS SYSTEM. 

Such is the system of Absolute Identity or Pantheism. 
That it is utterly false and foundationless, I argue from the 
following considerations : 

1. While it professedly gives a perfectly scientific system of 
knowledge, a system based upon self-evident axioms and postu- 
lates, it actually rests upon no form or degree of evidence 
whatever. The only claim set up in its behalf by Schelling 
himself, is a special faculty of intuition, inborn only in the few, 
and absolutely wanting in the general Intelligence, a faculty 
of intuition which, in the language of Morell, "affords us a 
species of knowledge which does not involve the relation of 
subject and object, but enables us to gaze at once by the eye 
of the Mind upon the eternal principle itself, from which both 
proceed, and in which thought and existence are absolutely 
identical." The reality of such a faculty, and its absolute au- 
thority in philosophy is wholly taken for granted in the sys- 
tem, without any attempt to establish either by evidence. In 
other words, this system rests upon unathorized assumptions, 
and upon nothing else. All real science has its exclusive ba- 
sis in axioms and postulates, self-evident not only to the few, 
but to the universal Intelligence. Such would be the basis of 
this system, were it founded on the rock of truth. 

2. The system is, in itself, intrinsically absurd and self- 
contradictory. The idea that that which is in itself already 
both infinite and absolute, has in itself the principle of self- 
development and self-expansion is intrinsically absurd and self- 
contradictory. We might, with the same propriety affirm, that 
infinite duration and boundless space contain in themselves the 
same principles, and that the action of these principles in these 
realities is the cause of all the facts of creation. The idea of 
development pertains to the finite alone. The Infinite and 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 375 

Absolute are already developed, or they never can be. Then 
the idea of an infinite and absolute thought (for being and 
knowing are identical, according to the system) seeking self- 
development, or having in itself such a principle, is, of all 
things, intrinsically absurd and self-contradictory, and the 
Mind cannot but thus regard the subject, the moment the idea 
is suggested. 

3. There is an absolute want of intelligible connection be- 
tween the principles of the system and the results deduced 
from them. We will first present these principles as set forth 
by Coleridge. " Descartes," he says, " speaking as a natural- 
ist, and in imitation of Archimides, said. Give me matter and 
motion, and I will construct you the universe. We must of 
course understand him to have meant : I will render the con- 
struction of the universe intelligible. In the same sense the 
transcendental philosopher says. Grant me a nature having two 
contrary forces, the one of which tends to expand infinitely, 
"while the other strives to apprehend or find itself in this in- 
finity, and I will cause the world of intelligences, with the 
whole system of their representations, to rise up before you. 
Every other science pre-supposes Intelligence as already exist- 
ing and complete. The philosopher contemplates it in its 
growth, and, as it were, represents its history to the mind, 
from its birth to its maturity." Again, " It is equally clear, 
that two equal forces acting in opposite directions, both being 
finite, and each distinguished from the other by its direction 
only, must neutralize or reduce each other to inaction. Now 
the transcendental philosophy demands, first, that two forces 
should be conceived which counteract each other by their es- 
sential nature ; not only in consequence of the accidental di- 
rection of each, but as prior to all direction, nay, as the pri- 
mary forces from which the conditions of all possible directions 
are derivative and deducible : secondly, that these forces should 



376 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

be assumed to be both alike infinite, both alike indestructible. 
The problem will then be to discover the result or product of 
two such forces, as distinguished from the result of those 
forces which are finite, and derive their diflference solely from 
the circumstance of these directions. When we have formed 
a scheme or outline of these two different kinds of force, and 
of their different results, by the process of discursive reasoning, 
it will then remain for us to elevate the Thesis from notional 
to actual, by contemplating intuitively this one power, with ita 
two inherent, indestructible, yet counteracting forces, and the 
results or generations to which their interpenetration gives ex- 
istence, in the living principle, and in the process of our own 
self-consciousness." 

Now, in the name of the universal Intelligence, we may 
ask, and we may ask it at the risk of being told that the 
" philosophic talent is not yet inborn in us," Can any Intelli- 
gence like ours, either by intuition, or by any process of dis- 
cursive reason, calculate the results of the action of two such 
forces as these ? Can he show the results, let him conceive 
these infinite and indestructible forces to meet in what direc- 
tion he will ? Above all, can he show, or conceive, that the 
result of the action of such forces, begun in the Infinite and 
repeated in the finite, shall and must be the system of which 
we are conscious, and nothing else ? This he must do, or his 
conclusions are not scientific. Must not a philosopher be, " not 
in himself, but beside himself," who can suppose that the sys- 
tem of mental operations of which we are actually conscious, 
is the real result of the action of two forces, one of which 
tends to expand infinitely, and the other to know itself in that 
expansion, and especially that he can logically deduce from the 
action of such forces, as the necessary result, this system just 
as it is ? Even Hegel could not digest such absurdities ; and 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 377 

hence, he rejected the system which rested on them as a sys- 
tem of monstrosities. 

We will next contemplate these principles as given by 
Schelling. We have given an infinite being, essence or thought, 
an undeveloped, unconscious infinite impersonality, having in 
itself the law or principle of self-development. These are the 
sole principles of the system. Can any one conceive how that 
the necessary results of the process of self-development in such 
an unconscious, undeveloped, infinite impersonality, would be 
the facts of human Consciousness pertaining to the universe 
of Matter and Mind just as they are, and nothing else ? that 
from such a process in such an impersonality, an infinite num- 
ber of self-conscious personalities, such as man is, with all his 
experiences, external and internal, would arise, and that none 
others can arise ? Such a connection as this must be shown 
to exist between the principles of a system, and these facls, or 
it has no claims whatever to our regard. No such connection 
can be conceived or shown to exist between the principles of 
the system under consideration, and the facts attempted to be 
deduced from them. 

4. There are undeniable facts of human Consciousness 
which could not exist at all, if the principles of this system 
were true. If being and knowing, as this system teaches, are 
one and identical, then thought is the only reality, and there 
cannot be in the Infinite and Absolute, developed or unde- 
veloped, or in any of the forms of its development, anything 
like a Sensibility or Free Will, or any of the phenomena per- / 
taining to either of these faculties. But we have the same 
evidence of the reality of the phenomena of these faculties, 
that we have of those of thought. We might, with the same 
propriety, assume, that Sensibility or Will is the only reality, 
as to assume that Intelligence ia, as this system does. This 

32* 



378 INTELLECTUAL I'lllLOSOPHY. 

system can give us but a part of the facts of Consciousness, 
and these not as they are. It therefore must be false. 

5. The idea of God as going through the process of self- 
development, attributed to Him in this system, a process in 
which He finally attains, from a state of unconscious imper- 
sonality, to self-consciousness and personality only in man, de- 
grades the Infinite and Perfect infinitely below religious wor- 
ship or veneration, and thus does the most fatal violence to the 
religious principles and sentiments in the human mind. The 
entire moral and spiritual departments of our nature are wholly 
correlated to the unreal, or this system must be false. Every 
feature of the divine character given in the system, tends to 
degrade infinitely the Divinity in our estimation, on the one 
hand, and the character of humanity, in entertaining such 
ideas of God, on the other. Take this process as described by 
Morell : " This Infinite being, containing everything in itself 
potentially which it can afterwards become actually, strives by 
the law which we have above indicated, after self-development. 
By the first movement (the potence of Reflection), it embodies 
its own infinite attributes in the finite. In doing this, it pro- 
duces finite objects, i. e., finite reflections of itself, and thus 
sees itself objectified in the forms and productions of the ma- 
terial world. This movement, then, gives rise to the philoso- 
phy/ of nature. The second movement (potence of sub-sump- 
tion) is the egress of the Finite into the Infinite ; it is nature, 
as above constituted, again making itself absolute, and resum- 
ing the form of the eternal. The result of this movement is 
mind, as existing in man, which is nothing else than nature 
gradually raised to a state of consciousness, and attempting in 
that way to return to its infinite form. This gives rise to 
transcendental idealism, the philosophy of mind. The combi- 
nation of these two movements (Patur der Vernunft) is the 
reunion of subject and object in the divine reason ; it is God, 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 379 

not in his original or potential, but in his unfolded and realized 
existence, forming the whole universe of Mind and Being. 
This is the proper view of Schelling's pantheism, and is fully 
unfolded in the philosophy of the Absolute." In other words, 
the Infinite and Absolute, the undeveloped, unconscious infi- 
nite Impersonality, attempts in the process of self-reflection to 
develop itself, that is, to see and know itself as it is, and not 
as it is not. The result is certain sensations which it sees as 
phenomena of a not-self, and hence the generation of the ex- 
ternal material universe, or rather perceptions of it, the seeing 
and the thing seen being, according to the system, one and 
identical. The Infinite and Absolute having thus seen itself 
as it is not, that is, as finite instead of infinite, and thus hav- 
ing got out of itself and beside itself, attempts a regress 
through the Finite back into the Infinite, that is, back into 
itself again. In this process the Infinite and Absolute attains, 
for the first time, to the exercise of self-consciousness, and 
here it appears transformed into an indefinite number of self- 
conscious individualities (men), not one of whom knows him- 
self as he is, that is, as Deity developed, but conceives of him- 
self as a self-conscious finite personality, surrounded with finite 
impersonal realities, wholly separate from itself, the material 
universe, and owing its existence to an infinite self-conscious 
personality, God. The Infinite and Absolute now having got 
wholly out of itself and beside itself, and hopelessly so, by any 
process of intuition or induction hitherto generated in any 
form which it has assumed, as a last and desperate resort, gen- 
erates in a few reflections of itself, " an intellectual intuition" 
through which the Infinite and Absolute perceives the whole 
process by which it got out of itself and beside itself, and thus 
it gets back into itself again, not however as it was originally, 
but in a state of complete development. This is no caricature. 
It is this system developed as it is, and who can entertain sen- 



( 



380 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

timents of respect for the Infinite and Absolute when contem- 
plating him as necessitated by the laws of his own being, to go 
through an endless round of such processes as these, and in 
none of them attaining to any higher forms of development, 
or to the exercise of any higher degrees of intelligence than 
appear in the consciousness of man ? 

6. There are other respects in which this system does vio- 
lence to all the laws of the higher, spiritual and religious na- 
ture of universal Mind. For a self-consciousness personality, 
endowed with all the attributes of infinity and perfection, and 
to whom we can look with sentiments of love, veneration, con- 
fidence and hope, the only idea of God to which our nature is 
correlated, it substitutes, in the first instance, an undeveloped, 
unconscious impersonality that neither knows itself nor any 
other object, and in the next, the universe itself as this God 
developed in the highest form to which he can possibly attain, 
an idea of Divinity that meets not a solitary demand of the 
religious sentiment in humanity. For fellowship and inter- 
communion with God, a fundamental demand of the sentiment 
under consideration, it substitutes the union of absolute iden- 
tity. For moral purity, as the exclusive condition of this 
union, it substitutes science, " intellectual intuition." Every 
feature of Divinity presented in the system is in absolute an- 
tagonism to the demands of the religious principle in universal 
Mind. 

7. This system is also equally subversive of morality, in 
every form or degree. All realities in existence are, according 
to its fundamental teachings, nothing but the Infinite and Ab- 
solute developed or undeveloped. All acts and events that ac- 
tually occur, are only diflferent forms and developments of the 
necessary activity of God himself. Unless God himself, and 
the necessary activity of the divine nature, are moral evil, 
there can be no such thing as moral wrong in the universe. 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 381 

Now a system that thus subverts fundamental and immuta- 
ble morality, and belies the Universal Conscience, is not hastily 
spoken of, when it is denominated " science falsely so called." 

8. I remark finally, that there is not, in a single principle 
or deduction of the system, anything good, or useful, or tend- 
ing, in any form, in that direction. Upon the procedure of 
none of the sciences does it throw a solitary ray of light, nor 
present a principle which can be a guide in morals, religion, or 
in any department of human activity. The system stands be- 
fore us simply as a lasting monument of illustrious talents 
wholly misdirected, talents laboring undesignedly, it may be 
hoped, for the subversion of every useful idea and principle 
pertaining to God, to humanity, and the universe. 

PURE IDEALISM. 

All forms of Idealism which we have yet contemplated, in- 
volve absolute contradictions, at the same time afl&rming 
and denying the same things. They are all based upon the 
exclusive assumption, that no ideas of Reason are valid for 
things in themselves, and then fundamentally base their ex- 
planation of the facts of Consciousness, upon the assumption, 
that some of these very ideas are thus valid, the ideas of sub- 
stance, for example, cause and effect, antecedence and conse- 
quence, &c. To escape such fatal rocks. Pure Idealism — the 
last and only other form which Idealism itself ever assumes — 
takes away all substances, all subjects and objects, all real enti- 
ties of every kind, and resolves all things into pure thought 
without subject or object. 

Thought has been supposed to imply two things, a subject 
and object. If either is assumed as real, then ideas of Reason 
are valid for things in themselves. To escape this difficulty, 
Hegel — the author of Pure Idealism in its modern form — ^ 
took away both the subject and the object, and affirmed ; 



382 INTELLECTUAL PHTLOSOPTTY. 

thought itself to be the only reality. Creatiou is nothing but 
a process of thinking, and the law of development inherent in 
thought itself, and giving existence and direction to the process 
of its development is God, God the Infinite and Absolute. 
According to the process of ordinary thinking, every thought 
implies the reality of a subject and object, vy^ith a perceived re- 
lation between them. The subject and object, Hegel affirms to 
be nothing : and the relation, as existing in thought, to be the 
only reality. The universe, therefore, is constituted wholly of 
relations, relations with no real objects related to each other. 
God is not a self-conscious personality, but, as we have said, a 
law of development in thought itself, and attains to self-con- 
sciousness only in man, the divine Consciousness being identi- 
cal with the endlessly progressing Consciousness of humanity. 
In the system of Hegel, God, as an object of thought, occu- 
pies no higher place than in that of Schelling. In that of the 
latter, he is, as we have before shown, an infinite, unconscious, 
undeveloped Impersonality, who attains to development only 
in the Universe, and to self-consciousness only in man. In 
the former system He is an infinite and eternal principle, or law 
inherent in thought itself, an endlessly progressive principle of 
development which attains to Consciousness only in man, and 
is itself synonymous with the ever-advancing Consciousness of 
Humanity. From what is said above, the reader will form a 
conception sufficiently distinct of the principles, essential char- 
acteristics, and bearings of this system, and that is all that is 
requisite for our present investigations. The details are left to 
other writers, whose object is to present the system in its en- 
tireness, in its principles and deductions. A few remarks only 
are requisite to demonstrate its total invalidity. 

1. Th-e system, in its essential principles and logical deduc- 
tions, is in direct contradiction to undeniable and fundamental 
facts of Consciousness. No system, as we have before said, 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. S83 

can be true, "whose essential principles do not, as their necessary 
results give, and whose logical deductions do not perfectly ac- 
cord with, those facts, just as they are. Now assuming thought 
to be the only reality, the principle and cause of all things, 
what can be deduced from it ? Absolutely nothing but forms 
and developments of pure thought itself. Nothing approach- 
ing the phenomena of Sensibility or Will, can, by any possi- 
bility, arise. But these phenomena are realities as fully 
attested as such, as thought itself. "We have the same author- 
ity for affirming feelings or voluntary acts to be exclusive real- 
ities, and to resolve all things into forms which such feelings 
or acts assume, as to postulate the same thing pertaining to 
thoughts. If these phenomena are not real, nothing is, and 
if they are, the system of Absolute Idealism must be founded 
wholly in error. 

2. This system is perfectly self-contradictory in its funda- 
mental principles. The assumption on which the entire super- 
structure rests is this, that nothing shall be assumed as the 
basis of philosophy which is not given in Consciousness, as 
contained in thought itself. The systems of each of his prede- 
cessors was rejected by Hegel for this reason, that in all of 
these systems, alike, something not given in thought, and as 
one of its essential elements, was assumed, as the ground of the 
explanation of the process of thought. After rejecting such a 
principle, as wholly unphilosophical and fatal to the system 
based upon it, what does Hegel do, in the construction of his 
own system ? He has, to be sure, not assumed the reality of 
an infinite and absolute substance from which all things pro- 
ceed, a substance lying out of thought, but he has assumed, as 
the condition and ground of explaining the process of thought, 
the reality of an infinite, eternal, and absolute Jaic, a law in- 
herent in thought itself. Now this law is no more given in Con- 
Bciousness as an element of thought, than the finite and 



L 



384 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

absolute substance above referred to. Both alike, and one 
just as much as the other, lie without the circle of Conscious- 
ness, and both are assumed for the same reason precisely, the 
explanation of the facts of Consciousness. If such an as- 
sumption is fatal to one system, it is to another; the system of 
Absolute Idealism falls to pieces upon its owu principles. Be- 
sides, if we are allowed to assume anything lying without 
thought itself, as the condition and ground of explaining the 
facts of Consciousness, we should make that assumption which 
is in itself the most reasonable, and which best accords with 
the laws of human nature, and the facts of the universe. Now 
the reality of an infinite Being, as the cause of all things, is 
in itself just as conceivable as that of an infinite Laio, and 
the former assumption infinitely better accords with the facts of 
Consciousness, the fundamental demands of our entire moral 
and spiritual nature, and with the facts of the Universe within 
and around us. The system under consideration is not only 
fatally self-contradictory, but is based upon a principle the 
most unreasonable in itself. 

3. The validity of the principles on which this system is 
exclusively founded, is absolutely inconceivable and impossible. 
Thought without a thinker, without subject or object, relations 
without realities related, and phenomena without substance, we 
can no more conceive to be possible or real, than we can con- 
ceive of the annihilation of space. Yet these constitute the 
entire basis and substance of this theory. Well has one of his 
own countrymen remarked, that " Hegel's philosophy is noth- 
ing in itself, and by itself, nor was its author in himself, but 
beside himself." 

4. The legitimate bearings of this system upon morality 
and religion must claim our attention. If thought, with its 
developments, is the only reality, then of nothing but thought 
ean any form of moral obligation be predicated ; and unless 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. S85 

tbought can affirm of itself, that it ouglit not to develop itself 
according to the necessary operations of an infinite, eternal, 
and absolute law, residing within itself, morality has and can 
have no place in the universe. Unless thought also can be to 
itself an object of self-worship, thought which attains and can 
attain to no higher forms of development than appear in the 
Consciousness of humanity, there can be no religion, no sphere 
whatever for the action of the religious sentiment. Yet Abso- 
lute Idealism speaks of God, of Morality, Religion, Sin, Ho- 
liness, Redemption, and Immortality; and professes to solve 
all the great problems of thought pertaining to all these high 
themes. But what are its actual teachings on these subjects? 
Let an individual from the country, from whence this system 
proceeded, answer. " Hegel has a God without holiness, a 
Christ without free love, a Holy Ghost without illumination, a 
Gospel without faith, an Apostacy without sin. Wickedness 
without conscious guilt, an Atonement without remission of sin, 
a Death without an offering, a religious Assembly without di- 
vine worship, a Release without imputation. Justice without a 
judge, Grace without redemption, Dogmatical Theology with- 
out a revelation, a This Side without a That Side, an Immor- 
tality without existence, a Christian Religion without Christi- 
anity, and in general, a Religion without religion." This is no 
caricature, but a valid statement of facts. Take the principles 
of the system, and no other or higher forms of thought on any 
of these subjects can be deduced from it. This system, to- 
gether with that of Absolute Identity, does idealistically what 
Polytheism does materially. It "changes the glory of the 
Incorruptible God, into an image made like unto corruptible 
man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." 

GENERAL REMARKS UPON THE SYSTEMS OP IDEALISM. 

I shall conclude what I have to say upon Idealism, with a 



386 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

few general remarks upon its diverse forms which we have con- 
templated. All these systems, as we have seen, rest upon 
common assumptions, and perfectly harmonize in certain fun« 
damental particulars, in the assumptions, for example, that no 
ideas of Reason are valid for things in themselves, that neither 
ourselves, the universe, nor God, time, space, cause, nor sub- 
stance, are in themselves, or their relationships, " that for 
which we take them," &c. Hence it is that there are certain 
remarks which are equally applicable to every form of develop- 
ment which this system has assumed, or can assume. Among 
these remarks I would direct special attention to the following : 

1. All these systems alike rest upon mere assumptions un- 
sustained by any form or degree of positive evidence whatever. 
Not one of their basis principles are intuitively evident, nor 
can their validity be established by any process of discursive 
reasoning. This has been rendered perfectly evident in our 
preceding investigations. All real science, all true systems of 
knowledge have their basis in principles having apodictical 
certainty, principles v/hose validity is self-affirmed. Not one 
of these systems rests upon any such principles, and conse- 
quently not one of them has any claim whatever to a place in 
the firmament of the sciences. 

2. All these systems are perfectly self -contradictory, and 
rest upon the assumption, that the same identical principles are 
both true and false at the same time. They all rest upon the 
assumption, that no ideas of Reason are valid for things in 
themselves, and must be false, unless that assumption is true. 
Then they all alike base their explication of the facts of the 
universe upon the assumption, that some of these ideas have 
this validity, and not one of these systems can be true, unless 
this assumption also is valid. They all agree, for example, 
that there is somewhere an ultimate reason why the facts of 
Consciousness are what they are, and not otherwise, that there 



MISCELL.INEOUS TOPICS. 387 

is in these facts a real process, a beginning, and a progress, a 
process which results from a real cause inherent in thought it- 
self, in the substance of the Mind, or in the Infinite and Ab- 
solute. Here we have the assumption of the validity of the 
ideas of substance, cause, antecedence and consequence, succes- 
sion and time. But none of these systems can be true, if any 
of these ideas have objective validity, and they cannot be true 
unless these same ideas have this validity. They all rest upon 
the assumption that nothing without the circle of the Mind's 
conscious operations is to be assumed as real, and then base 
their explication of these very facts upon the assumption of 
the validity of principles lying wholly without the circle of 
Consciousness. Now systems thus fundamentally self-contra- 
dictory must be false. 

3. From the principles of none of these systems, nor of all 
together, can we explain the facts of Consciousness, as they 
are. On the other hand, it can be rendered demonstrably evi- 
dent, that if these principles were true, these facts could not, 
by any possibility, be what they are. If, for example, there 
is in the human Mind the power of Will, of voluntary deter- 
mination, not one of these systems can be true, and if such a 
power does not exist, no facts of Consciousness should be as- 
sumed as real. If either of the systems last elucidated is true, 
there not only cannot be any such power as that of Will in 
man, but not even a sensibilit}' : for if being and knowing are 
really and truly one and identical, as they both alike afl&rm, 
and cannot otherwise be true, then thought is the only reality. 
There can be no Sensibility or Will in any being. No system 
can be true which does not explain all the facts of Conscious- 
ness as they are. Not one of the systems under consideration 
can give us but a part of these facts, and not even these as 
they are. 

4. According to all these systems, there is a necessary and 



388 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

irreconcilable antagonism between the natural and scientific 
procedures of the Intelligence. In the former, we attain, as 
they all teach, to a knowledge of ourselves as endowed with 
the powers of thought, feeling, and voluntary determination, 
of the external material universe, of Matter, as a substance 
possessed of the qualities of extension, form, &c., and of God, 
as the creator and governor of all things, and as such, as pos- 
sessed of all the attributes involved in the ideas of infinity and 
perfection. In the latter procedure, we discover that all these 
great pre-afl&rmed realities are nothing but splendid nonenti- 
ties. Thus science and nature are and must be eternally at 
war with each other, the exclusive function of the former be- 
ing to destroy and dissolve what the latter constructs and 
builds up. Now the exclusive function of real science is, not 
to annul, but to enlarge and perfect the natural procedures of 
the Intelligence. Idealism, in all its forms, is based exclu- 
sively upon the assumption, that the exclusive direction of the 
natural and unavoidable procedure of the Intelligence is 
towards the unreal and nothing else, an assumption just as absurd 
and self-contradictory as the idea of an event without a cause. 
5. Hence, I remark, that there is a precisely similar antago- 
nism between the theoretical imiii practical sides of all these sys- 
tems. Practically, as they all teach, we are to treat ourselves, 
the world and God, as given in the natural procedures of the 
Intelligence, as most real and substantial verities. Theoreti- 
cally we are to hold and treat these same verities, as nothing 
but absolute nonentities. Such are the fundamental teachings 
of all these systems. Now what man in his senses can be- 
lieve that there is any such antagonism between true theory 
and right practice ? "What is the province of true theory or 
science, but to give to practice its most perfect direction ? 
What must we think of systems of philosophy whose funda- 
mental assumptions are, that all right forms of human activity 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 389 

are in the exclusive direction of the unreal ? Such is Ideal- 
ism, whatever form it assumes. 

6. Idealism, in all its forms alike, totally confounds all dis- 
tinction between truth and error, and annihilates all tests by 
which the one can be distinguished from the other. If mental 
operations are the only objects of real knowledge, and all else 
is to be held as unreal, as all these systems maintain, then as 
one form of cognition is, in itself, just as real as another, it is 
consequently just as true. The wildest vagaries of the maniac 
are in themselves just as real, and consequently just as true, as 
the most sober deductions of the philosopher. One system of 
philosophy is as real a development of the Ego, of the Abso- 
lute, or of the law of thought, as another, and consequently 
has precisely the same claims to be received as true. These 
are the legitimate consequences of Idealism, and can, by no 
possibility, be separated from it. There is no such thing as 
truth as distinguished from error, if any of the forms of Ideal- 
ism are true. 

7. I remark finally, that Idealism in all its forms, is ut- 
terly subversive of all the principles of morality and religion. 
It takes from God every attribute to which the religious senti- 
ment in humanity is correlated, and from humanity every cle- 
ment on which moral obligation can be based, and every 
principle by which the right can be distinguished from the 
wrong. By it the universe is unpeopled of all proper subjects 
of moral government, and left itself as a nonentity without a 
divine sovereign to rule over it. This is Idealism in its 
" naked nature," and " living grace." Much more might be 
said of it, but nothing good. There is not a principle in it 
which tends in that direction. It takes from humanity its uni- 
verse, its God, its redeemer, its guide of life, and the vista of 
immortality, and leaves it to satisfy the longings of its immor- 
tal nature with the empty shadows of absolute nonentities. 

33* 



•) 



390 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

I would not here be understood as affirming that none of the 
teachings of the advocates of Idealism are true and worthy of 
regard. What I do say is this, that what they have said that 
is true, has not grown out of their theories, and is not to be 
found among the basis principles of the same. Not a solitary 
proposition that is true can be found among those principles, 
or can be logically deduced from them. We say this in sor- 
row, not in anger. We commenced our inquiries into the 
German philosophy, confidently expecting to be thereby en- 
riched with priceless treasures of wisdom and knowledge. We 
take leave of it, with the fullest persuasion, after fathoming 
its depths, that it is nothing but an abyss of darkness and 
error. 

MODERN TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

The procedure of the systems of philosophy, which we 
have been considering, has been very much like the " endless 
wars of Chaos and old Night," described by Milton. Each 
new sect in philosophy demolished the system of their prede- 
cessors, and then erected another, to be demolished by a third 
more foundationless, if possible, than any that preceded ; and 
the last that appears is the most baseless of all, and leaves the 
great questions in philosophy more in the dark than they were 
before. As a consequence, the public mind has been fast be- 
coming somewhat skeptical in respect to the jyossibiU ft/ of phi- 
losophy itself This circumstance apparently has given rise in 
Europe and this country to a new sect, it would hardly be 
proper to say of philosophers, since they systematically reject 
all philosophy. They assume as true, the general principles 
of Cousin, Hegel, Schelling, &c., and then reject and denounce 
all philosophy, everything like consecutive reasoning, or logical 
<^ deduction. Action purely instinctive, they hold, is by far the 
I most perfect form of activity. The same holds of the Intelli- 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 391 

gence. Philosophical reflection, logical deduction, and syste- 
matic treatises, especially in respect to Mental Philosophy, 
Theology, or Morals, only trammel thought and darken the 
spiritual vision. Thought, purely spontaneous and instinctive, ^ 
is the most true, and the most perfect. 

When Reason is permitted to develop itself freely, untram- 
meled by logic; when men, in short, think, speak, and act 
from pure instinct, without system, there is the most perfect 
system. The most perfect demonstration is the simple enun- 
ciation of spontaneous mental conceptions, without argument. 
Hence, they never reason, never explain, never discuss, but, as 
oracles of Reason, simply announce her dicta. If you call in 
question any of their enunciations, they have one reply, and 
that is always at hand, to wit. You are not spiritual. The 
truly spiritual is not developed in you. How can a man that 
never saw, discriminate between colors ? You ask of them a 
particular explanation of their principles. This only occasions 
the retort. You are not spiritual — the truly spiritual is not 
yet inborn in you. They talk much of religion, and complain 
that all the world lacks it; and yet religion is, with them, 
'^ without form and void ;" for almost all of them deny of God 
everything but an ideal existence. They speak of Christ as 
the incarnation of divinity ; and then, in the language of one 
of their great leaders, represent his character as essentially de- 
fective, on account of the lack of "fun" in its composition. 
They talk much of sin, regeneration, atonement, redemption, 
repentance, faith, holiness, purity, and love, &c. All the vo- 
cabulary of evangelical religion is introduced as familiar terms 
into their discourses : yet all such terms find themselves there 
in such strange company, and in the midst of such new and 
bewildering associations, that they cannot even know them- 
selves. The following passage will give, perhaps, as correct a 
view of the meaning which they attach to terms like the above, 



392 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

as any that is often met with in their writings. It is from one 
of their leading writers^ in an article found in the Dial, the 
organ of the sect : 

" Holding, as they do, but one essence of all things, which 
essence is God, Pantheism must deny the existence of essential 
evil. All evil is negative — it is imperfection, non-growth. 
It is not essential, but modal. Of course, there can be no 
such thing as hereditary sin — a tendency positively sinful in 
the soul. Sin is not a willful transgression of a righteous law, 
but the difficulty and obstruction which the Infinite meets with 
in entering into the finite. Regeneration is nothing but an 
ingress of God into the soul, before which sin disappears, as 
darkness before the rising sun. Pantheists hold also to the 
Atonement, or at-one-ment, between the soul and God. This 
is strictly a unity, or oneness of essence, to be brought about by 
the incarnation of the Spirit of God in us, which is going 
on in us as we grow in holiness. As we grow wise, just, and 
pure — in a word, holy — we grow to be one with him in 
mode, as we always were in essence. This atonement is effect- 
ed by Christ, only in as far as he taught the manner in which 
it was to be accomplished more fully than any other, and gave 
us a better illustration of the method and result in his own 
person, than any one else that has ever lived.'' 

Now, if any one should ask this writer to explain the 
meaning he really attaches to such terms and phrases as " non- 
growth," the " Infinite entering into the finite," and " the in- 
carnation of the Spirit of God in us," and especially if we 
should ask of him a reason of his belief in Pantheism, his 
only reply, no doubt, would be : You are not spiritual ; the 
spiritual is yet to be inborn in you. And then he would go 
on with most pitiful lamentations over the want of religion, 
of spirituality, in all the world; of the melancholy decay of 
the god-like spirit of faith, and spiritual vision, and inspira- 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 393 

tion, that existed in Moses, and Christ, and Paul, and Mahom- 
et, and among the heroic spirits of the Reformation. Now, 
the philosophic observer is not at a loss to perceive, that all 
this complaining of the non-growth, and absence of spiritual 
vision in all the world but themselves, is nothing but a feint, 
to keep from view a mass of foundationless assumptions, the 
validity of which they themselves dare not seriously examine, 
nor have distinctly exposed to public view, lest their baseless- 
ness should become so manifest, that even their abettors would 
be ashamed to avow them any more. Mysticism is the consum- 
mation, the last development, of false philosophy. Men who 
are on the track of error, will reason and philosophize, as long 
as they can hope to convince the world of their principles by 
reasoning based upon the result of philosophic investigation. 
When this hope fails, the last resort is assumptions, attended 
with the usurpation of direct spiritual vision, and superior di- 
vine insight and illumination. 

ECLECTICISM OF COUSIN. 

System stated. 

From the chair of Philosophy in Paris, Cousin has pro- 
nounced Eclecticism as constituting the distinguishing charac- 
teristic, the perfection of the philosophic movement of the 
ninteenth century. Before admitting this enunciation as true, 
it becomes us to inquire diligently into the meaning of such 
an imposing term. The attentive reader of the Vv'orks of this 
great philosopher will not be at a loss to determine the mean- 
ing which he attaches to the term, nor the doctrine represented 
by it. This philosopher professes to have obtained a point of 
observation, from which he has brought all previous systems 
of philosophy into complete harmony with each other. All 
possible questions in philosophy have been solved in these dif- 



394 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ferent systems. Each system has moved iu the direction of 
some oue great question, and lias attained its (ibject in the so- 
lution of that question. It now remains to take from all these 
systems the principle on which each rests, and which each 
has developed, and resolve the whole into one harmonious 
unity. The following passages will show that I have not mis- 
conceived nor misstated the principles of this philosopher: 

" You may perceive the tendency of my discourse. After 
the subjective idealism of (he school of Kant, and the empiri- 
cism and sensualism of that of Locke, have been developed, 
and their last possible results exhausted, no new combination 
is, in my opinion, possible ; but the union of these two systems, 
by centering them both in a vast and powerful eclecticism." 
Again : " Our philosophy, gentlemen, is not a melancholy and 
fanatical philosophy, which, being prepossessed with a few exclu- 
sive ideas, undertakes to reform all others on the same model; 
it is a philosophy essentially optimistical, whose only end is to 
comprehend all, and which therefore accepts and reconciles all. 
It seeks to obtain power only by extension ; its unity consists 
only in the harmony of all contrarieties." 

Remarks ujpon this System. 

For myself, I would say, that I wholly dissent from the 
system of Eclecticism as above announced. I do it for the 
following reasons : 

1. It is, as a system, totally unlike the procedure of the 
Intelligence in reference to every other science. No science 
whatever that has stood the test of time has been evolved in 
conformity to this principle. What if some astronomer, for 
example, should arise, and profess to have found some point 
of observation from which ho could show that all systems 
of astronomy were essentially correct, and should proclaim that 
the true system is found in all, as the general in the particu- 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 895 

lar, and should be so evolved as to include all other systems ? 
He might say, in the language of this great philosopher, '' Our 
astronomy, gentlemen, is not a melancholy and fanatical astron- 
omy, which, being prepossessed with a few exclusive ideas, 
undertakes to reform all others upon the same model ; it is as 
an astronomy essentially optimistical, whose only end is to com- 
prehend all, and which, therefore, accepts and reconciles all. 
It seeks to obtain power only by extension ', its unity consists 
only in the harmony of all contrarieties." All this is well 
said, and looks well on paper. But who would expect to find,, 
in a system constructed in conformity to such an hypothesis, 
the true " Mecanique Celeste ? " In every other science, each 
school has found its point of observation, from which it has at- 
tempted a solution of the great questions pertaining to that 
particular science, and which was its object to solve. One 
school has succeeded another, till some one has evolved a sys- 
tem which has stood the test of time. So, I venture to pre- 
dict, it will be in respect to the Philosophy of Mind. If the 
true system has not yet been developed, the time is coming 
when it will be. And that philosopher will have the happi- 
ness of attaining this great end, who shall find, not some point 
of observation from which he can reconcile all the jarring an- 
tagonistic systems which have claimed the credence of man, 
but some great central position, in the depths of our inner be- 
ing, from which he can solve the diversified questions of phi- 
losophy pertaining to the facts of universal Consciousness. 

2. The assumption on which Eclecticism, as above defined, 
rests, is totally false in point of fact : the position that the 
essential element in each system is true. Take, as an illustra- 
tion, the system of Pantheism. Now that system is either 
totally right or wholly wrong. It either correctly explains 
every fact pertaining to the universe, or it totally falsifies every 
fact professedly explained by it. It either rightly explains, or 



396 INTELLECTUAL rHILOSOPHT. 

totally misrepresents all things. Further, if /his system is 
right, every other system is totally wrong, and misrepresents 
everything which it proftssedly explains. There is no blend- 
ing of this system with any other which does not assert its 
fundamental principle ; and then it is not another, but one and 
the same system. 

The same holds true of the systems of Hegel, Kant, and 
Locke. Either thought is the only reality, and then Hegel is 
totally right, and all other systems wholly false, or thought is 
not the only reality, and then in nothing is Hegel right. This 
system either correctly explains or totally misrepresents every 
fact in the universe. 

Either ideas of Reason are valid for things in themselves, 
and then Kant is wholly wrong, or they are not thus valid, 
and Kant is wiiolly right. His fundamental principle either 
rightly explains or totally misrepresents every idea of Reason. 
There is no position midway between the.^e extremes. 

Either all ideas do come from experience, and then Locke 
is wholly right, and all systems denying this are so far wholly 
wrong, or all ideas do not come from experience, and then 
Locke is wholly wrong. It does not help the matter to say, 
that some ideas come from experience, and therefore Locke is 
partly right. Locke and all the world knew, long before his 
celebrated Essay was thought of, that some ideas came from 
experience. It was only as an universal proposition that 
Locke affirmed his position. If that proposition is not strictly 
universal, Locke is wholly wrong, and so he himself regarded 
the subject. 

Nor, in my judgment, was it becoming in a great philoso- 
pher to attempt to show, as Cousin has done, in conformity to 
the spirit of Eclecticism, that the great principle of Locke's 
philosophy is right, by attributing to him a principle that he 
never held, or conceived of; to wit, that ideas of experience 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 397 

are the chronological antecedents of all other ideas. The indi- 
vidual who has ever read Cousin's Psychology, translated by 
Prof. Henry, a work presenting one of the finest specimens of 
philosophic reasoning to be met with in any language, will 
recollect the frequency with which the remark is made in that 
work, that there is an important sense in which the proposi- 
tions of Locke, that all ideas come from experience, is true. 
Locke's whole system rests upon this one proposition. Cousin, 
after proving the proposition false, must show that after all it 
is true, or the fundamental position of his own Eclecticism 
would fail entirely. How does he accomplish his object ? By 
the afl&rmation that there is a sense in which the proposition, 
that all ideas are derived from experience, is true ; that is, 
such ideas are the chronological antecedents of all other ideas. 
But this, I repeat, is a sense in which Locke never presented 
the proposition under consideration, and never thought of do- 
ing it. Did it become a great philosopher to attempt to save 
his own hypothesis, by attributing to another a principle which 
all the world know he never held, or, at least, never avowed ? 

In the remarks made above, I would by no means be un- 
derstood as advancing the sentiment, that if Pantheism or any 
other system is wrong, that therefore nothing which the abet- 
tors of such systems may say, is true. Nothing is further 
from my intention than this. This whole Treatise presents 
proof sufficient of the fact, that no such thing is intended. 
What I do mean is this, That whatever truths exist in connec- 
tion with false systems, and many such often are therein found, 
exist in them not in consequence of the systems, but in spite 
of them, and are totally misrepresented by them. The true 
Eclecticism, as I understand it, is this, To search for truth in 
connection with every system, without assuming beforehand, 
that it does or does not exist there. " Prove all things; hold 
fast that which is good." This is an Eclecticism, which is in- 
34 



i 



398 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

finitely preferable to that which '' consists only in the harmony 
of all contrarieties." 

3. In his position as an Eclectic, Cousin has fallen into the 
very error which he has cliarged upon Locke, as so greatly 
vitiating his method as a philosopher. The error is this : 
Beginning with an hypothesis, before carefully analyzing and 
classifying the facts of Psychology as the basis of an hypoth- 
esis. Locke, as Cousin has shown, by assuming at the outset 
a particular hypothesis respecting the origin of Ideas, was led 
to misrepresent (an error perfectly natural under the circum- 
stances) the most important facts of human Consciousness. 
So Cousin, by assuming, that the fundamental elements of all 
systems are right, must, to be consistent, be a sensualist with 
Locke, a spiritualist with Fichte, a pantheist with Schelling, 
and a nihilist with Hegel. These considerations are abund- 
antly sufficient to show the claims of Eclecticism to the regard 
of philosophers. 

COMMON SENSE. 

There are few words in more common use than the above. 
Common Sense is everywhere appealed to as a standard and 
test of truth and error. Yet it would be somewhat difficult, 
without the most careful reflection, to define correctly the 
words under consideration. Dr. Reid regards Common Sense 
as a distinct faculty of the mind. Philosophers generally have 
rejected this assumption. This they have done, however, with- 
out themselves attempting to tell us what this something is, 
the reality of which they all acknowledge. My object will be, 
to state distinctly the real meaning of the words under con- 
sideration. 

Common Sense defined. 
Every one is aware, that, in the presence of certain facts, 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 399 

the universal Intelligence invariably makes particular affirma- 
tions. With such affirmations, numberless assumptions, to- 
gether with their consequents, may be mingled. Hence, in 
reference to almost all subjects of thought, diversity of opin- 
ion appears. Yet, in the midst of all this diversity, there are 
judgments common to all minds who have apprehended the 
same facts. 

Noxo iheae affirmations, commoji to all minds in the pres- 
ence of the same facts, affirmations in their concrete and 'par- 
ticular form, is what is meant hy the words Common Sense. 
Tlie words designate the real affirmations of the universal In- 
telligence, in view of given facts, as distinguished from assump- 
tions, and the logical consequents of the same, pertaining to 
the same facts. Common Sense, then, is not, as Dr. Reid 
supposes, a special faculty of the Intelligence. It desig- 
nates, I repeat, the real affirmations of the general Intel- 
ligence, in distinction from assumptions and their logical con- 
sequents. 

Common Sense a Standard of Truth. 

Common Sense, then, may be properly appealed to, as a 
decisive standard of truth. Its responses must be true, else 
the universal Intelligence is a lie. No conclusions in philos- 
ophy and religion, no results of processes of investigation and 
reasoning which are in contradiction to its decisions, will stand 
the test of time. I will here confess, that the principle under 
consideration has been a leading idea which has guided my 
Judgment in respect to the great facts and principles announ- 
ced in the present Treatise. That philosophy, which, disre- 
garding all assumptions and their consequents, shall announce 
the real convictions of the universal Intelligence, is the true 
philosophy. Philosophy and Common Sense the Author of our 
existence has joined together. Philosophy runs mad with the 



400 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

wildest conceivable delusions, when divorced from Common 
Sense as a light, and authoritative guide. 

Philosophic Principles — why rejected hy the mass of Man- 
hind. 

Philosophy (falsely so called) has at various periods denied 
the reality of Mind, of Matter, or the external world, and of 
God, the author of the two former. Yet the mass of mankind 
have continued to believe their own substantial existence, to- 
gether with that of the external world, and of God. The rea- 
son is, that philosophers have rested their investigations upon 
baseless assumptions ; while the mass of mankind, more fully 
influenced by the philosophic spirit in respect to such subjects, 
have followed the dictates of Common Sense. Universal ma- 
terialism, on the one hand, or spiritualism on the other, to- 
gether with kindred systems, such as Pantheism and Idealism, 
can never become the sentiments of the race. The Common 
Sense of mankind is at war with all such principles. Suppose, 
for example, an individual announces as a truth of philosophy, 
what Pantheism affirms, that all individualities in the universe 
are not real, but only apparent, that they are all the phenom- 
ena of one common substance. Such a dogma can never be- 
come the belief of the race; for the obvious reason that it 
contradicts the fundamental affirmations of the universal Intel- 
ligence pertaining to phenomena and substance. The reason 
is that separateness, and not absolute unity, is the fundamental 
phenomenon which all individualities present in respect to each 
other. When things appear as separate, we must admit that 
they are separate ; in other words, that Pantheism is false, or 
deny the fundamental convictions or Common Sense of the 
race, pertaining to their ideas of substance. 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 401 

Dictates of Common Sense — lioio Jaioion and distinguished. 

One important question arises here, to wit : How can we 
determine, whether a given fact or principle is or is not a dic- 
tate of Common Sense ? This question we can answer, not by 
an appeal to tradition, to books, or to the responses which the 
race at large might formally give, if required to respond to 
the inquiry. For with all such responses, numberless assump- 
tions would no doubt be mingled. On the other hand, every 
one who would understand the dictates of Common Sense must 
enter into the depth of his own Mind, and there notice the 
real affirmations of his own Intelligence, in view of given facts. 
Such affirmations he may trust in and announce, as the real 
dictates of the Common Sense of the race. He that will most 
correctly interpret the real dictates of his own Intelligence, is 
the most perfect oracle of the universal Intelligence. In retir- 
ing, then, from the outward world into the depths of our own 
Minds, and there receiving the real dictates of our own Intelli- 
gence, we find the true facts and principles of Common Sense. 

Cfliaracteristics of 3Ien distinguished for Common Sense. 

We often hear individuals spoken of as wanting in, or pos- 
sessed of a great degree, of Common Sense. The characteris- 
tic which distinguishes the latter from the former class, is a 
well-balanced Judgment, particularly in respect to the common 
transactions of life — a Judgment by which they detect and 
announce at once the real affirmations of the Intelligence in 
the presence of given facts. The mass of men — a fact to 
which philosophers as a body are by no means exceptions — 
are so blinded by assumptions, and theories founded thereon, 
that, in respect to the most important subjects, they do not 
recognize the real affirmations of their own Intelligence. In 
34* 



402 INTELLECTUAL PinLOSOPHY. 

the presence of given facts, they nee in tliem what all the world 
sees. Yet under the influence of false assumptions and theo- 
ries, they disregard what their own Intelligence really affirms. 
Men, on the other hand, distinguished for Common Sense, in 
the presence of the same facts and convictions, announce and 
rely upon, not in their abstract and universal, but in their con- 
crete and particular form, their own judgments, just as they lie 
in their own Intelligence — judgments which all the world 
really pass in the presence of the same facts; but which, for 
reasons above stated, philosophic minds especially, in many in- 
stances, totally disregard. Of the latter class we say, they are 
destitute of, or rather do not use, their Common Sense. 

After writing the above, I was much interested to find that 
the sentiments exj^ressed so fully, correspond with those of 
JoufFroy, in respect to the same subject. I will present, as a 
further elucidation of this important subject, two extracts 
from the writings of the philosopher above named : 

" The history of philosophy presents a singular spectacle j 
a certain number of problems are reproduced at every epoch ; 
each of these problems suggests a certain number of solutions, 
always the same ; philosophers are divided ; discussion is set 
on foot; every opinion is attacked and defended, with equal 
appearance of truth. Humanity listens in silence, adopts the 
opinion of no one, but preserves its own, which is what is 
called Covimon Sense. 

" Thus, to refer to examples, all philosophical epochs have 
produced upon the stage the opposite theories of Materialism 
and Spiritualism in metaphysics, and those of Stoicism and 
Epicureanism in morals. None of these doctrines has perma- 
nently prevailed: none has perished; all have found sincere 
and illustrious partisans; all have exerted nearly the same in- 
fluence ; but, in the end, the human race, which has witnessed 
their debates, has become neither Materialist nor Spiritualist, 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 403 

neither Stoic nor Epicurean; it has remained what it was prior 
to philosophy, believing at once both in matter and spirit, re- 
specting duty and pursuing happiness at the same time." 

Again : " Everybody understands by Common Sense a cer- 
tain number of principles or notions evident of themselves, 
from which all men derive the grounds of their judgment and 
the rules of their conduct; and nothing is more correct than 
this idea. But it is not sufficiently known that these princi- 
ples are merely positive solutions of all the great problems 
which philosophy agitates. How could we regulate our con- 
duct, what judgments could we form, if we could not distin- 
guish between good and evil, truth and falsehood, beauty and 
deformity, one being and another, and reality and nullity ; if 
we did not know what we should hold to, concerning that 
which we see with our eyes, perceive with our Consciousness, 
and apprehend with our Eeason ; if we had no idea of the 
purpose and the consequences of this life, of the Author of all 
things and of his nature? What would be the light of Intel- 
ligence, how would society proceed, if there were even the 
shadow of doubt on the notions which we possess in regard to 
most of these points? Now what are these notions, so firmly 
and so necessarily established in the Intelligence of all men, 
but a series of responses to these questions : What is the 
true ? What is the good ? What is the beautiful ? What is 
the nature of things ? What is being ? What is the origin 
and certainty of human knowledge ? What is the destiny of 
man in this world? Is his entire destiny accomplished in this 
life ? Is this world the production of chance, or of an intelli- 
gent cause ? And, we ask, are not these the questions with 
which philosophy is occupied ? Do they not contain, in their 
germs at least, all the questions of logic, metaphysics, morals, 
politics, and religion ? 

^' Common Sense, therefore, is nothing but a collection of 



404 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

solutions to those questions which philosophers agitate. It is 
another philosophy prior to philosophy properly so called, 
since it is found spontaneously at the bottom of every Con- 
sciousness, independently of all scientific research. There are 
accordingly two votes on the questions which interest human- 
ity, namely, that of the mass and that of the philosophers, the 
spontaneous vote and the scientific vote, Common Sense and 
systems." 



CHAPTER XIX. 

THE INTELLIGENCE OF MAN, AS DISTINGUISHED PKOM 
THAT OF THE BRUTE. 

It has been very common with philosophers to represent 
all created existences, from the highest Intelligences in heaven 
to the crude forms of matter, as successive links in one great 
chain, each link in the chain, commencing with the lowest, 
differing mainly in degree from that which immediately suc- 
ceeds it. The highest forms of brute, and the lowest of ra- 
tional Intelligence, for example, differ, it is asserted, not in 
hind, but only in degree. Of late, the reality of orders of ex- 
istences, as successive links of a great chain, ,has come to be 
seriously doubted. The intelligence of man and of the brute, it 
is said, differs not in degree, but in kind. If we conceive of 
the highest forms of brute intelligence increased to any degree 
whatever, as far as degree is concerned, still it makes no ap- 
proach at all to real rationality. The different orders of brute 
instincts do constitute, it is thought, different links of one 
chain. Those of rational Intelligences constitute another and 
totally different chain, a chain none of the links of which are 
connected, in any form, with any of those of the other. This 
last is the opinion entertained by the author of this Treatise. 
I will now proceed to state the grounds of this opinion. I 
will introduce what I have to say upon this subject by two ex 
tracts, somewhat lengthy, from Coleridge. In the first, we 
have a classification of the different forms of brute Instinct ; 
in the second, we are presented with two instances of Instinct- 
ive Intelligence, in their highest manifestations. 



406 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



BRUTE INSTINCTS CLASSIFIED. 

" It is evident that the definition of a genus or class is an 
adequate definition only of the lowest species of that genus : 
for each higher species is distinguished from the lower by some 
additional character, while the general definition includes only 
the characters common to all the species. Consequently it 
describes the lowest only. Now I distinguish a genus or Icind 
of powers under the name of adaptive power, and give, as its 
generic definition, the power of selecting and adapting means 
to proximate ends ; and as an instance of the lowest sjjecies of 
this genus, I take the stomach of a caterpillar. I ask myself, 
under what words I can generalize the action of this organ ; 
and I see that it selects and adapts the appropriate means (i. e., 
the assimilable part of the vegetable coiiT/esta) to the proxi- 
mate end, I. e., the growth or reproduction of the insect's body. 
This we call vital power, or vita propria of the stomach ; 
and this being the lowest species, its definition is the same with 
the definition of the Jcind. 

" Well, from the power of the stomach T pass to the power 
exerted by the whole animal. I trace it wandering from spot 
to spot, and plant to plant, till it finds the appropriate vegeta- 
ble ; and again on this chosen vegetable, I mark it seeking out 
and fixing on the part of the plant, bark, leaf, or petal, suited 
to its nourishment ; or (should the animal have assumed the 
butterfly form), to the deposition of its eggs, and the susten- 
tation of the future larva. Here I see a power of selecting 
and adapting means to proximate ends according to circum- 
stances. And this higher species of adaptive power we call 

INSTINCT. 

" Lastly, I reflect on the facts narrated and described in 
the succeeding extracts from Huber, and see a power of select- 
ing the proper means to the proximate ends, according to var^- 



HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE. 407 

ing circumstances. And what shall we call this yet higher / 
species? We name the former, Instinct; we must call this ) 
Instinctive Intelligence. 

" Here then we have three powers of the same kind, Life, 
Instinct, and Instinctive Intelligence ; the essential characters 
that define the genus existing in all three. But in addition to 
these, I find one other character common to the highest and 
lowest, viz. : that the purposes are all manifestly pre-deter- 
mined by the peculiar organization of the animals; and though 
it may not be possible to discover any such immediate depend- 
ency in all the actions, yet the actions being determined by the 
purposes, the result is equivalent : and both the actions and 
purposes are all in a necessitated reference to the preservation 
and continuance of that particular animal or of the progeny. 
There is a selection, but not choice — volition rather than Will. 
The possible knowledge of a thing, or the desire to have the 
thing representable by a distinct correspondent thought, does 
not, in the animal, sufiice to render the thing an object, or the 
ground of a purpose. I select and adapt the proper means to 
the separation of a stone from a rock, which I neither can, nor 
desire to make use of for food, shelter or ornament : because, 
perhaps, I wish to measure the angles of its primary crystals, 
or, perhaps, for no better reason than the apparent difficulty 
of loosening the stone — stat pro ratione voluntas — and thus 
make a motive out of the absence of all motive, and a reason 
out of the arbitrary will to act without any reason." 

manifestations op instinctive intelligence. 

" Huber put a dozen humble-bees under a bell-glass along 
with a comb of about ten cocoons, so unequal in height as not 
to be capable of standing steadily. To remedy this, two or 
three of the humble-bees got upon the comb, stretched them- 
selves over its edge, and with their heads downwards fixed 



408 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

their fore feet on the table on which the comb stood, and so 
with their hind feet kept the comb from falling. When these 
were weary others took their places. In this constrained and 
painful posture, fresh bees relieving their comrades at inter- 
vals, and each working in its turn, did these affectionate little 
insects support the comb for nearly three days, at the end of 
which they had prepared suflScient wax to build pillars with. 
But these pillars having accidentally got displaced, the bees 
had recourse again to the same manoeuver (or rather ^ecZoeu- 
ver), till Huber pitying their hard case, &c. 

" * I shall at present describe the operations of a single ant 
that I observed sufficiently long to satisfy my curiosity : 

" ' One rainy day, I observed a laborer digging the ground 
near the aperture which gave entrance to the ant-hill. It 
placed in a heap the several fragments it had scraped up, and 
formed them into small pellets, which it deposited here and 
there upon the nest. It returned constantly to the same place, 
and appeared to have a marked design, for it labored with ardor 
and perseverance. I remarked a slight furrow, excavated in 
the ground in a straight line, representing the plan of a 
path or gallery. The laborer, the whole of whose movements 
fell under my immediate observation, gave it greater depth and 
breadth, and cleared out its borders : and I saw at length, in 
which I could not be deceived, that it had the intention of es- 
tablishing an avenue which was to lead from one of the stories 
to the under-ground chambers. This path, which was about 
two or three inches in length, and formed by a single ant, was 
opened above and bordered on each side by a buttress of earth, 
its concavity en forme de goutti^re was of the most perfect reg- 
ularity, for the architect had not left an atom too much. The 
work of this ant was so well followed and understood, that I 
could almost to a certainty guess its next proceeding, and the 
very fragment it was about to remove. At the side of the 



HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE. 409 

opening where this path terminated, was a second opening, to 
which it was necessary to arrive at b}' some road. The same 
ant engaged in and executed alone this undertaking. It fur- 
rowed out and opened another path, parallel to the first, leav- 
ing between each a little wall of three or four lines in height. 
Tliose ants who laj the foundation of a wall, a chamber or gal- 
lery, from working separately, occasion now and then a want 
of coincidence in the parts of the same or different objects. 
Such examples are of no unfrequent occurrence, but they by 
no means embarrass them. What follows, proves that the 
workman, on discovering his error, knew how to rectify it. A 
wall had been erected with the view of sustaining a vaulted 
ceiling, still incomplete, that had been projected from the wall 
of the opposite chamber. The workman who began construct- 
ing it, had given it too little elevation to meet the opposite par- 
tition upon which it was to rest. Had it been continued on 
the original plan, it must infallibly have met the wall at about 
one-half of its height, and this it was necessary to avoid. 
This state of things very forcibly claimed my attention, when 
one of the ants arriving at' the place, and visiting the works, 
appeared to be struck by the difficulty which presented itself; 
but this it as soon obviated, by taking down the ceiling and 
raising the wall upon which it reposed. It then, in my pres- 
^enee, constructed a new ceiling with the fragments of the 
former one.' " — Huher's Nat. Hist, of Ants. 

The facts above cited, every one will acknowledge, may be 
assumed as representing Instinctive Intelligence, in its highest 
form. The question to be settled is. In what respects is this 
like rationality, as it exists in man ? In what respects do these 
forms of Intelligence agree, and disagree ? 
35 



410 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE ARGUMENT IS BASED. 

In conducting our inquiries on this subject, the first thing 
to be settled is, the prindjyle on which our conclusions shall 
be based. On all hands it is agreed, that there are points of 
resemblance between the manifestations of Intelligence in the 
brute and among mankind. At the same time, there are points 
of dissimilarity equally manifest and important. Now let A 
represent the mental phenomena which appear in man, and 
never appear in the brute. If we can find the power or pow- 
ers in man from which the phenomena represented by A re- 
sult, we have then determined fully the faculties which man 
possesses and the brute wants. The faculties thus asserted of 
man, are to be wholly denied of the brute, and all the mani- 
festations of brute intelligence are to be accounted for by a 
reference to what remains, after the former have been sub- 
tracted. All must admit, that this is the true and the only 
true principle to be applied in the case. It now remains to ap- 
ply the principle to the solution of the question before us. 

POINTS OF RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN THE MAN AND THE BRUTE. 

That brutes, such as are supposed in the present argument, 
possess the faculty of external perception, such as sight, hear- ' 
ing, taste, smell, and touch, that such perceptions are followed 
by feelings of a given character, and that these feelings are 
followed by external actions which are correlated to the percep- 
tions referred to, and that all these manifestations are common 
to man and the brute both, will be denied by none who have, 
however carelessly, observed the facts which have presented 
themselves to their notice. Such are the phenomena common to 
man and the brute. 



HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE. 411 



HYPOTHESES ON WHICH THESE COMMON FACTS MAY BE 
EXPLAINED. 

There are two distinct and opposite hypotheses on which 
these common facts may be explained. When man has an 
external perception, Reason at once suggests certain funda- 
mental ideas in the light of which he explains to himself the 
phenomena perceived, and passes certain judgments upon them. 
Action with him has special reference, not to the phenomena, 
but to the judgments thus passed. All these things we know 
from Consciousness, to be true, in reference to man. 

As far as the facts under consideration are concerned, it 
may be that the same is true of the brute. All the phenom- 
ena of brute action, however, are equally explicable, on an 
entirely different hypothesis. When a brute has a perception 
of some object, without the presence of any fundamental ideas 
in the light of which he can explain to himself what he sees, 
and consequently form notions and judgments of the object 
perceived, and then act in view of judgments thus formed, it 
may be, that such perceptions are followed by certain feelings, 
and that from these, as necessary consequents, external acts, 
such as the brute puts forth, arise. All that would be intel- 
lectual with the brute, on this hypothesis, would be the simple 
power to perceive the object, without the capacity to recognize 
himself as the suhject, or the thing perceived as the ohject of 
the perception, so as to form any conceptions or judgments 
pertaining either to the subject or object. The feelings which 
attend such perceptions, together with such as arise from the 
internal organism of the brute, such as hunger and thirst, are 
followed necessarily by external actions in harmony with the 
sphere for which the creature was designed. The action of 
the brute would be in fixed harmony with law — law, however, 
which has no subjective existence in the Intelligence of the 



412 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

creature, but which exists as an idea in that of the Creator. 
Action, in such a case, would be purely mechanical, the pro- 
pelling force being the feelings generated as above supposed, 
while the law of action would be an idea which the subject of 
the action never apprehended, but in conformity to which the 
organism of the brute is formed. 

A case stated in the public prints, a case, whether true or 
false, at least conceivable, and therefore proper to be used in 
illustration, will fully illustrate the hypothesis uader consider- 
ation. A lady, some time before the birth of a child, was 
struck at by a rattlesnake, and barely escaped with her life. 
As a consequence of the fright of the mother, the child, when 
born, had upon parts of its body the marks of the serpent. 
His eyes had the fiery and vengeful appearance peculiar to the 
reptile. One arm, also, lay coiled upon its side in a manner 
perfectly serpentine. As the child grew up, and came into the 
presence of certain objects, despite of all efforts of his Will to 
the contrary, his eyes would roll in their sockets, with the fiery 
vengeful appearance peculiar to the serpent when attacked by 
an enemy. At the same time, the arm referred to would strike 
at the object perceived, in exact conformity to the motions of 
the reptile in similar circumstances. In connection with the 
physical organization of this individual, two classes of actions, 
each equally conformed to ideas, appeared ; the one class, how- 
ever, the consequents of volition in harmony with conceptions 
and judgments, and the other caused h-^ feelings generated by 
external perceptions. Now, in conformity with the fact last 
named, we can explain all the phenomena of brute action, how- 
ever intelligent in appearance. All such phenomena may be 
the exclusive result of the peculiar feelings and organism of 
the animal, in the total absence of the Intelligence peculiar to 
man. The question is, Are there any facts peculiar to brute 
and human action, verifying this hypothesis ? This question I 



HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE. 413 

will now endeavor to answer, in the light of the principle I 
have laid down as the basis of our conclusions on this subject. 

POINTS OF DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN MAN AND THE BRUTE. 

In order to test the validity of the hypothesis under con- 
sideration, we will now attend to the fundamental phenomena 
which distinguish man from the brute. Among these, I will 
specify only the following : 

1. Man, from the laws of his Intelligence, is a scientific 
heing. Tlie main direction of the human Intelligence is not 
merely towards phenomena, but towards the scientific explana- 
tion of phenomena. This is one of the great wants of human 
nature, the scientific explanation of phenomena. All mankind 
agree in the assumption, that in the brute there is a total ab- 
sence of this principle. Brute intelligence pertains exclusively ^ 
to mere phenomena. The creature never seeks au explanation ) 
of what he sees. He acts from feelings generated by percep- 
tions, without ever seeking an explanation of what he sees or 
feels. 

2. Man, as a race, is progressive. The brute is perfectly / 
stationary. For six thousand years, each race has been spec- < 
tators of precisely the same phenomena. The commencement 
of observation with man, was the commencement of intellectual 
progress, which has been onward from generation to genera- 
tion. With all his observations, the brute has never advanced 

a single step. He is now just where he was six thousand 
years ago. The beaver builds his dam, lives and dies, just as 
did the first that ever appeared on earth. The same is true of 
the action of every brute race. 

3. Man is the subject of moral obligation, and consequent- 
ly of moral government. In other words, man is a moral 
agent. All this is universally denied of the brute. He is 

35* 



414 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

never, except when man acts towards him, as all acknowledge, 
irrationally, regarded or treated as the subject of moral obliga- 
tion or of moral government. I might cite other points of dis- 
similarity, equally manifest, and equally fundamental. But 
these are sufficient for the present argument. 

FACTS APPLIED. 

It now remains to apply the facts above stated to the solu- 
tion of the question under consideration. When we have de- 
termined the faculties necessarily supposed, as the condition 
of science, progress, and moral agency in man, we have deter- 
mined the faculties which we are totally to deny of the brute. 
For it should be borne in mind, that the facts above named do 
not exist in one degree in man, and in a smaller degree in the 
brute. The difference is not that of degree, but of total dis- 
similarity. What various individuals of our race, in the re- 
spects under consideration, possess in different degrees, the 
brute totally wants. The faculties, therefore, which are to be 
affirmed of man as the condition and ground of these facts, are 
to be totally denied of the brute. 

1. I ask, then, in the first place. What faculties constitute 
man a scientific heing, those in the absence of which he cannot 
possess science, and in the possession of which he is, of course, 
scientific? Sense, the faculty of external perception, man, as 
we have seen, has in common with the brute. But this a crea- 
ture may possess in any degree, and make no approach what- 
ever to science. Other faculties in addition are supposed as 
the condition and ground of such developments. What, then, 
are these faculties ? I answer, they are of the primary facul- 
ties. Reason, and Self-Consciousness; and of the secondary. 
Understanding and Judgment. In the absence of Reason, 
fundamental ideas, in the light of which phenomena may be 
explained, are totally wanting, and consequently Science be- 



HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE. 415 

comes impossible. Without Reason also, Self-Consciousness 
would, properly speaking, be impossible, or if possible, abso- 
lutely useless, and therefore not supposable, as originating 
from perfect Intelligence. Without Reason, too, conceptions, 
notions, and judgments would, as we have seen in former 
Chapters, be absolutely impossible. Notions cannot be formed 
without ideas of Reason, such as substance, cause, time, space, 
&c. Judgments, also, and consequently classification and gen- 
eralization, cannot take place without the ideas of resemblance 
and difference. In other words, without Reason, the exercise 
of the Understanding and Judgment is impossible. The ex- 
istence of these faculties is therefore not to be supposed. If, 
then, as we are logically bound to do, we take from the brute 
Reason, Self-Consciousness, Understanding, and Judgment, 
what remains to him ? Just what we have attributed to him, 
to wit, the power of external perception, together with corres- 
ponding feelings and susceptibilities, and an external organism, 
the action of which is in necessary conformity to the feelings 
thus generated. 

It should be borne in mind, that science in man does not 
depend upon the degree in which the faculties above named 
are possessed by him. The degree of the scientific movement 
will be, other things being equal, as the degree in which these 
powers are possessed. When they exist in any degree, there 
will be real science. The total absence of science in the brute, 
indicates most clearly a total absence of the scientific faculties, 
faculties which are so connected with each other, that if one be 
conceived of as wanting, the others also must be. 

The question, I repeat, is not whether the action of the 
brute is not in harmony with fundamental ideas, but whether 
these ideas have a subjective existence in his Intelligence. The 
bee, for example, builds its cell in conformity to pure ideas of 
Reason. But does it not thus build, not because it knows such 



416 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ideas, but because of the peculiarity of its perceptions, sensa- 
tions, and physical structure, all of which render its thus build- 
ing mechanically necessary ? The facts before us show clearly 
that it does. 

2. In the next place, we will raise the inquiry. What fac- 
ulties in Uian render him a j^^'ogressive being ? They are evi- 
dently the same as those which render him scientific, with the 
addition of the Imagination. It is because that where phe- 
nomena appear, mankind are able, in the light of ideas of Rea- 
son, to explain to themselves these facts, and thus find the 
fundamental principle involved in them, that, as a race, we are 
progressive. For this reason, also, mankind gain important 
knowledge from accidental experience, a fact which never ap- 
pears in the brute. A man and a brute are swimming together 
across a river. They become exhausted, and when about to 
sink, meet with something like a plank floating by. They 
both get on to it and are saved. The brute passes on without 
being a whit wiser from his experience. The occurrence con- 
stitutes an era in the history of the human race. Man reflects 
upon the occurrence, and hence arises all the wonders of ship- 
building and navigation. All these had their origin in acci- 
dental occurrences like that above supposed. In the knowledge 
obtained from occurrences similar in their nature, the art of 
printing, and all the results of steam-power, &c., originated. 
Man and the brute also hear melodious sounds. Each alike 
copies what he hears. On the part of man, these sounds are 
recombined into strains still more melodious. Hence the sci- 
ence of music. The brute copies what he hears, but never, in 
a solitary instance, recou) bines, in the least, what he hears. 
The mocking-bird presents a striking illustration of the truth 
of this statement. It will copy almost every melodious sound 
it ever hears. Tet it was never known to produce a single 
new combiaation of sounds. Such facts most indubitably 



HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE. 417 

indicate in the brute the total absence of all the faculties 
which lay the foundation for progress in man, the faculties of 
Reason, Self-Consciousness, Understanding, Judgment, and 
the Imagination. With these in any degree, creatures are in 
a corresponding degree progressive. Without them, whatever 
else they may possess, they are perfectly stationary. Nothing 
is more unphilosophical and illogical, than the conclusion often 
drawn, in the presence of progress on the one hand, and its 
total absence on the other, that brute Instinct and human In- 
telligence differ only in degree. How demonstrably evident is 
the conclusion, that they differ not in degree, but in kind. 

3. In respect to the inquiry. What iaculties in man exist 
as the condition and gi'ound of moral agency in him ? the an- 
swer is ready. They are the faculties above named, together 
with that of Free Will. The absence of those first named, in 
the case of the brute, has already been establisbed. Shall we 
still attribute to him that of Free Will ? The following con- 
siderations perfectly satisfy my own mind on this point : 

(1.) The action of Free Will, in the absence of conceptions 
and judgments, is impossible. Till I have conceptions of A 
and B, and judge that one differs from the other, or at least, 
that one is not the other, I cannot choose between them. 
There may be selection, but not choice ; nor can there be selec- 
tion such as implies the action of Free Will. 

(2.) None of the phenomena of brute action necessarily 
suppose the presence of Free Will in the subject. All such 
phenomena are just as explicable on the opposite hypothesis as 
on this. Now a power is never to be supposed, when its pres- 
ence is not affirmed by positive facts, or necessarily supposed 
by the known sphere of the subject. No such considerations 
demand the assumption of Free Will in the brute. Such an 
assumption therefore is wholly illogical. 

(3.) All the phenomena of brute action clearly indicate the 



418 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

absence of the power under consideration. Plaie the brute in 
any circumstances whatever, and there let particular sensations 
be generated in him, and his action will be just as fixed aL 
uniform, as that of any mechanical power whatever. As 
often as tlie experiment is repeated, it will invariably be at- 
tended with the same results. With such facts before us, how 
illogical the assumption of Free Will in the Brute. 

(4.) Such a power as that under consideration would be a 
totally useless appendage to the brute, contemplating him in 
reference to the sphere for which he is designed. When the 
intellectual faculties above named are denied him, what a use- 
less appendage to the brute, and how worse than useless to 
man, in respect to the use to be made of the animal, would 
such an appendage as Free Will be. The creation of such a 
power, under such circumstances, would be a wide departure 
from all the manifestations of wisdom visible in all the Divine 
works beside. 

(5.) Finally, the power under consideration constitutes one 
of the most essential elements of the Divine image in which 
man was created. Why should we suppose an element so fun- 
damental in that image to exist in a creature, in whom all the 
other elements are totally wanting, and that without any solid 
basis for that conclusion ? 

Thus, by the most logical deductions, we have determined 
the powers of the brute, as distinguished from those of man. 
Taking from the former, what fundamental phenomena require 
us to do, to wit, the powers of Reason, Self-Consciousness, 
Understanding, Judgment, Imagination, and Free Will, we 
leave him with the powers of external perception, with a sen- 
sibility, and physical organization, of such a nature, that under 
the varied circumstances of his being, his action is in necessary 
harmony with the ends for which the all-wise Creator designed 
him. All the phenomena of brute action can be accounted 



HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE. 419 

for on this hypothesis, and its truth is also affirmed by funda- 
mental phenomena. In this lower creation man stands alone. 
There is nothing like him " in the heavens above, nor in the 
earth beneath, nor in the waters under the earth." There he 
stands, " the image and glory of God." Fallen though he is, 

" his form has yet not lost 
All its original brightness, nor appears 
Less .... than the excess 
Of glory obscured." 

GENERAL REMARKS. 

1. We are now prepared to explain the ground of the mis- 
judgment so common in respect to the action of the brute. 
Men judge of brute action in the light of their own conscious- 
ness, pertaining to similar actions in themselves. When men 
and brutes are placed in similar circumstances, and the exter- 
nal actions of both are similar, men often conclude that the 
brute acts in view of the same conceptions and judgments, in 
view of which they are conscious of acting themselves. Now 
such conclusions are wholly unauthorized. The external man- 
ifestations of instinctive and rational Intelligence may be, in 
many important respects, similar, yet there may be a total dis- 
similarity in the nature of these different kinds of Intelligence. 

2. We are also prepared to state the conclusion which the 
facts connected with brute Intelligence force upon us. It is 
one of these two : Either the Intelligence of the brute is in- 
comparably more perfect than that of man, or, aside from the 
power of external perception, he has no Intelligence at all, 
such as man possesses. The first manifestations of Intelligence 
in man, how imperfect and feeble ! How rude and ill-shaped, 
for example, the first habitations built by man ! How slow the 
progress of human architecture from such rude beginnings to 



420 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

its present perfection ! On the other hand, the first produc- 
tion of the brute bears the stamp of perfection. The first 
dam built by the beaver, the first nest built by the bird, have 
never been surpassed. The first cell built by the bee can 
hardly be improved, even in thought. Now suppose that such 
actions of the brute are, as is the case with man, the result of 
the carrying out of an idea, a plan, previously developed in his 
Intelligence, what must we conclude? Why, that the first 
race of brutes that ever appeared on earth, had a degree of 
Intelligence which man, after six thousand years of laborious 
progress, has hardly reached. This or the opposite one forces 
itself upon us. 

3. Another consideration to which I would direct attention 
is this — the facts on which the conclusions of individuals have 
been based, in re.«pect to the existence of the higher powers 
of Intelligence in the brute, as contrasted with others in the 
same connection, which have been totally overlooked. A dis- 
tinguished naturalist, for example, states that the wild ass, 
when he begins to flee from a man, will first turn one ear, and 
then the other, backwards towards the object of his terror. 
From this fact, he concludes that the animal is deliberating 
what course he shall take; and, as a consequence, attributes 
to it the possession of the powers of deliberation and Free 
Wil^. A grave conclusion, surely, to infer from the leering 
of an ass, the existence of such powers. How often have the 
actions of the elephant been proclaimed, as proof of the exist- 
ence of the higher powers of Intelligence in that animal? 
Now let us contemplate another class of facts in connection 
with the same animal. Those who have visited menageries 
are familiar with the dancing of the animal at the " sound of 
the lyre," actions as indicative of superior Intelligence as any 
he ever puts forth. How was the creature taught such an 
act? Did he take lessons, as men do, and thus acquire it? 



HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE. 421 

It was by a process very different from this. When the keep- 
ers wish to have the animal acquire the art under considera- 
tion, they place him upon a floor covered with plates of iron- 
These plates are gradually heated, till the creature, beginning 
to feel pain in his feet from the heat, lifts first one foot and 
then the other. As soon as such motions begin, the music 
commences, which is made to become more and more lively as 
the animal steps with greater and greater rapidity. When this 
process has been continued for a sufficient length of time, the 
music ceases, and the animal is instantly taken from his pain- 
ful condition. These experiments being repeated a few times, 
such an association is established between the sound of the 
lyre and the Sensibility of the animal, that as soon as he hears 
the music he begins to dance, and continues the pace till the 
music ceases. Thus we have the elephant dancing in his wis- 
dom, as many suppose. Now had the animal the real Intelli- 
gence possessed by any individual of our race, who is in any 
degree removed above absolute idiocy, such an imposition could 
not be practised upon him for a single hour. 

The actions of the creature, in this case, in conformity to 
Intelligence, are not, as all perceive, a manifestation of Intelli- 
gence in him, but in the keeper. So whatever Intelligence 
the animal manifests in any instance, is not an indication of 
Intelligence in him, but in the Creator. The same is true of 
all other animals. 

4. The form in which memory exists in brutes, may now 
be readily pointed out. Memory, in man, is the recalling of 
the fact that we were, in particular circumstances, the subjects 
of such and such thoughts, feelings, &c. In the brute no 
such recollections can occur. When the brute has been af- 
fected in a given manner, in given circumstances, the same sen- 
sations are reproduced in him when he comes into similar cir- 
cumstances again, and hence the same actions are repeated. 
36 



422 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

5. Finally, we notice the error of some who attempt to ac- 
count for the diversities of intellectual manifestations between 
men and brutes, on the ground of diversities of phrenological 
development. To suppose that the soul of a dog, if placed in 
connection with the brain of a Newton, would manifest the 
Intelligence of that great philosopher, is as illogical as to sup- 
pose that gold and water will exhibit the same phenomena, 
when subjected to the same influences. The manifestations of 
substances diverse in their nature will, under the same circum- 
stances, be as diverse as their nature. The brute, in any cir- 
cumstances, is still a brute, and not a man, nor an angel. Di- 
versities of phrenological development may account for the 
diverse intellectual manifestations among men; but not for 
those between man and the brute. The brute must become 
another being, before he can manifest the intelligence of man. 



^ 



CHAPTER XX. 

MATTER AND SPIRIT. 
PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE ARGUMENT IS BASED. 

All legitimate reasoning, in respect to the nature of any 
substance, is based upon the assumption, that all substances 
are as their essential phenomena, that substances all of whose 
phenomena are totally and fundamentally unlike, are as totally 
and fundamentally diverse from each other in their nature, and 
that so far as the fundamental phenomena of any substances 
differ, there is, and must be, a corresponding difference in the 
nature of the substances themselves. 

All reasoning, also, pertaining to substances, must be based 
upon their Jcnown qualities. No qualities known to exist 
must be overlooked or disregarded, and no unknown qualities 
must be supposed to exist, unless the reality and the character of 
the unknown are clearly indicated by those that are known, 
and then the former are no longer unknown, but positively dis* 
cerned. Such are the principles on which the argument per- 
taining to these two substances — Matter and Spirit — must 
be based. 

PRINCIPLES APPLIED. 

We have already, in a former Chapter, said all that need be 
said on this subject. In showing, as we think we have done, 
that the material hypothesis cannot account for all the facts of 
the universe — that of Mind especially — we have shown that 
Matter is not the only substance ; in other words, that Spirit 



424 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

or Mind is not Matter. All that is requisite on the present 
occasion, is to indicate simply the nature of the argument 
bearing upon this subject. The reality of a fundamental dis- 
tinction between these two substances, can be denied but upon 
one of two hypotheses — the Material hypothesis which re- 
solves the phenomena of Mind into those of Matter, or the 
Spiritual hypothesis which resolves the phenomena of Matter 
into those of Spirit. Against each of these hypotheses I urge 
the following fundamental objections : 

1. Each alike stands opposed to the absolute intuitions of 
the universal Intelligence. That Intelligence no more con- 
founds one of these substances with the other, than it does 
substance with space, or scarlet color with the sound of a trum- 
pet. It has separated them as opposites. Now this convic- 
tion must be held to be true until it has been demonstrated to 
be false. The universal Intelligence has separated Matter and 
Spirit, as diverse and opposite substances. The burden of 
proof lies upon him who would convict that Intelligence in this 
separation of fundamental error. 

2. No positive evidence of any kind or degree can be ad- 
duced in favor of either of these hypotheses. Each hypoth- 
esis alike must rest, as we have seen in a former Chapter, upon 
mere assumptions wholly unsusceptible of proof, and as totally 
unsustained by any form or degree of positive evidence. This, 
we are quite sure, will not be denied. 

3. The truth of either of these hypotheses is absolutely 
inconceivable and impossible, excepting upon the assumption 
that our knowledge of the qualities of these two substances is 
not valid. If we admit that thought, feeling, and voluntary 
determination, are the real qualities of the Mind, we must ad- 
mit that the substance in which these qualities inhere is an abso- 
lute unity, wholly incapable of division or composition on the 
one hand, and as utterly void of solidity, extension, and form, on 



MATTER AND SPIRIT. 425 

the other. We cannot divide a thought, feeling, or act of 
Will. Neither of these phenomena has a this side, a that 
side, a top or a bottom, length, breadth, thickness, taste or color. 
The substance, itself, thus assuming that its real qualities are 
known, must be an absolute unity, as absolutely void of all the 
properties of Matter. So if we assume that the qualities of 
Matter are really known to us, and that the substance itself is 
as its qualities, then we can, by no possibility, conceive of it 
as anything else than a compound, extended, solid, and figured 
substance, that is, as not being an absolute unity, void of ex- 
tension and form, and endowed with the powers of thought, 
feeling, and free Will. Suppose we assume that our knowledge 
of the qualities of these substances is not valid, then the sub- 
stances themselves are absolutely unknown to us, and we can- 
not reason about them at all. We should also deny the 
validity of all knowledge of every kind : for if we know not 
the qualities of Mind, on the one hand, and of Matter, on the 
other, it is absolutely impossible for us to know anything. 
Assuming our knowledge of the qualities of these substances 
to be real, the truth of the doctrine of Materialism or Ideal- 
ism, each alike, is absolutely inconceivable and impossible. As- 
suming this knowledge to be invalid, then neither of these 
hypotheses can be held as true, because we know nothing, and 
can know nothing, upon this subject or any other. The doc- 
trine of the immateriality of the soul, then, can be denied but 
upon one hypothesis, a denial of the integrity of the Intelli- 
gence as a faculty of knowledge in respect to all subjects alike. 

COMMON OBJECTIONS. 

A few of the common, and most important objections to 
the above argument, demand a passing notice : 

1. It may be said, that for aught we know, there may be 
phenomena yet unknown to us, common to both these substan- 
36* 



426 INTKT.LEOTLAL Pnil-OSOPIIT. 

ces. To this 1 reply, that wheu such phenomena are discov- 
ered, we will acknowledge that so far, and so far only, their 
natures are alike. Such a discovery, however, would not affect 
the above demonstration ; for it would still remain true, that, 
as far as the phenomena under consideration are concerned, 
tbey are wholly unlike. 

2. It may also be objected, that these two substances have 
always, so far as our knowledge extends, existed together. This 
objection supposes us ignorant of the Eternal mind, an admis- 
sion which we shall by no means grant. But suppose we yield 
even this. Does co-existence, and even necessary co-existence, 
suppose a common nature ? Body and Space always co-exist, as 
far as Body is concerned, and as far as our experience goes; but 
to supppose them, for this reason, identical in their nature, is 
absurd. 

3. The mutual influence of these two substances, the one 
upon the other, is often adduced as proof of the identity of 
their ultimate essence. But this fact equally consists with both 
hypotheses, and of course can prove neither. Before it can be 
shown to possess any force, it must be shown that no two sub- 
stances can mutually affect each other, only on the single con- 
dition of a common nature. But this can never be done. 

These are the principal and only objections, as far as my 
knowledge extends, to the above demonstration. Their weak- 
ness shows the weakness of the hypothesis they are designed 
to sustain. 



CHAPTER XXL 

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 

The relations of spirit to the eternal future before us, pre- 
sent questions of greater moment to us, as intelligent beings, 
capable of investigating the question of our own destiny, than 
any other of which we can conceive. Indeed, all real inter- 
ests with such beings are involved in such a question. In the 
volume of Inspiration, this doctrine is, as we should expect, 
set with the greatest possible distinctness before our minds. 
The individual who confides in the truth of that sacred record, 
needs no other foundation on which to rest the question of his 
own Immortality. The examination of the truth of this doc- 
trine, however, pertains not merely to those who are privileged 
with the knowledge of Inspiration. This conviction may prop- 
erly be presented as the great phenomenon of the race, of the 
universal human Intelligence. It belongs to Philosophy to 
investigate the grounds of this universal conviction. 

PEELIMINART CONSIDERATIONS. 

Before proceeding to a direct consideration of the grounds 
of this conviction, a few preliminary considerations demand 
our special attention : 

1. The first that I notice, is the fact above stated, that the 
conviction of the truth of this doctrine is co-extensive with 
the race of man. It belongs to no age, to no form of religion, 
to no nation, to no race of men, as a peculiarity. It is the 
common element of all religions, the common conviction of 



428 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the race, in all ages and conditions. To the wild son of the 
forest, to the ferocious cannibal of the isles of the Pacific, to 
the wanderer among " Afric's sunny mountains," and the in- 
habitants of '' India's coral strand," as well as to that portion 
of the race to whom Christianity has imparted the blessings of 
civilization, the conviction of an endless existence after the 
closing up of the concerns of this mortal sphere is an omni- 
present reality. " Simple nature" has imparted this expecta- 
tion to the race, as the common boon of Heaven, irrespective 
of rank or condition. 

2. This conviction does not exist in the universal Intelli- 
gence as the result of investigation, of logical deductions from 
processes of reasoning. This is evident from the fact, that it 
exists among races of men totally unaccustomed to reason on 
any such subject. Here, also, it exists with as much strength 
as among those who are most disciplined in logical deductions. 
It lies in the mind as one of the great primary intuitions of 
the universal Intelligence. It has precisely the same claim to 
a place among such intuitions that the belief of our own exist- 
ence has. 

3. This conviction lies in the Intelligence in such a form, 
as to be, in reality, incapable of increased confirmation by any 
process of reasoning. When we fall back upon the primary 
intuitions of our minds, we find it there, as one of the great 
starting points of the Intelligence. We find it, not as a point 
to be reached after we have left the sphere of primary intui- 
tions, but as one of the seven pillars on which the temple of 
truth, reared by investigation and reasoning, must rest. Like 
all other primary intuitions, this conviction is incapable of es- 
sential confirmation by any process of logical deduction. 

4. While this conviction, as a primary intuition of the 
universal Intelligence, is incapable of essential confirmation 
from logical deductions, it remains equally proof against all 



IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 429 

apparent demonstrations to the contrary. An individual may 
pile what he may deem demonstration upon demonstration 
upon this conviction, in order to crush and annihilate it, till he 
triumphs in the terrible assumption, that its light is for ever 
extinct in his mind. Still, in a moment, it will rise before 
him again, in all the strength and vigor of immortal youth. 
He again knows the truth of that conviction, with an assur- 
ance with which he hardly recognizes his own existence. This 
apparent resurrection is not the result of logical deductions. 
In that moment the Intelligence looks down into the depths 
of its inner being, and there again finds this intuition unmoved 
from its eternal foundations, as the moveless rock beneath the 
billows of the ocean. The individual who thinks that he has 
demonstrated to himself the fact, that as a brute he shall live 
and die, should remember, that however secure he may think 
himself from the conviction of, to him, the unwelcome truth 
of his own immortality, the terrible reality will hereafter leap 
upon him again, as an armed man. He will never escape 
from it. It will and must be to him as a guardian angel, or a 
specter of darkness. 

5. In the facts above stated, we have the highest possible 
evidence of the truth of the doctrine under consideration. 
What the universal Intelligence affirms, in view of certain 
facts, must have its foundation in these facts, or we must as- 
sume that the Intelligence itself is a lie ; and then to reason 
on any subject becomes the perfection of folly. 

6. As a primary conviction of the universal Intelligence, 
the exclusive province of philosophy pertaining to it is, to in- 
vestigate the grounds of this conviction, and not to attempt to es- 
tablish the truth of it by any other process of logical deduction. 
Here, I think, lies the error in the common demonstrations, or 
attempted demonstrations, of the doctrine of Immortality. 
The assumption in all such demonstrations is, that the truth 



430 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of this doctrine is to be found as some distant point in a pro- 
cess of logical deduction, instead of recognizing the conviction 
of the truth of the doctrine as one of the primary intuitions 
of universal Reason, and then falling back upon the intuition 
itself, to discover its foundation, or chronological antecedent. 
One fact should be kept in mind here. In falling back upon 
any primary conviction of the Intelligence, for the purpose of 
finding the foundation of the same, the validity of that convic- 
tion does not depend upon the success of our endeavors. Re- 
flection may fail of its object, " yet the foundation of truth 
standeth sure." 

PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE PRESENT ARGUMENT RESTS. 

There are two foundation principles on which the entire 
argument pertaining to the doctrine of Immortality rests : 

1. The first is this, that every sentient being is formed for 
a particular destiny. To fill the sphere of existence for which 
each creature was formed, that constitutes his destiny. That 
each creature is thus formed and adapted to a particular sphere, 
the filling up of which constitutes his destiny, is a fundamen- 
tal conviction of the race. 

2. There is in the constitution of each being, and order of 
beings, a fixed adaptation to his or their particular destiny. 
To suppose the opposite, would be to suppose that the Creator 
lacks wisdom, or goodness, or both. 

Hence, if we would determine the destiny of any being, 
or order of beings, we must investigate their powers and sus- 
ceptibilities, and from these learn what their real destiny is. 
The great French naturalist, from a single bone belonging to 
an animal of an extinct species, could determine at once, in 
view of that single part, the genus or species of the animal, 
and the main features of its physical structure. So true is 
Nature in the adaptation of one part of her works to another. 



IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL, 431 

Equally real and perfect is the adaptation of the constitution 
of each creature to his particular destiny. Of this all men 
are convinced. All men believe that the destiny of the bee 
differs from that of the horse, and that that of man differs 
from that of either of the former. The ground of this convic- 
tion is the fundamental difference of their nature and consti- 
tution 

We must admit the validity of the above principles, as the 
ground of the argument pertaining to the doctrine of Immor- 
tality, or deny wholly the validity of all conclusions based 
upon the laws and constitution of Nature. If we deny the 
propriety of reasoning from the fundamental laws and consti- 
tution of a being to his destiny, it becomes perfect folly for us 
to reason from or about creation at all. If the voice of Na- 
ture is false in this instance, he is guilty of infinite folly and 
absurdity who will trust her anywhere. 

DIRECT ARGUMENT. 

We are now prepared for a distinct statement of the ground 
of the universal conviction of the truth of the doctrine of Im- 
mortality. It is the conscious adaptation of the powers and 
susceptibilities of the soul to that great idea, or to its realiza- 
tion, as the appropriate destiny of man. Our godlike powers 
and susceptibilities are in conscious adaptation to the realization 
of that idea as our appropriate destiny, and to none other. 

1. The universal conception of the idea, as one of the 
primitive ideas of Reason, indicates in man powers adapted to 
its realization. For who should realize an idea but the being 
who has conceived of it ? The conception of the idea of Para- 
dise Lost indicated, in Milton, powers adapted to the produc- 
tion of that immortal poem. So the universal conception of 
Immortality, as one of the fundamental phenomena of the 



432 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

human Intelligence, indicates, in man, powers adapted to the 
realization of that conception. 

2. But when this conception arises in the human mind, we 
find our powers and susceptibilities in conscious adaptation to 
it. The realization of the idea becomes the great object of 
desire, and our whole being shrinks back with horror at the 
thought of annihilation. How true to nature, as the truth 
lies revealed in the depths of universal mind, is the sentiment 
which Milton has put into the mouth of a fallen spirit : 

" For who would lose, 
Though full of pain, this intellectual being 
These thoughts that wander through eternity, 
To perish rather, swallowed up and lost 
In the wide womb of uncreated night, 
Devoid of sense and motion ? " 

Unless the fixed direction of universal nature is towards 
the unreal. Immortality is the destiny of man. Now it is the 
conscious adaptation of his powers to that idea, together with 
the principle, that the destiny of each being and race of beings 
is as their powers and adaptations, that constitutes, as it ap- 
pears to me, the chief ground of the universal conviction of 
the truth of the doctrine of Immortality. What other convic- 
tion should arise in the conscious presence of such facts ? 

3. But there is another fundamental fact which lies at the 
basis of the universal conviction of which we are speakiug — 
a fact of which every one becomes sufficiently conscious, as 
soon as he knows himself, to lay the foundation of the convic- 
tion under consideration, although the fact may not, in most 
minds, possess all the distinctness of reflection. It is the fact, 
so undeniably and universally manifest, that all the powers of 
the soul are capable of and adapted to a state of endless pro- 
gression. The powers of thought involve the elements of end- 



IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 433 

less progress in knowledge. So all our capacities are in their 
nature adapted to a state of limitless expan^ion. What is the 
conviction which forces itself upon the mind in the presence 
of such powers? The answer is, th;it the doctrine of Immor- 
tality reveals the destiny of man, or the fundamental tenden- 
cies of nature are towards the unreal and untrue. Which con- 
clusion is most reasonable, that powers and susceptibilities 
adapted to endless expansion are just to begin to open to the 
light and influence of truth, and then descend into the abyss 
of non-existence, or that " the eternal years of God are theirs ?" 
What excuse can a rational being have, in the presence of such 
faculties, for not assuming his own Immortality as the great 
goal towards which all his plans and purposes shall be directed ? 
4. There is another important fact bearing upon this topic 
— a fact of which every one is conscious as soon as he comes 
to recognize himself as a moral agent. It is a fact, that we 
do violence to our moral nature, and render ourselves really 
incapable of the virtues to which our nature is adapted, when 
we reject the doctrine of Immortality. When we contemplate 
ourselves as the creatures of a day, our nature shrinks to the 
dimensions of its own withering, contracted conceptions, and 
thus becomes incapable of great thoughts and noble aspira- 
tions. " The grander my conceptions of being, the nobler my 
future. There can be no sublimity in life without faith in the 
soul's eternity." It is only in the presence of such concep- 
tions and anticipations, that great virtues, such as render us 
pure and blessed even here, become possible to us. The indi- 
vidual who does not " dial on time his own eternity," cannot 
become truly great, nor greatly good. His aspirations and his 
virtues, if he could have any, would, of necessity, be as con- 
tracted and groveling as his conceptions of h ■ own destiny, 
and that of the race with which he is connected. Now this 
feeling of suicidal violence done to the higher departments of 
37 



434 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

our nature, in the denial of this doctrine, is one of the chief 
sources, as I suppose, of the universal conviction of the truth 
of the soul's eternity. 

5. I mention another fact as the ground of this conviction. 
It is the fact, that every one becomes aware of as soon as the 
fact presents itself to his mind, that no real reasons whatever 
exist against the doctrine of which we are speaking. On the 
one hand, the truth of the doctrine stands forth as a primary, 
fundamental intuition of universal Reason. On the other, no 
reasons at all present themselves against this intuition. "What 
reason, for example, does the dissolution of the physical organ- 
ization, with which the soul is now connected, and the conse- 
quent disappearance of any manifestations of the soul's exist- 
ence to us, afford against this doctrine? This fact is just as 
consistent with the soul's Immortality, as with the opposite 
supposition. It may be but one of the necessary steps in the 
progress of its future development. 

The same holds true of the loss of mental vigor which 
often attends the approach of dissolution under consideration. 
When from weariness and exhaustion, we approach a state of 
sleep, we find the same want of vigor ; yet we know that the 
real powers of the soul are not the less, under such circum- 
stances. The same may hold true in the case above referred 
to. It may be, and no doubt is, one circumstance which at- 
tends our mortal state, while it has no bearing whatever against 
the soul's Immortality. With such evidences as that above 
stated, and in the total absence of all evidence to the contrary, 
every one feels that it would imply infinite guilt in him not to 
assume the doctrine under consideration as true. 

6. There is one fact which science has developed, as con- 
firmatory of the universal conviction under consideration, 
though from its being a fact of science, it cannot constitute a 
ground of that conviction At death, not a particle of the 



IMMORTALITY OP THE SOUL. 435 

physical organization, with which the soul is here connected, 
perishes. How unreasonable and absurd the supposition, that 
the soul, for which all else was made, is the only reality that 
then ceases to be ? As the particles of the body immediately 
enter into new combinations, how reasonable the conclusion 
(and how unreasonable and absurd the opposite conclusion), 
that the soul also passes away from the present scene to the 
sphere of its future existence ! 

FUTURE RETRIBUTIONS. 

There is one element of the doctrine of Immortality which 
should not be passed over without special attention. T refer to 
the question, whether the soul, in the eternal future, is to ex- 
ist in a state of moral retribution. The following considera- 
tions may be presented as having a decisive bearing upon this 
question : 

1. Wherever, throughout the wide world, the idea of Im- 
mortality is met with, we find it connected with the belief and 
anticipation of a state of moral retributions. There is not an 
age or nation where an exception to this belief can be met with. 
Such a fact marks the doctrine of future retributions, as one 
of the primary intuitions of universal Rason. 

2. All our ideas of moral fitness are met in this doctrine, 
and are perfectly reversed by every other hypothesis. No in- 
dividual can contemplate a life of self-sacrificing virtue, and 
of flagrant wickedness and crime unattended with repentance, 
as terminating in the same condition hereafter, and retain his 
sentiments of moral esteem for the "Judge of all the earth.'' 
Every individual does as fatal violence to his moral nature, 
who entertains the sentiment that God does not, in eternity, 
hold deserved retributions in readiness for the virtuous and vi- 
cious, as the man does who denies the soul's immortality. I 
feel perfectly safe in venturing the affirmation, that there is 



436 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

not an individual on earth, who holds that God has prepared 
the same rewards hereafter for the virtuous and the vicious here, 
that does, or can, in the depths of his own mind, entertain feel- 
ings of esteem and reverence, and is inspired with feelings of 
delight and praise, for the Eternal One. 

3. I mention one other very decisive fact bearing upon this 
question. Every observer of the facts that lie all around him 
in the universe, cannot have failed to notice an invariable ten- 
dency, common to the practice of both virtue and vice ; it is a 
tendency to changeless fixedness of character in the one spe- 
cific direction in which an individual accustoms himself to act. 
Now, what does such an unvarying and universal fact indicate, 
in respect to the character of the future destiny of moral 
agents ? Certainly this, and this only, that the moral universe 
is advancing, not only in the line of immortal existence, but to 
a state of fixed and changeless moral retributions. What 
other convictions do such considerations tend to impress upon 
the Mind of all who seriously throw their thoughts upon the 
eternal future before them ? How thoughtfully, then, does it 
become us to walk along the borders of that " undiscovered 
country," across whose bourne we are so soon to pass. 



CHAPTER XXII. 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 



We come now to a consideration of the last and most im- 
portant subject to be investigated in the present Treatise — 
the idea of God. 

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 

In the commencement of my remarks upon this subject, 
special attention is invited to the following preliminary consid- 
erations : 

1. The idea of God, like that of Immortality, is in all Minds 
in whom Reason is in any considerable degree developed. 
This will be admitted by all who are at all acquainted with the 
history of the race. The idea of God is a common phenom- 
enon of the universal Intelligence. 

2. Like the doctrine above named, it is not in the Mind as 
the result of logical deduction ; yet it is there with such weight 
of conviction, that every one feels that he involves himself in 
infinite guilt, in denying, or entertaining a doubt of its object- 
ive validity. This is evident from the fact, that every skeptic, 
in the depths of his own mind, believes that, if there is a 
God, he has forfeited His eternal favor, in the denial of His 
existence, a fact clearly evincing the consciousness, that in 
doubting, instead of adoring and worshiping, he has done fatal 
violence to the laws of his own being. 

3. This idea is naturally in the Mind with such weight of 

37* 



438 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

conviction, as to be apparently incapable of any considerable 
increase or diminution by any process of logical deduction. 
Arguments in favor of its validity, do not, in most instances, 
really increase the weight or force of this conviction. They 
simply develop in the Mind a distinct and reflective conscious- 
ness of what it was absolutely assured of before. Nor can pro- 
fessed arguments to the contrary erase this conviction from the 
Mind; a fact fully evinced by the force with which the assu- 
rance of the being of God often leaps upon the Mind of the 
skeptic, in moments of solemn thought, of sudden calamity, 
or unexpected exposure to death. 

4. As this conviction is thus in the Mind, and not there as 
the result of logical deduction, it- must be ranked among the 
primary intuitions of Reason. 

5. As a first truth of Reason, the Divine existence is sus- 
ceptible, in the first instance, of the kind of proof common to 
all first truths, and in the second, of that which is peculiar to 
all necessary intuitions. 

In the light of the above observations, we will now proceed 
to a consideration of the ground of the universal conviction of 
the reality of the Divine existence. There are two funda- 
mental forms in which the idea of God exi.sts in the Mind, to 
each of which special attention will be directed, to wit, God, 
the unconditioned cause of all that exists and acts condition- 
ally — and God, the Infinite and Perfect. 

GOD THE UNCONDITIONED CAUSE OF ALL THAT EXISTS 
CONDITIONALLY. 

Whatever ideas mankind may entertain of the universe, 
whether they re.-olve all substances into Matter or into Spirit, 
or whether they regard thought as the only reality, there is 
one point in respect to which they all in fact do, and must 
perfectly harmonize, to wit, that there is an ultimate reason 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 439 

why the facts of the universe, whatever their nature may he 
supposed to he. are tvliat they are, and not otherwise. Now if 
the term God be employed to designate this ultimate Reason, 
or unconditioned Cause, then all mankind do really and truly 
believe in God, and none doubt, or profess to doubt his exist- 
ence. It is no more possible for us to doubt the reality of 
such ultimate Eeason, than it is to doubt the validity of the 
principle, that every event must have a cause. As thus de- 
fined, the question, and only question, at issue between the 
Theist and anti-Theist is, not whether God exists, but tchat is 
his character ? that is. What is the nature and character of 
this final, unconditioned Cause, the reality of whose existence 
all admit, and none can, by any possibility, doubt ? 

POSSIBLE HYPOTHESES ON THIS SUBJECT. 

On a moment's reflection, it will be perceived, that there 
are but a certain number of possible hypotheses on this sub- 
ject, and that some one of these, to the exclusion of all the 
others, must be true. It is self-evident, that this cause must 
exist as an inherent law of nature, or it must exist out of and 
above nature, as a power exercising an absolute control over it. 
If the latter supposition be granted, then, as all will admit, the 
Theistic hypothesis, as above defined, must be true. If, on the 
other hand, the former supposition be granted, then the un- 
conditioned Cause must exist as an inherent law of Matter, or of 
Spirit, or of pure thought, no other supposition being conceiv- 
able or possible. The true answer, then, to the question, What 
is the nature and character of the ultimate Reason or uncon- 
ditioned Cause under consideration, will be found in the hy- 
pothesis of Theism, of Materialism, or in that of some one of 
the forms of Idealism. This must be true, because these in- 
clude all conceivable hypotheses. 



440 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

None hut the Theistic Hypotliesis can he true. 

If it be admitted, that there are two orders of finite substan- 
ces — Matter and Spirit — and that they possess the attributes, 
and sustain to each other the relations which we have attribu- 
ted to them, then the truth of the Theistic hypothesis is unde- 
niable. Indeed, it has never been denied, but upon the 
assumption of the non-reality of Spirit as distinct from Mat- 
ter, or of Matter as distinct from Spirit, or of all substances 
whatever. The Unconditioned must be an inherent law of 
thought, of Spirit, or of Matter, or the free, intelligent, self- 
conscious personality of Theism. The truth of these state- 
ments is so self-evident, that no one was ever known to deny it. 

Now it has already, we think, been rendered perfectly evi- 
dent, that neither the hypothesis of Materialism, nor any one 
of those of Idealism can be true. That of Theism, then, 
must be true. We might with perfect safety rest the argu- 
ment here. The paramount importance of the subject, how- 
ever, requires that we give to the argument bearing upon that 
subject, a still more extended elucidation. 

THE THEISTIC HYPOTHESIS ESTABLISHED AS A TRUTH OF 
SCIENCE. 

The relation of the Divine existence considered as the Ul- 
timate Reason or Unconditioned Cause of the facts of the 
universe, is an absolutely necessary truth, the opposite being 
inconceivable, and in itself, impossible. Hence, as we have 
already remarked, it is a truth universally admitted. Now 
whatever attributes are necessarily implied in the idea of such 
a cause, on the one hand, and in the facts of the universe, on 
the other, must be affirmed of G-od. This all will admit. 
The process of the argument, in the first instance, is wholly d. 
priori, and in the next d posteriori. 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 441 



ATTRIBUTES NECESSARILY IMPLIED IN THE IDEA OP THE 
UNCONDITIONED. 

The following may be enumerated as the attributes necessa- 
sarily implied in the idea of Grod considered as the Uncondi- 
tioned Cause, to wit, Eternity, absolute Immutability, and full 
and perfect adequacy and adaptation to produce the facts of the 
universe, and render them what they are, and not otherwise. 
If this Cause did not exist from eternity, it would itself be an 
effect of some other and prior cause, and therefore not itself 
the ultimate or unconditioned Cause. If it were not absolutely 
immutable, its condition and states would be determined by 
some other cause, in which case also, it would not be the ulti- 
mate Cause, If it did not possess perfect adequacy, and adap- 
tation to produce the facts of the universe, it could, in no 
sense, be the cause of those facts. These attributes then must 
pertain to God, as the Unconditioned. As necessary corollo- 
ries from these truths, the three following propositions may be 
affirmed of the Unconditioned : 

1. The cause assigned, in any given hypothesis, must have, 
to possess any claims whatever to our regard, an intelligent 
adaptation to produce the facts of the universe, and render 
them what they are. If it has no apparently adequate adap- 
tation to such an end, the hypothesis containing it, is intrinsi- 
cally absurd, and may be properly rejected on the ground of 



2. The cause assigned must not rank lower in Mnd than 
the effect attributed to it; otherwise such cause could have no 
intelligent adaptation to produce the effects attributed to it. 

3. The Unconditioned Cause assigned for the facts of the 
universe, must be one which possesses in itself the power of 
self-originating activity, that is, of commencing action from a 
state of rest, and that from the influence of no cause out of 



442 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

itself. The facts to be accounted for are not a series of events 
existing from eternity, but one having, as we shall see here- 
after, its beginning in time. The Unconditioned must be 4 
cause then, having in itself the power of pure self originating 
activity. It must be one possessing a creative, or formative 
energy, which remained inactive from eternity up to a certain 
moment in time, and then, from no cause out of itself, com- 
menced such activity. The truth of these statements, the 
first two, to say the least, will not be denied. How the last 
can be is hardly conceivable. 

ATTRIBUTES OF THE UNCONDITIONED NECESSARILY SUPPOSED 
IN THE FACTS OF THE UNIVERSE. 

We now come to a consideration of the attributes of the 
Unconditioned, necessarily supposed in the facts of the Uni- 
verse. To proceed intelligently in this department of our in- 
quiries, we must first classify the facts from which these attri- 
butes are to be deduced. Among these facts, I notice the 
following : 

Facts of creation hearing upon our present inquiries. 

1. These facts, that is, the present order of things through- 
out the universe, had their origin in time, and are not a series 
of events existing from eternity. This statement is affirmed 
as tiue by the intuitive convictions of the race, by all tlie de- 
ductions of science bearing upon the subject, is assumed as 
true in all the theories of the universe invented by the inge- 
nuity of man, and is contradicted by no known facts in exist- 
ence. We therefore assume the truth of the proposition as 
universally granted. 

2. The present state of the earth is the result of a series 
of independent creations, each having its beginning in time. 
The earth has existed under the reign of Fishes, under the 



THE IDEA or GOD. 443 

reign of Reptiles, under the reign of Mammals, and it now 
exists under that of Man. Not a solitary fact can be adduced 
presenting the remotest indication, that any one of these orders 
of existence originated by transmutation from any one that 
preceded it. All the known facts of creation, on the other 
hand, aflirm, and that most absolutely, the opposite supposi- 
tion. I simply announce here the teachings of science on this 
subject, and assume the truth of its uncontradicted teachings 
as the basis of the present argument. 

3. Every distinct species of animals or plants that now 
exists, or ever has existed on earth, has an independent exist- 
ence, that is, did not derive its existence by transmutation 
from any pre-existing species. K science has not established 
this fact, it may truly be said to have established nothing. 

4. Creation, from its commencement, has been progressive 
in one direction exclusively, from the less to the more perfect. 
The truth of this proposition is affirmed directly by all the 
teachings of science pertaining to the facts of creation, and is 
assumed as true in all the theories of the universe, of every 
kind. This fact, which is in itself of fundamental importance, 
also implies, that the series of creations had a beginning; else 
there could be no progress in the direction referred to. 

5. No evidence whatever can be adduced of the existence 
of any power inhering intrinsically in nature, of originating 
from a state of total and universal inorganization, any, much 
less the leading, orders of animals or vegetables that now exist, 
or ever have existed on the earth. The only power pertaining 
to this subject, even apparently inhering in nature, is that of 
perpetuating species already existing, and that according to a 
fixed and immutable law of propogation. Nothing can be 
affirmed as a law of nature, if this proposition is not true. 

6. All the material elements of which the earth is now 
constituted, once existed in a state of total unorganization, 



4^ INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

with no animals or vegetables upon it, and no embryo princi- 
ples from which such organizations new originate. An indi- 
vidual must close his eyes to all the facts of Geological science, 
to doubt the truth of this proposition. 

7. Two orders of finite substances, Matter and Spirit, are 
to the Mind, as the basis of its reasonings on this subject, ob- 
jects of absolute knowledge. These substances are in all their 
known qualities not only diverse the one from the other, but 
perfect opposites. Mind, rational Mind, I mean, everywhere 
stands revealed with the attributes of a free, intelligent, sensi- 
tive, self-conscious personality. Matter exhibits none of the 
properties which u)ake any approach whatever towards the 
idea of such a personality. Undeniable and fundamental phe- 
nomena place an irapas.sable gulf between them, as far as unity 
of nature is concerned. No one will question at all these 
statements, but upon one assumption, that their real qualities 
are wholly unknown to us. This is a fonnal impeachment of 
the validity and integrity of the Intelligence, as a faculty of 
knowledge, and then all inquiry after truth becomes an absurd- 
ity. Hence, I remark : 

8. That while these substances are in their nature funda- 
mental opposites, a fixed and undeniable relation exists between 
them, which imparts an absolute iiniti/ to creation. Mind is 
the center about which the entire material universe revolves. 
Mind is the end, to which the entire organization and move- 
ments of the universe sustain the exclusive relation of a means. 
Creation is thus an absolute whole, in which there is a place 
for everything, and everything is in its place, as far as the 
great, all-comprehending law of means and ends is concerned. 

9. Creation, throughout, is constructed upon principles of 
pure science as developed in the Intelligence. Everything 
within and without us, seems, to say the least, to be the reali- 
zation of dijplany which had a pre-existence in the Intellect of 



THE IDEA OP GOD. 445 

the great Architect of nature. In the constitution of our na- 
ture, mental and physical, in the general structure of the uni- 
verse, as developed in the science of Astronomy, and in the 
organization of animals and plants in the world around us, 
ideas and principles of pure science, as they exist in the Intel- 
ligence, are everywhere realized. Creation, throughout, wears 
this one exclusive aspect, and this is one of the fundamental 
facts that bear upon our present investigations. 

10. Mind is constituted in fundamental and immutable cor- 
relation to one idea of the Unconditioned, the idea exclusively 
presented in the Theistic hypothesis. Two absolutely universal 
instincts noticed in a preceding Chapter, point, as thus shown, 
exclusively in this one direction — those of ivorship and j^rayer. 
To these I may add a deep and universal sentiment, from 
which, indeed, those just named take their rise, that of pro- 
found dependence upon a power out of and above itself. Man, 
also, is fundamentally constituted as a subject of moral govern- 
ment. In the interior of his Mind there is a perpetual reve- 
lation to him of the idea of right and wrong, or of the law of 
duty ; through his conscience he ever recognizes himself as in 
the presence of a solemn behest to do the one and avoid the 
other. At the same time, he feels deeply impressed with the 
sense of the moral desert of good or ill, as he does the one or 
the other, and he instinctively anticipates from a power out of 
and above himself corresponding retributions. It is, finally, 
an immutable demand of the moral nature of universal Mind, 
that all the interests of the moral universe should be finally 
adjusted according to the principles of eternal and immutable 
justice. All the above-mentioned principles and instincts of 
our rational nature, are immutably correlated to but one idea of 
the Unconditioned, that of a free, intelligent, self-conscious 
personality, ruling the universe in absolute wisdom and right- 
eousness. Whether such a being exists, is not now the question. 
38 



446 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

We might, however, as well deny that Mind, or any of its 
operations exists at all, as to deny the facts of its constitution 
above referred to. 

11. Finally, throughout the entire domain of nature, one 
fixed and immutable law obtains, as far as the observation of 
man extends, to wit, For every fundamental want of sentient 
existence, there are corresponding provisions, and for every 
fundamental adaptation a corresponding object, or sphere of 
activity. Human observation has never yet discovered a soli- 
tary exception to this principle. Nature never vibrates towards 
the unreal. Nor is there, we may safely conclude, throughout 
the wide domain of her creations, such a chasm as there would 
be, were the above principles untrue. 

THE THEISTIC HYPOTHESIS INTUITIVELY CERTAIN FROM 
THESE FACTS. 

Such are the great leading facts of the universe bearing 
upon our present inquiries, facts against none of which will 
any well-informed and candid mind venture a denial. Now 
we affirm, without fear of contradiction, that from these facts 
the truth and necessity of the Theistic hypothesis, in opposition 
to every other, actual or conceivable, is intuitively evident. 
We cannot deny the facts without impeaching the validity and 
integrity of the Intelligence itself, as a faculty of knowledge, 
and then all inquiries after truth of every kind become absurd. 
We cannot, on the other hand, admit the facts, without affirm- 
ing, as self-evident, the truth of this one hypothesis, and the 
total invalidity of every other. But the truth of this one hy- 
pothesis, as affirmed by these facts, aeeds a still more particu- 
lar and special development. To accomplish this end, I 
remark — 



THE IDEA OF GOD, 447 



TRUTH 01' THIS HYPOTHESIS MORE PARTICULARLY DEVELOPED. 

1. The Unconditioned can, by no possibility, be any law 
inJierivg in nature, any law, as affirmed by the material hy- 
pothesis on the one hand, or the Idealistic, in any of its forms, 
on the other. This I affinn for the following reasons : 

(1). As we have already seen, not one of these hypotheses 
can be true, and som* one of these must be true, if the Un- 
conditioned is an inherent law of nature. We need not re- 
peat the argument, by which the truth of these statements has 
already been demonstrated. 

(2). On no such hypothesis can we account for the undenia- 
ble fact pertaining to the Unconditioned, that of commencing 
activity, or putting forth of creative power from a state of inac- 
tion. Creative energy in the Unconditioned remained inactive 
from eternity up to a given period, and then it commenced ac- 
tion. Now this could not possibly be true of any law inher- 
ing in nature. Any such law remaining inactive, from eternity 
to any one period, must remain so to eternity, unless roused to 
action by some power out of itself, and then this law would 
not itself be the Unconditioned. The idea of a law of nature 
remaining from eternity to a given period inactive, and then 
commencing action from no cause out of itself, is just as in- 
conceivable and impossible as an event without a cause, or the 
annihilation of space. 

(3). Hence, I remark, that on no such hypothesis, can we ac- 
count for the undeniable fact of Creation, that of its origin in 
time. The Unconditioned, as we have seen, must be immuta- 
bly the same, from eternity to eternity. If it were an inher- 
ent law of nature, it must have acted as a creative energy from 
eternity, or it never could have acted at all. Creation, then, 
could not have been a fact having its origin in time. It is such 



448 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

a fact, and therefore the Unconditioned is no law inhering in 
nature. 

(4). The element of progression from the less in the direc- 
tion of the more perfect, an element -which undeniably consti- 
tutes a fundamental characteristic of creation, can be accounted 
for on no hypothesis that the Unconditioned is in any form a 
law inhering in nature. Progression proceeding from such a 
law must have been from eternity, and would already have at- 
tained to infinity. It has not thus attained, and therefore can- 
not proceed from such a law. The hypothesis, under consid- 
eration, then, cannot be true. 

(5). The facts of the origin of animal and vegetable or- 
ganizations, such as really appear on earth, from a state of 
universal unorganization, cannot be accounted for on the hy- 
pothesis under consideration. Matter was once exclusively in 
this state, with no embryo principles or conditions from which 
such organizations now originate, or by any known law of na- 
ture can originate. This is absolutely undeniable. Now from 
what known (and we must reason only from the known) inher- 
ing law of nature can the origin of all the species of animals 
and vegetables that have existed and now exist on earth, be 
accounted for ? No such law can be designated, and therefore 
the facts before us must be attributed to a power out of and 
above nature. 

(6). This hypothesis can be true, also, but upon the validity 
of one assumption, to wit, that nature, in all the higher depart- 
ments of her works, is immutably correlated to the tmreal, in- 
stead of the real in the Unconditioned. I refer, of course, to 
the higher and spiritual departments of Mind. These, as we 
have seen, are in fixed correlation to the Theistic hypothesis, in 
opposition to every other. The great fundamental principle 
of science, that for every fundamental want of sentient exist- 
ence there is a supply, and for every fundamental adaptation a 



THE IDEA OP GOD. 449 

corresponding sphere of action, is totally false, if the hypothesis 
under consideration is true. It cannot be true, for the reason 
that for the facts of the universe it assigns a cause, which 
makes nature opposed to herself, and from which such facts 
can, by no possibility, arise. 

2. The Unconditioned can be no cause acting from neces- 
sity. This is absolutely evident from considerations already 
presented. A necessary cause must act, as soon as the condi- 
tions of its activity are fulfilled. This is the fundamental ele- 
ment of our idea of such a cause. Wit^ the Unconditioned 
these conditions must have been fulfilled from eternity, or not 
at all. The opposite supposition involves the assumption that 
the action of the Unconditioned depends upon a cause out of 
itself, in other words, that it is not the Unconditioned. Crea- 
tion, then, would be from eternity, and could not be an event 
of time. To account for creation as having had its beginning 
in time, a cause must be assigned, that could have acted as a 
creative energy, at that one moment, and need not to have 
thus acted at any preceding one, and that cause remaining 
from eternity to eternity absolutely immutable and determined 
in its activity by no other cause. Now the idea of necessita- 
ted causation does not, and cannot answer these conditions. 
It has no power from a state of inaction to commence activity, 
but from causes out of itself. From one state it cannot assume 
a new form of activity, but from the occurrence of new condi- 
tions which render continuance in the former state, and non- 
action in the new direction, equally and absolutely impossible. 
Now no such new conditions could have arisen with the Un- 
conditioned, at the moment referred to, the very supposition of 
their occurrence implying a self-contradiction, to wit, that the 
Unconditioned is not the Unconditioned. No reasons existed 
for the commencement of creation at the moment referred to, 
rather than at any other moment, each period being in itself 
38* 



450 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

in all respects absolutely like every other, and as equally dis- 
tant from the eternity past and the eternity to come. The 
fact of creation as an event of time, a fact undeniable, cannot 
be accounted for upon the supposition, that the Unconditioned 
is any form of necessitated causation. 

Every objection also, almost without exception, that lies 
against the idea that this cause is any inhering law of nature, 
lies with equal force against the idea, that it is any other form 
of necessitated causation. It is just as impossible to account 
for the facts of creation on one supposition as on the other. 

3. The Unconditioned must be a/ree Cause, in opposition 
to all forms of necessary causation. On no other supposition 
is the undeniable fact of creation as an event having its be- 
ginning in time, a conceivable or possible event. On this hy- 
pothesis, it is both conceivable and possible. If the Uncon- 
ditioned is a free and not a necessary cause, then at each 
successive moment from eternity, he might or might not put 
forth his creative energy. Its non-exercise at each previous 
moment, and its exercise at the moment when it was put forth, 
is conceivable, and therefore possible. On no other conceiv- 
able supposition can the fact, that the eifects of the Divine 
agency are in time and not from eternity, be accounted for. 

A cause that acts from necessity must, as we have seen, 
act as soon as it exists, and the conditions of its activity are 
fulfilled, which must have been true of the Unconditioned 
from eternity. The effects of the Divine agency, then, if the 
Unconditioned is a necessary cause, must have been from eter- 
nity, and not, as in fact they are, in time. If the human race, 
or the universe of mind around us, had their origin from a 
necessary cause, their existence must have been from eternity, 
or they could never have existed at all. That which rendered 
it impossible for the Unconditioned to create such beings from 



:. THE IDEA OP GOD. 451 

eternity up to any one moment, would have rendered it impos- 
sible for him to have created them to eternity. There can be 
no possible escape from this supposition. 

To suppose the Unconditioned to be a necessary and not a 
free cause, is also self-contradictory. What is the fundamental 
element of our idea of a necessary cause ? It is this : a cause 
which can act only as it is acted upon by something which 
necessitates its action. A necessary cause, therefore, in its ac- 
tion, must be conditioned, and not unconditioned and absolute. 
If God, then, is not a free, he is not the unconditioned cause 
of all conditional existences. Besides the supposition that the 
unconditioned and absolute is under the law of necessity, im- 
plies that the necessitating power acted antecedently to the 
unconditioned. This is equivalent to denying that God is the 
firsts as well as the unconditioned and absolute cause. 

4. As an unconditioned and absolute cause, God must be 
possessed of Intelligence. This follows as a necessary conse- 
quence of the fact, that he is a/ree, and not a necessary agent. 
Free agency, in the absence of Intelligence, is an absolute im- 
possibility. We cannot possibly conceive of such an agent. 
Further, the universe to which God has given existence is one. 
Every object and element in the universe exists as a part of 
the great whole. The whole is in perfect adaptation to each 
and every part, and every part is in adaptation equally perfect 
to the whole ; and the great whole, with all its parts, exists in 
perfect harmony with fundamental ideas of the Intelligence. 
Now to suppose that a free cause without Intelligence has 
created and constituted a universe, all the parts and depart- 
ments of which, as parts of one great whole, exist in perfect 
harmony with fundamental ideas of the universal Intelligence, 
is an absolute impossibility. It is, in reality, the gross ab- 
surdity of affirming an event without a cause. 



452 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. v^ 

5. As the unconditioned and absolute cause of all that 
conditionally exists, God is a spiritual, and not a material 
existence. This follows, as the logical consequent of the fact, 
that he is a free and intelligent, and not a necessary and unin- 
telligent agent. 

6. God also must be a moral agent. This likewise is a 
logical consequent of the fact that he is an intelligent and free 
agent. Intelligence and free agency cannot be postulated of 
any being without, as the logical consequent of that supposi- 
tion, attributing to him moral agency. 

7. As the unconditioned cause, God exists and acts as the 
moral legislator and governor of the moral universe, exercising 
the functions of moral government in perfect harmony with 
the laws of absolute wisdom and rectitude. The basis of the 
universal and necessary conviction that God thus exists and 
acts, is found, I suppose, in the conscious laws and operations 
of our own mental and moral nature. Here we are conscious 
of the actual establishment of a moral government in perfect 
harmony with the immutable principles of justice and good- 
ness. Conscience reveals the right and the wrong, and de- 
mands implicit and absolute obedience to the one, and corres- 
ponding avoidance of the other. Nor can we do the one or 
the other without experiencing in ourselves corresponding re- 
tributions. Here is moral government established, and no one 
can mistake its character. What is without may present ap- 
parent disorders, in the midst of which, however, we cannot 
mistake the fact, that all things are tending towards an ulti- 
mate adjustment, in accordance with the principles of absolute 
truth and justice. The revelations in the interior of our own 
mental and moral being, however, we cannot mistake, the rev- 
elations of " God as the judge of all," ruling the moral uni- 
verse in absolute wisdom, justice, and beneficence. 



THE IDEA OP GOD. 453 

8. I remark, finally, as a necessary deduction from all that 
"we have previously established, that as the Unconditioned, God 
is a free, intelligent, self-conscious Fersonality, in opposition 
to the impersonal god of Pantheism and kindred hypotheses. 
Freedom, Intel .igence, spirituality, and moral agency must, as 
we have seen, be affirmed of God. Now these attributes ne- 
cessarily imply Personality in the Godhead. With this posi- 
tion the entire facts of the universe, material and mental, per- 
fectly accord, and they accord with none other. Our entire 
mental and moral nature are immutably correlated to the un- 
real, if God is not such a personality. Man also exists as such 
personality. To suppose that the Unconditioned is not a per- 
son, but a thing, as in that case he must be, is to assign for 
the effect a cause which ranks infinitely lower in kind than 
that which it produces. From what has already been estab- 
lished, however, the truth of the proposition before us is self- 
evident. No further enlargement of the argument is demanded 
in this connection. 

GOD, THE INFINITE AND PERFECT. 

We come now to consider the second form in which the 
idea of God is revealed in the human Intelligence, to wit, God, 
the Infinite and Perfect. 

This a First Truth of Reason. 

That this form of the idea of God is a first truth of Rea- 
son, is evident from this one consideration. Should any one 
attribute to God an acknowledged imperfection of any kind, 
he would know in himself, that he had thereby involved him- 
self in infinite guilt. Men may, without conscious guilt, im- 



454 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

pute to the Most High real imperfections, "but not as such. 
Whatever individuals regard as necessarily implied in the idea 
of the Infinite and Perfect, they universally conceive them- 
selves as under the highest obligation to attribute the same to 
God. Further, there never was a time, since the idea of God 
first arose in our minds, when we did not thus regard him. 
There never was a time since the period under consideration, 
when we would not regard ourselves as infinitely guilty in at- 
tributing to God any acknowledged imperfection, or in not 
affirming of him whatever we regarded as involved in the idea 
of the Infinite and Perfect. God, then, the Infinite and Per- 
fect, is a first truth of universal Reason. It now remains to 
designate the grounds of our conviction of the objective valid- 
ity of this form of the idea of God. 

DOES CREATION INDICATE THE CHARACTER OF GOD AS INFI- 
NITE AND PERFECT? 

At the outset of our inquiries here, an important question 
arises, to wit : Does creation reveal its author as Infinite and 
Perfect ? Can an effect acknowledged to be finite reveal its 
cause as infinite ? If so, this revelation cannot be found in 
the mere extent of the Divine works. Suppose that the crea- 
tion of 07ie world only would have revealed its author as finite, 
bow many such worlds would it take, to reveal him as infinite ? 
Nothing short of a number absolutely infinite, which is an ab- 
surdity. It is the height of absurdity, therefore, to reason, as 
is commonly done, from the mere extent of creation, which is 
still acknowledged to be finite, to the absolute infinity and per- 
fection of its author. Yet we cannot say, d priori, that God 
may not stand revealed in his works, as the Infinite and Per- 
fect. That he is thus revealed therein, has been shown above. 
The fact we are bound to admit, although we may not be able 



THE IDEA or GOD. 455 

to designate the grounds of our convictions in respect to it. It 
not unfrequently happens, that in the presence of certain facts, 
our Intelligence affirms absolutely particular conclusions, as 
the logical antecedents of the facts, while we may be at a loss 
to determine the particular elements in view of which those 
conclusions are affirmed. For such a reason, the conclusions 
ought to be to us none the less valid. I once read of a paint- 
ing which, presented with great perfection of execution, a hu- 
man countenance. Every one that contemplated the counte- 
nance, felt, as h.is eyes were fixed upon it, a sort of horror 
creeping over him. Let us suppose that no one could desig- 
nate the elements in the picture, which sustained to those feel- 
ings the relation of cause. No one would, for that reason, 
doubt the existence of such elements in the object. So, in 
the presence of the universe, God stands revealed to our minds 
as the Infinite and the Perfect. Though we may not be able 
to find those elements in his works, which thus reveal him, 
shall we, for that reason, doubt the reality of the revelation? 
In the case of the painting referred to, it was found that the 
author had produced it, after perpetrating the crime of mur- 
der. Hence he had penciled in the countenance, the internal 
feelings of his own mind. So Grod, for aught we can know, 
cL priori, may have somewhere in his creation, penciled out the 
indications of his own Infinity and Perfection, peneilings which 
the universal Intelligence discovers and correctly interprets, 
without, in most instances, being able to distinguish. This I 
believe to be the real state of the case. God, in his works, 
stands revealed as the Infinite and Perfect. The elements in 
his works, by which he is thus revealed, may not yet have 
been designated. Yet they will be. It becomes us, as phi- 
losophers and Christians, to continue our observations till the 
elements under consideration are recognized and presented to 
the world. 



456 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



REASONS WHY THESE ELEMENTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN 
DESIGNATED. 

Permit me here to suggest the inquiry, whether, mainly 
for the three following reasons, almost, if not quite all efforts 
to find the ground of the conviction under consideration, per- 
taining to the Divine Infinity and Perfection, have proved 
unsuccessful : 

1. The two forms above designated, in which the idea of 
God is developed in the Intelligence, have not been recognized 
and separated from each other. Hence, considerations adapted 
only to reveal God as the unconditioned and absolute Qause, 
have been adduced to prove his Infinity and Perfection. Fail- 
ing to establish this last point, they have been rejected, as 
having no bearing whatever upon the question of the Divine 
existence. 

2. An attempt is always made to demonstrate the reality 
of the Divine existence and perfections by a formal process 
of logical deduction, instead of recognizing the belief of these 
truths as among the primary and necessary intuitions of Kea- 
son, and then falling back upon those intuitions to find their 
chronological antecedents, in other words, the grounds of such 
afl&rmations of Reason pertaining to God. 

3. The argument for the Divine Infinity and Perfection 
has almost invariably taken a wrong direction, to wit, the ele- 
ment of immensity in the external creation. This immensity 
is limited, finite. The infinite is not found here. Hence, 
many have concluded, that no evidence at all exists in creation, 
of the Infinity and Perfection of God. So Kant reasons j 
and because this one element of creation does not reveal God 
as the Infinite and Perfect, he argues, that creation presents 
no evidence at all, even of the Divine existence, — a most 
strange and illogical conclusion. Where, then, should we ex' 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 457 

pect, d priori, to find those pencilings in view of which the 
Intelligence affirms the Divine Infinity and Perfection ? Not 
surely in the external material universe, but in that " which is 
made in the image of God/' the universe of Mind. Among 
the laws of its inner being, Mind will find the indications of 
the Infinity and Perfection of its Author, if it finds them at all. 

FOUNDATION OP THE CONVICTION THAT GOD IS BOTH INFI- 
NITE AND PERFECT. 

"We are now prepared for a direct consideration of the 
grounds of the affirmation of the Intelligence, that Grod is both 
Infinite and Perfect. 

1. The first that I notice is a fundamental element in the 
idea of God, as the unconditioned and absolute cause of all 
that exists conditionally. Whatever the Intelligence neces- 
sarily apprehends as finite, it as necessarily regards as condi- 
tioned. In tracing back every chain of causes and effects to 
the first, or unconditioned and absolute cause, we naturally and 
necessarily ask, in respect to everything given as finite. What 
caused that ? We put this question with no more doubt that 
it had a cause, than we have that no event exists without a 
cause. The Intelligence does not, and cannot recognize itself, 
as in the presence of the unconditioned and absolute, till it 
finds itself in the presence of the Infinite and Perfect. This 
I believe to be one of the chief sources of the conviction in 
our minds in respect to God as the Infinite and Perfect. 

2. In the presence of this idea of God, the Intelligence 
intuitively and absolutely affirms the total absence of all evi- 
dence, that God is finite and imperfect. Hence the Intelli- 
gence cannot affirm either of God. Further, from the depth 
of our inner being there proceeds a solemn prohibition against 
imputing to God any imperfection, natural or moral, without 



458 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

positive evidence. Every one feels the presence and force of 
that prohibition, who attends properly to the admonitions of 
his own nature. 

3. To the idea of God, as the Infinite and Perfect, our en- 
tire mental constitution is in conscious harmony. It is only 
in the presence of this idea that the Mind is capable of the 
degree of virtue and happiness which its nature consciously 
demands. We cannot exist without a consciousness of such 
facts pertaining to the fixed correlation between the changeless 
demands of our own nature and the reality of God, as the In- 
finite and Perfect. Our nature shudders and shrinks back 
with horror at any other conception of God than this. The 
idea of God, as the Infinite and Perfect, is the great want of 
universal Mind. To every other want, in the universe within 
and around us, a corresponding reality exists. To know the 
demands of the nature of any being, is to know with perfect 
certainty the reality of corresponding objects in creation 
around. Shall we suppose that the great overshadowing want 
of universal Mind is the only necessity to which no correspond- 
ing reality exists ? Now, I believe that the conscious correla- 
tion of our immortal powers to the idea of God, as the Infinite 
and Perfect, and to that idea alone, is one of the chief grounds 
of the afiirmations of our Intelligence, under consideration, 
pertaining to God. 

4. In all minds, also, there exists a conscious conviction 
that God should be nothing else than the Infinite and Perfect. 
Morally perfect we know he ought to be. So the Intelligence 
affirms, that having voluntarily given existence to beings whose 
nature demands nothing else than Infinity and Perfection in 
him, he ought to be to those beings what their nature, as he 
has constituted it, demands. Hence, also, from the depths of 
our being, there not only comes up a solemn prohibition against 
attributing finiteness and imperfection to God, but a solemr 



THE IDEA or GOD. 459 

admonition to esteem, adore, and -worship him as nothing else 
than the Infinite and Perfect. Every one who properly lis- 
tens to what is passing in the inner sanctuary of his own mind, 
will recognize what I mean in these declarations. 

5. Worship is recognized by universal Consciousness, as a 
changeless demand of our nature. Yet every one feels that he 
does that nature infinite violence, when he worships anything 
but divinity, and divinity in harmony with any idea opposed 
to that of God as the Infinite and Perfect. What does such 
a law of universal Mind indicate ? Certainly, that God, the 
only object of worship, is nothing else than the Infinite and 
Perfect. In the consciousness of such demands in our nature, 
the Intelligence perceives at once, as their logical antecedent, 
the reality of Infinity and Perfection in the Author of that 
nature. 

6. One other ground of conviction under consideration yet 
remains to be designated, a ground more fundamental, if pos- 
sible, than any yet pointed out. Mind is everywhere revealed 
to itself, not only as destined to an immortal existence, but as 
possessed of powers involving in their own nature the ele- 
ments of endless progression. Every power and susceptibility 
of our nature possesses this one characteristic, a fixed adapta- 
tion to a state of endless growth and expansion. Of this 
characteristic of his own immortal powers every one is really, 
though he may not be reflectively, conscious. What do such 
powers indicate in respect to their Author ? Nothing else than 
Infinity and Perfection. As Mind descends to a contempla- 
tion of its own powei's and susceptibilities, and perceives in 
them all the elements not only of Immortality, but of endless 
gi-owth and expansion in thought, feeling, and action, here it 
finds those pencilings in which it reads, with the most profound 
and solemn convictions of its being in the presence of eternal 
realities, the Infinity and Perfection of the Author of its ex- 



460 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

istence. Mind knows, that in the endless growth and ex- 
pansion of its immortal powers, nothing but Infinity and 
Perfection in God can meet the eternally enlarging demands 
of those powers. In view of its own powers and destiny. 
Mind reads, with the most undoubted convictions, the Infinity 
and Perfection of the eternal Guardian and Disposer of the Im- 
mortal interests involved in the possession of such powers. 

Such, as I conceive, are the grounds of the affirmations of 
the universal Intelligence in reference to God, as the uncondi- 
tioned and absolute cause of all that conditionally exists, and 
as the Infinite and the Perfect. 

RELATION OF THE IDEA OP GOD, ABOVE ELUCIDATED, TO 
ALL OTHER IDEAS OF HIM. 

The two forms of the Divine idea above elucidated, to wit, 
God, the absolute and unconditioned cause of all that exists 
conditionally, and God the Infinite and Perfect, are the great 
foundation principles in the science of Theology. Whatever 
is correctly affirmed or denied of God, must be done in the 
light of these two principles. In their light every other truth 
of God, and all the principles of his eternal government, stand 
revealed to our minds. Do we, for example, affirm omnipo- 
tence, omnipresence, omniscience, justice, goodness, truth, of 
God ; it is because these perfections are involved, as essential 
elements, in our idea of him as the Infinite and Perfect. Do 
we legitimately deny anything of God, it is because that, in at- 
tributing it to him, we should affirm finiteness or imperfec- 
tion of him. The same holds true of every form in which 
any particular characteristic is to be attributed to God. That 
conception of any particular characteristic which most fully 
harmonizes with the fundamental elements involved in the idea 
of absdute Infinity and Perfection, is to be affirmed of God; 



THE IDEA or GOD. 461 

while every other, and especially every opposite form, is to be 
denied of him. 



THE IDEA OF A SYSTEM OP THEOLOGY. 

Theology defined. 

Theology is the science of God, systematically evolved in 
the light of the fundamental ideas of Reason, pertaining to 
him, above elucidaied. This will be admitted by all in whose 
minds the idea of science is developed at all, as a correct, and 
the only correct, definition of the subject. 

Postulate, Axioms, &c., in Theology. 

The great postulate, the foundation principle in the science, 
as shown above, is the idea of (xod as the unconditioned and 
absolute cause, and as the Infinite and Perfect. 

The axioms in the science are the two following : 

1. Whatever is involved as an essential element of our 
idea of an unconditioned and absolute cause, and of Infinity 
and Perfection, is to be affirmed of God. 

2. Whatever, if attributed to him, would contradict the 
idea of an unconditioned and absolute cause, or affirm finite- 
ness or imperfection of God, is to be denied of him. 

All particular attributes, the definitions in the science, are 
then to be elucidated in the light of the postulate and princi- 
ples, or axioms, above presented. 

Kind of Proof pertaining to each particular Attribute. 

The proof, and the only proof, to be presented, that any 
particular characteristic is to be affirmed of God, is a demon- 
stration of the fact, that such characteristic is essentially in- 
volved in our conception of him as the unconditioned and 

39* 



462 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

absolute cause, or as the Infinite and Perfect. This is the 
kind of proof peculiar to all sciences — proof resting upon the 
principle of contradiction. While it is shown that such or 
such an attribute, or any particular form of a given attribute, 
must be affirmed of God, else we deny of him the prerogative 
of unconditioned and absolute cause, or the characteristics of 
Infinity and Perfection, we have presented absolute demonstra- 
tion of the fact, that such attribute belongs to God. 

Tilts Science to he evolved in the light of the Works of Gody 
material and menial, and of the Teachings of Inspiration. 

This science also should be evolved with continued reference 
to the works and Word of God. In developing the attributes 
involved in the principles under consideration, we should not 
go to the Bible to prove that such a characteristic is to be 
affirmed of God, but the teachings of Inspiration should be 
adduced, to show the correspondence between the affirmations 
of science and the Word of God. Thus the science under 
consideration would be, as far as it extends, a continued com- 
mentary upon the sacred volume. The perceived harmony of 
the two would give additional force to the influence of each 
upon the mind. Facts in the external material creation will 
not be adduced in proof of the reality of particular attributes 
in God, but creation itself will be thrown before the mind, as 
the work of God, in the light of all the attributes involved in 
the ideas of him as the unconditioned and absolute cause, and 
as the Infinite and Perfect. The great truth to be developed 
is. What may be accomplished through matter, under the guid- 
ance and control of a being possessed of all the perfections in- 
volved in the principles under consideration ? Of course, no 
attempt will be made to determine particular developments. 
But this great thought will be thrown into distinct visibility 
before the mind, to wit : that all that is possible, through mat- 



THE IDEA or GOD. 463 

ter, the attributes involved in the ideas of Infinity and Perfec- 
tion, enable the Most High to discern and accomplish. 

In respect to Mind, this science should be evolved in cor- 
relation to all the powers and susceptibilities of our nature. 
The fundamental object of the science relating to Mind being 
mental development, in harmony with the idea of God as the 
unconditioned and absolute cause, and as the Infinite and Per- 
fect, under the influence of these ideas, it should be so evolved 
that the natural result upon the Mind, of a knowledge and 
contemplation of the system, would be endless progression and 
expansion of the powers of thought, feeling, and action. The 
demands of the logical department of our nature will be fully 
met, when each attribute, and each characteristic of every at- 
tribute, are seen to follow, as logical consequents of the ideas 
of Grod under consideration. The demands of the Sensibihty 
will be met, when the Divine perfections rise before the con- 
templation in such a manner, as is best adapted to excite all 
those feelings and sentiments which the finite is bound to 
cherish towards the Infinite. The demands of the voluntary 
powers are met when the Divinity stands in distinct contem- 
plation before the Mind, as the proper, and only proper object 
of the Mind's supreme choice, obedience, love, worship, and 
delight. 

In the development of this science, another great thought 
would be thrown into distinct visibility before the Mind, to 
wit : What will be the destiny of Mind, what its future devel- 
opments, under the teachings, guidance, and control of such a 
being ? Here, also, no attempt would be made to determine 
particulars. The contemplation, on the other hand, would be 
turned upon the destiny and developments of Mind, viewed in 
the general point of light, in the contemplation of the facts 
under consideration. 



464 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHT. 



THEOLOGY, NATURAL AND REVEALED. 

Theology, with truth and propriety, has been separated into 
two departments, natural and revealed. 

Natural llieolotji/, as a science, is a systematic develop- 
merit of those truths pertaining to the attributes, character, 
and (jovernment of God, involved in the ideas of him, con- 
sidered, as the unconditioned and absolute cause, and as the 
Infinite and Perfect. 

The idea of a Divine revelation, as far as it pertains to God, 
is, God the unconditioned and absolute cause, and God the 
Infinite and Perfect, revealed in fixed and perfect correlation 
to the necessities of the beimjs to ichom that revelation is made. 
Nothing in such revelation would contradict either of the 
principles under consideration, nor any of the logical conse- 
quences of the same. As fur as natural theology and revela- 
tion pertain to the same things, there will be a perfect bar- 
mouy between them. Each will elucidate and confirm the 
teachings of the other. Revelation will extend the sphere of 
mental vision in relation to divinity and humanity both, far 
beyond the reach of natural theology. But the natural and 
revealed will harmoniously blend into one beautiful, all-com- 
prehending unity. Such will be the character of any real, 
revelation from God. Such a revelation the sacred volume 
claims to be. Its friends have no fear, in meeting the ques 
tion of its divine origin, in the light of these principles 
When the science of theology shall be developed in a foriM 
truly scientific, then the harmony between the natural and re- 
vealed, and of the teachings of both with the dictates of uni- 
versal Reason, will become distinctly visible to the world. The 
accomplishment of this object is a want yet, as it appears to 
me, to be met with, in the science of theology. 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 465 



DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MYSTERY AND ABSURDITY IN 
THEOLOGY. 

The terms mystery and absurdity are in very common use 
in theology. Doctrines presented as affirmed by the direct 
teachings of Inspiration, are often objected to, on the ground 
of intrinsic absurdities imputed to them. When the element 
of absurdity is imputed to a given doctrine, the doctrine is 
often defended, on the ground, that mystery is a common ele- 
ment of all religious truth, and that consequently the fact that 
any doctrine is very mysterious, is no valid objection against it. 
It belongs to the province of Intellectual Philosophy to dis- 
criminate between a real mystery and absurdity. 

Absurdity Defined. 

When all the elements contained in the subject and predi- 
cate of a given proposition are fully and distinctly known to 
the mind, and when those terms are said to agree, while the 
Intelligence clearly perceives, from the nature of the elements 
which, they represent, that they cannot agree, or when they are 
affirmed to disagree, while the Intelligence perceives and af- 
firms absolutely that they do and must agree, here we have a 
contradiction, or absurdity. If God himself should directly 
require us to affirm as true, what our Intelligence thus affirms 
to be false, we could not comply with the requisition. A pro- 
fessed revelation containing any such proposition as the above, 
we cannot admit to be a real revelation from the Infinite and 
Perfect. The Intelligence, on no authority whatever, can af- 
firm any such proposition of God, while it still affirms his 
Infinity and Perfection. 

Mystery defined. 
On the other hand, let us suppose that the subject and pre- 



466 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

dicate of a proposition, each embraces some elements wbich we 
know, and some which we do not know, and that in the propo- 
sition the subject and predicate, in view of the elements which 
we know, are affirmed to disagree, and on the ground of the 
unknown it is affirmed that they agree, or vice versa, the ad- 
mission of the truth of such a proposition involves no contra- 
diction. The grounds of the agreement or disagreement under 
consideration would be a mystery. As such we might reason- 
ably admit the truth of the proposition, on sufficient testimony. 

Mystery and Absurdity defined in another Form. 

Further, facts are sometimes presented to us in such a 
light, that their logical antecedents, or the condition and ground 
of their existence and explanation, are also given at the same 
time. On the other hand, facts of the highest moment to us 
may be revealed as facts merely, while the condition and 
ground of their existence are wholly unrevealed and unknown 
to us. In the former instance, if a proposition is presented to 
us, affirming, as the logical antecedent of the facts referred to, 
what our Intelligence affirms can never be such antecedent, in 
other words, when any proposition contradicts the neccsssiry 
intuitions of our Reason, the Intelligence, on no authority 
whatever, can admit its truth. Tlie proposition is absurd. 
On tbe other hand, when facts are affirmed, as in the second 
instance above specified, we can admit their reality as facts, 
while the ground of their existence is unknown, that is, mys- 
terious to us. There is a mystery but no absurdity in such a 
case. The proper application of these principles will be found 
to be of fundamental importance in the science of theology. 

FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A REAL REVELATION 
FROM GOD. 

We have in our hands a book which claims to be a revela- 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 467 

tion to man from the, Infinite and Perfect. The question 
arises, In what light shall we regard the book ? Bj what prin- 
ciples shall we test its claims ? The following may be laid 
down as decisive principles to be rigidly applied under such 
circumstances : 

1. As far as the revelation pertains to the same subjects 
whicb fall within the legitimate domain of natural theology, 
as above defined, there will be a perfect harmony between the 
natural and revealed. 

2. In this revelation, the Infinite and Perfect will stand 
revealed in full and fixed correlation to the condition and fun- 
damental wants of man, circumstanced as he now is, as affirm- 
ed by the testimony of human consciousness. The consciousness 
which every man that truly knows himself and God, has that 
the truth of what is affirmed is a changeless demand of his na- 
ture, in his present and prospective condition, will be to him 
the highest evidence that the record is and must be true. 

3. Such a revelation will present a resolution of the great 
questions of human duty and destiny, the solution of which 
is one of the great wants of man. 

4. The claims of the record, as a revelation from God, will 
be urged upon us, by all the external evidence which, in all 
other cases, distinguishes truth from error. 

Such a record the sacred volume professes to be. Its 
friends, as before remarked, have no fear, in submitting the 
claims of Christianity to the most rigid test of. the principles 
above elucidated. 

Revealed Theology defined. 

We are now prepared for a distinct definition of revealed 
theology. As .-evealed. theology includes the teachings of nat- 
ural, it may be defined as the systematic development, in the 
light of some one grtat central idea or principle, of the trutlis 



468 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of Inspiration 'pertaining to the character and government of 
God. la its most comprehensive signification, it would in- 
clude the entire system of divine truth, pertaining not only to 
God exclusively, but to human duty and destiny, in both of 
which G-od stands revealed to our minds. Everythinjf per- 
taining not only to the character and government of God, but 
to the subjects of that government, so far forth as their re- 
vealed duty and destiny would illustrate the principles of the 
Divine admiuistration, would be comprehended in a system of 
revealed theology, using the words in their most extensive 
application. Such, as I suppose, is theology. Its systematic 
development upon principles purely scientific, still remains as 
one of the great wants of humanity. This want will remain 
unmet, till the true conceptii'n of such a system shall be dis- 
tinctly developed in the minds of philosophers and theologians 
both. If the hints above given shall tend to this result, I 
shall feel tluit no small service has been done to the cause 
of truth. 



DEFECTS OF METHOD IN THE COMMON SYSTEMS OF THEOLOGY. 

There is no drpnrtnient of human thought where system, 
scientifically devel 'ped, is not a great want of the human 
mind. In no other dei)artmeut is this want more deeply felt, 
than in theology. There is no subject of thought which, when 
developed upon scientific principles, does not become an object 
of interest. Theology, in itself the most interesting and im- 
portant of all subjects, will, when as a system it shall be de- 
veloped upnn profoundly scientific principles, possess an inter- 
est which shall, as it ought to do, overshadow all other sub- 
jects. Every system of truth has some one great central 
truth or principle about which all the others revolve, and in 
the light of which they appear as harmonious parts of one 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 469 

great whole. No subject of thought is scientifically developed, 
until it is evolved in conformity to the conception above given ; 
in other words, till it is systematically evolved in the light of 
fundamental ideas. To no subject are the above remarks more 
fully applicable than to that of theology. Theology, like 
every other department of human research, has its great 
central truths and principles, about which all other truths 
and principles pertaining to the same subject revolve, and 
in the light of which they all appear as parts of one great 
whole. Unless this is true, to speak of the science, or system 
of theology, is to use words without meaning, or to " speak of 
things that are not, as though they were." In the definition 
given of revealed theology, I have not designated the particu- 
lar truth or truths, about which, as I suppose, the entire sys- 
tem of revelation revolves, and into which all its diversified 
parts blend into one sublime and harmonious unity. I leave 
it to theologians who may condescend to receive a hint from a 
source so humble, to find, in the light of it, this great central 
position, and from it to give to the system of theology a truly 
scientific development. The man is yet to rise, who, by a 
" wisdom which cometh from above," shall do this great work 
for humanity. That man, when his work shall come to be 
appreciated, will be ranked among the greatest benefactors of 
his species. 

But I have wandered much further than I expected, when 
I commenced this seeming digression from my subject, which 
is, the defects of method in the common systems of theology. 
On this subject, as a friend of truth as well as philosophy (for 
philosophy as well as theology is deeply concerned in the sub- 
ject upon which I am speaking), I may be permitted to speak 
my thoughts with all freedom. What then are the errors, 
particularly of method, in the common systems of theology ? 
Among these I notice the following : 
40 



470 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

1. An error frequently noticed in the preceding part of 
this Chapter, and which I need but hint at here, is the method 
of proving the Divine existence. If in the first step an error 
of method is committed, the whole subsequent procedure is 
marred, and the system of theology is developed in a manner 
not fully satisfactory to the mind. If the question in respect 
to the Divine existence is not settled to the full satisfaction of 
the mind, the proof pertaining to each particular attribute will 
be in a corresponding degree unsatisfactory, and a feeling of 
uncertainty, in respect to that which the mind really knows 
with more certainty than almost anything else, a feeling some- 
what at least bordering on skepticism, will creep over the mind, 
in relation to the whole system. Now there are, as it appears 
to me, three prominent errors of method in the prevailing 
treatises on theology, in respect to the subject before us. 

The first is the fact, as stated above, that the Divine exist- 
ence is not recognized as a truth already known and affirmed 
by the human Intelligence, and that the only proper method 
of demonstration of that truth, is by a method purely psycho- 
logical, that is, by falling back upon the conviction itself, and 
finding the real facts on which it truly rests, in the depths of 
the Intelligence. When the Intelligence has affirmed any 
truth with profound conviction on any subject, the only real 
demonstration of that truth which can be presented to the 
mind, is to throw into distinct visibility, the real facts in view 
of which the reality of the truth was affirmed. Now theolo- 
gians, instead of recognizing this fact in respect to theology, 
have gone beyond the circle of the mind's convictions, to find 
some facts in the external world from which, as a logical con- 
sequent, the truth of the Divine existence would follow. The 
mind of course returns from its researches more unsatisfied 
than when, from the center of real illumination, it wandered 
abroad in search of light. 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 471 

Another error which I repeat here, is not recognizing the 
two distinct and prominent forms in which the idea of G-od 
is developed in the human Intelligence, to wit : God the un- 
conditioned and absolute cause, and God the Infinite and Per- 
fect. Hence considerations perfectly demonstrative of the 
validity of the idea in one form, but which are without force 
in reference to the other, are adduced without discrimination 
of their real bearing. The Mind perceiving that the argu- 
ment has no real weight to prove the existence of God in the 
form in which it expects it to prove it, assumes that it has no 
real bearing upon the subject, and thus becomes dissatisfied 
with the whole argument on the subject. This is a natural 
consequence. Hence many a student in theology has had oc- 
casion to confess that he never doubted the reality of the Di- 
vine existence, till he turned to the arguments adduced in 
books and the theological recitation room to prove it. 

The other error is in attempting to deduce the evidence of 
the infinity and perfection of God from the extent and laws 
of the world of Matter, instead of that of Mind. On this 
point I have already said so much that I shall not enlarge 
here. 

2. The second, and the great error of method, in the com- 
mon (so called) systems of theology, is an almost, if not quite, 
total want of scientific development. I know of no professed 
system of theology, the mode of presentation and development 
of which accords with any proper conception of a system of 
truth, much less with a true definition of real science. There 
is and can be no real system where there are not one or more 
great central truths or principles which impart unity and har- 
mony to the whole. There is and can be no such thing as a 
system evolved in such a manner as to realize the idea of sci- 
ence, in which the relations and properties of a given subject 
are not systematically evo'.ved in the light of fundamental ideas. 



472 INTEELECTUAL PHniOSOPHT. 

Now where is the system of theology that is developed in 
any degree of conformity to the idea of system or science as 
above announced, or to any other proper definition of the idea 
of a system scientifically expressed ? I know of no such sys- 
tem. What is the mode of procedure in such systems? The 
first thing proposed is to prove the existence of Grod. The 
next step is to take up each particular attribute, and by a sep- 
arate course of argument, prove that such attribute is to be 
affirmed of him. Now this can be shown in a moment to be 
a most unphilosophical procedure. 

In the first place, if the proposition first proved, to wit, 
God exists, does not in itself involve a real demonstration of 
the reality of his particular attributes, the proposition abso- 
lutely amounts to nothing ; for it is a demonstration of the ex- 
istence of a God without attributes — that is, the existence of 
no God at all. For a God without attributes, is, in fact, no 
God. 

If, on the other hand, the demonstration of the proposition, 
God exists, does involve in itself a corresponding proof of his 
particular attributes, then the only proper subsequent scien- 
tific procedure is, to evolve analytically each particular attri- 
bute as involved in the proposition already demonstrated. To 
attempt in any other form, by a separate course of argumenta- 
tion, a subsequent demonstration of each particular attribute, 
is a most unphilosophical and unscientific procedure — a pro- 
cedure which really, as shown above, nullifies all that went 
before. 

Further, when the proposition, God exists, is proposed as 
a subject of demonstration, the first thing to be done is to 
define the terms used, especially the term God. Now if this 
term is not so defined as to involve his particular attributes, 
the term means nothing, and the demonstration is null and 
void. If the term is so defined as to involve the particular at- 



THE IDEA OP GOD. 473 

tributes, then, when the proposition, God exists, has been 
demonstrated, the reality of each attribute is involved in the 
demonstration, and the only subsequent procedure really phi- 
losophic, scientific, and reasonable, is to evolve each particular 
attribute as thus involved in what has already been proven. 
To attempt, by a separate course of argumentation, to demon- 
strate the reality of any particular attribute, is to confess the 
futility of the previous demonstration. In fact, if the com- 
mon procedure is the correct one, we have not proved that 
G-od according to any proper definition of the term, exists, 
till we have presented a formal demonstration of the reality 
of each particular attribute. For a God destitute of any es- 
sential attribute is not God. 

In proving the proposition, God exists, according to the 
two forms above stated, to wit, God the unconditioned and ab- 
solute cause, and God, the Infinite and Perfect, we have done 
what every demonstration should do — that is, demonstrated a 
proposition which involves every particular attribute, and which 
has given us a great central position, from which the entire 
system of theology may receive a purely scientific development. 
The whole sphere of vision becomes as luminous as heavenly 
light. 

3. The third general defect that I notice in the common 
systems of theology, is the total unsatisfactoriness of the argu- 
ments adduced to prove the reality of particular attributes. 
Suppose we have fully satisfied our minds of the validity of 
the two forms of the idea of God presented in this Chapter. 
Our attention is turned to a particular attribute. We see at 
once that we must affirm this attribute of God, or deny of 
him the prerogative of unconditioned and absolute cause, or 
impute to him finiteness and imperfection. The reality of the 
attribute as a characteristic of God, thus becomes demonstra- 
bly evident. In affirming the attribute of him, every depart- 
40* 



474 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ment of our nature is satisfied. The demands of the logical 
department are fully met. The scientific and philosophical 
ideas also receive a most full and delightful realization. 

On the other hand, let us suppose, that having proved the 
proposition, Grod exists, we attempt, by a new and separate 
course of argumentation, to prove the reality of some particu- 
lar attribute — the Divine omnipotence, for example. AVhat 
should we naturally expect from such a procedure? Just 
what, in fact, we shall find — arguments perfectly unsatisfac- 
tory and inconclusive. The nature of the argument, as pre- 
sented in such a system of natural theology, may be thus 
stated, and these present the strongest arguments that can be 
met with : 

1. The fact and the extent of creation. 

2. The fact that God now sustains and governs the uni- 
verse, particularly the physical. 

Now, here are efi'ects undeniably finite. From them it is 
argued, that their cause must be infinite, a palpable violation 
of a fundamental principle of logic, a principle universally ad- 
mitted, to wit, that no legitimate conclusion is more extensive 
than the premises from which it is deduced. Hence it is, 
that the Mind does not and cannot perceive any force in the 
argument ; and as this is the best that can be adduced in the 
same direction, a feeling of dissatisfaction and doubt arises in 
respect to all arguments to prove the divine Infinity and Per- 
fection. 

When the testimony of Inspiration is adduced in confirma- 
tion of such arguments, the feeling of dissatisfaction experien- 
ced in the presence of the first attaches to that of the second, 
and the result very probably is, that feelings more allied to 
skepticism than joyful confidence and faith, creep over the 
mind, and it may be, mar its peace and purity. 

I mention one other defect. According: to the com- 



THE IDEA 01" GOD. 475 

mon method of developing truth in theology, we have no 
proper tests which we can apply to determine the question, 
whether any particular attribute shall be affirmed of God, or 
the particular form in which it shall be affirmed. If we as- 
sume the idea of Grod as the unconditioned and absolute cause, 
and God the Infinite and Perfect, as the great central idea 
about which the entire system of truth pertaining to God, his 
character and government, is to revolve, and in the light of 
which each particular truth is to be explained, we have a plain 
and sure test, a standard to which we can apply in all cases in 
determining what attributes and characteristics we shall affirm 
or deny of God, and the light in which we shall affirm or deny 
them. The great question to be asked in each instance is. 
Must we affirm this particular attribute, and must we affirm it 
in this or that particular form, or either deny of God his pre- 
rogative, as the cause unconditioned and absolute, or assert of 
him finiteness or imperfection ? 

But according to the common methods of theologizing, 
when we take up any particular attribute, we have nothing in 
what has gone before, or what is to follow, to which we can ap- 
peal as a standard or test, to determine what attributes, or 
what forms of particular attributes, we are to affirm or deny of 
God. The entire system of theology is thus rendered vague 
and indefinite, and the truth makes no deep and palpable im- 
pression upon the Mind. No other result can follow from such 
a method of evolving the truths of theology. 

USE OP THE COMMON TREATISES ON NATURAL THEOLOGY 

The question is often asked. Of what real utility are the 
common treatises on natural theology — such, for example, as 
that one so celebrated of Dr. Paley ? To me such treatises 
appear really worse than useless, if presented as grounds of 
proof of the existence of God, particularly as the Infinite and 



476 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY, 

Perfect. How many persons have said, " I never doubted the 
reality of the Divine existence, till I sought for a proof of it in 
" Paley's Natural Theology." If, on the other hand, such works 
are referred to, as sources of beautiful and striking illustrations 
of the ** handiwork of Grod," thus awaking in us a sense of the 
Divine wisdom and glory, they may be read with great interest 
and profit. This, as I conceive, is their appropriate, and only 
appropriate use. 

CONCLUSION. 

I must here take my leave, for the present, of the inquirer 
after truth in this field of vast and solemn thought and contem- 
plation. If we were never to return to it again, to renew our re- 
searches, I should part with him with the deepest regret. If, 
however, the inquirer has become imbued with a love of the sci- 
ence which we have investigated, and has understood and ap- 
preciated the bearing of its principles, it may be that the time 
is not far distant when I shall behold him upon elevations, and 
traversing fields of thought which my own powers never ena- 
bled me to reach. 

One thing has cheered me on in these interesting and mo- 
mentous investigations — the thought that they were all legiti- 
mately tending in one fixed direction — to God as the Infinite 
and Perfect. 

Here I leave the inquirer, with the fervent hope, that at 
last, in the unveiled presence of that infinite, all-perfect, and 
Eternal One, we may again meet; that Eternal One, " in whose 
presence there is fullness of joy, and at whose right hand there 
are pleasures for evermore." 



* * ^ jSiit/onul ^t'/ies 0/ K>laiKla>d ^School Uouks, t 




WILLARD'S HISTORIES AND CHARTS. (fi »J 

tUilltub's (iUrs. (Jmrnci) ^bribgcb ^\%\(ixx\ of tl)c 'j 
llnitcb Gliitfa, wim Mafs and Engkavixgs. Du- | 

sigucd for School! «ud Ac»Jemi«». 75 eta. r 

tUilliirb's ^iotoria be Coe O^stniios llnibos. * 

Ueintf a tr»nfliiiioii of " WilUrd's United State*," into the Span'uh jg 
Lanijuaij*. By Miguel T. Tolou. $"2.00. t 

iDilhub's (fltro. (f mma) i^istoru of tl)C Unitcb ,^ 
GliUfs, or lUpnblic ol. '^Imcrira. l Vol. 8vo., 1* - 

WITH Mam. l)e»ij,'iied fi>r the Libtury, mid as a Text Book for the jt f' ; 
higher el.is» of School* aad Acftdcmie*. $1,50. ^ i-. 

IXJilltirb'o (i!ko. Cmma) ^tniucrsal <5istorT) in Per- * 

eycrliliC. Divided into tliree parts: Ancient, Middle, * 
Modern History, with Maps and Engravings, to which is added t' 
a Chrouologicivl Table and ludex. $1.50, k' 

tUilltub'g {&\xt. €mma) ^ietoric ©nibe anb illap ;■ 
of iKiine, designed for general use in Academies and 

Seminaries. 3 vols. $1.25 

tDiUavb'o (illrs. €mmn) Cast £cnot» of American 

fjistorjl, embracing the events of the last ten years. 
75 ctfl. 

tOilIarb'e Q^.mcrican Clironograplfcr, a Mounted Chart, 

to Aid in Fixing the Important period* of American History in the 
Mind of ths Student. $1.60. 

Mounted 
Chart of 



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